



M. Aurelius Antoninus

THE
MEDITATIONS
OF
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus
THE
ROMAN EMPEROR,
Concerning HIMSELF.

Treating of a Natural Man's Happiness:
Wherein it consisteth, and of the Means to
attain unto it.

Translated out of the Original *GREEK*;
With *NOTES*.
By *MERIC CASAVBON*, D.D.

The Fifth Edition.

To which is Added,
The *LIFE* of *ANTONINVS*:
WITH SOME
Select *REMARKS* upon the Whole.

By Monsieur and Madam Dacier.

Never before in English.

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THE PREFACE

THE greatest Part of Mankind have generally a very ill Opinion of Philosophy: They imagine that it consists only in Discourse and Disputation; whereas in Reality it is neither a Sport, nor a Science made up of Vanity and Ostentation, but it is the Profession of a thing very Grave and Serious, which is Wisdom; and to act well, is to be a good Philosopher.

From hence it is evident, That there is nothing but Morality which can deserve this Name, since that alone gives Rules for the management of Human Life. But what is this Morality?

The Preface.

If we follow the common Opinions, we shall find almost as many different Morals as there are different Men: For that is often called Morality which is only Use, Custom or Conceit: And it happens to this Science as to the Sacrifices of the Pagans, who when they had not such Victims as were acceptable to their Gods, they called some other things by the same Names, and made them supply their Places; so Men having lost the Truth, give the plausible Name of it to their own Imaginations and Fancies.

Now it is necessary, in the first Place to get rid of this Error, and to separate that which is Doubtful and Uncertain, from that which is constant, and always the same.

If then we have the least Recourse to Reason, it will be very easie to see that true Morality ought to be an unvariable Rule, which follows neither our Prejudices nor our Humours. It can then be nothing else but the displaying of Truths, which are conformable to the Eternal Truth, that is to say, to the Law of God; and by consequence the Law of God is that fix'd and indivisible Point from whence we ought to view that which is called Morality. if we would know either its Beauties or its Defects.

According

The Preface.

According to this Principle one may immediately conceive, That Morality is the Daughter of Religion; That they march Hand in Hand, and that the Perfection of the one is the Measure likewise of the others Perfection. There is then no perfect Morality to be sought for but in Christianity: But since it has pleased God in all Ages to discover himself to Men, there can be nothing more Profitable, nor more Pleasant than to know to what degree he has been pleased to communicate himself to those who were at the greatest distance from his Covenants.

We do not well know what was the Morality of the Heathens before the Time of Pythagoras, and the Wise Men of Greece, for we have no Remains of that Antiquity: But that little which is preserved of the Writings and Maxims of those Philosophers informs us, That in their Time, which was very near that of Solomon, Morality did for the most part consist in Dark Sentences and Proverbs, which might indeed make Men Wise, or lead them to the Practice of their Duty, but which could not explain to them Fundamental Truths, so as they might have a distinct Idea of them; for a Proverb seldom contains either a Definition or an Inference.

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From the Time of Pythagoras to that of Socrates, there is no great Appearance that Morality was much improved. Almost all the Philosophers applied themselves to the Knowledge of Numbers, to Natural Philosophy, or to the discovery of the Causes of what ever happen'd in the Heavens.

Socrates was the first, who knowing that that which is transacted without us, does not at all concern us, and is rather for our Curiosity than Profit, applied himself more particularly to the Study of Morality, and reduced it to a better Method; for before him the Heathens had but confused Idea's of God, of Law and of Justice: He dispersed this mass of Darkness, and struck out such a Light as shines through succeeding Ages. He discovered that Sub-ordination which is in Nature, and shewed Men the Path that they must tread to become truly Happy. Were one to judge of Socrates by the Truths which he knew, one would not be content to say, That he was a great Philosopher, but one would be almost so far byassed as to affirm, That he was a Prophet, and that God had revealed Mysteries to him which in these latter Times were to receive their Accomplishment.

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This Doctrin of his being more conformable to Truth and Justice than any which had appear'd before, made Men run in Troops to this new Light; but because they were not all equally able to endure its Brightness, a great many more were dazzled by it, than enlightened; and this Philosophy had much the same Fate with the true Religion, for it was torn into almost as many Sects, as there were Men who endeavoured to explain it. This is the Original of all those different Sects of Philosophy which since that time have reigned in the World; they all would have Socrates for their Leader, as all Heresies would make God himself the Author of them.

Among all these Philosophers, the Stoicks kept nearest to the sentiments of Socrates, and were the faithful Depositaries of his Wisdom and Vertue. If they have added some Severity and Harshness to their Masters opinions, it was not so much the effect of a fierce and cruel Humour, as a thing which Prudence suggested to them: For being sensible of the Weakness which is natural to Man, they often pusht his Duty farther than Nature is able to go, that so whilst he uses his utmost endeavours to follow their Precepts, he might at least continue in the mid way, as we

force a Tree to the opposite side, when we would have it lose that bent which it has by Nature. It is true, that after the School of the Stoicks was founded, there arose the Scholars of Zeno, who taking the Opinions of these great Men too near to the Letter, fell into such Absurdities, as made them be jested on and despised by understanding Men. But these ridiculous Philosophers do no more deserve the Name of Stoicks, than such Men do the Title of Followers of the Prophets and Apostles, who interpreting the Writings of these Divine Men too grossly, wrest them to a sense quite contrary to the Spirit of God, and the Faith of the Church.

To make this more plain, let us propose some Examples of those absurd Explications, which these ignorant Disciples have given to the wise Precepts of their Masters.

When Zeno said that all Sins were equal, he would cure Men of that pernicious Opinion, which others too often hold; That provided they abstain from the Commission of great Crimes, it is not necessary that they should keep such a Guard against small Offences; and he would persuade them that the least Sin becomes incurable when it is neglected; and that God who is

Purity

Purity it self finds nothing in us but what deserves Death, unless we disarm his Justice by Satisfaction, and Repentance. But then comes Chrysippus, and he taking this Precept in the grossest Sense, affirms, That there is no difference at all between stealing a Cabbage out of a Garden, and committing Sacrilege; between killing a Capon, and cutting ones Father's Throat, and would have both Actions receive the same Punishment: Now this is so far from holding Men in, that it gives them the Reins, and lets them run to the utmost excesses.

When he said, A Wise Man ought to be without Compassion, his Design was to be so understood, That a Wise Man does not limit those real Succours which he owes his Neighbour, to a meer Tenderness, but that he endeavours to help him without any emotion or Trouble: But Chrysippus from this Precept takes occasion to break all the Bonds of Society, and to tread under Foot that Pity which is one of the most Essential Characters of the Deity.

When he said, That a Wise Man must expect all things from himself, his End was to let us know, That our true Happiness cannot depend upon anothers Acti-

ons, and to expose the Ease and Idleness of those, who, giving themselves wholly up to Providence, expect every thing from God Almighty, without ever endeavouring to obtain his Favour by their Labour and Good Works: Besides, seeing he taught, That the Soul was a part of God, and God himself; this Precept, That Men ought to expect every thing from themselves, signified nothing else, but that they ought to expect all from God, who guides them. But a Scholar of his, as Ignorant as Proud, poisons this Precept, and draws thence this pernicious Consequence, That the Wise Man is above even God himself, and is the Author of his own Happiness, independently of that Supreme Being which made him.

It is much the same thing, in several other Passages which have been made use of in all Ages, to render the Stoick Philosophy Suspected and Odious. It is not that it is Perfect, or that we would defend it in every particular. We have already said, That Perfection is to be look'd for only in Christianity. And we have often in this Work encountered those Errors into which the Stoicks have fallen. We say only that there is no Morality which comes nearer to the Morality of

of Jesus Christ, than that of these Philosophers; and this the Fathers of the Church have themselves acknowledged.

But some say, The Morality of the Stoicks contains no Precept that obliges us to the Love of God.

It never begs his Assistance to be able to obey him.

It does not advise Men to hate themselves.

It does not maintain, That Man is at the same time the most Excellent, and the most miserable of all Creatures.

It does not teach Humility.

It takes no notice, That the attributing all to our selves, and setting our selves above all, is a Sin natural to us; it obliges us not to resist it; and never thinks of prescribing any Remedies for it.

These are the Objections which one of the Learnedest Men of our Age has made, or rather intended to make, against the Stoicks; and all the Heathen Philosophers. But if God had given him leave to finish his Work, he would undoubtedly have corrected this Draught; the

Reading

Reading of Antoninus would let him have known that God had not left so good Men in so profound a Darknes.

This wise Emperour confirms the necessity of Loving God, by asserting that of liking whatever he sends, how troublesome soever it may appear to us, and making Mans Happiness to consist in nothing else but the being in Gods favour.

He not only teaches that we ought to beg Gods Assistance in order to serve him, but he acknowledges likewise a power of God which acts in us, performs all our good Actions, and stirs up our good Desires, and shews us that it is God who hinders all those Opportunities which we might have of falling into Sin, or else gives us Strength to resist it.

He teaches us above all things to hate our Body which is the source of Sin, and which resists the Spirit, and would have us look upon it as a Prison, which hinders us from having a more immediate Communication with God. The true Religion does not command us to hate our selves after any other manner.

He proves in several places that Man is the most excellent of all Creatures, because of his Original, and of those Perfections which God has been pleased to communicate

to him; but at the same time he is the most miserable because of his Vices, which make him lose all these Advantages, and render him a Slave, by separating him from God.

As for what concerns Humility, some People are not content to say that the Stoicks never knew what it was; but they add that this Vertue was inconsistent with those other Vertues of which they made Profession. When one would lay a Charge of this nature to Philosophers, it is requisite we should know the very Foundation of their Principles, and such Consequences as may naturally be drawn from thence. It is true that neither the Academians nor the Stoicks, have ever had a Word which properly signifies that which we call Humility; but if this Vertue consists in knowing Man's inconsiderableness in respect of God, in believing that he is the Author of all good and that he can do no ill; and in teaching that there is no true being but God, and that all other Things are vile, transitory, momentary, and subject to Corruption, then they did know it, and the Books of Antoninus are full of it.

The last Objection is not less unjust: For Antoninus has very soundly proved after

after his Master Socrates, that the self-love which makes a Man break the Bands of Society and retire from other Men, and act as one distinct from the whole, is a Rebellion against God, and a disobedience to the most ancient Law in the World, which commands, that Things less perfect should be for those that are more perfect, and that those which are most perfect should be for one another, which is the only Foundation of Piety and Justice. He exhorts us to resist this unhappy inclination of a corrupted Soul, by convincing us that the first and chiefest Property of Man is to love his Neighbour, and by letting us see that whilst we look upon our selves simply as distinct from the whole and not as one of its Members, we can never love our Neighbours with all our Hearts, and can never have that true and solid Pleasure in doing good, which results from the consideration of being all one Body; and at last he prescribes an excellent Remedy against this Disease, which is the love of God, of which the love of our Neighbour is not only the true Mark, but the Accomplishment and Perfection.

Since then we have undertaken to defend the Morality of the Stoicks against the Ob-

Objections of this great Man, we must not forget his Censure upon one of the Principles which they establish, That since the Desire of Glory can make any thing to be undertaken, the Desire of Justice may do so too. He maintains, That there is nothing more Vain and False than this way of Reasoning, Those, says he, are Fits of an Ague which Sound Health can never imitate.

He would say undoubtedly, That Reason cannot do what Passion does, because the Effects of Passions depend upon Violent and Involuntary Motions, which Reason cannot stir up at its Pleasure: And this is true of Reason when alone; but Reason, when sustained and aided by Grace, is stronger than the most violent Passion, and such was the Reason of the Martyrs. This Criticism then of this Learned Man is wholly useless, and the Stoicks Argument is most Sound, most True, and Agreeable to that of S. Paul, I can do all things through Christ, that strengtheneth me.

Phil. 4. 13.

The Faults which are justly to be found with the Stoicks, are, The Believing a Multitude of Gods: Teaching that the Soul was a part of the Divinity: Knowing nothing of Original Sin, and the Fatal

Fatal Consequences of it : Maintaining that a Wise Man is so much at his own Disposal as to kill himself when he thinks convenient.

Excepting these Errors, and some few others that are no longer dangerous, there is nothing more perfect than their Maxims ; and next to the Holy Scriptures there is nothing more worthy any Men's Perusal, that would follow Justice, and make a True Use of their Reason.

We have nothing of the Stoicks but the Works of Seneca, so much of Epictetus as Arrian has preserved, and the Books of Antoninus. But this last is almost as far above the other two, for the Beauty of his Writing, as he was in his Birth and Fortune. Seneca has mixt the Vertues of the Ancient Stoicks with all the Pride of their Disciples : Epictetus is more Plain, Solid and Pure ; but he had no great Prospects, no extent of Soul, no Elevation. Antoninus had all these Qualities, and his Mind was Vaster and Larger than his Empire. He was not content to receive, and fully to explain the Precepts of his Master, but he has often corrected them, and has given them new Force by that Ingenuous and Natural Turn with which he proposes them,

them, or by some new Discoveries that he has added to them.

He acknowledges, That our Soul is not a Light to it's self, and that it sees nothing but with that Light, with which it pleases God to enlighten it. He explains all it's Proprieties, and teaches us, That it can be more visible than the Body, and can alone enjoy such Fruits as it brings forth.

He strongly demonstrates, That Justice is not the Daughter of Convenience, as some Philosophers have believed, but that it depends immediately upon God, and is as Ancient as his Wisdom.

He shews, That Charity is a Vertue, the most convenient and proper to Man, and that there is no true Good that is not profitable to Society.

He lets us see, That all the Mischiefs which happen in the World, are so far from hurting the Law, that they are only the Accomplishment of it, and serve for Instruments either of God's Goodness or his Justice.

He proves, That true Strength, and true Courage are to be found nowhere, but in good Nature and Bounty.

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He forces our Consent to this most important Truth, That a Lie, though involuntary, is a Fault; and that the Ignorance, which occasions its commission, is no ways excusable, because it proceeds only from a Neglect of such Helps as God has given us; that we have voluntarily put our selves into such a Condition, as not to be able to discern Truth from Falshood.

There would be no end if one should collect all those excellent Maxims which Antoninus has established, and draw thence all those Consequences which would truly and unavoidably follow them. The Reader may do it himself, and we shall be glad if our Remarks may assist him. For Example, when Antoninus tells us, That at the same Time one may be a Divine Man, and yet a Man unknown to all the World; Who would not draw this Consequence from thence, That Fame, Glory and Splendor are not always the True Characters of Divinity? And who will admire them at the Obscurity of Jesus Christ, which was so great, that Historians, who often take up little Particularities, and who strive to forget nothing that is considerable, have scarce took notice of him?

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When he advances this Truth, That Man cannot find his Happiness in the Sciences or in Reasoning, it is easie to make this Reflection, That the Sciences and Reasoning may bring us to the knowledge of God; but that they can never make us know Jesus Christ both God and Man, nor distinguish the real Greatness of our Saviour, from his seeming Baseness; this can only be seen by Faith. There is nothing then but Faith that can save, according to the Principles of Antoninus.

All the other Precepts which this Philosopher has delivered, are no less admirable or of less use: And it may be affirmed that no Person has laid down better Methods of living well, and discharging those Obligations we stand bound in, to God, to our Neighbour, and to our Selves; and whatever he teaches us upon these points is conformable to the Rules of the true Religion.

The true Religion teaches us that we must always submit to God, and be persuaded that he does nothing but what is just. It commands us to strive with our Passions, to purge our Soul from all Vices, that we may become acceptable to God, who can endure nothing that is impure. Antoninus does the same.

The True Religion endeavours to make

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us see our own Vanity, as well as that of all Earthly Things, and to convince us that true Greatness does not consist in Glory, in Birth or Empire, but in Justice. Antoninus does the same thing.

The True Religion teaches us to Pray for all Men, to do good to our Enemies, and to follow the Example of God, who every day sends his Succours to the Ingrateful, and makes his Sun to rise upon the Just and the Unjust. Antoninus teaches the same, and all that he says upon it might become an Evangelist.

The True Religion exhorts us not to pass rash Censures upon others, and to despise those past upon our selves; to bear patiently with our Neighbours Infirmities, and when Charity requires it, to reprove him with Modesty; to fling off all dependance upon the World, that our reliance may be only upon God; to avoid all idle Discourse, and the vain Business of this World, that we may be employed in that which is fit for us, and which God requires of us, and to be always content with our Condition. Antoninus exhorts us to the same.

In short, Antoninus has shewed us as well as the True Religion, That God's Yoke is lighter and more easie to be born, than that which our Passions impose upon us.

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Besides these universal Maxims that are common to the World, Antoninus has some that are peculiar to Kings, to whom Morality is much more necessary than to private Persons, for they are Men, and they govern Men; and as it is God himself that has given them this Light, we may dare to say that the true Religion teaches nothing in this Matter, that can be more perfect. He makes Princes see that though they should conquer all the Earth, and unite in their own Persons whatsoever Men call great, yet if they are Unjust, and make themselves Slaves to another Man's Ignorance, that they become very little People; and for this very Reason he places Alexander, Cæsar and Pompey, below three Philosophers who were, as one might say, the very Sport of the People. Since Wisdom dwells in the Council of the Wise, he advises them to undertake nothing without the advise of understanding Persons, and after a long and mature Deliberation. He remonstrates to them that they ought never to look upon that thing as useful, which will one day force them to break their Words, and that instead of making Religion a Slave to Politicks they are obliged to make Policy humbly submit it self to Religion.

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He lays it plainly before their Eyes, That they are not set over their People to oppress, but to preserve and defend them: He proves to them, That Reason of State and their particular Interest require them to protect the Sciences; for the more the People are instructed in them, so much the more may they respect Obedience and Fidelity from them.

Since Philosophy ought to contain Precepts not only for those wise Men who design heartily to be instructed, but for those senseless Men also, who endeavour to stifle their Reason, and to give themselves up to their Passions without fear or remorse, Antoninus not content to prove the Being of a God to Libertines and Atheists, shews them farther, that though they could bring themselves to be persuaded that there is none, yet that they would find no true and solid Happiness in the attainment of their Wishes, and so he forces out of their very last Intrenchment, all those miserable People who to rid themselves of the Authority of Religion, treat it as thing of Human Invention; for he shews them plainly by this Principle, that they gain nothing by it, since Nature alone and Reason require no less Wisdom and Moderation, than Christianity; and that 'tis necessary for them
either

either to renounce their being Men, and to descend into the Rank of Beasts, or they must live according to those true Rules which Reason dictates, and which can never be opposite to those of Religion.

If the Reading of a Treatise of Tullies which was properly only an Exhortation to the Study of Philosophy, made so great an Impression upon St. Austin's Mind, that he had immediately new Prospects, and new Thoughts; and made him address himself to God in Prayers very different from those he used before, so that despising the vain hopes of this World, he had no love but for the unfading Beauties of true Wisdom; what may we not expect from the Reading of Antoninus his Reflections which fix such Important Truths so clearly, and which search the most hidden Recesses of the Heart, to root out thence Pride, Affectation and Lust, the fatal sources of all our Sins, and which encounter all our Passions by Reason, as Religion does by Authority?

This very Book might render us so Pious and so Just, that we should have but one Step more to make, to become true Christians, if we on our part would bring only Patience and a Readiness to be taught; but unhappily enough for us these Truths make no more Impression upon our Minds,
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than Objects do upon a Looking-Glass; the Image is expressed upon it to the utmost Exactness, but as soon as the Objects pass away there is nothing left, and the Glass remains empty.

However it is not one Man that instructs another; Socrates and Plato with all their Wisdom and Eloquence, could bring but a few understanding Men, and those naturally devout, to the adoring of one only God. All that David, Solomon and the Prophets, have said concerning him, to give some Glimpse of him to the Heathen, has been to little purpose. It was necessary that one who was both God and Man, should cure the Blindness of Mens Hearts, and subdue that Self-conceit that is natural to them, and which resists the clearest Proofs, and the most evident Demonstrations.

Without this Help we know that all these Treasures of Wisdom will be useless. Even those who will read these Reflections with the greatest Pleasure and understand them best, will reap no farther Profit from them, nor use them towards the arrival at the Knowledge of the Truth. For if we may use that Thought of Plato's which St. Austin has so well apply'd; since they turn their

back

back to the light of Heaven, they shall only look upon the Book which is enlightened from thence, but they themselves shall remain in Darkness.

But we must not question the Designs of Providence; it is our Duty to labour without ceasing after that which is good and useful. It was this which made us at last resolve upon the Translation of Antoninus his Reflections, and to add some Remarks, which may render the Reading of them more easie (and if we may presume to say it) more pleasant.

We found no small Difficulties in this Design, the Style of the Stoicks is harsh, obscure, and proportion'd to few Mens Capacities. For fear of unnecessary Words, they dont always use so many as are needful; and provided, they can give a force to what they say, they often neglect perspicuity. This obscurity which was common to all the Sect, is still greater in this Emperors Reflections, for he often expresses himself by halves, because he wrote only for himself.

Besides, there were several places corrupted, and a great many others whose sense was very dark, because sometimes two Paragraphs were unluckily confounded into one, or one divided into two.

If we add these Difficulties to those which arise from the matter which is often very much abstracted, and which Antoninus has made more so by the Sublimity of his flights, People will soon agree that it was no easie Task to accomplish, and will be more ready to excuse the Faults which we may have committed.

We have not forgot to give the Translation that perspicuity which is wanting to the Original, so that each Paragraph may be as a Picture, on which from whatever side you look it will be still in full sight, always representing his true Thoughts. If we have not absolutely compass'd our Design, we may be at least so bold as to promise, that there will be neither many Obscurities, nor much trouble found in the Reading of it.

As for the Remarks, we have only proposed to our selves to explain the Text without discussing any Criticism. Criticism is needless and out of its Place, when one treats of Morality: Our Design all a long has been to make this Book a Book of Piety. To this End when Antoninus his Maxims are entirely true, which they cannot be without being Christian, we confirm them by the Authority of Religion, and endeavour to make some Christians blush, to see themselves at this Time of Day less convinced

of

of these Truths, than the very Heathens.

When they are false, as coming from his Mouth, but true from ours, as when he says, That we have a God that dwells in our Hearts, and who is as sacred there as in a Temple; We confute the Error of that Sense which he puts upon it by Teaching, That the Soul is a God, and a part of the Divinity, and we shew the Ground for that which we give, by saying, That it is the Work of God, and that the Holy Spirit dwells there, to the end that we may be his Spiritual Temples.

When his Maxims are true in one Sense, and at the same Time will bear another that is more true, and of greater Importance, we lay down both, as in this remarkable Passage, where he says, That it is a Shame that the Soul should be soiled where the Body is not. And in this other, where he teaches, That when one has lost the Remembrance of his Sins, it is to no purpose to live.

When they contain an obscure Truth, which has a mixture of Doubt, or Falshood, as when he speaks of the Resurrection of the Dead, and of the Immortality and Nature of the Soul, we endeavour to help this Truth to arise from this Darkness, and we call in the Light

Light of the True Religion to our Assistance.

When they contain some Example of a profound Humility, and of a sweetness of Temper that may improve and instruct us, we heighten it as much as we can possibly: As when he says, That all his Life, is but one continual Service which he owes his Subjects; and when he thanks the Earth for furnishing him so liberally with those things he stood in need of; and acknowledges himself, almost unworthy to tread upon it, since he has a thousand ways abused those Benefits which she has bestowed upon him.

Lastly, when they are absolutely false, we shew the Falsity of them, and endeavour to make this use of those Mistakes; That the contrary Truths appear the brighter.

We were no longer diffident of the Conduct we should observe in publishing the Heathan Authors, when we saw our selves supported by the Authority of a very knowing Man, whose Piety edifies us, and whose Learned Works instruct us. For in the Second Part of The Education of a Prince, he set us this Pattern, and shewed us, That the only good Method of making these Books become Christian, was by the manner of explaining them.

It is a perpetual Truth, That Vertue does not consist in Persuasion but in Action, and that to be a true Philosopher it is not sufficient only to speak, but there must be Action: As to be a good Magistrate it is not enough to know the Law, but it must be put in practice. We thought therefore, that the surest way to make these Maxims become useful, was to join to them the Life of Antoninus: For we shall see there, That he wrote nothing but what he himself followed, and that his Precepts, which sprang from his Practice, and not from bare Speculation, may properly be said to be Doing Precepts.

One of the Ancients has said, That the most pleasing Sight to God, was to see a virtuous Man striving against ill Fortune. But there still remains another much rarer, and without comparison far more agreeable to him, viz to see that we have the happiness at present to behold a great King resisting his own good Fortune, and vanquishing those Obstacles which might make his own Grandeur oppose his generous Designs. Let a Philosopher be never so wise we are apt to think, That he does not trample on the Pleasures and Pumps of the World, but for want of Power to attain them; and that he seeks his Revenge on Fortune by def-

despising her, as Men rail at the Lady by whom they can never be beloved. It is not so with a King, who since he can do every thing, there can be nothing more admirable, and finer than to see his Power regulated by his Justice, and indeed he has need of a greater Measure of Vertue than Private Persons. Hence it is that Antoninus ought to be placed above all the Ancient Philosophers, we should place him even above Socrates, if Socrates by sealing that Truth with his Death, which he maintained during his Life, had not filled up that vast Distance which was between his Quality and that of an Emperor; for a Man's Vertue is not measured by Sallies and Efforts which may often arise from bad Principles, but 'tis measured according to the generality of his Actions. The whole Life is but sufficient to make a good Man, and it is the last Breath that compleats him.

We have the Life of Antoninus made by a Spaniard, who would persuade us, That he translated it out of Greek. It is an amazing thing, and such as one would be scarce believed, if one did not see it, that upon so grave and serious a Subject, and so full of good Instructions as the Life of this Emperour, there should be a Man so ignorant, so vain, and so insensible

sible as to disregard Truth, and to have recourse to Lies and Fictions. And at last to what Lies and to what Fictions! There can be nothing worse contrived or more Childish; Antoninus is absolutely disguised. If here and there there may happen to be some Truth, 'tis like a little bit of Gold in a vast abyss of Sand. To give a true Idea of this Book there needs no more to be said, than that the Author never heard speak of Antoninus his Reflections, for he has not one single Word concerning them in his whole Book.

We thought it not our Duty to take any thing from this Author that is not to be found in others, and therefore we advance nothing but what Antoninus has wrote concerning himself, or what other Historians have informed us concerning his Actions, or what we our selves have drawn from such Monuments as have preserved the Memory of them.

This great Man wrote his own Life, that it might serve for an Instruction to his Son. If we had it at present, we might be sure of having a true Portraiture of this Prince, for he was not disposed to flatter himself, as may be seen in some Passages of his Works. But Fortune envies us this Happiness; nay she would not suffer that

that even that which good Historians have wrote concerning it, should come entire to our Hands. What we have, may pass for Memoirs, which are far from exact, very imperfect, and not pursued. For they leave us almost wholly in Ignorance of what happened from his Birth to his Advancement to the Empire, and only tell us in gross his most memorable Actions, and the most considerable events of his Reign. However these Remains are very precious, and great helps may be drawn thence towards the forming of a good Prince.

We have nothing more to do but to answer the Criticism of some unquiet Spirits, who find that Antoninus uses too many Repetitions in his Reflections. What an unhappy Niceness have these Men! Repetitions offend them, but their own Relapses never hurt them. We must therefore pray them to remember that one of the essential Differences that is between Books made for Diversion, and those which are made for Instruction, is that in the former, Repetitions are faulty, and therefore are carefully avoided; because the Mind not being able to rest contented with that which has been said before, seeks continually for some new Thing to satisfy it; and in this space there is no entertaining it but by flatter-

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ing its Curiosity, which alone can hinder it from recollecting its self, and blushing at its vain Employment. But in Books made for our Amendment and to teach us Things good and honest, Repetitions are so far from being faulty that they are necessary; for besides our falling continually into the same Faults, and so having often need of Reproof, our Passions have taken so deep Root in our Hearts, that 'tis not possible to rase them thence at the first onset, but they must be attack'd with several Encounters. It is the same thing with the Diseases of the Soul, as with those of the Body. Both in one Case and tother the Sick Man would be as ridiculous as incurable, if he would not use the same Medicines the second time, because they did not at first restore him perfectly to his Health. Besides, when one is about the Explication of Truths that are either obscure, or hard to be digested, because of the Aversion we bear to any thing that may contradict or vex us, these Repetitions serve admirably to make us understand that which had escaped us, or to render that more familiar to us, which at first might seem too severe. In short, those that we find in Antoninus, are not troublesome, as Repetitions use

use generally to be, for they have almost always some new Air by the turn, or by the new Light that shines in them, so that it is surprizing, that without any care taken of his Terms, Antoninus should so often say the same Things with so admirable a Variety.

T H E

T H E
L I F E
O F
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus,
Dedicated to the
Lord *De HARLAY*,
Chief President.

My Lord,

TH E Translation, and the Life of *Antoninus* were not only undertaken at your Desire, but were likewise begun and finished at that Pleasant Seat, which your Lordship's Goodness sometimes permits us to enjoy, and whither your Lordship
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The Life of

2 goes not so much to ease your self of the Labours, that attend the Administration of Justice, as to continue them. Suffer us then, my Lord to pay the first and justest part of our Duty, which is our Acknowledgment, and receive these Fruits of it that do so lawfully belong to you. We can wish nothing more to our Advantage than that they may not be unfit to be presented to your Lordship, and that they may be no Disgrace to the Place which produced them. It is said, That *Egypt* brings forth a great many Good things among a great many Bad, but *Mesnil Park* has this Advantage, that nothing grows there but what is Excellent; and those things which prosper best there, since they were improv'd by the Great Chancellor *De Bellicure*, and since you have taken Care of them, are the Fruits of Reason and Wisdom. It is extreme good Fortune to us to have compos'd this Work in so fine a Place, where we continually beheld Examples of all *Antoninus* his Precepts. No Man knew better than this Prince the true Duties of great Employments, nor could teach better how to discharge them without Reproach. To understand what he has writ, there is nothing else to be done

MARCUS AURELIUS.

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done but to study what you do, and this Study has often forced us to admire the Happiness of those who lie hid in the Retirement of a Private Life; they are good enough, if they keep a Watch over themselves, and regulate their own Desires: But to a Chief Minister how many things are indispensably necessary! A profound Knowledge, burthened with nothing that is unuseful; a way of Speech that's sound and natural, full of Vigour, Nobleness and Truth; an indefatigable Application, that can close with all things; a Greatness and Constancy of Mind, void of all Pride and Self-conceit; such a Love for the Publick, as is always in a Readiness to sacrifice every thing to it; a Gravity full of Plainness and Modesty; a Disposition so unbiass'd, that nothing can stagger it; and a Good Nature, that as it is far from Rigor, is likewise so from Weakness.

These are the Qualities which they must have who would discharge the Duties of such a Station as yours, and make a good use of their Authority. Justice cannot subsist without them, and they all are in your Lordship.

Antoninus exhorts us to have the Virtues of our Contemporaries always in

The Life of

our View, and assures us, There are no Pictures that are more entertaining or useful. Should we follow this Rule, my Lord, we should need only to consider your Behaviour, and your Actions, they alone would furnish us with an admirable Variety of these Rare Pieces which always instructing some, and being Patterns to others, would continually afford us new Delights: And indeed what Prospect can be more pleasant or instructive than that of a Man; who convinced that Ambition is an Injustice, has never sought after the greatest Dignities; who being content to discharge his Duty in an Employment, whose Lustre he increases, has thought of nothing else but proceeding from one good Action to another, ever since he was called, by the Wisest of Princes, to preside over the most August Parliament, and has risen to that Honour which his Ancestors so worthily enjoy'd? What ought sooner to attract our Eyes than a Man, who applies all his Thoughts and Actions to the Publick Good, and who does not make use of his Authority to domineer over his Prince's Subjects, but looks on it as a farther Engagement to be continually watchful for an Opportunity to serve them?

MARCUS AURELIUS.

them? It would not be easie for us to stop here, my Lord, if we did not remember, That Justice, which is the Mother of all Vertues, and is your Lordship's peculiar Character, because it is that which makes a good and a great Man; sustains its self with its own good Actions, and expects no other Reward: However just your Praises may be, you will find that they will scarce agree with those Reflections which *Antoninus* has made upon the Vanity of all Praises in general, and which make equally against those that receive, and those that give them. We have nothing to say now, but concerning the Life of this Emperor. But here my Lord, we must beseech you, not to bring hither that exquisite Relish, that Nice and Delicate Judgment which makes you immediately perceive all the Beauties and all the Faults that are in Works of this Nature; to dismiss all these Ideas that you have gained from the Writings of the Ancients, which you so much delight in; but above all to forget the infinite Graces of *Platarch*, which never appear so fair and so inimitable as when we would strive to come up to them.

THE Roman Empire, under the Triumvirate, under *Nero* and *Domitian*, had experienced all the dismal Effects of the Rage and Cruelty of the most unjust Tyrants, and under *Augustus*, *Vespasian*, *Trajan*, *Adrian* and *Antoninus Pius* it tasted all the sweet Fruits of the Justice, Clemency and Goodness of the best of Princes. It seems then in these two Conditions to have had an exact Model both of Vertues and Vices. But God, who gives a People Kings according as he would raise or depress them, shewed that the Vertues of the former *Cæsars* were but rude Scratches of those which shined in *Marcus Aurelius*. It may indeed be said, That Providence proportioned the Wisdom of this Prince to the Plagues with which he would afflict his Reign. Rome never saw its self assaulted with so many Storms, and nothing else could have preserved it but the Wisdom of this Emperour. Let not those who read this Life expect to find there the Intrigues of Court, or the finenesses of Policy, it is the Reign of a Prince that was a Philosopher, that is to say, of a Prince adorned with Plain dealing, Truth, Religion and Modesty, and whose Will was always submitted to Reason and Justice. The

The Family of *Marcus Aurelius* was one of the greatest and most Noble in all *Italy*. By his Fathers Side, who was *Annius Verus*, he was descended from *Numa*: His great Grand-Father was Pretor and Senator, and his Grandfather was thrice Consul and Governour of Rome. His Father died in his Pretorship, and left two Children *Annia Cornificia* and *Annius Verus*, who is the same Man as *Marcus Aurelius*, whose Aunt *Annia Galezia Faustina* was married to the Emperour *Antoninus Pius*. This is all that we know of the Family of *Marcus Aurelius* by his Father's Side. His Mother *Domitia Calvilla Lucilla*, was descended from a Prince of the *Salantines*, she was the Daughter of *Calvisius Tullus*, who had been twice Consul, and Grand Daughter to *Catilius Severus*, who had likewise been twice Consul, and Governour of Rome.

Marcus Aurelius was born at Rome, *A. Ch.* 121. upon *Mount Celius*, on the twenty fifth of *April*, in the second Consulship of his Mother's Father, and was named *Catilius Severus*; *Adrian* afterwards called him *Annius Verissimus*, making some Allusion to the Love which he bore to Verity. But when he came to be a Man, he took the Name of his own House, and was
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called *Annius Verus*, till being adopted into the *Aurelian Family* by *Antoninus Pius*, he had likewise the Name of his adoptive Father, and was called *Marcus Aurelius*. He lost his own Father when he was very young, and was bred up in his Grand Father's Family, who was so nice in his Education, that as soon as ever he came from under the Ladies Care, he provided him a Governour compleatly vertuous, and whose Merits were universally known, and chose him out such Masters as were every way the most accomplished: *Euphorio* taught him to Read, *Geminus*, an excellent Comedian, instructed him how to Speak, and *Andro* was pitch'd on to teach him Musick and Geometry: His Master in the Greek Tongue was *Alexander*, for the Latin he had *Trosius Aper*, *Pollio*, and *Euty chius Proculus* an *African*. He learn'd the Grecian Oratory from *Annius Marcus*, *Caneinus Ceter*, and *Herod*; And the Latin from *Cornelius Fronto*. But being of a true manly Spirit, and loving nothing more than Truth, he did not trouble himself long with these sort of Studies, he soon proceeded on to a Science more exalted, and more useful, and applyed himself wholly to the *Stoick Philosophy*. To
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this End he had with him *Sextus Cheronensis Plutarch's* Grandson, *Junius Rusticus*, *Claudius Maximus*, *Cinna Catulus*, who were the most famous *Stoicks* of that Age: He had likewise a great *Peripatetick* Philosopher called *Claudius Severus*.

He constantly preserved all that due Regard for his Masters, which they could possibly expect from a Prince who knew very well how much their Labours had deserved; and his Acknowledgments proceeded so far, that he raised Statues to *Fronto* and *Rusticus*; and promoted the same *Rusticus* and *Proculus* to the Consulship, and this latter not being very Rich, he himself defrayed all the Charges of that Office, and always honoured *Rusticus* so far, as to salute him before the Captain of his Guards. He went farther yet; and considering, that things liable to decay are no sufficient Recompence for solid Good, that is to say, for those Vertues which the Precepts of these Great Men had either bred or improved in him, he resolved, That the Publick should be informed how much he owed to their Cares, and upon this account he began those admirable Reflections which he has left us. An extraordinary piece
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of Gratitude, which he had no Example for, and which no one since has imitated. When Men are endued with any Vertues, it is natural for them to imagine that they acquired 'em themselves; and they would think the better part, and indeed the whole Grace of them was lost, if they should confess that they were owing to another Man's Instructions. *Marcus Aurelius* was a professed Enemy to this Self-love, and always had a Veneration for his Masters as for his Gods; for after their Deaths he made them Golden Statues, which he placed among those of his Household Gods, he often visited their Tombs, offered Sacrifices at them, and strowed them with all sorts of Flowers.

Since all the Advantage of Philosophy redounds to those that practise it, one may very well affirm, That this Science is not compleat in Princes, except it be accompanied with Justice, whose Effects tend alwaysto the Publick Good. *Marcus Aurelius* did not neglect so important a Science, which is the source of all Prosperity in a Commonwealth. He took a great deal of Pains to improve himself in it, for he studied the Laws under *L. Volusius Mecianus*, the most able Lawyer of those Times.

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In his very Infancy he gain'd the good Will of *Adrian*, who would always have him near him, and who made him a Roman Knight at six years old, an Honour which had never been done to one of that Age.

It being then the Custom for young Persons of Quality to pass through the Priesthood, before they were advanced to other Employments; at eight years old he was made a *Salio*, that is, a Priest of *Mars*. He was very far from acquitting himself of this Employment, as young People generally do in those Offices which they look upon only as Steps to Higher Preferments, to which they see that they shall be unavoidably advanced; for he discharg'd all the Duties of his Office with as much Exactness and Diligence, as they could have done who had made it the utmost limit of their Ambition. He was made Controulor of the Musick, and Chief of that Order. And as for all those who either came into, or left that Society, he received and dismiss them, without ever having the Sacred Forms read to him, for he knew them all by Heart: For it was one of his Maxims, To do nothing but with the nicest Accuracy, or

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as he used to say, Without the Rules of Art.

It was during his continuance in this Office, that he received the first Omen of his Advancement to the Empire; for when all the Priests, according to the Custom, threw their Garlands of Flowers upon a little Bed where the Image of *Mars* was laid, that which *Marcus Aurelius* threw, fell as exactly upon the Head of the Statue as if some hand had plac'd it there, whereas it belong'd only to the Emperor to Crown it.

At fifteen years old he took the Habit that was to shew him to be a Man, and by *Adrian's* Order he was contracted to the Daughter of *L. Cejonius Commodus*; some small time after he was intrusted with the Government of *Rome*, whilst the Consuls went to Mount *Alba* to Celebrate the *Latin* Feasts. He acquitted himself of this Employment as well as the gravest Magistrates could have done, and kept the Emperor's Table with a great deal of Grandeur and Prudence.

He gave to his Sister *Annia Cornificia*, who was married to *Numidius Quadratus*, all the Goods that came to him by Inheritance from his Father, and permitted his Mother likewise to give her all the

she had, that, as he said, her Husband might have nothing to reproach her with.

He had some Inclination to Painting, which he practis'd under *Diognetus*, who was at the same time both a great Painter and a great Philosopher.

He very much admir'd Wrestling, Racing, Tennis and Hunting; which he did not look upon as Diversions only, but as those Innocent helps which Nature has ordained for the Preservation of our Health: For he was of the same Opinion with *Socrates* and *Aristippus*, That the exercise of the Body, is no improper means for the attaining of Vertue.

Before his Travails and continual Business had alter'd his Constitution, one might often see him at the Chace, attacking the fiercest Bores all alone, and coming off with Honour.

But the delight which he took in Philosophy exceeded all his others. This Passion was so strong in him from his very Infancy, that at twelve years old, he was got into the Habit of the Stoicks, practis'd all their Austerities, lay upon the Ground without his Cloak, so that his Mother had all the difficulty in the World to persuade him to lye upon a wooden Bed,

Bed, covered with one only Skin. Nature had framed him to be the Restorer of the *Stoick* Philosophy, which had always been the most faithful Preserver of Vertue: For he had so much Constancy and Gravity, that from his very Childhood neither Grief nor Joy could make any Change in his Countenance. But, this Gravity was not at all Troublesome to his Friends, or to those about him: For it was as much without Moroseness, as his Wisdom was without Pride, and his Complaisance without Meanness.

Adrian having lost *Cajus Commodus*, who was his adopted Son, look'd for one to supply his Place, and soon cast his Eyes upon *Marcus Aurelius*; but finding him too young, for he was not yet eighteen, he adopted *Antoninus Pius*, upon condition that he would adopt *Marcus Aurelius*, and *L. Verus*, the Son of him that was dead. So *Marcus Aurelius* was adopted at eighteen Years old.

He dreamt over Night, that his Shoulders and Hands were of Ivory, and that, when he tryed to carry great Burthens with them, he found them stronger than ordinary.

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The News of his Adoption did only afflict him, and when his Servants ask'd him why so great an Honour should make him so Melancholy, he discour'd with them a long Time concerning those Evils which are the inseparable Companions of Power.

Some Days after his Adoption, *Adrian* went to the Senate, and demanded a Dispensation for his Age, that he might be admitted to the Office of *Questor*. This was the last Favour which he received from this Emperour, who died soon after at *Baie*. *Marcus Aurelius* made a magnificent Funeral for him, which was followed by a Fight of Gladiators.

After the Death of *Adrian*, *Antoninus Pius* disannulled the Marriage which *Marcus Aurelius*, in Obedience to his Prince, had contracted with the Daughter of *Lucius Commodus*, and profered him his own Daughter *Faustina*, whom he had contracted to *Verus*, that was not as yet of an Age fit for Marriage, and having thus designed him for his Son-in-law, he immediately from being *Questor* raised him to the Consulship, which was a thing unusual, gave him the Title of *Cesar*, made him Colonel of one of the six Regiments of Horse, assisted

A.D. 140.

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at those Publick Games which he and his Collegues set forth, associated him, though against his Will, in all the Imperial Honours, and received him into the College of the High Priests by a Decree of the Senate.

Marcus Aurelius being loaded with all these Honours, which he had been far from seeking after, and being obliged to assist at all the Councils, that he might one Day become able to govern alone, had a greater Passion than ever for Philosophy, upon which he bestowed all the Time that he could possibly steal from Business. The Emperour *Antoninus Pius* did not a little contribute to the furtherance of these Desires which he had for the Study of Wisdom; for he not only engaged him still more and more by his own Example, but he made *Appollonius the Chalcidian*, a famous *Stoick* Philosopher, come to him from *Athens*, and his Conversation was of no small Profit to the Young Prince.

There is one Particular which must not be omitted, since it shews the true Characters of the Philosopher and the Emperour. When *Appollonius* was arrived at *Rome*, *Antoninus Pius* sent him Word, That as soon as he would come,

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his Scholar should be delivered to him. The *Stoick* returned answer, That it was the Scholar's Duty to find out his Master, and not the Master to go to the Scholar. This Answer was brought to the Emperour, who said smilingly, It seems it was less Trouble to *Appollonius* to come from *Athens* to *Rome* than it would be to come from his Inn to the Palace, and so sent *Marcus Aurelius* to him.

It was about this Time that the Prince lost his Governour: He was so concerned at his Death, that forgetting his usual Steadiness and Constancy, he could not refrain from Tears; and when the Courtiers made their Reflections upon it, the Emperour said to them, Give him Leave to be a Man, for neither Philosophy nor Empire, can root out the Passions.

He married *Faustina* two Years after A.D. 147. his second Consulship. This Princess was very beautiful, but her Humor was too gay to make any Husband happy; she followed her Mother's Example; and little regarding the Young Prince's Wisdom, she sought for more agreeable Company, that would not undervalue all those Graces which she was Mistress of. *Marcus Aurelius* had one Daughter by her the first Year after his Marriage;

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and at the same Time was honoured with the Tribunal Power, and the Title of Proconsul, which used generally to be united to the Imperial Majesty.

To all these Dignities the Senate added another Honour, which was invented for *Augustus*, and which succeeding Ages had mightily augmented.

All the Decrees of the Senate were made upon the Report of the Consul that presided, and he alone had the Right of Reporting. The Consuls parted with this their Right in favour of *Augustus*, to whom, by a solemn Decree they gave the Right of making one Report every Day that the Senate assembled, that is to say, upon each of those Days he might propose to the Senate some one Business, what he pleased, and of what Nature soever. But when Flattery has once made Men part with their Privileges, it is difficult for them to keep any Measures, and to know where to stop. Whereas *Augustus* made only one Report, other Emperours had afterwards the Power granted them of making some three, some four, others five, and this last Privilege was that which at present was given to *Marcus Aurelius*: A Privilege of so great Power, and so vast an extent, that that alone was

was sufficient to render the Assembling of the Senate wholly useless.

Marcus Aurelius did not make use of this Authority for the rendering himself more absolute, but employed it to the Preservation of the Liberty, and the Publick Happiness of the People.

Nor did he ever make any ill use of that Credit which he had with the Emperour, who preferred no Man but upon his Recommendation, for he always took Care to mention no Men but such as were fit for the Places that he would obtain for them. As his Honours increased, so his DefERENCE to the Emperour became greater: He paid him the same Respect, that might have been expected from a Private Man; and the Love which he bore him seemed to augment daily, for in twenty Years Time that he lived in the Palace, he never left him, nor lay abroad any more than two Nights.

This constant Attendance, and all these Marks of Tendernefs touched *Antoninus* so nearly, that he would never give the least Ear to those who endeavoured to raise Suspensions in him against *Marcus Aurelius*, and to make him doubt of the Sincerity of his Affection. One

Day, one of his Courtiers walking with him in a Garden, and seeing *Lucilla*, the Mother of *Marcus Aurelius*, upon her Knees before an Image of *Apollo* in a holy Place, said to him in his Ear, *What can you think Lucilla asks this God for so heartily? She prays him, That you may die and her Son be Emperour.* This Speech, which under a Tyrant would have been fatal both to the Mother and the Son, was not at all minded by the Emperour, who was too well assured of the Faith and Honesty of *Marcus Aurelius*, to believe any thing that might be to his Disadvantage. This Union between these two Princes continued entire and perfect till the Death of *Antoninus*, who falling sick at *Lorium*, and finding himself beyond all Hopes of Recovery, ordered his Friends, the Captains of his Guards, and his principal Officers, to come to him, and afore them all he confirmed his Adoption of *Marcus Aurelius*, and named him his only Successor, without ever mentioning *Verus*; and when the Tribune came for Orders, the Word which he gave him was *equanimity*, as much as to say, That he had now nothing more to desire, since he left such a Successor to the Empire, and immediately he

he commanded, That the Golden Statue of Fortune (which as a faithful Pledge of the Publick Happiness, stood always in the Emperour's Chamber) should be removed from his own Apartment, to that of *Marcus Aurelius*.

After the Death of this Prince the Senate obliged *Marcus Aurelius* to take the Government upon him. But the first Mark of the New Emperours Authority was the making *Lucius Verus* his Companion in it. He gave him the Tribunal Power, named him Emperour, and would reign joyntly with him. This was the first Time that Rome saw its self governed by two Sovereigns; which was a surprising Spectacle to a City, that had seen almost all the Blood of her Citizens shed in choosing of a Master.

The same day *Marcus Aurelius* took the Name of *Antoninus*, and gave it to his Collegue, making him marry his Daughter *Lucilla*, and the better to testify their joy for this Marriage, and their union they settled a considerable Fund for the entertainment of new Citizens, who were very numerous. When the two Emperours came from the Senate they went together to view the Regi-

The 6th of April he had reigned one Month alone.

ments of Guards, and gave each Soldier five hundred Crowns, and to the Officers in the same proportion. After this they prepared for their Fathers Funeral, whom they buried in *Adrian's Tomb*. They ordained Feasts to make the Mourning more solemn; and afterwards, according to Custom, proceeded to his Consecration, which was after this manner: There was an Image made of Wax which resembled the dead Emperor, this was plac'd upon an Ivory Bed rais'd very high, and covered with Cloth of Gold, and was set at the entrance of the Palace: Upon the left hand were all the Senators in black; on the right, the Ladies of the first Quality all in plain white Habits, without Jewels or any other Trimming. This lasted for seven days, during which time Physicians came in and out, as though they had been to visit the sick Man, and every time they said he grew worse, and that he would certainly die. At last when they had declared that he was dead, the noblest and youngest of the Senators and Roman Knights, carried the Bed upon their Shoulders through the *Via Sacra*, and set it in the midst of that place, where the Magistrates used to lay down their

Offices.

Offices. On each side of the place were two Scaffolds, on the one was a Company of young Boys, on the other of young Maids, all Children of the first Quality, who sang Hymns and Songs in Honour to the Dead, in the most mournful Notes that could be. These Songs ended, the Senators and Knights took up the Bed again, and carried it out of the City to the Field of *Mars*, in the midst of which there was a Structure of Wood in the form of a Pyramid, with several Stories. The first Story was square, and was a sort of a little Chamber fill'd with all sorts of combustible Matter, and garnished on the out-side with Cloth of Gold, Ivory Statues, and fine Pictures: The second was of the same Figure, though something less, having the same Ornaments, and this only difference, that the four sides of it were open. Upon this there was a third still less, and upon that a fourth, and so on a great many other Stories, still growing less in proportion, till the last ended in a point. The Bed and the Statue were plac'd in the second Story, which was fill'd with sweet Flowers and Plants, and all manner of Gums and Spices; Cities, Nations and private Persons striving by their

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Presents who should do most Honour to their deceased Emperor. The Roman Knights rode Races on Horseback round this Pyramid in good order, marching to the sound of several warlike Instruments; to this there succeeded Races of Chariots, in which were seated young People clothed in Robes bordered with Purple, with Masques on, that represented to the Life the Faces of the most famous Captains and greatest Emperors.

These Races ended, his Successors in the Empire came to the Pile, and set fire to it with Torches, the Consuls, Senators and Knights did the same, each to their own side. All was in a Flame in a moment, and at the same time from the top of the pile, flew an Eagle which was presently out of sight. The People believ'd that it was that Eagle, which carried the Emperors Soul to Heaven; and from that moment they paid him the same worship, that they did to the Immortal Gods.

After this Ceremony the two Emperors made each of them a Funeral Oration upon their Father, ordain'd that he should have a High-Priest, whom they chose from his own Family; instituted

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to his Honour a College of Priests, whom they call'd *Aurelians*; and concluded these Solemnities with a fight of Gladiators.

Antoninus had no sooner finished this Apotheosis of his Father, but he found himself troubled with an infinite number of Petitions which were continually presented him by the Pagan Priests, the Philosophers, and even by the Governors of some Provinces, to obtain leave of him to persecute the Christians, who by the Clemency of *Adrian* and *Antoninus Pius*, had for a long time been defended from their Persecutions. This Emperor who was no less an Enemy to Violence and Injustice than his Father and his Grand-Father, and who besides this, resolving to govern after their Maxims, withstood this blind Rage very vigourously; and that the Christians in the remote Provinces might be preserv'd safe from danger, he wrote to the general Assembly of *Asia* held this year at *Ephesus*, this admirable Letter which *Eusebius* has preserved for us.

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I am persuaded that the Gods will take care that the Christians shall not be able to hide themselves from their Eyes : It is more their Interest than yours, to punish those who refuse to acknowledge them. Those Persecutions which you have rais'd against them as impious Persons, serve to no other end but to confirm them more in their own Opinions ; and since they believe that they die for their God, ought not Death to seem as agreeable to them as their Life ? By this means it is that they are always Conquerors, chusing rather to die than submit to your Orders. As for the Earthquakes which have happen'd and which happen still, it is fit to advise you to make a serious and just comparison of the condition that you and they are in upon such Accidents : The Confidence they have in God increases still, as their danger grows greater ; but as for you, you lose your Courage immediately : They humble themselves then more profoundly before God ; but as for you, you are so Ignorant, and so Blind, that not content to have forgot all your Gods, and the Worship that you owe the Immortal God, that you persecute, and pursue even to death, those Christians that serve and adore him. The Governors of several Pro-

vinces

vinces have often wrote upon the occasion of those of this Sect, to our Father of Immortal Memory ; who has always return'd this Answer, That they should create 'em no trouble, unless they were convicted of any Design against the State. I therefore, conforming my self to his Maxims, have given the same Answer to them, that have writ to me about it ; and if any one continues to disturb them upon pretence that they are Christians, I command that the Accused, though acknowledged to be Christians, be absolv'd, and their Accusers punish'd. This Letter was publish'd at Ephesus in the common Temple of Asia.

This Order was obey'd, and Peace and Quiet reign'd through the whole Empire, and the beginning of this Government was as easie and as happy, as if the Soul of Antoninus Pius had pass'd to his Children. Though in the mean time there was nothing more opposite, than the Humours and Inclinations of these two Princes.

Antoninus was Constant and Modest ; Grave and Complainant ; Mild and just ; as Indulgent to others, as severe to himself ; not inclin'd to vain glory, unalterable in his designs, which he

he never form'd without having thought well, being never led aside by any Humour or Passion; an Enemy to Informers; Pious without Affectation; Moderate in all things; always of an even Temper, always Master of himself, always submitting to Reason, incapable of Dissimulation; always upon his guard against the Love of himself; never either Impatient or Unquiet; very ready to pardon the greatest Faults when they only regarded himself, and inexorable, when extream necessity, that is to say, the Interest of the publick, forced him to punish them. He gave the same Laws to all the World, and let his Subjects live in perfect Liberty; whatever he did, the good of the State was always in his Eye, and never his own Pleasure, nor his Interest, nor his particular Glory. In short, having no other design but to do good to Men, and to be obedient to God he always followed Justice, and never spoke any thing but Truth.

Lucius Verus had none of these Qualities, he was Passionate, and Dissolute, and the greatest of his Vertues was, that he had none of those Horrible Vices which make a Lawful Prince become a True Tyrant. But this Disparity of Humours did

did not appear in the first Years; the the Respect which he could not but have for his Brother and his Obligations to him, forced him to hide this Vicious Temper, whilst he was near him. He seemed as though he would wholly conform himself to his Manners, and imitate the Prudence of his Life; he behaved himself so upon all occasions that one would have said, That *Marcus Antoninus* alone was Emperour; for *Verus* paid him the same deference, or rather the same Submission that a Lieutenant would have had for a Proconsul, or the Governour of a Province for the Emperour himself. But it is a difficult thing for Vice to be long kept in, this Constraint serves only to provoke it, and this young Prince did not let slip the first Opportunity which Chance offered him of making it apparent.

Commodus came into the World about the latter end of the first Year of *Antoninus* his Reign. The Birth of this Prince, whose life seems to have been a Dishonour to Nature, was signalized by the most horrible Disasters. The *Tiber* began these Publick Calamities by an Inundation, which overwhelmed great part of *Rome*, bore along with it a multitude of

of Cattle, ruin'd all the Country, and caused an extreme Famine. The two Emperours soon remedied these Evils by distributing everywhere such Succours as were needful. This Inundation was followed by Earthquakes, Burning of Cities and a general Infection of the Air, which immediately produced an infinite number of Insects, who wasted all that the Floods had spared, and the whole World resounded with the noise of Wars, which broke out almost at the same Time. The Parthians, under the Conduct of their King *Vologesus*, surprized the Roman Army that was in *Armenia*, cut it in Pieces, and came into *Syria*, and drove thence *Attilius Cornelianus*, who was the Governour of it. The *Catti* ravaged *Germany*, and the Country of the *Grisons* with Fire and Sword, and the *Britains* began to revolt.

Calpurnius Agricola was sent against the *Britains*, *Ausidius Victorinus* against the *Catti*, and the Parthian Expedition was reserved for *Verus*, who parted some few Days after.

Marcus Antoninus, who was obliged in Prudence, and by the Necessity of Affairs to remain at *Rome*, accompanied the Prince to *Cosma*, did him all

sorts

sorts of Honours, and made his Friends and principal Officers attend him, either because by this Means he would secure himself of his Conduct, or else had no other Design but to render the young Prince's Court more Magnificent; or lastly, which is most probable, That he might lay a Restraint upon him, and by some Remains of Modesty repel or correct those bad Inclinations which he saw in him. But all this Precaution was to no purpose: *Verus*, who was weary of contraining himself, made no account of those Friends which *Antoninus* had sent with him. As soon as he had lost Sight of him, and being no longer withheld by Respect or Fear, but could pursue his own Humour, he forgot the Defeat of the *Roman* Legions, and considered no longer that *Syria* was in a likelihood of Revolting, but plunged himself into all manner of the most Infamous Debauches, and that to such Excess, that he fell dangerously ill at *Canusium*. This News was brought to *Rome* just upon *Antoninus* his Return thither; who immediately went back to see him: But before his Departure, in a full Senate he made Vows, which he religiously perform'd, when he return'd and knew that *Verus* was embark'd.

The

The Sickness which the young Prince had at *Canusium* did not at all amend him, he continued his Debauches upon his March, and he was no sooner in *Syria* but he totally forgot it at *Daphne*, one of the Suburbs of *Antioch*, the entrance of which place, was as it were, prohibited to all honest People, since the goodness of its Air, the beauty of its Woods, its Flowers, and its Fountains had made the very Throne of impurity be seated there. *Verus* added to the Debauchery of this place, by such Excesses as were unknown to its Inhabitants, though the most profligate People upon Earth.

In the mean time his Lieutenants made War against the *Parthians* with good Success. *Statius Priscus* took *Artaxata*; *Cassius* and *Martius Verus* put *Vologesus* to flight, took *Seleucia*, burnt and sacked *Babylon* and *Æsiphon*, and ras'd the Magnificent Palace of the *Parthians*. Their Troops which had gain'd so great Victories, and had defeated Armies of five hundred thousand Men, in their return were forc'd to encounter Sickness and Hunger, which swept away more than half of them: *Cassius* brought back but a small part of his Army into *Syria*. But this

A.D. 163,
164, 165.

this did not hinder *Verus*, who was exalted with his Victories, from taking the lofty Title of *Conquerour of Armenia and the Parthians*, as if he had justly acquired it in the midst of his Pleasures.

During all this, *Marcus Antoninus*, who feigned himself ignorant of these Debauches, thought the surest way to retrieve him was to get him married: He therefore without Delay commits to his Sister's Care, his Daughter *Lucilla*, who was one of the finest Princesses in the World, made her go for *Syria*, and bore her Company as far as *Brundisium*: Some say that he resolved to have carried her himself to *Verus*, but that he was put off of that by the Reports which were spread, That he went into *Syria* only to attribute to himself the Honour of finishing this War. Before he parted from *Brundisium* he saw the Princess embark, and wrote to the Proconsuls, and to the Governours of the Provinces, to forbid their going to meet her, or making such Solemnities for her Reception as were usual upon those occasions, which served to no other end, as he said, but to have People crowded.

Verus, who believed that *Marcus Antoninus* brought his Daughter himself, and

was afraid lest he might come to the Knowledge of his Disorders, went to receive him at *Ephesus*, from whence he went again some few Days after the Celebration of his Marriage, and returned to *Antioch* with his Empress, who soon led a Life there very little different from her Husband's, and very agreeable to the Examples which her Mother *Faustina* had given her.

A.D. 167,
168.

When *Verus* had set a King over the *Armenians*, and entirely subdued the *Parthians*, he returned to *Rome* to partake of the Honour of a Triumph with *Marcus Antoninus*. His Return was thought to be Fatal to the Empire, for he carried the Plague into all the Places through which he pass'd. The beginning of this Plague was remarkable, and they say, That at the Sacking of *Babylon* the Soldiers that went into *Apollo's* Temple to pillage it, in a Place under Ground found a little Golden Coffer, which was no sooner opened, but there came out an infected Air, which spread it self even to *Gaul*, and carried Mortality all-a-long with it. But there is more probability that it was a Consequence of those Diseases by which *Cassius's* Army suffered in his Return from his Defeat of the *Parthians*.
Much

Much about this Time the *Germans* revolted, and made an irruption into *Italy*, where they ravaged all that came in their way. *Pertinax*, a Man of known Valour, but whose Enemies had made his Fidelity be suspected, and who by all the Assistance of his Friends could rise no higher than to be Commander of some Auxiliary Troops, was chosen, contrary to the Expectations of the Court, with his best Friend *Claudius Pompeianus*, to go and withstand this Torrent, which threatned *Rome*. *Antoninus* made them both his Lieutenants, that they might share the Honour of this Expedition with him. *Pertinax*, who knew the Value of this Favour and Trust, forgot nothing that might make the Emperour have no reason to repent of them, and gave evident Marks of his Faithfulness, his Experience, and his Courage. They attacked their Enemies briskly, who stood their Ground, and fought with a great deal of Resolution: The Fight was long and obstinate, but at last they were cut in Pieces, and among the Dead were found several Women armed, who had been slain fighting near their Husbands, and their Children. How great seemed this Victory might be, and whatsoever

He that
was after-
wards Em-
perour.

Pleasure the Emperour might take in it, he was nevertheless able to give a Repulse to this Victorious Army. When they prayed him to increase their Pay, he answered them, That to give them Money for this Happy Success, was to be liberal to them at the Expence of the Blood of their Kindred and their Parents, concerning whom he was to give an account to God, who is the only Judge of Princes: And that in whatsoever Danger he might be, he would always have so much Resolution and Wisdom, that neither Fear nor Compliance should ever oblige him to pass the Bounds of the exactest Justice. He was proclaimed *Imperator* the fifth Time, the Victories of *Verus* having gained him that Title four Times before. The Night before the Fight, they brought a Spy to his Tent, who was taken in the Camp: The Emperor would have ask'd him some Questions, but he told him: *I am so cold that I cannot speak, therefore if you would know any thing from me, order first that they give me a Coat, if you have ever a one.* *Antoninus* was not angry at his Boldness, but did as he desired.

There happened an Action of a Soldier, which must not be forgotten; he being upon

upon the Guard one Night, on the Bank of the *Danube*, and hearing the Voice of some *Roman* Soldiers from the other Side, swam through the River in his Armour, delivered his Comerades, and brought them back the same way into the Camp.

In the Year following another War was raised, more dangerous than these that were ended: The *Marcomanni* and the *Quadi*, a Warlike People, took Arms and terrified all the *Romans*, who saw that they were but in a bad Condition to resist so powerful an Enemy, whilst the Plague raged both in the Cities and Country, and filled almost all Places with Heaps of the Dead. The Emperour was the only Man that did not despair of the Protection of Heaven: His first Care was to appease it by Sacrifices; He made Processions round about the City; the Images of the Gods were served and adored upon their Beds for seven Days: And lest that Service, which was most pleasing to them, might chance to be forgot, he made use of strange Rites, and to this purpose made Priests and Sacrificers come from all Parts. But that which is more astonishing is, That he re-established the Ceremonies of *Isis*,
F 3 which

which had been prohibited in the Time of *Augustus*, and made no Scruple to adore a Goddess that had her Temple beat down in the Reign of *Tiberius*, her Ornaments burnt, her Priests murdered, and her Image thrown into *Tiber*.

There were so many Victims slain upon this Occasion, that some merry People, who could not forbear their Jest even in the Time of a publick Calamity, said openly, That if the Emperour returned Victorious, he would find no Oxen left in all his Empire.

When he had performed his Devotions he departed, and carried *Venus* along with him, who would much rather have staid behind at *Rome*, to run on in his Debaucheries, which *Antoninus* would have hindred. The two Emperours therefore took both of them the Way of *Aquileia*; they were no sooner arrived there, but they marched against the *Marcomanni*, who were encamped not far off, beat them out of their Trenches, and made a great Slaughter of them. *Furius Victorinus*, Captain of the Guards, was slain in the Battle, with a great many of the best Troops. This did not hinder the two Emperours from continuing their Attacks with a great deal of Vigour;

Vigour; they pressed upon the Enemy so forceably, that at last they broke through their Army: The greatest part of their Allies drew off their Troops, slew the Authors of the Revolt, and desired a Truce. *Venus* content with these Conditions, and sighing after the Pleasures of *Rome*, urged *Antoninus* to agree to their Request, and to return back: *What greater Advantage can you hope for*, said he, *than that which they offer you? Would you reduce your Enemies to Despair, and force them to know our Weakness? Let us make our Advantage of their Ignorance and Fear, and let them rather think of Retreating than Revenge.* But *Antoninus* represented to him, that there was no heed to be given to the offers of these Barbarians; that they in Appearance only returned to their Duty, to avoid the Storm which was pouring down upon them; that use was to be made of their Disorder, and that no Time should be given them to Rally again, when the Roman Army should be more harass'd, and immediately ordered the Troops to march.

The two Emperours pass'd the *Alps*, pursued the Enemy, overcame them in several Encounters, defeated them entirely,

tirely, and came back without any considerable loss. Winter was now far advanced, and they had made a Resolution of staying at *Aquileia* till the end of it, but the Plague oblig'd them to part thence with some of their Troops. In this Journey *Verus* was struck with an Apoplexy near *Altinum*, whither they carried him, and where he died; his Body was brought to *Rome* by *Antoninus*, who did his last Office to him after the same manner that he had done it to his Father, and seemed not much troubled at his being made a God: Nay, it was but just that he should not be sorry for his death; and this would not have misbecome that Wisdom he made Profession of, and that tenderness which he had for his People. But that which an Historian adds, That he shew'd his satisfaction publickly to the Senate, is not at all probable, and deserves no Credit. He says that the Emperor insinuated, That the War against the Parthians had never been so happily ended but by his Counsels, and declared, That being no longer now to divide the Sovereignty, with a Man sunk in his Debaucheries, he would begin a new Reign. *Antoninus* was too Modest, and too Prudent to speak thus, and

and this neither corresponds with his Maxims, nor with that Portraiture of *Verus*, that he gives us in his first Book; nor indeed with the very subject of his Discourse, which was to thank the Senate for having ordered the Consecration of *Verus*. His Enemies no doubt, spread this Report to put some colour upon the Calumny, of the Emperor's having discovered that *Verus* had resolved to poison him, and therefore would be before-hand and poison him first, or got his Physician to kill him by letting him Blood; a suspicion of this Nature could never fall upon *Marcus Antoninus*, and therefore the greater part lay it to *Faustina's* charge, and lay this Princess out of vexation that *Verus* had discovered the Intrigues he had with her to *Lucilla*, reveng'd his Treachery by Poison. But the most general Opinion, is, That his death was *Lucilla's* handy-work, who not being able to endure that Passion which *Verus* had for his own Sister *Fabia*, and being less jealous of her Husband's love, than of her Sister in Law's power, who with an Insolence equal to her Crime, abus'd the Credit she had with her Brother, and treated the young Empress with scorn, chose rather

rather to let her vengeance fall upon him than her Rival; for she guess'd from the Haughtiness of her Humour, that the greatest punishment she could have, was to throw her on a suddain from that pitch of Grandeur she had rais'd her self to by her Incest, and reduce her to a private condition, in which, being destitute of all support, she could no longer pretend to be equal to the Daughter and Widow of an Emperor.

After the Consecration of *Verus*, *Antoninus* fearing lest those Freemen who had govern'd this Prince in *Syria*, and who had been the Ministers to his Debaucheries, should carry a worse Plague to *Rome*, than that whose dismal effects it then felt, bethought himself of sending them from Court, but in such a way as might not be publicly injurious to his Brother's Memory, he dispers'd them all, giving them considerable Charges, which under the specious name of Rewards, were nothing else but a true and honourable Exile: He kept none but *Electus*, whom he was better assured of.

The Licence and Disorder of these Wars stir'd up the rage of the Pagans, who forgetting the Emperor's Orders began

began to persecute the Christians in the remote Provinces. *St. Polycarp* was the first Victim sacrificed to their Fury, and the then Flames of his Funeral Pile were the Signal which rekindled the Persecution in *Gaul* and *Asia*. It is pretended that *Antoninus* himself agreed to it, for the Governor of *Gaul* having wrote to him to know what he would order concerning some Christian Prisoners, he answer'd, *That he should only let those die that confess, and release the others.* But his intent was not that they should condemn those to death who confess they were Christians, it was only that they should slay those who could not deny the Crimes they were accus'd of. For the Magistrates and Officers seeing that the only means to suppress them and to gain upon the Emperor was to make their Innocence suspected, had accus'd them of the most horrid Crimes, which were set down at large in their Petitions, to which they had joyn'd the Depositions of some Slaves, who frightned by their Threatnings, and work'd over by their Promises, had in their Torments confess'd whatever they would have them. So this Order grounded upon a false Suggestion, and conceiv'd in general

general Terms, was explain'd according to their own fancy, and was taken in a sense that gave the full Reins to their Fury. Have not the Governors of Provinces, the Officers of the Army, and other Magistrates abus'd their power in the Provinces, under the very best of Princes, and yet their Violences and Injustice ought not to be imputed to the Orders of their Emperors? Let us on the one side consider the Circumstances of time and place; and on the other the Character of *Antoninus*, his Charity, his Justice, and his Constancy, and we shall never think that he authoriz'd this Persecution after having so long prohibited it; and that he would authorize it when he reign'd alone, and whilst a Plague and War exhausted the whole Empire. How will this pretended Persecution be made agree, with this Maxim of the Emperor, That those who are deprived of the Truth, are so unwillingly, and therefore deserve our pity, and not our Hate? There is lastly, one sure evidence that *Antoninus* did not persecute the Christians, for the Blood of one single Martyr was not spilt within the Walls of *Rome* during his whole Reign.

Before

Before her year of Mourning for *Verus* was out, *Antoninus* married his Daughter *Lucilla* to *Claudius Pompeianus*, who was something old and the Son of a plain Knight, but he had all the qualities that might make a Man considerable, Fidelity, Honesty, Courage, the ancient Gravity, Experience, and that which is not always the companion of Merit, a very great Reputation. This made the Emperor prefer him to those that were more noble, for he lookt after nothing but Vertue which he plac'd infinitely above Birth and Riches. The young Empress and her Mother were not much pleas'd at this Match; but *Antoninus* having preserv'd to his Daughter all the marks of her former Grandeur, they soon comforted one another. *Faustina* thought her Daughter lost nothing because she kept the rank of Empress; and *Lucilla* that had a mind to live after her own Fancy, found some pleasure in the consideration of having married a Slave rather than a Husband.

After this Marriage *Antoninus* freed from any farther care of his Daughter, went to end the War with the *Marcomanni*, who joyning with the *Quadi*, the *Sarmatians* and the *Vandals* and other

ther Nations, were become fiercer and more formidable than before. The Wars against *Hannibal* and the *Cimbri* never appeared more terrible. The Emperor had much the disadvantage in the first Fights; for 'tis probable that it was during this War he lost that considerable Battel, which he was afraid would have been followed with the loss of *Aquileia*, which happened after this manner.

Alexander the false Prophet, whose Life is wrote by *Lucian*, was then in so great Reputation that he was lookt upon as a God. He had the Impudence to send the Emperor this Oracle:

4 Two
Lions.

*Send two of Cybele's † Slaves, much
Indian Spice,
To Danube's God a grateful Sacrifice;
This Price buys Conquest, with the large
Increase,
And the sweet Blessings of Eternal Peace.*

Antoninus obey'd this Oracle out of Superstition, or to encrease the Order which this promise had rais'd in his Soldiers: They threw into the River two Lions with abundance of Flowers, Herbs, and Spices. The Lions no sooner crost the

the *Danube*, but they were knockt on the head by the Enemies. Then Battle being given, the *Romans* were so ill handled that they lost more than twenty thousand Men, and the *Barbarians* pursued them even to *Aquileia*, which they had taken, if the Emperor had not rallied his Troops. This Affront which they had receiv'd, rous'd their Courage; they beat their Enemies, and at last drove them into *Pannonia*.

Whilst he was taken up with this War, the Moors ravaged *Spain*, and the Shepherds of *Egypt*, who were then a kind of Banditti, took Arms, and under the Conduct of a Priest call'd *Isidore*, a stout Fellow, surpris'd a Roman Garrison. For being disguised in their Wives Clothes, they made as if they would put some Money into the Hands of the Officer of the place. This Officer being too credulous was catcht by this Trick, and had his Throat cut with all his Garrison. Pust up with this first Success they sacrificed a Prisoner, and over his reeking Bowels, which they afterwards eat, confirmed their Rebellion by an Oath, and promised never to desert. After this they beat the *Romans* several times, and had taken *Alexandria*, if *Antoninus*

Some Historians place this Egyptian War two Years sooner in 168.

ninus had not recalled *Cassius* from *Asia*, where he then commanded, and sent him against these *Shepherds*. *Cassius* had not Strength enough to attack these Barbarians, who were very numerous, and fought like Mad-men, and had a Leader of prodigious Courage; but he was so happy as to sow Division in their Camp, and knew so well how to make his Use of their Disorders, that he dispersed and defeated them.

The Moors had not much better Treatment in *Spain*, the Emperours Lieutenants slew a great many of them, and put the rest to Flight.

In the mean time *Antoninus* was resisting the Northern Rebels, whom he so tired by the continual Advantages that he had daily over them, that he forced them to take such Conditions as he would impose upon them; and then returned to *Rome*, where he celebrated the *Decennalia* according to Custom, and made such Vows as were usual on those Occasions.

During the Peace he applied himself entirely to the correcting such Faults as he found in his Laws and Policy. That those who were Free-born, might have it in their Power to prove it, he ordained,

ed, That each Roman Citizen should go to the Treasury in the Temple of Saturn, where the Publick Records were kept, to tell what Children were born to them: And he establish'd Notaries to keep Registers of all Births in the Provinces.

He wisely prohibited, That no Enquiry should be made after the State and Condition of People Dead, after five Year. And lest Crimes should go unpunish'd, and Private Men should suffer by the Delays which the Festivals might bring to their Process, after the Example of *Augustus*, he increased the Number of Court Days, so that there were two hundred and thirty: By which he did two very good Things at the same Time, for he took from the People several Opportunities, that they would else have had both of Idleness and Debauchery.

He provided for the Security of Pupils, by constituting a Pretor, who was call'd *Tutelar*, because he appointed Tutors, and because all Business concerning Guardianships were under his Cognizance. He reformed that Law which ordered *Tutoria* Curators to be given to Minors only, in case of Madness or Extravagance, and had them given to all Minors, without Exception.

He always took so much Care to hinder Unlawful Marriages, and such as were within the prohibited Degrees, That he dissolved that of a Lady of Quality, who had been married to her Uncle several Years, but he Legitimated her Children.

The Rescript which he sent her by one of his Servants is still remaining; 'tis wrote in the Name of *Vernus* and *Antoninus*, and deserves to be set down in this Place.

WE are concerned that you should have lived so long with your Uncle, and have had so many Children by him; But then we consider, That the Match was made by your Grand-Mother, when you were too young to be thoroughly informed of our Customs and Laws. These Reasons make us confirm the present Condition of your Children, which you have had by this Marriage contracted above forty Years ago, and so Legitimate them, as though they had been born in Lawful Wedlock.

He moderated the Publick Expences, and lessened the number of Shews and Sports, that his Subjects might not give themselves

themselves up too much to such Idle Diversions, and ruine themselves by such Extravagant and Unnecessary Charges, whence there often arose mortal Enmities between the best Families. He likewise retrenched the Salary of the Comedians.

He took great Care of maintaining the Streets and High-ways. He reformed all the Abuses of Sales and Usury. He extremely mitigated that Law, by which Strangers, who had any Legacy or Inheritance, were to pay the twenty fifth Penny, though this Law had already been moderated by *Trajan*. He ordained, That Children should succeed their Mothers, who died intestate.

He reformed that Ordinance, which, that it might engage such as were not originally *Italians*, and yet sought for Employments at *Rome*, to look upon that City and *Italy* as their own Country, obliged them to have the third part of their Effects in *Italy*; *Antoninus* was contented with a fourth.

He did the Senate all the Honours he could think of; for he not only remitted a great many Causes to them, which might have been judged in his own Council; but he let them judge Sovereignly,

reignly, and without Appeal. He generally reserved the Office of *Edile* and *Tribune* for such of that Order as were poor, and whose Poverty came not by their own Fault. He received none into their Body but with the Consent of all the Senate, and after strict Enquiry. When any of their Lives were concerned, he took all imaginable Care to be thoroughly instructed in the Business, and then reported it to the Senate, and would not suffer the Knights to assist at the Tryal of such Causes. He was never absent from their Assembly, when he could possibly be there, though he had nothing to report to them: When he had any Report to make, he would take the Pains of coming, even out of the Country. The greatest part of the Governours and Officers that he placed over Cities, he took from among the Senators; and he was persuaded, as well as *Augustus*, That whatever a Prince does to increase the Honour and Dignity of his Magistrates, heightens his own Power, and establishes his own Authority, which neither ought nor can be founded upon any thing but Justice. What he did to the Senate did not at all hinder him from extending his Bounty to the other Orders

ders of Magistrates, and indeed to all Private Persons. No Person of any Condition whatsoever, appeared to him unworthy of his Care, which he took even of the Gladiators and Rope-Dancers; for he commanded, That the first should fight only with Foyls, or Swords without Points; and under the latter he ordered Quilts and Feather-Beds to be laid, to prevent the Danger of their Fall; but afterwards for a long Time they used to hang up Nets and Sheets.

He made very severe Laws, to hinder any Violence that might be done to the Sanctity of Sepulchres. He ordained likewise, That the Poor should be Buried at the Publick Charge. But this here is a particular Mark of his Indulgence; A Company of Thieves designing to commit their Robberies in *Rome*, their Captain, to gain an Opportunity, thought of getting upon a Wild Fig-tree, that grew in the Field of *Mars*, and entertaining the People for some Time with several Predictions, he told them, That the same Day that they should see him fall from that Fig-Tree, and be changed into a Stork, that Fire should fall from Heaven, and consume the World. The Common People, who are always Cre-

dulous and Superstitious, received this Prophecy with Amazement and Respect: They ran every Day in vast Numbers to this Fig-Tree, whilst the Comrades of this Prophet made their own Advantage of their Credulity and Absence. At last the Day of so expected and terrible a Metamorphosis being come, the Impostor fell from the Tree, and in his Fall let go a Stork, which he had in his Lap, and was quickly lost in the Crowd. The People astonished at this Miracle, and thinking that they already saw Heaven on Fire, filled all *Rome* with Tumult and Confusion. The Emperour informed of this Adventure, made the Prophet be brought to him, and when he had got the Truth out of him, upon Promise of Pardon, he only laughed, and kept his Word with him.

He endeavoured by all means to correct the Disorders of Women and Young People, without knowing it was his Private Interest to do so. For he was wholly ignorant of *Faustina's* Irregularities, as appears by the Letters he wrote her a little before his Death; and there is no Probability that if he had known them, he would have wink'd at rather than reform'd them. He was incapable

of

of so base an Indulgence which the Laws would have punish'd in a Private Person. Nevertheless an Historian relates, That he one Day answered some People, who would have had him divorce *Faustina* for her ill Conduct, *Then her Portion must be returned her*; and this Expression pleased a great many People.

There is nothing one ought to fear more than the opposing of ones Private Opinion to a General Consent and Publick Approbation: But since it is related but by one Historian, and he such an Historian as is not much to be commended for his Faithfulness, his Judgment or his Exactness, one may very well think that this Expression does not owe so much of its Success to its own Merit as to the small Reflection that was made on it when People first received it. And indeed, though the Empire had really been *Faustina's* Dowry, as it must be supposed to be, to bring off this Historian; yet this Answer had nevertheless been insipid, and not becoming *Antoninus*, who was not capable of gaining the Empire of the World by such a Baseness: But it is so far from being true that the Empire was *Faustina's* Dowry, that this Prince was destined to it independently from

G 4

this

this Marriage, and that *Adrian*, when he adopted him, oblig'd him to be contracted to the Daughter of *Lucius Commodus*.

The Jest which the Comedians made before him upon the Name of *Tertullus*, who was *Faustina's* Gallant, proves nothing, for *Antoninus* might interpret that of others rather than himself.

There was a Play acted, in which one Actor asked another, *What the Lady's Gallant's Name was*: He, as studying for it, answered, *Tullus, Tullus, Tullus*; the first impatient to know the True Name, was urgent with him, saying, *What do you say?* the other replied again; *Why I have told you Tertullus*: Which is as much as to say, *I have told you three Times Tullus; and therefore I have told you Tertullus*.

Adrian had before prohibited the going in a Coach, Litter, or on Horse-back in any Town; *Antoninus* renewed this Prohibition, under express Penalties: For he could not endure that that should be employed to an ordinary Use which *Cæsar* and *Augustus* used only in their Triumphs, or upon some Days of extraordinary Solemnity.

He was persuaded, That one of the greatest Mischiefs which Princes could do, was to put the Magistracy into such Hands as were unfit for it; and taking all imaginable Precaution, lest he might fall into this Misfortune, he, without any

any Trouble, refused whatever was unjustly requested of him. A Man of very ill Reputation having beg'd an Employment of him, and received this Answer, *Clear your self first of the ill Reports that go about of you*; without Hesitation replied, *I see Pretors that are not honest Men than my self*. The Emperor was not at all offended with this Liberty, he endeavoured only to give no more occasion for such Reflections.

When he found People serviceable to the Publick, he gave them always such Commendations as they deserved, and made use of them in such Stations as they had so well discharged; and used to say, *That it was not in a Prince's Power to make his Subjects such as he would have them; but it was in his Power to make good use of their Service, by employing them in such Business as they understood*. No Consideration could hinder him from treating each Man according to his Deserts, and the good Qualities he found in him. Never Prince loved more to enrich his Friends; he raised some to the chiefest Dignities; and to such whose Course of Life would not permit them to come into Offices and Employ-

Employments, he loaded them with Presents, and gave them such Pensions as might make them easie in those Stations where their want of Ambition had left them: But at the same time he took very great Care not to bestow these Pensions upon such as were not useful to the Publick; for he retained this wise Maxim of his Father *Antoninus Pius*, who said, That there is nothing more Shameful and Injust, than to suffer the Publick to be devoured by such People, who will contribute nothing by their Labours towards the enriching of it. The Poor had never Recourse to him in vain; and he took so much Pleasure in Relieving them, that he looked upon it as one of the greatest Happineses of his Life, that he never wanted wherewith to do it, and he thanked God for it with all his Heart.

In the punishment of Crimes he mitigated such Penalties as were ordained by the Laws; he was so exact in doing Justice, especially in Criminal Causes, that one day he severely reprimanded a Pretor, who had pass'd a wrong Sentence upon some Persons of Quality and condemned them with too much haste; he obliged him to review the Process and told him, That it is the least thing which
a Magi-

a Magistrate who is appointed to do Justice to the People, can do, to hear the Accused with Patience, especially when they are of Quality. Another Pretor having behaved himself ill, and that upon an important Concern, the Emperor instead of turning him out of his Office, was content to transfer all his Authority and Jurisdiction to the other Pretor for some time. In short, he endeavoured by all ways to keep Men from doing ill; and to make them do good, he rewarded their good Actions, and conceal'd their bad as much as he could possibly by his Indulgence, or corrected them by such Punishments as were rather useful to to them than rigorous.

As no Action of a Prince is ever indifferent but does either a great deal of good or harm; so the value which *Antoninus* had for Philosophy, might have been hurtful to the *Romans*; for it immediately rais'd up abundance of Philosophers, who to tast their Prince's Bounty took the Habit of Philosophers without their Vertues; so that they were not only a charge to private Persons, but to the Publick. The Emperor put a stop to this disorder as soon as he perceived it, for he granted not his Favours and Im-

Immunities to such as were Philosophers in name only, but to such as were so in effect, and who after a constant practice of all Vertues had deserved, rather than chosen that Title.

He said often that an Emperor should never do any thing carelessly, or in haste, and that the smallest oversight, might occasion his being blam'd in greater matters. He gave the Lawyers who were to plead before him, as much time as they would require; for he thought it Imprudence and Rashness to prescribe a certain time to Causes whose extent and importance were unknown, especially since Patience is a part of Justice; and that it is better to let a Lawyer say such things as are unnecessary, than to hinder him from producing any thing that is material.

He examined the smallest Affairs with as much care and exactness as the greatest; being persuaded of this Truth, That Justice being all entire throughout, that there is nothing that regards it but what is great: So that he often employed ten or twelve days about the same business, often sat in Council till night, and never went out of the Senate till the Consul, according to Custom, dismissed

dismiss the Assembly and pronounced these Words, *We detain you no longer.* And that which makes this Assiduity and Patience the more remarkable, was, that he was so Infirm, that he could not endure the least Cold, nor make but a light Meal, which was always at Night; in the Day he only took a little Treacle for his Stomach. But nothing could hinder him from doing what he thought his duty to his Subjects, and discharging all those Obligations which he used to say were necessarily incumbent upon a Lawgiver and a King.

He would have thought it an Impiety to have flung away one Minute upon things frivolous and unprofitable; even that Time which he out of complaisance bestowed upon the seeing Shows and Plays was never entirely lost, for he always read or wrote something. In his Travails and Expeditions, in the midst of the most difficult Affairs, he always made his advantage of that Time which other Men generally lose in Relaxation or Diversions; for he continually employ'd it in recollecting with himself, and demanding an exact account of his Conduct, his Thoughts, and his Intentions, and that admirable Work which he has

has left us as owing to his Laborious Care. The date of the two first Books informs us, That one was wrote at Carnuntum, the other at his Camp in the Country of the Quadi, during the most cruel War that Antoninus was ever engaged in. Time so well manag'd produc'd several other Works which are now lost. The Commentaries of his Life, which he left for the Instruction of his Sons, are those whose loss ought to be the most regretted.

He was throughly persuaded that the strength of a State consists in a wise Council; wherefore he never undertook any thing, though of never so small Importance, either in War or Peace, without consulting not only his ordinary Council, but those who had the Reputation of being most able, whom he chose out of the Court, the City, and the Senate; and being very far from the false Ambition of drawing others over to his Opinion, he was very glad to submit to theirs, and would always say, *It is much more reasonable that I should follow the Counsel of so many great People who are my Friends, than that so many great People should follow mine.* And that he might remove that fatal prejudice which

is so common, That it is mean to alter ones Counsels, he has made this important Truth one of his Maxims, *That a Man is no less free when he submits to other Peoples Counsel, than when he continues obstinate in his own Opinion; and that this Change is the pure effect of his Wit and Judgment.*

He was a Religious Observer of his Word; and that he might never hearken to the false Reasons of those Politicians who maintain, That a wise and able Prince is not oblig'd to keep it when it interferes with his Interest, and that he may use it as an allurement to draw the People he gives it to, into his snare, he establish'd this Maxim, which deserves to be remark'd by all Princes, and is worthy of our Admiration: *Take heed lest you look upon that thing as useful, which will one day force you to break your Word.*

He often as necessity requir'd, chang'd the State of the Government of Provinces, taking to himself some of them which were govern'd in the Name of the Senate and the People by Proconsuls; and giving them in Exchange some of his own which were under Præ Pretors and Lieutenants; that is, he gave the People,

People, according to the wise Maxim of *Augustus*, such Provinces where he had nothing to fear, and took such to himself as he had a mind to be secure of.

He informed himself punctually of what was said of him, not to punish those who spoke with too much Freedom, but to know what they approv'd or disapprov'd in his Conduct, that he might reap this benefit from the publick Censure, That he might correct what was amiss; and from his Praises, That he might continue in doing well. Whenever ill was spoken of him, or he was accus'd of some Vice that he was not guilty of, he answered his Accusers either by Letters, or word of Mouth, not so much to justify himself as to discourse and inform them.

He would never accept those lofty Titles which had been given to other Princes, nor would he suffer Temples and Altars to be erected to him, knowing that 'tis Vertue only that makes Princes equal to Gods, and not Voices and Flattery of the People; and that a King who rules with Justice, has' all the World for his Temple and all good Men for his Priests and Ministers.

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The *Marcomanni*, who designed only to lay the Emperor asleep by their Submission, and send him farther that they might make advantage of his Absence, took Arms with greater fury than before. They were so much the more terrible, because they had drawn over to their side all the People from *Illyrium* to the farthest parts of *Gaul*. The Emperor who saw his Army wasted by the Plague, and such losses as they had sustained in several Encounters, and his Treasure entirely exhausted by so many Wars, found himself in such Difficulties, as he had never till then experienced. He remedied the first of these Misfortunes by lifting the Gladiators, the Banditti of *Dalmatia* and *Dardania*, and the Slaves, which had not been done since the second *Prunick* War. But one thing which seems very remarkable is, that the *Roman* could not endure that the Emperor should secure their repose, at the expence of their pleasures. They demanded back their Gladiators, and in all the Streets one might hear seditious Persons insolently murmuring, *Does the Emperor think then of making us all Philosophers, that he takes away all our Shows and Sports?* Antoninus was not

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mov'd at it, for he understood the Temper of the People, and knew that the same Man that they look upon to day as a Savage Beast, they shall to morrow honour as a God, if he always follows Reason as his Guide.

It was not easie for such a Prince as *Antoninus* to help the ill condition which the Treasury was in. The most proper Expedient that occur'd to him, and the readiest to make such Funds as were necessary, was to follow the Example of *Nerva* and *Trajan*, and to sell the Moveables that belonged to the Empire. But because it was not permitted to private Persons to have Moveables so magnificent as the Emperour, and to be serv'd in Gold or Silver; to make the Sale more easie *Antoninus* was obliged to grant this Permission to Persons of Quality: So a Sale followed of every thing that was most Pretious, and there were sold his Jewels, his Pictures, his Tapistry, his Vessels, and Gold and Silver Plate, his Chrystals, his Furniture, the Empress's Cloths that were of Silk, and Cloth of Gold, and the Pearls which were found, to a great Number, in *Adrians* Cabinet. The *Romans*, who had no Mony to Succour so good a Prince, in a War, where-

in they were as much interested as himself, did not want it to buy these fine Things. This Sale lasted two Months, and raised so considerable a Fund, that the Emperour had wherewithal abundantly to defray all the Expences of the War. At his Return he let them know, it was his Pleasure, That they should restore them at the same Price they had bought them, but he used no Constraint to those who had a mind to keep them.

Before his Departure he lost his second Son *Verus Caesar*, about seven Years old, who died of an Impostume in his Ear, which the Physicians launced too soon. He bore this Loss with a great deal of Courage, forbade that the Feasts of *Jupiter* which hapned then, should be put off by publick Mourning. He himself comforted the Physicians, and made them Presents: He contented himself with raising Statues to his Son, and ordering his Statue of Gold to be carried in state into the *Circus* during the Sports there, and to have his Name inserted in the Poem of the *Salians*: After this he sought for such Consolation as became him; in his Care of the Publick, fell to his Business, beg'd the Assistance of the Gods by

Prayers and Sacrifices, and marched against the Enemy.

This Expedition was longer, and more dangerous than his others. The Emperor arriving at *Carnuntum*, where he made his Rendezvous, passed the *Danube* by a Bridge of Boats; at the Head of his Troops, attacked the Enemy, and got the better of them in several Encounters, burnt their Barns and Houses, and received several of the chief of the Allies, who astonished at the Suddenness of his Victories, came in to submit themselves.

One Day as he himself was looking for a Ford along the Bank of a River, that not only hindered his Passage, but was a Defence to the Barbarians, the Enemies Slingers, who were on the other side, poured a great quantity of Stones upon him, which had overwhelmed him, if the Soldiers had not covered him with their Bucklers. This Insult stirred up the Soldiers more than before, they furiously passed the River, fell in upon the Enemy, and made a great Slaughter of them. The Emperor went afterwards to view the Field, not to see the Marks of his Victory, and to feed his Eyes with so hideous and cruel a Spectacle, but to

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shed Tears of Compassion for the Misery of Men, and to save those who were in a condition to receive Succour; and before he continued his March, he sacrificed upon the same Place.

The *Quadi* judging rightly, that they should be pursued, had left several Companies of Archers covered with some Horse, as if it were to skirmish with the *Romans*, and to seem to dispute the Passage with them. The *Romans* marched upon this occasion with more Bravery than Conduct, a thing usual after good Success: They attacked these Archers briskly who, according to their Orders, ran away; and by their hasty Flight drew them unawares among dry and barren Mountains, where they were shut in on every Side. They not knowing yet the Danger they were in, and thinking their Courage could overcome any thing, continued fighting stoutly, notwithstanding the Disadvantage of the Place: This made more of them be slain than of the Enemy, who would not put that to Chance which they expected from Delay, and therefore instead of attacking, stood only upon their Defence: The *Romans* could not comprehend the Reasons of this Conduct, till the excessive

Heat that was between these Mountains, Weariness, Wounds and Thirst had entirely confounded them. They knew then, but too late, that they could neither Fight nor Retreat, and that they must either die the most cruel Death, or become a Prey to their Enemies. In this Extremity where Rage and Despair were but Melancholy Comforts, *Antoninus* more concerned at their Miseries than his own, ran through all their Ranks and endeavoured, in vain, to raise their Hopes, by performing of Sacrifices, which they no longer now confided in. When the Sun had exhausted all their Strength, then were the Enemies in a readiness to attack them. Having therefore no Expectations either from their own Courage, from Fortune, or their Gods, they looked upon themselves as Victims, to be slain immediately. Nothing was to be heard from every Side but Cries and Groans, and nothing seen but Marks of the most horrible Desolation; when all on a suddain, the Clouds coming on began to thicken and overcast the Sun, and to discharge abundance of Rain into the Camp: The Poor Soldiers, who were more like Ghosts than Men, and had not Strength to subsist, took new
Courage

Courage at the Sight of those Showers, which they could not expect, and believing they fell faster in Places that were at some Distance from them, run to get into the Place which their Companions had quitted, and all with an equal eagerness held their Mouths, their Helmets, and their Bucklers up to Heaven.

Whilst they thought of nothing but quenching their Thirst, and their whole Camp was in disorder, the Barbarians would not let so fair an Opportunity escape 'em, but attack'd them on every Side. The *Romans* fought, and yet continued drinking, so that the most part swallowed the Blood which ran from their Wounds, and was mingled with the Water which they had catch'd.

But this Succour which Heaven sent, would have been useless to them, and nothing could have defended them from the Fury of their Enemies, if by good Fortune, which was more surprizing than what had already happened, the same Clouds that sent down so kind a Shower upon the *Romans*, had not discharg'd a terrible Storm of Hail, accompanied with Fire and Thunder against the Barbarians. So whilst the former refreshed themselves and quenched their
H 4 Thirst

Thirst with Ease, the others were consumed by a Fire, which nothing could extinguish. 'Tis reported, That if this Fire by chance fell upon the *Romans*, it had no effect; whereas the Rain which hapned to light upon the Barbarians increased their Fire, so that they sought for Water in the midst of Waters: They add, That several wounded themselves very deeply, that their Blood might quench the Fire which devoured them; and that several others rendred themselves to the *Romans* with their Wives and Children, to have their Share in this Miraculous Shower, which brought Safety only to such as declared in their Favour. Whilst *Antoninus* received those graciously who yielded themselves up to him, his Soldiers rather enraged at the Affront they had received, than remembering the Danger they had escaped, cut in Pieces all that resisted them, put the rest to Flight, and took a great many Prisoners.

There are divers Reports about this Deliverance; some say the Emperor upon this occasion employed an *Egyptian* Magician called *Arnuphis*, whom he brought with him, and who raised this Storm by his Enchantments. For what could hinder

hinder, but that among so many Pagans besotted with their Superstitions and Follies, there must be a great many who would attribute the Honour of this Miracle to their own Religion and their Gods? But this is soon confuted, because *Marcus Antoninus* tells us himself, in his first Book, *That he had no Commerce with Quacks and Enchantors; and that he believed nothing that they said about the Conjuratation of Spirits, or any other Enchantments of that Nature.*

Others inclined more favourably to the Emperor, as being Witnesses of his Piety and Vertue, and attribute this Succour to his Prayers. They report that he said, lifting up his Hands to Heaven: *Lord, who art the Giver of Life, I implore thy Help, and I lift up these Hands to thee that have never shed the Blood of any Person.*

The Care which the Pagans took to attribute all the Glory of so strange and extraordinary event to themselves, serves at least to prove the Truth of it: But this Truth is farther confirmed, by all those Monuments which can most securely convey the Memory of Men's Actions down to Posterity. Without any Fear then of being blamed for being too credulous,

dulous, or for endeavouring to support the Christian Religion by Error or a Lye, Foundations that it has always been a Stranger to, we shall affirm, That there is no good Reason to reject the Testimony of them who have written at the same Time, That the Captain of the Guards having advertised the Emperor, That God denyed nothing to the Christians, abundance of whom were in the Legion of *Melitene*, a City of *Capadocia*, and that he ought to try if their Prayers could procure that Deliverance which he could not otherwise expect: The Emperor ordered they should be called together; and they all at the same Time did with Success invoke the only True God, whom the Thunder and Winds obey, and who had delivered their Fathers from a multitude of as pressing Dangers.

Antoninus upon this wrote to the Senate, in favour of the Christians, and ordered those to be punished with Death who accused them; a convincing Proof that he thought this Assistance which was sent him from Heaven was owing to their Prayers. *Tertullian* and other Authors mention this Letter; but it too openly overthrows the Pretensions of the Pagans,

Pagans not to have been suppressed. 'Tis only to the Spirit of Lying and Falshood, that the loss of a Letter so honourable to the Christians ought ever to be imputed. That which we find in the Works of *St. Justin Martyr* is plainly counterfeit, and *Antoninus's* true Letter was no longer remaining a great while before the time of *Eusebius*.

The Emperor never wrote to the Senate but in Latin.

They that have written that this Legion of *Melitene* was call'd the Thundering Legion because of this Miracle, are very much deceived. The Thundering Legion was formed by *Augustus*, and that Name was given them because of the Thunder-bolt that they bore on their Bucklers.

The Roman Army then gave *Antoninus* the Title of *Imperator* the seventh time, who contrary to Custom received it, without expecting that it should be decreed him by the Senate: The Empress *Faustina* likewise was honoured with the Title of *Mother of Armies*. A.D. 174.

Mater Caesatorum.

The Night after so successful a day *Antoninus* drew his Troops from so disadvantageous a place, and seiz'd on the best Posts, where he fortified himself. He after some days spent in the refreshment of his Army, having by his Spies gain'd

gain'd sure Information of the march and posture of the Enemy, held a Council, and put himself in order to pursue them. He found them encamp'd beyond a River between some Villages that surrounded their Camp. The Army pass'd the River in spite of the Resistance made by the Slingers and Archers, and charg'd the Barbarians briskly, who having sustain'd the first Attack, and lost their best Men, ran all away. The *Romans* made a horrible Slaughter of them; the Field was cover'd with Dead, and the Emperor's greatest trouble at this time was to stop the fury of the Soldier, who gaining this Revenge, forgot all his Labours. A great many Prisoners were taken, and several Kings, with their Wives and Childen loaden with Chains were brought to *Antoninus*.

After this Victory the Emperor led his Army towards the River *Granua*, which separates the *Quadi* from the *Fazygian Sarmatians*, who are the most Warlike of all the Barbarians, and put himself in a posture of passing it. Behind this River was another, and the *Sarmatians* had possess'd themselves of the ground between them both. The Thundring Legion was commanded first; They

They pass'd over a Bridge of Boats, overthrew the *Sarmatians* who disputed their passage, and who for the most part were either slain or drown'd, and fix'd their Standard upon the Bank of the second River. In the mean time the whole Army pass'd, and *Antoninus* having sacrificed, mark't out his Camp between the two Rivers, and ordered Works to be thrown up. The Barbarians amaz'd at this, sent Embassadors to him, but their Proposals not seeming reasonable, *Antoninus* commanded to sound a Charge and lead on his Troops to Battle. The Thundring Legion were the first that pass'd the second River in the Emperors sight, and fell with such vehemence upon the *Fazygian* Horse, that they totally routed them. Then they ravag'd the whole Country, and brought away a great Booty of Men and Cattel. The Inhabitants of all the places round about, sent to make their Submissions to *Antoninus*, and to beg peace of him: He received all their Hostages, and upon advise given him that the chief of the Country held Councils, according to the custom of these Barbarians, in some remote and by places, he advanced with such diligence, that he surprized them

them before they had any knowledge of his March. The Barbarians surprized at so unexpected an Arrival, and more in admiration than fear, threw themselves at his Feet. The Emperor sent them to his Camp, and with his best Troops proceeded to attack their Army, which lay encamped between a Morass covered with Reeds and a Forrest. The Fight was obstinate, and the *Romans* were so furious upon this occasion, that after having broke in pieces the *Sarmatians*, slain abundance of them, took a multitude of Prisoners, fir'd all the Country; they still ran on with Torches to look for those who had hid themselves in the Marshes and the Woods. *Antoninus* on this occasion did a thing which ought to be a greater Honour to him at this day than his Victory, he went himself into the Woods and among the Reeds, to save these Wretches, whom he advised to try his Clemency, by rendring themselves to him.

All these advantages did not put an end to the War, there was a more compleat Victory wanting still to finish it. But it was difficult to gain it over these Barbarians, who never fighting with all their Forces, reserved still some Recruits

to make head against the Enemy. *Antoninus* who saw the Season began to be bad, forgot nothing that might make him come quickly to an end with these People: Wherefore not minding these Deputies that were sent him from all Parts, to amuse him rather than submit themselves, he resolved to penetrate those very places where they had assembled their greatest force, and carried all their Goods. This Enterprize was the more dangerous, because he had a long March to make, several difficult places to cross; his Troops had been continually harras'd by the Barbarians, and could march but slowly for fear of some Ambuscade, or engaging to disadvantage in an unknown Country. But at last all these difficulties were happily surmounted; *Antoninus* arrived at the place where the *Sarmatians* were fortified between the *Danube*, which was frozen and a great Wood, and having deliberated after what manner he should attack 'em, he puts his Troops in order for Battle. The Barbarians did so too. The Charge was sounded, the *Romans* threw their Javelins and poured in upon the Enemy, who received them with a great deal of Courage. The Fight was long

long and bloody. The *Romans* asham'd to find such resistance, redoubled their Efforts, and press'd so forcibly upon the *Sarmatian* Horse, that at last they turn'd their Backs, and got upon the *Danube*. The Emperor's Foot got thither at the same time. The Fight began again more sharp than it was before, the Enemies hoping that the *Romans* who were not so much accustomed as themselves to fight upon the Ice, and who could hardly keep upon their Legs, much less stand firm, rallied and fell upon them on all sides. *Antoninus's* Infantry was staggered at the first Shock, and had been entirely lost, if they had not made a new use of their Bucklers; they put them upon the Ice to keep one foot steady. By this means standing firm they made head against their Enemies, and taking hold of their Horses Bridles and throwing themselves with fury upon their Bucklers and Lances, came in so close to 'em, that they threw them from their Horse. For these Barbarians being lightly armed could not resist the *Romans* who had heavy Armour. Of this vast number of *Sarmatians*, but a small Party escaped, who retir'd into Ports that were in their Intrenchments, or sav'd themselves

selves in the Forrest. The Emperor concerned not himself with the pursuit of those Runaways, but caus'd the Forts to be attacked, which were carried notwithstanding the vigorous Resistance of the Enemy, who defended them as their last Refuge.

After this Victory *Antoninus* put his Troops into Winter Quarters, and went himself to *Syrminum*, which was the nearest and most convenient place for him. During his stay there he received the Complaints which *Demostratus* and *Proxagoras* brought him in behalf of the *Athenians* against *Herod*, and those which *Herod* made against these Envoys. They accused *Herod* of Injustice and Tyranny, and upon that Tie which was between him and *Verus*, they would make him pass for an Accomplice in the pretended Conspiracy, that that Prince had of poisoning *Antoninus*. *Herod* accused *Demostratus* and *Proxagoras* of having stir'd the People up against him. *Herod's* Enemies were secretly upheld by the *Quintilians*, who commanded in *Greece*, and had a great deal of Credit there, and who sought an occasion of being revenged of *Herod*, who speaking of the Honours which *Antoninus* had heaped

He was the famous Rhetorician who had been Master to *Marcus Antoninus* and *Verus*.

upon 'em and making an Allusion to their Country, for they were originally of *Troas*, had said, *Homer's Jupiter is not to be endured for loving the Trojans so well.* This Speech was more hurtful to its Author, than to those it was level'd against. The Protection of the *Quintilians* was not unserviceable to *Demostratus* and *Proxagoras*.

The Emperor and Empress gave them Audience several times, and treated them with that distinction that *Herod* took notice of it, and no longer doubted that *Antoninus* favoured the *Athenians* out of complaisance to *Faustina* and one of his Daughters, who interested themselves for them. One Morning then surrounded with Jealousie, and his Grief being fresh for an Accident that had happened to him, two fair Slaves whom he called his Daughters being killed by Thunder, he was so disturb'd that full of rage he went to the Emperor, and in an extream Passion told him insolently, *These then are the great Rewards which I must have for my Conversation with Verus whom you sent me to: Call you this Justice, to sacrifice me to the Passion of a Woman and a Girl?* The Captain of the Guards put himself in a posture of stopping

ping or killing him, but *Antoninus* hindered him, and without the least Emotion or change of Countenance, turned to the *Athenians*, and told him, *You have nothing to do, but to plead your Cause, though Herod at present is not in the Humour to hear you.* *Demostratus* spoke with so much vehemence, that he drew Tears from the Emperor, who turn'd all his Anger against the Freeman of *Herod*, whom he found most faulty, and yet punisht them according to his Custom, with a great deal of Moderation. He entirely remitted the punishment that was to be inflicted on the Father of those two Maids that were kill'd by the Thunder, and said, He had suffered enough already by the Grief which such a loss must cause him.

They who have writ that *Herod* was banish'd into *Epirus*, have without doubt took for a Banishment that long Stay which a Sicknefs obliged him to make at *Oricum*, in his Return from *Pannonia*. But how can this Banishment agree with a Letter which *Herod* wrote to the Emperor some time after; in which he complains, That he no longer did him the Honour of writing to him, and asks him, *What was now become of that Time when he*

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received three Courriers in a Day from him? Nay, how does it agree with *Antoninus's* Answer, which calls him *Friend*, and after having spoke a Word or two about Winter-quarters, condoled with him upon the Loss of his Wife, and mentioned his ill Health, proceeds, *I desire with all my Heart you may be well, and that you would not doubt of the Continuance of my Good Will to you, and that you would not think I have done any injustice to you in punishing some guilty Persons, whom nevertheless I have treated more favourably than they deserve. I desire you to be no longer troubled; and if I have offended you in any other thing, or given you the least Disturbance, demand Justice of me in the Temple of the Great Minerva at Athens, at the Mysteries of the Initiations, for in the greatest Heat of the War my utmost Desires were to be initiated there. God grant that you may perform the Ceremony of it. One does not write thus to a Man that one has banished.*

The Spring was no sooner come, but *Antoninus*, who would afford the Barbarians no Time to gather new Forces, took the Field, to prevent them. He pass'd the *Danube* and fought the Enemy several Times; who at last despairing to be able

to

to resist a Commander who joyned Diligence and Watchfulness to Courage and Providence, sent to offer him Hostages, and beg Peace. He was wholly taken up in answering their Embassadors, and receiving several Kings that came to do him Homage. The King of the *Sarmatians* alone restored him a hundred thousand Prisoners, that he had taken from the *Romans*; and gave him eight thousand of his Men, the best part of which were sent against the *Britains*. The Emperor imposed upon these People Conditions more or less hard, as he found their Inclinations to revolt, and they were all ready to submit to what he should please to command; so that the Lands of the *Marcommanni*, the *Quadi* and the *Sarmatians* had been made Provinces of the Empire, if the News of *Cassius's* Revolt, *A.D. 165*, who had proclaimed himself Emperor in *Syria*, had not come just at that Moment. The News surpris'd the Emperor, and rais'd the Courage of the Barbarians, who taking hold of this occasion, and being always more concerned for their Liberty than their Word, oblig'd *Antoninus* to remit great part of the Impositions he had charged upon them, and to make new Treaties of Peace, far less advantageous

tagious to him than those which they had sworn to ; and this without Doubt was the Reason why he did not, as was usual, specify the Conditions of this Peace, in the Letter which he wrote to the Senate to give an account of his Conduct.

The Design of seizing the Empire was never put in Practice by a Man, who was more able than *Cassius* to have accomplish'd it, for he had all the Qualities requisite to it. The Victories he had gain'd in *Armenia*, *Arabia* and *Egypt*, had got him the Esteem and Love of the Soldiers ; he had Boldness and Resolution, he was Patient in Labour and Dissolute in his Pleasures ; Prodigal of his own, and Covetous of other Mens ; he knew his Times to be Mild and Severe, Religious and Impious ; and taking Pains to settle his Inclinations, which tended naturally to Policy and Dissimulations, he acquired a marvelous Address in hiding those Vices that were in him, and making those Vertues appear which he was not possess'd of. It was he that restored the Ancient Discipline of the Army, and he was so severe and exact in it, that he never pardoned the least Fault, and called himself a second *Marius*.

He

He made those Soldiers dye without Quarter who took any thing by Violence, in the Places where they were in Garrison. When he commanded the Army in *Germany*, some Auxiliary Companies having upon the Bank of the *Danube* surpris'd a Body of the *Sarmatians* very much in disorder, attacked it and cut it in Pieces : But *Cassius* instead of rewarding the Captains of these Companies, crucified them all, saying, They ought not to fight without Order, for how did they know whether there were no Ambuscades there, and whether they might not expose the *Roman* Arms to a very great Affront ? This Cruelty rais'd a furious Mutiny in the Army. *Cassius*, who heard the Noise of the Soldiers, ran naked from the Place where he was Exercising himself, and Addressing himself to the boldest of them, and with a steady Voice and threatening Countenance cryed, *Kill your General, if you dare, and add a Crime to your Disobedience.* This Boldness frighted the Soldiers, who never fear but when they see they are not feared, and made the Enemies lose much of their Courage, who thought an Army, in which so rigorous and exact a Discipline was kept, as to punish even them that had conquered,

must be Invincible, and therefore fought for nothing more than a Peace. *Cassius* was likewise the first that cut off the Hands or else Ham-string'd Deserters, and forbad the Soldiers to carry any other Provisions, but Lard, Bisket and Vinegar. He himself made a Review of his Soldiers every Week, inspected their Arms and Cloaths, and exercised them; for he said, *It was a Shame that Wrestlers and Gladiators should be exercised, and not Soldiers, who find Labours much more supportable when they are accustomed to them.* Above all things he would suffer no Superfluity or Delicacy among them; and when he found any one in those Faults, he made him encamp all the Winter. This Severity of his Discipline made *Antoninus* gave him those Legions which had been debauch'd in *Syria* during *Verus's* Expedition: And here's the Letter which the Emperor wrote upon this occasion to one of his Lieutenants.

I Have given *Cassius* those Legions which the Debaucheries of *Syria* and *Daphne* had quite spoiled, and who were found by *Cesonius*, *Veſtilianus* drowned, as it were, in their hot Baths. I believe you will ap-
prove

prove of my Conduct, especially you knowing *Cassius* to be a Man that has the Severity and Discipline which belonged anciently to the *Cassii*; for it is by that alone that Soldiers can be governed. You know the famous Verse of an excellent Poet: The *Ennius*.
Ancient Discipline and the Ancient Severity are the only Supports of Empire. See only that there are no Provisions wanting to my Army, and if I know *Cassius* well, I can assure you they will not be stung away.

The Answer which this Lieutenant made the Emperor, affords us still more Knowledge both of the Behaviour and Reputation of *Cassius*: 'Twas thus,

YOU have done very well in giving the Syrian Legions to *Cassius*; for nothing is more necessary for Soldiers debauch'd with the Grecian Delicacies, than a General who is somewhat severe: He will have soon laid aside their hot Baths, and thrown away their Flowers and Essences that they perfume themselves with. Provisions are ready for the Army, nothing is wanting under a good Captain, for then little is required and little spent.

This

This *Cassius*, whose Manners were so severe, was nevertheless a *Syrian*, the Son of that *Heliodorus*, who for his great skill in Rhetorick, came to be Secretary to *Adrian*, and afterwards Governor of *Egypt*.

But Fortune, which cannot change the quality of a Mans Birth, yet often makes him have a desire to disguise it. *Cassius* no sooner found himself in a considerable Post, but he resolved to pass for a Descendent of the Ancient *Cassius*, who conspired against *Cesar*: For the agreement of Names is often more than two thirds of the Proof. After having founded his Pedigree upon this agreement, he was resolved to Establish and Confirm it, by imitating the Man from whom he said he was Descended, and like him he had a secret hatred of the very name of Emperor, and would say, *There was nothing more insupportable than this name, which could never be extinct, for He that went to suppress it, still reviv'd it*; and like him, he pretended to re-establish the Ancient Common-wealth: *Let the Gods only favour the Right Side*, would he ordinarily say, *and the Cassii will still restore the Common-wealth to all its Authority*. This hatred, strengthened by an un-

measurable

measurable Ambition, and flattered by the Prediction of some Fortune-tellers, who are never wanting in such encounters, designed to have broke out in the Reign of *Antoninus Pius*. *Cassius*, though he was then very young, had conspired against him; but *Heliodorus*, a very Grave and Wise Man, stifled the Conspiracy in its Birth, hoping his Son would grow wiser and amend with time. *Cassius*, during his Fathers Life, seem'd to make good use of his Advice, but this constrain only rous'd his Passion, which became at last so strong, that he could no longer conceal it. The Emperor *Vernus* was the first that perceived it in his Expedition to *Syria*; and fond of this opportunity of ruining a Man, whose great Exploits had rais'd his Jealousie, wrote to *Antoninus* about it after this manner.

Cassius aspires to the Empire, as it has appeared to me, and as it was long ago apparent in the Reign of my Grandfather, your Father. I would desire you therefore to let him be observed; whatever we do displeases him, and he heaps up vast Riches: He Jest's openly at your Love of your Studies, and calls you an old crabbed Philosopher, and me a little Debauchee.

See

See then what you have to do ; for my own part I bear no hatred to him ; but take good heed lest you and your Children suffer one Day, for having permitted such a Man to continue in your Army, whom the Soldiers bear with Delight, and see with Pleasure.

Antoninus imputing this Accusation to Verus's Jealousie, or to some private Pique, answered him thus.

I Have read your Letter, which is more becoming a Fearful and a Suspicious Man than an Emperor, and which is a Reproach to our Government. If the Gods have decreed to give the Empire to Cassius, it is not in our Power to hinder it : You know this Expression of your Grandfather Adrian, No Body ever slew his Successor ; but if it is against the Will of the Gods that he aspires to the Empire, he will be his own Ruin, without any Necessity of our being Cruel. Besides, it is not easie to proceed against a Man whom no Body accuses, and who, as you say, is so well beloved by the Soldiers. Nay, in Cases of Treason, the Publick almost always believe, That Injustice is done to those very Men who are palpably convicted of it. Have

you

you forgot what Adrian used to say upon this occasion ? There is nothing more unhappy than the Condition of Princes ; for it is never believed that there is a Design against them till they are found to be assassinated. Domitian was the first Author of so good a Sentence, but I chuse rather to quote Adrian for it, because the Words of Tyrants don't carry such Weights and Authority with them as those of good Princes. Let Cassius then follow his own Way and Custom, especially seeing he is a great Commander, strict, brave, and useful to the State. And whereas your Letter would insinuate that his death alone can secure my Children ; let my Children perish if Cassius deserves to be beloved more than they, and if it is more expedient for the Publick that Cassius live, than the Children of Antoninus.

The Event shewed the Emperor that Verus had made a true judgment concerning the designs of Cassius, and knew him better than he did : But it is common for Vertue always to judge favourably of others.

The Love which the People bore to Antoninus made it harder for Cassius to accomplish his Designs, and whatever
reliance

reliance he might have upon the People of *Egypt* and *Syria*, he had never gained his point if he had not took the advantage of a false Report that was spread of *Antoninus's* death. Some say he himself invented this Piece of News, and that *Faustina* seeing her Husband old, and broken with Sickness and Labours, and her Son *Commodus* too young to succeed him, and fearing lest she should fall from her Grandeur, held Intelligence with him, and by an extraordinary fetch of Politicks, stir'd up his Ambition, by offering him both her Bed and the Empire, which by this only means, as she pretended, could be secured to her Children. But there is no probability that *Faustina* would take such false measures, and the very Character of *Cassius* is alone enough to justify her. However it was, he publisht the news of the Emperor's death, with all the marks of the most sincere Affection, and to this he added, That the Army in *Pannonia* finding *Commodus* too young to be Emperor, had named him to succeed in his place. There was nothing more wanting to make this Title be confirmed, and after having disposed of the chief Commands in the Army; which he disposed of to
his

his Friends, he thought of securing all that might possibly make Head against him, and in a little time he brought under his subjection all the Country from *Syria* to Mount *Taurus*. At the same time he wrote to his Son who was Governor of *Alexandria* this Letter, which was a kind of *Manifesto*.

THere is nothing more miserable than that State which nourishes in its Bowels such sort of People, as all the Riches in the World can never satisfy. Marcus Antoninus is undoubtedly a very good Man, but for the vain Title of *Clemency* he bears with those Men whose Life he himself disapproves. Where is that *Cassius* whose Name we bear to no purpose? Where is *Cato* the Censor? Where is the discipline of our Ancestors? It died with those great Men, and at present there is no more search made after it. Antoninus is wholly taken up with his Philosophy, he is looking after the nature of the Elements and the Soul, and discoursing all day what is honest and what just, and takes no care at all of the Common-wealth. You see then that for the reducing it to its Primitive Constitution, it is absolutely necessary that Fire and Sword should be employed. What
should

Should I suffer these Governors of Provinces, if we may call such People Governors and Proconsuls, who think that Antoninus and the Senate have given them Provinces only to grow rich there and live at their pleasure? You have heard how this Philosopher's Captain of the Guards, was a meer Wretch the night before his Promotion to that Dignity, and now all of a sudden is grown prodigiously rich: Whence think you this Wealth can come, but from the Bowels of the Common-wealth and the goods of private Persons? But 'tis very well they are so opulent, the publick Treasure will be enriched with their Spoils. Let the Gods but favour the right side, and the Cassii will still restore the Common-wealth to all its Authority.

Martius Verus the Lieutenant General, who, as has been already said, had great share in those Victories which Cassius gained in Armenia, and who commanded then in Cappadocia, dispatched Couriers to Antoninus. This Prince fearing lest Cassius should find some means of seizing Commodus, or else dispatching him, wrote immediately with all secrecy to Rome to have him come to him, and in the mean time endeavoured to conceal this News from

from the Army; but when he knew it was divulged, and the Camp in a commotion, and that some Soldiers made Parties, he called them together, and spoke to 'em in these Words: Fellow Soldiers, I don't come hither either to be angry or to complain: For to what purpose is it to be angry at Providence, that disposes all things as it pleases? Perhaps Complaints might be more excusable, especially when one suffers 'em. In short, is it not very troublesome to be continually tost by new Tempests into new Wars? Is it not horrible to see ones self engaged in a Civil War? But is it not still more troublesome and horrible to see that there is no more Faith in Man; and that one of those whom I thought to have the greatest concern for my Interest, should rebel against me without my having done him the least Injustice, or being wanting to him in any thing whatsoever? Where can Vertue henceforth be secure? Where is a faithful Friendship to be found? Is not Truth dead, and then what can be hoped for among Men? If this danger reached no farther than my self, I should be very little concerned at it, for I am not Immortal; but since it is a publick Revolt we are all equally threatened, I should be very willing that Cassius would come hither,

and clear all our differences before you, or the Senate, by the ordinary Forms of Justice. For without Fighting, with all my Heart I would yield him up the Empire, if it should be judged a thing necessary for the State. It is only for the State that I have so long sustained so great Labours, and expose my self to so many difficulties. It is for that alone that I live so long at such a distance from Italy, old and infirm as I am, and that I dont make one Meal without care, nor have on single moment of easie rest. But Cassius would never consent to this; for how could he trust himself with me, after such base perfidiousness? In the mean time, my Companions, take Courage; the Cilicians, the Syrians, the Egyptians and the Jews, never were nor will be so brave as you, though they should be as far above you in number as at present they are below you. Cassius himself as great a Commander as he is, and after all the great Actions he has done, ought to be esteemed as nothing: For what can an Eagle do that leads on Pigeons to fight, or a Lion followed only by Hinds? Besides 'tis not Cassius that has Conquered the Arabians and Parthians; 'tis you. And whatever Reputation he may have gained by that War, yet have you not Martius Verus, who

who yields to him in nothing, and who contributed as much if not more to our Victories? But perhaps Cassius may at present be informed that I am alive, and has repented of his rashness: For if he had not thought me dead, he had never made this Enterprize: And though he still persists in it, yet when he knows that we march against him, both fear and shame will make him lay down his Arms. My Companions, the only thing that I fear is, lest Cassius not having the Face to endure our presence and come into our sight, should kill himself; or some one knowing that we are coming to fight him, should do us this ill Office, and ravish from me the most glorious Prize that I can hope for from my Victory. And what then is this Prize? 'Tis to pardon an Enemy; to shew Friendship to a Man that has violated all the Bonds of Friendship, and to continue faithful to one so perfidious. This may seem incredible, but you ought not to disbelieve it; for in short, all that is good has not entirely left the Earth, and there remains still some Footsteps of the ancient Vertue. If the Gods favour me so far as to put an happy end to these disorders, I shall have the satisfaction of shewing you that which at present may appear impossible; and I shall at least extract this good from so much

mischiefe, That I shall convince Men of this important Truth, that a good Use may be made even of Civil Wars.

He wrote the same thing to the Senate, who declared *Cassius* a Publick Enemy, and confiscated all his Goods to the use of the City, the Emperor having refused to take them to his own. In the mean time *Commodus* arrived at the Army, *Antoninus* gave him immediately the Tribunician Power; and having ordered all things for the march of the Army, went into *Italy* for the Empress and his other Children, whom he resolved to carry with him: Being come to Mount *Alba*, he wrote this Letter to *Faustina*.

VERUS wrote truth when he gave me the advise that *Cassius* would usurp the Empire. I believe you have heard what the Fortune-tellers have foretold him. Come then to *Alba*, where I expect you, that under the Protection of the Gods we may discourse of our Affairs, and fear nothing.

Faustina made him this Answer.

I Will

I Will come to morrow to *Alba* according to your Orders; in the mean time I beseech you, if you love your Children, root out these Rebels; It is an ill custom to let Captains and Souldiers take advantage of you, who will at last infallibly ruin you, if you don't prevent them.

Faustina being hindred from going to Mount *Alba*, *Antoninus* wrote to her to come to *Formia*, where he was to embark, but the sickness of their eldest Daughter detaining her still at *Rome*, she wrote him this Letter.

IN *Cassius's* revolt, the Empress *Faustina*, my Mother, advised our Father *Antoninus* to be good to his own first, and then to Strangers: For an Emperor can't be said to be good, that has no care of his Wife and Children. You see the Age and Condition of our Son *Commodus*; our Son in Law *Pompeianus* is Old and a Stranger. Look then what you have to do with *Cassius* and his Accomplices. Spare not those Traytors, who have not spared you, and who would neither spare Me, nor Our Children if they could compass their Designs. I will follow you instantly. *Fadilia's* sickness

ness has hindred my coming to Formiæ, but if I cannot get thither, I hope I shall meet you at Capua; the good Air of that place may recover Me and my Children. I desire you to send your Phisitian Sotiridas from Formiæ, for I have no great opinion of Sositheus, who does not know how to deal with Children.

Calphurnius has delivered me all your Letters, the Seals safe: I will answer them if my departure be delayed, and I will send the trusty Cælitius, who shall have order to tell you by word of mouth what Cassius's Wife, Children, and Son in Law say of you, which I cannot put in writing.

Cassius, who was too able a man not to know that great Crimes must have a speedy execution, endeavour'd to draw Greece to his side, that his way might lay open to Italy. Foreseeing therefore that Herod's Credit and Eloquence might be useful to him in this design, he omitted nothing that might gain him, and stir up that resentment which he supposed he might have conceived against Antoninus; but Herod without hearkning to his Proposals, or reading his Letters through, made him this an-
swer,

swer, which was such a one as he deserv'd. Herod to Cassius. You're mad.

Cassius was not more successful in other places; he could not bring over any considerable City, nor gain any to his Party, but such as were already ruin'd by their Debts and Vices. This bad success brought him into discredit with the Souldiers, and at last having rather dreamt that he was Emperor, than been so really, he was slain three months and six days after his Revolt. His Head was carried to the Emperor, and presented to him whilst he was at Formiæ, as may be seen in his Answer to a Letter which Faustina sent him after she received the news of the death of Cassius.

NO one can shew greater Tenderneſs and Affection, my dear Faustina, than you do to me and our Children. I have here at Formiæ read over and over again the Letter, in which you advise me, to punish Cassius's Accomplices. But for my part I am resolved to pardon his Wife, his Children, and his Son in Law, and I am going to write to the Senate, that their Proscription be not too harsh, nor their Punishment too severe: For there is nothing more recommends a Roman Emperor than Clemency,

This Answer in the Original was in.

mency. *It is that which has raised Cæsar and Augustus to the Rank of Gods, and made our Father deserve the Name of Pius. In short, had this War been ended, as I desired, even Cassius himself had not been slain. Rest content therefore: The Gods take care of me, and my Piety is acceptable to them. I have named our Son Pompeianus Consul for the Year ensuing.*

This Clemency was admired by some, and condemned by others. One of these last took the Liberty of asking *Antoninus* one Day, What he thought *Cassius* would have done if he had conquer'd? He answered him: *We have not served the Gods so ill, nor lived after such a manner, as to have any cause to fear that Cassius should vanquish us.*

After this he reckon'd up those Princes who had been driven out, or defeated by Rebels, or slain by their Subjects, and shewed that their Unhappiness was brought upon them by their Cruelty or their ill Conduct. For, said he, *Nero and Caligula were the only Authors of their own Misfortunes: Otho and Vitellius had not the Courage to reign, and Galba was ruined by his Avarice. He added, That you should scarce find a good Prince that*

had

had such Fortune, and quoted the Examples of Augustus, Trajan, Adrian and Antoninus Pius, who all triumphed over their Domestick Enemies, the greatest part of which were slain against the Conquerers Order, or without his Knowledge. It were much to be wished that this Maxim were true, but in these latter Ages there are but too sure Proofs, that it is not always so. Antoninus wrote afterwards to the Senate, and this is what remains of his Letter.

IN Consideration then of my Victory, you have given your Consent that my Son-in-law Pompeianus shall be Consul. His Age ought long ago to have been honour'd with that Dignity, if such deserving Men had not been presented to it, to whom it was but just that the Publick should acquit itself of the Obligations it had to them. As for what relates to the Revolt of Cassius, I pray and conjure you, to remit your usual Severity, and not do so much Wrong to my Piety and Clemency, or rather to your own, as to condemn any Person to Death. Let no Senator be punish'd, nor any Nobleman's Blood be spilt; recal the Exiles, and let the proscribed Persons enjoy their Goods. Would to God even those who are

Dead

Dead could be recalled from their Graves; for I no ways approve the Revenge which an Emperor takes of his Private Injuries: It always appears too great, how just soever it may be. Wherefore you shall pardon Cassius's Children, his Wife, and his Son-in-law: But say I you shall pardon? alas they have done nothing, let them therefore live in Safety, and perceive that they live under the Government of Marcus Antoninus. Let the Goods belonging to their Family be restored them, that having their Gold, their Silver, and their Moveables, they may be Rich without Fear, and enjoy perfect Liberty, and where ever they go may bear the Marks of my Goodness and of yours. 'Tis no great Mercy to pardon the Wives and Children of them who are Proscribed: I beseech you do more for my sake; deliver from Death, Proscription, Fear, Hatred, Infamy, and Protect from all manner of Injury those Conspirators who are of the Body of Knights or Senators, and let this be allowed to my Government: That so in the Crime of Treason one may approve, or at least excuse the Death of such as have been slain by the Chance of War.

The reading of this Letter was followed with a thousand Acclamations, and

and a thousand Blessings. In the mean Time the Emperor having caused the Head of *Cassius* to be buried, and testified the Grief that he had for his Death, continued his Journey to accomplish the appeasing of this Revolt, and to make the People and Army of the *East* return to their Duty. He began with *Egypt*, and pardoned all the Cities that had taken *Cassius's* part, and left one of his Daughters at *Alexandria*, as a Pledge of his Friendship.

Coming to *Pelusium* he found that they celebrated Feasts there in honour of *Serapis*, to which they came from all Parts of *Egypt*, which gave occasion to a thousand Debaucheries and Excess; without Fear therefore of the People, who do not willingly suffer their Religion to be meddled with, he abolished those Feasts, and ordered, That the Sacrifices should be performed in private by the Priests, without the People's assisting at them. Where-ever he passed, he went into the Temples, the Schools, and all Publick Places, and instructed the People, conversing familiarly with them, and explaining to them the greatest Difficulties in Philosophy, leaving the Marks of his Wisdom in all Places.

The

The first thing that he did in *Syria* was to burn all the Letters that were found in *Cassius's* Closet, that he might not against his own Inclinations be forced to hate any Body. Others pretend, that *Martinus Verus*, whom the Emperor sent before him into *Syria*, the Government of which Place was conferred on him as a Reward of his Fidelity; had already burnt them by his own Authority, saying, It would please the Emperor; but if he should have the ill Fortune to displease him, he should not be troubled at Death, when it was to save the Life of so many Persons. This Example of the Love of ones Neighbour is very rare in a Heathen, but I don't know whether it is not as rare in a Courtier.

A.D. 176.

Towards the latter End of this Year *Antoninus* was proclaimed Emperor the eighth Time, for the Medals joyn this eighth Title with the twenty ninth Year of his Tribunical Power.

Faustina died in this Voyage, at the Foot of the Mountain *Taurus*: *Antoninus* was sensibly concerned at her Death, and the Senate thinking she would have incensed him against the Conspirators, and that he could not find greater Comfort than in seeing them sacrificed to her Grief,

Grief, increased their Severity, out of Complaisance and Flattery, Vices which don't reign less in the most illustrious Assemblies than in the Hearts of Private Persons. But the Emperor being advertised of the Intention of the Senate, wrote a second Time to them, to assure them, That this Rigor would but increase his Grief; he prayed them to put no Body to Death, and concluded his Letter with these Words: *If I cannot obtain from you the Life of all the Conspirators, you will make me desire to die.*

That no more such Revolts might happen, he ordered, That no Person, for the future should command the Province he was born in.

Among *Cassius's* Children, the eldest only, called *Mecianus*, Governor of *Alexandria*, was slain in his Government the same Day that *Cassius* was in *Syria*. *Heliodorus* only was banish'd to an Island, the others simply banished, and their Estates continued to them. His Daughter *Alexandra* and her Husband *Druncianus* had the Liberty of Retiring whither they pleased, or else of staying at *Rome*. *Antoninus* preserved to them all their Rights, and had always such a Regard for them, that in a great Tryal which

which they had before the Senate, he forbade the adverse Party to reproach them, either directly or indirectly, with the Misfortunes of their Family, and that they should be fined if they failed in it.

In the mean Time, the Senate, who saw that they could not make their court to the Emperor by their Cruelties; endeavoured to do it by inventing new Honours for *Faustina*. They were not content to raise a Temple to her, but ordered likewise her Statue to be made in Gold, and that every Time the Emperor went to the Theatre, this Statue should be set in the Place where she used to see the Shews, and that the chief Roman Ladies should be round about the Seat. But there was a newer Piece of Flattery; They decreed Silver Statues to *Antoninus* and *Faustina*, placed them in the Temple of *Venus*, and erected an Altar to them, whither it was ordained that all the young Maidens of Rome should go to sacrifice on their Wedding Day along with those who were to marry them.

Antoninus returned the Senate Thanks for all these Honours, and after the Example of *Antoninus Pius*, he founded a Society of young Maids, whom he bred

at his own Expence, and called them *Faustinians*, and built a Temple to his Wife in the Town where she died. This Temple had afterwards a Chance which became the Divinity which presided there: For it was consecrated to *Heliogabalus*, who was the true God of Impunity.

After the Re-establishment of Peace in the East, *Antoninus* took his Journey to Rome. He made some stay at *Smyrna*, and all People coming to salute him, he recollected one Night that he had not seen *Aristides*, and feared he had neglected him: For it was one of his principal Maxims, always to distinguish and honour Vertue, and to treat every one according to his Merit. He shewed his uneasiness to his Courtiers, and above all to the *Quintilians*, who were Governors of Greece. They assured him that *Aristides* had not yet been there, for they should not have failed to have taken him from the Crowd and presented him to him; however the next day they brought him. As soon as *Antoninus* saw him; *Aristides*, said he to him, *How comes it that you were so long before you saw me? I was at study*, replied *Aristides*, *and you know better than any Body that when one is*
busie

busie, the Mind cannot endure that any thing should interrupt its Meditation. The Emperor charmed with this Character so plain and natural, said to him, *When shall we hear you then?* You have nothing to do, replied Aristides, with the same Freedom, But to give me a Subject, and you shall hear me to morrow, for we are none of these who discourse at random, but who first study for it: I only beg your leave that all my Friends may come with me. *It is granted,* said the Emperor. But upon condition too, added Aristides, That they shall clap their Hands and applaud as they please, and cry out as if you were not present. Oh for that, replied the Emperor, smilingly, That shall be wholly left to you, you shall be Master. Aristides the next day spoke in praise of the City of Smyrna with a great deal of Success, and we have this Oration among his Works.

From Smyrna the Emperor went to Athens, where, according to his Desires, he was initiated in the Grand Mysteries of Ceres, which was the most Religious, and the most solemn of all the Pagan Devotions: For to be admitted there, one must always have led a very innocent Life, and have no Crime to be objected

to

to one. It was likewise the Custom to be prepared for it, by a General Examination made before a Priest, appointed to judge of the Condition of those who presented themselves.

He did a great many Honours to the Athenians, and established in their City Professors in all sorts of Sciences, with large Pensions; he made them magnificent Presents, and granted them a great many Privileges and Immunities. In his Passage by Sea, there was a horrible Tempest, in which he thought he should be cast away. As soon as he came to Brundisium, he quitted his Soldiers Habit, and made all his Soldiers do so too; who during his Reign never appeared in Italy but in their Gowns.

He was received at Rome with all imaginable signs of Joy: And immediately, because he had been absent almost eight Year, he distributed eight Pieces of Gold to each one of the People, remitted all that they owed to the Publick and Private Treasury for threescore Years past, burnt all their Bills in the midst of the Market-Place; gave his Son Commodus the Habit of a Man, made him Prince of the Youth, associated him in the Empire, triumphed with him, named him Con-
L ful

A.D. 176.

ful for the Year ensuing ; and to honour his Consulship, followed his Chariot on Foot, when he went to the *Circus*. He retired afterwards for some time to *Lavinium*, into the Arms of Philosophy, which he called his *Mother*, opposing it to the Court, which he called his *Step-Mother*. He had always this Expression of *Plato's* in his Mouth, *That People were happy whose Philosophers were Kings, or whose Kings were Philosophers*. In the mean time knowing that a People Victorious and in Peace cannot be without Shows, and that Prudence requires that they should be amused with innocent Diversions to ease them after their Labours, and to hinder them from thinking of Novelties, which are always fatal to the Common-wealth ; he exhibited to them such as were very magnificent, though naturally he himself had but a small share in those Diversions.

A.D. 177. Whilst *Rome* enjoyed the presence of her Emperor and the delights of that Peace which her labours had procured her, *Smyrna* was destroyed by Fire and an Earthquake, which buried the greatest part of the Inhabitants under the ruins of the Houses. *Aristides* upon this wrote so moving a Letter to the Emperor,

ror, that he could not forbear Weeping at the Reading of it, and immediately issued forth his Orders, established such Funds as were necessary, and committed it to a Senator's care to see it so Rebuilt, as that it might have no cause to regret its ancient Magnificence. The Inhabitants of *Smyrna* out of Gratitude to *Aristides*, erected his Statue in Brass in the midst of the Market-place. A thing particular enough, and which alone may shew a happy Age, when the Honour due to the sole Bounty of a Prince, was entirely rendred to the Eloquence of an Orator. *Antoninus* by their means recompensed the *Smyrnians*, for the Fidelity and the Services they had done him. For in the Revolt of the *Parthians*, *Alidius Cornelianus* having been worsted and wounded by them, and his Troops broken and put to flight, *Smyrna* received them, buried *Cornelianus*, who died of his Wounds, and the People strove who should treat the Soldiers most kindly, gave them all Cloaths, Arms, Money, as *Venussum* had done heretofore to those who escaped from the defeat at *Cannæ*. What the Emperor did for *Smyrna* he had already done in *Italy*, and besides for several other Cities which had had

the same Misfortune, as *Carthage*, *Ephesus* and *Nicomedia*.

The Expences of his Shows, the Presents he bestowed on the People, the immense Sums that he gave to rebuild the Cities ruined by Earthquakes and Fire, and the Taxes that he forgave the People in his most pressing necessities, are sufficient to take away the Reproach that has been made of his not being Liberal. He was indeed a good Husband after the Example of *Antoninus Pius* his Father; and managed his Revenues with a great deal of care. But when the Glory of the State or the ease of the People were concerned, his Largesses went even to Prodigality, being persuaded that these are the only occasions on which a Prince may be Prodigal, and that Covetousness then is a dangerous Mischief. He was used to say, that Subjects who saw a Prince liberal in publick, and a good manager in his private Concerns, pay their Duties with more satisfaction, because they are convinced that his Riches are the source of their Happiness, and their Abundance. One must not be surprized at the little Justice that is rendred to *Antoninus* upon this Account: The Largesses of Princes that are ill designed, are those

those only which the People honour with the Title of Liberality, whereas those which are ordered by Prudence and Reason, pass for Avarice in their Esteem: For they never knew the difference between giving and squandering, and they judge of Gifts only by their own greediness. It is certain that *Rome* never had a Prince that did so much good as *Antoninus*, and he was the first that built a Temple to the Goddess that presides over Benefits; and which perhaps was the only Vertue that the *Romans* did not then adore. But the introducing of this new Worship belonged only to him who knew so perfectly all the Ceremonies and Customs of it, and practised them continually. The Medals shew that at the end of the year he received the Title of *Imperator* the ninth time, which they joyn with the thirty first year of his Tribunitial Power.

Fabia, that we spoke of before, who was *Verus's* Mistress, though she was his Sister, and who had not less Ambition than Impudence, endeavoured to try the last efforts of her decaying Charms, and lest nothing undone that might oblige the Emperor to marry her. The Emperor who knew her better than he did

Faustina, and besides never thought of Marrying again, always resisted her Solicitations ; nay they write, that rather than let his Children have a Mother in Law, he kept a Mistress. It is not a sure way of refusing what is said of Men, by saying it is contrary to their usual Discourse ; for there is not always a perfect Harmony between their Words and Actions. But since *Antoninus's* Life through the whole course of it, corresponds with his Maxims, one may on good Grounds doubt of this particularity ; and there needs no other Mark of its falsity, than the Thanks he gives the Gods in his first Book, that he was Educated no longer time near his Grand fathers Mistress. How would he have given his Children such an example, as he thanks the Gods he had not long in the House where he was bred ?

The Peace which they enjoyed did not last two years. The *Scythians* and People of the North took Arms, and attacked the Emperor's Lieutenants, who were not in a condition of making a long resistance. This obliged *Antoninus* to prepare for his departure : He went therefore to the Senate, and this was the first time that he asked them to have

Mony

Mony out of the publick Treasury. This Mony was in his own Power, if he would have made use of his Authority ; but he said that Emperors had no propriety to any thing, not so much as to the Palace in which they liv'd or belong'd ; for these are his Words to the Senate and the People. After this he Married his Son to *Crispina* the Daughter of *Beutius Kalens*, a Man of consular Dignity ; and after the Marriage which was without any Pomp, he went to the Temple of *Bellona* where he performed the Ceremony of the Javelin. This Ceremony was very ancient, and was never performed but when the War was to be carried beyond the Seas into a foreign Country. The Emperor went into the Temple, took the bloody Javelin that was kept there, and threw it over against the Column that was in the *Flamanian Circus*.

The *Romans* seeing their Emperor old and broken, yet ready still to go and expose himself to all the dangers of a new War, and fearing at the same time to be deprived of this Prince, and that Prudence which seemed to breath in only him, assembled themselves before the Palace to pray him not to leave them, till he

had given them some Precepts for their Conduct, that if the Gods should take him away they might by this help continue in the same Path of Vertue which he had lead them into by his Example. *Antoninus* moved to see their good Dispositions, spent three whole Days in explaining to them the greatest Difficulties of Morality, and in giving them short Maxims by which they might regulate all their Actions.

He departed afterwards with *Commodus*, and gave the Command of the Army to *Paternus*. The *Scythians* lost the best part of their Troops in the first Fight, which was so stubborn that it lasted from Morning till Night. The Army then proclaimed *Antoninus* *Imperator* the ninth Time.

It were to be wish'd that we had the exact particulars of these last Campaigns, which were so glorious to this Prince: But since there is no Author remaining that has wrote of them, we must be contented with knowing, That this War had not fewer Difficulties than the former; that the King of the *Scythians* beheaded several Officers upon Suspicion of their holding Intelligence with the *Romans*; that *Antoninus* fought several
Bloody

Bloody Battles, where the Victory was always owing to his Prudence, and that great Example of Bravery which he gave his Army; that he was always at the Head of them, in Places which were most exposed to Danger; that he built Forts, into which he put good Garrisons, to keep the Country in aw, and that about the Time that he was going to open the third Campagne, in the beginning of *March*, he was seized at *Vienna* In Austria, others say at *Sirmium*. with a Sicknes, that carried him off in few Days. 'Tis said that his Physicians hastned his Death, to make their court to *Commodus*: If this be true, as *Dion* assures us, *Antoninus* had more reason than he thought, for saying to himself, as he often did: *How many things have we which make our Death be desired by a multitude of People? Those whom I have loved most are those who desire I should die, hoping that my Death may procure them some Advantage.* And he did not forget to practise the Precept which he gave at the same Time; *However, don't go out of this Life, with any ill Wishes to them; but on the contrary, according to thy good Custom, give them all the Testimonies of Friendship, Sweetness of Temper and good will: For the same Dion reports, That there*

there was very great Care taken to conceal the Cause of his Death; that he recommended his Son to the Army, and when the Tribune came to him for Orders, he sent him to him saying, *Go to the Rising Sun*. But his being so very young, that he could not as yet have given any Signs of so Vicious a Nature, must render this particular very improbable, and it is manifestly contradicted by *Herodian*, who tells us, This Prince was not debauched till after the Death of *Antoninus*. The Hatred that he soon drew upon himself by his Cruelties, made them without doubt willing to impute this Parricide to him, that there might be no Crime that he was not blackned with, the People easily believing that Princes have done every thing which their last Actions shew them to have been capable of doing. *Antoninus's* Sickneſs ſoon became deſperate. In this Extremity, which is commonly as a Rock to moſt Men's Conſtancy, this wiſe Emperor made it appear, That thoſe Truths which he had always made Profeſſion of, were ſo deeply graven on his Heart that nothing was able to efface them. But if onth' one ſide, his Submiſſion to the Orders of Providence made him eaſie to receive his Death;

Death: So on the other, the Love which he had for his People filled his Heart with Fear and Bitterneſs. As his laſt Hour approached he found his Pains increaſe, and he paſſed the Day before his Death in a perpetual inquietude. The Examples of all thoſe Princes who coming very young to the Throne, had not been able to reſiſt their Vices, their Fortune and their Flatteries came continually into his Mind. The Life of *Nero*, and that of *Domitian* ſtill increaſed his Troubles, and he feared leſt his Son, not able to keep himſelf up, upon ſuch a Slippery Place, ſhould forget the good Education he had given him, and loſing all thoſe Seeds of Vertue that he had cultivated with ſo much Care, ſhould plunge himſelf into all ſorts of Debaucheries, and at laſt become a Tyrant to his People inſtead of being their Father and Protector. Beſides, he ſaw his Conqueſts in the North unſettled, the People inclinable to revolt, and the Enemies with their Swords in their Hands, who were the more to be feared for having been often vanquiſhed. He apprehended therefore, and that with good Reaſon, that his Death would re-unite all theſe People, and make them take the Advantage of his Son's Youth

Youth and small Experience to efface the Dishonour of their Defeats. Struggling with these Thoughts, and fluctuating between Hope and Fear, and his Soul overwhelmed with Care, he commanded that his Friends and Principal Officers should come in. When he saw them about his Bed, he made Commodus come near, and gathering together that little Strength he had left, he sat up and spoke to them in these Words.

The Grief which you shew to see me in the condition I am in, does not at all surprize me; Compassion is natural to Men, and the Evils which they see continually, enlarge it. But I am persuaded, That these Tears which I see you shed, come for me from another Spring; and the Affections that I have for you makes me reasonably expect a mutual Friendship on your part. This is the favourable Time which will give us both Opportunities, to me of knowing whether I have rightly placed that Esteem and Consideration which I have always had of you, and to you of shewing me your Acknowledgments, in letting me see, That you have not forgot the Benefits that you have received from me. You see before your Eyes my Son, whom you your selves have brought up, and who being just now in the Flower of

of his Youth, as in a Stormy Sea, has need of wise Governors, lest being hurried away by his Passions, as by violent Winds, he may throw himself into Vicious Courses. Instead therefore of one Father, whom he is about to lose, let him find many in you; have you Care of his Youth, give him such Counsels as he needs; represent to him, That neither all the Riches in the World are sufficient to satisfy the Luxury of Tyrants, nor the Guards that watch about their Palaces are able to defend them against the hatred of their People. Make him remark, That we see no Princes enjoy long and quiet Reigns, but such, who instead of exciting hatred by their Cruelties and Violences, have on the contrary by their Mildness raised Love in the Hearts of their Subjects. Tell him continually, That they are never those who serve out of Constraint, but they that obey voluntarily, who continue faithful in all Tryals, and who in no encounter can be suspected either of Flattery or Dissimulation. Let him know that these are the only Men who never fall into Disobedience, at least unless they are forced to it by ill Usage. But at the same time be not wanting to set before him how difficult, and yet how Necessary it is in an Absolute Power to moderate and set Bounds to his Desires: If you
instruct

instruct him in these Truths, if you incessantly make him recollect what he has heard, together with the Satisfaction of forming a good Emperor for your selves and the whole Empire, you will have the Comfort of rendering to my Memory the greatest of all your Services, since by this means you will make it immortal.

As he was speaking these last Words he was seized with a Weakness, which took away the use of his Voice; he fell upon his Bed, and died the next Day, being infinitely regretted by those of his own Time, and leaving an Eternal Remembrance of his Vertues to Posterity. When the News of his Death was publick, there was a general Affliction throughout the Army and all *Italy*: There never was so great Mourning, nor was *Rome* in the like Consternation; it seemed as if the Glory, the Prosperity of the Empire, that all was dead with *Antoninus*. Some called him their Father, others their Brother, these their brave Commander, those their good Emperor, their Wise and Prudent Prince, and the Pattern of all Vertues; and which is very strange, among so many thousand Men, who all gave him different Praises, there was not one who did not speak Truth.

The

The Senate and People adored him before his Funerals were over, and as if it had been a small thing to raise him a Golden Statue in the *Julian Chamber*, and to decree him all Divine Honours, they declared such Persons to be Sacrilegious as had not in their Houses, according to their Quality, either a Picture or a Statue of *Antoninus*.

The Place where the Senate assembled.

So there died in his fifty ninth Year almost compleat, the best and greatest Emperor that *Rome* ever had. He reigned nine Years with his Brother and ten alone; and his greatest Happiness was to die before he knew the wicked Inclinations of his Son, who was a Monster in all sorts of Vices.

The E N D.

Printed for Tho. Bennet at the Half Moon in
S. Paul's Church-yard.

A Critical History of the New Testament, in two Parts, by *Father Simon*, of the Oratory, together with a Refutation of such Passages as are contrary to the Doctrine of the Church of *England*.

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The Works of the Learned, or an Historical Account and Impartial Judgment of Books newly published both in *England* and Foreign Parts; published every Month, by *J. de la Croze*, a late Author of the Universal and Historical Bibliotheque.

Two Sermons before the Queen in *July*, 1691. by *R. Meggot*, D. D. Dean of *Winchester*.

A Sermon preached before the Queen, *Aug. 16*. 1691. by *N. Resbury*, Chaplain to their Majesties.

A Sermon preached before the Honourable House of Commons, *November 26*. 1691. being a day of Thanksgiving; by *W. Fane* D. D. Dean of *Glocester*.

A Sermon preached before the King and Queen, *November 29*. 1691. by the Right Reverend Father in God, *Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester*.

Aristo. Historia LXXII. Interpretum, accessere Veterum Testimonia de eorum versione; Oxonii, è Theatro Sheldoniano.

Librorum Manuscriptorum in Duabus Insignibus Bibliothecis, altera Tenesoniana, Londini; altera Dugdaliana, Oxonii; edit. E. G. Oxonii è Theatro Sheldoniano.

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

THE
ROMAN EMPEROUR,
HIS
MEDITATIONS
Concerning HIMSELF:
Treating of a Natural Man's
Happiness: Wherein it consisteth,
and of the Means to attain unto it.

Translated out of the Original *GREEK*;
with *NOTES*.

BY
MERIC CASAUBON, D. D. and Prebendary
of *Christ-Church, Canterbury*.

The Fifth Edition.

ECCLUS 18. 8.
What is man, and whereto serveth he?
What is his good, and what is his evil?

L O N D O N,

TO THE
Most Reverend Father in GOD,
W I L L I A M,

By the Divine Providence,
Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury*,
Primate of all *ENGLAND*, and
Metropolitane; One of the Lords
of His Majesty's most Honourable
Privy Council, and Chancellour
of the University of *Oxford*: My very
Honourable good Lord.

May it please your Grace,



*Present here unto you
the Writings of a King.
I have presumed that
You would honour that
sacred Name even in
a Heathen so far, as to accept of the
Work, were it but for the Authour's
sake. For as it may well be esteemed
(in such an Age as this) none of Your
Grace's least commendations, that*

The Epistle Dedicatory.

you are truly φιλοσοφικὸς, so I suppose Your self account it no small happiness, that You live to serve so Great and Gracious a King. But if the bare Name of a King would not serve, I could add, that they are the Writings of the Wisest, the Learned'st, the Best that ever was among Heathen Kings, if Historians may be credited. It is observed by some of them as a great argument of the Divine Providence, that such a Prince was provided against such times, when all things seemed to tend to ruine and confusion, and all humane ordinary means were thought too little to keep the Empire standing: the happy preservation whereof they generally ascribe to the singular and extraordinary Wisdom of this One; both in his Wars abroad; and in his Civil Government at home. Hence it is, that as of a man of whom there is no
hope,

The Epistle Dedicatory.

hope, we commonly say, Nè Salus quidem: so was it used as a Proverb in after-ages by some of them, of a State irrecoverably gone, and declined, Nè Marcus quidem. As for his Learning, I could wish Your Grace had the leisure to peruse the Historian's own words, lest mine may seem too hyperbolical, and yet come far short of their expressions. What shall I say then of his Integrity, which is so commended by them, as it alone might well be thought sufficient without any other commendation, to make him Incomparable? And indeed I fear I have spoken but improperly, when I have mentioned his Wisdom, Learning and Integrity, as three several Excellencies, since that (as he himself professed, and they report of him) all the Learning he was ambitious of, was but to be Wise; and all the Wisdom, but to be Good. The Writings of such a one

The Epistle Dedicatory.

I know Your Grace would respect, although he had been no King. And yet another reason, which hath made me the bolder to present them to Your Grace is, because in reading them You shall often reade Your self; and though perchance Your Modesty will not suffer You to make the application, yet others will, I am sure, that shall reade him; and I could not but have respect unto it. Upon these reasons I have presumed. If beyond reason; I can excuse my boldness no otherwise, but as I am,

YOUR GRACE'S

Humbly devoted Chaplain,

Meric Casaubon.

Some few Testimonies concerning *Antoninus*, and these his Books.

Out of *SUIDAS*.

MARCUS the Roman Emperour, whom it is easier to admire in silence, than to praise, it being altogether impossible to equal his merits with any expression of words. For from his youth, having betaken himself to a composed and settled course of life, he was never seen to alter his countenance, through either fear, or pleasure. He most approved the Stoicks, and was their follower, not onely in their order and discipline of life, but also in their course and method of Learning. He therefore from his younger years, became so famous and illustrious, that Adrianus intended oftentimes to settle the Empire upon him: but having after a more legal way first settled it upon Antoninus Pius, he nevertheless reserved the succession of it unto Marcus. He thought good also by marriage to allie him unto Antoninus Pius, that so by succession of blood also he might come to the Empire. As for Marcus, he still continued in the same private course of life, and in the like subjection as other Romans did, and was in nothing altered by this adoption and new affinity. And when he

was come to the Empire; and had the absolute power in his hands, [or, and was an absolute Monarch:] he was never known to do any thing insolently, but as in matters of bounty he was always most free and exuberant; so in his government, he was no less meek and moderate.

Again out of the same.

Marcus Antoninus, a Roman Emperour, having deserved in all things the commendation of a perfect Philosopher, &c. He hath written concerning the course of his own life, twelve Books.

Athenagoras, a Philosopher of Athens, in his Apology for the Christians addressed unto Marcus Antoninus, and his Son Commodus, by way of humble Mediation and Intercession.

I know well enough, that ye do not more surpass others in royal power and prudence, than in the exact perfection of all manner of Learning: so that even they that have singled out, and wholly applied themselves to any one part, have not attained to that happy perfection in that one, which ye have attained unto in all parts of Learning.

Jul. Capitol. in vita Marci.

Erat enim ipse tantæ tranquillitatis, ut vul-
tum nunquam mutaverit moerore vel gaudio,
Philoso-

Philosophiæ deditus Stoicæ, quam & per optimos quosque magistros acceperat, & undique ipse collegerat.

Vulcatius Gallicanus, in Avidio Cassio.

NEC desuere qui illum [Cassium, scil.] Catilinam vocarent; cum & ipse gauderet se ita appellari, addens futurum se Sergium, si Dialogistam occidisset, Antoninum hoc nomine significans; qui tantum enituit in Philosophia, ut iturus ad bellum Marcomanicum, timentibus cunctis ne quid fatale proveniret, rogatus sit, non adulatione sed serio, ut præcepta Philosophiæ ederet, &c.

Aurelius Victor, in Breviario.

Tantum Marco sapientiæ, innocentia, ac literarum fuit, ut is Marcommanos cum filio Commodus, quem Cæsarem suffecerat, petiturus, Philosophorum obtestantium [vi] circumfunderetur, ne se expeditioni aut pugnae prius committeret, quam sectarum ardua & occulta explavisset. Ita incerta belli (in) ejus salute doctrinae studiis metuebantur; tantumque illo imperante florere artes bonæ, ut illam gloriam etiam temporum putem.

I. C. Exercit. in Bar. pag. 85.

Multa in hanc sententiam scribit M. Antoninus Imperator, in suis illis divinis libris &c.

Idem

Idem ad ista Julii Capit. ridens res humanas, &c.
 Non ridere, sed rite, ac suo pretio æstimare res
 humanas solitus hic vir sapientissimus. *Hoc ille*
nos docet, divinis illis suis libris: velut cum ait in
11. non enim tempero mihi, quin mellitissimi
doctoris verba adscribam, &c.

Canterus, *Nov. Lect. lib. 7. cap. 1.*

M*arcus Aurelius Antoninus*, Imperator opti-
 mus, atque idem Philosophus tantus, ut
 hoc meruerit proprium cognomen, duodecim
 conscripsit *de officio suo* libros, maximæ pietatis,
 humanitatis, temperantiæ, eruditionis, aliarum
 rerum præclararum testes plenissimos; & cum
 quibus multorum Philosophorum operosa præ-
 cepta collata, merito sordere possint. Quocir-
 ca nemo, spero, male collocatum tempus puta-
 bit, quod in ejus operis lectionem studiose
 quondam impendimus, cum ex ea præter cæte-
 ra, fructum hunc retulerimus, quod ex multis
 vitiosis locis duo saltem dextro, si dicere licet,
Æsculapio sanavimus. Ac primum suo finem
 primi libri ait, τὸ μὲν ὅτι πλέον μὲν προκόβει ἐν ρη-
 τορικῇ καὶ ποιητικῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐμπροσθέντα, repe-
 ritur autem, ὑπὸ κοινῇ, ὥστε καὶ διὸν ἔλαβον,
 sed pro μὲν ego μὴ legendum affirmare non du-
 bito. Nam ideo mox subjungit hæc, ἐν αἷ-
 ῖσι δὲ καὶ κατεχέσθαι, εἰ ἡδύμενον ἑμαυτὸν, ἐν ὁδοῖς περι-
 ὄντα. Quod si, inquit, in poeticis & orato-
 riis studiis foeliciter progressus fuisset; nemo me
 inde retrahere, & ad majora perducere facile po-
 tuisset. Quocirca Diis gratias ago, quod in
 studiis illis non nimis magnum feci profectum,

nec

nec ea nimis adamare coepi. Nec injuria, Im-
 perator. Nam ut in homine privato tolerari
 fortassis queat, si natura jubente, suppetente
 otio, aspirante fortuna, jucunda Musarum stu-
 dia paulo diutius colat, & amoenissimas syre-
 nas, quæ tamen non dent sine mente sonum, at-
 tentius ac pertinacius auscultet: Ita non potest
 is, quem ad res maximas gerendas, ac totius U-
 niversi curam natura progeniit, alio cogitatio-
 nes omnes suas, quam ad eum scopum dirigere,
 & ut illum asséquatur quam citissime, non om-
 nem operam dare. Sed jam ad alterum perga-
 mus locum. In fine libri sexti, hanc adfert si-
 militudinem, εἰ κυβερνῶν οἱ ναῦς ἢ ἰατρὸν οἱ κα-
 κῶς ἔλαβον, ἄλλω πνὶ ἂν περσέειχον; ἢ πῶς
 οὐτὸς ἐνεργῶν τὸ τοῖς ἐμπέσει σωτήριον, ἢ τὸ πῶς δι-
 ραπδομῶν οἱ ὑγιεινόν; Quemadmodum, inquit, si
 nautæ gubernatori, aut ægroti medico maledi-
 cerent, non facile alium auscultarent, nec vel
 ille vectorum salutem, vel hic agrotantium sani-
 tatem procurare posset: ita cum quis alius nun-
 quam alteri bene & recte monenti parere consi-
 lium capit, is non temere vel rectum vitæ cur-
 sum tenere, vel post errorem in viam possit re-
 dire. Verum quod pene oblitus eram, * pro * There is
 κυβερνῶνται & ἰατρὸνται, legendum est κυβερνῶνται καὶ
 ἰατρὸνται. Quod cum non advertisset interpretes, The sense
 alioqui doctissimus, quique paucos hac ætate is better
 pares habet, alienum plane sensum commentus as the
 est. Sed profecto homines omnes sumus, & er- words are
 ramus facillime: nec reperitur hoc seculo quis printed.
 quam, qui securus possit medium Momq digi- See there.
 tum ostendere.

Lib. VI.
 num. I.

Lib. I.
 num.
 XIV.

Many

Many more Testimonies might be added if need were: but of all late Writers I know not any that hath had more to doe with Antoninus than Barthi-
us in his Adversaria; I will not say to what pur-
pose, because I will not preoccupy the Reader's judg-
ment, the Book being every where to be had. In lieu of
it, I will add that here, which I know will be of ve-
ry good use to the Learned: and that is, a brief Col-
lection of those passages of Antoninus, (of all I will
not say, but of most I dare) that are any where cited
by Suidas; with reference to the particular Books and
places of Antoninus from whence they are taken:
whereby many places both in the Text of Suidas it self,
and in the late learned Interpreters Translation of the
said Suidas, may easily be corrected and supplied by
them that will take the pains to compare them.

Suidas, Ἀκρόσπεδον ὡς Διογνήτω, Anton. B. I.
n. III. Of Diognetus, &c.

Suidas, ἀκρόσπεδον ἔν τ' Μάρκῳ Ἀντωνίνῳ συγγρα-
φῆς ἡ τριχίλια ἔτη βιώσας μέλλης καὶ τοπωπῆς
μύρια, ὅμως μέμνηται, &c. Anton. B. II. n. XII. If
thou shouldst live thre thousand or as many 10000. of
years, &c.

Suidas, ἀποθνήσκω ἔάν τις αὐτὸ μόνον εἰδῇ, καὶ πῶς
μεριπτῶ τῆς ἐννοίας διαλλάσσει τὰ ἐμμαναζόμενα αὐτῷ,
&c. Anton. B. II. n. X. As also what is it to dye,
and how if a man shall consider, &c.

Suidas, ἀρχαῖον ὁ μὴ ἐυαγιστῶν, &c. μηδὲ χαλεπὸς
ἀνάγκης λέγειν πρὸς πνα, ἢ ἐν ὁπισθοῇ γράφειν, ἐπ' αὐ-
χλός εἰμι· μηδὲ διὰ τοῦτο τρέψω, &c. Anton. B. I.
n. IX. not often, nor without great necessity, &c.

Suidas, ἀψιχρόσθη· εἰ δ' ἰδιωτικὸν ὡς πᾶν, &c.
Anton. B. IX. n. III. But if thou desirest a more
popular, &c.

Suidas,

Suidas, ἀψιχρόσθη, ἐυμετάβλητος, &c. ὡς ἡγε-
μὸν δὲ τῷ πρὸς τοῦ φίλου, καὶ μετὰ αὐτὸν ἀψιχρόσθη,
Anton. B. I. n. XIII. His care to preserve his
friends, &c.

Suidas, Γεῖσθαι· γεῖσθαι· ἢ δυσσομία, &c. πῶς
γεῖσθαι μὴ ὀργίζε, Anton. B. V. n. XXII. Be not
angry, &c.

Suidas, Δαίμων ἢ ἐκάστου πύλη, &c. ἐν αὐτῷ
πρὸς τὸ πᾶν καὶ κῶλον περιεχόμενος, καὶ τὰ νόρδεν γῆς
ἐκτενῶν, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ πλησίον, &c. An-
ton. B. II. n. II. There is nothing more wretched
than that soul which in a kind of circuit compas-
seth all things, &c.

Suidas, Ἐπιδραμεῖται· ἡσυχῇ· μέμνηται· μὴ ὁ-
νειδιστικῶς ἐπιδραμεῖται τῇ βυρβάρων ἢ σόλοικον, &c.
Anton. B. I. n. VII. And not reproachfully to re-
prehend any other, &c.

Suidas, εὐλυτῶ· Μάρκῳ Ἀντωνίνῳ ὁποῖον, ἔσω
ἀναρδῶν τὸ ἀνακληπτικόν, ἐν τῷ βίῳ εὐλυτῶ, &c. An-
ton. B. III. n. V. As one that expected, as it were,
nothing but the sound of the Trumpet, &c.

Suidas, ἐυμάρεια· ἢ ἐυκολία· λέγειν δ' καὶ ἐυκοσμία
ὡς Μάρκῳ Ἀντωνίνῳ, Anton. B. IV. n. III. ἐν πᾶ-
σι ἐυμάρεια ἐυδὺς γίνεσθαι· τῇ δ' ἐυμάρεια ἐστὶν ἄλλο λέγειν
ἢ ἐυκοσμίαν, By tranquillity I understand a decent or-
derly disposition and carriage, &c.

Suidas, Ὁρδὸς λέγειν καὶ ὁρδῶ· Μάρκῳ, ὁρδῶν
τῇ δ' καὶ μὴ ὁρδόμενον, Anton. B. III. n. VI. Rather
like one that is streight of himself, &c.

Suidas, Ὁστικῶς, τὸ κατὰ βίαν καὶ ὠδισμῷ· μηδὲ ὠσι-
κῶς καὶ κατὰ βίαν πρὸς θάνατον ἔχειν, Anton. B. IX.
n. III. It is therefore the part of a wise man in
matter of death, not in any wise to carry him-
self, &c.

Suidas,

Suidas, ἔρτυρόκοπος, παιδία πε, &c. μηδὲ ἔρτυ-
ροκοπεῖν, μηδὲ πεὶ τὰ παιῶν ἐπιήδης, Anton. B. I.
n. III. *Not to keep Quails for the game, &c.*

Suidas, Παράπτηγμα, καὶ ὦν, &c. εἰ ὃ ἰδιώτην
παράπτηγμα, Anton. B. IX. n. III. *See before in αΨ-
κέρδι*.

Suidas, ἀπαρτάνω. ὅπ ἀπαρτάνω λόγια καὶ βε-
βαιάνω, καὶ παλινἀρτάνω, καὶ σκελάρτω. ὡς Μάρκος
Ἀντωνίω, Anton. B. I. n. II.

Suidas, ἀσσοχή, ἀκριβὴς ὅπμ. &c. ὅτ' ἰδίῃ σώμα-
τι ὀπμιελικῶς δεῖ ἔχειν ἑμμέβως. ἕτε ὡς ἂν πε-
ριλόζω, ἕτε πρὸς κατὰσπονδόν, &c. Anton. B. I.
n. XIII. *His care of his body within bounds and
measure, &c.*

Suidas, Συμβαίνοντα, συμφωνῶντα. τὸ συμβαίνειν
ἀγόμεν, ὡς τὸ περὶ τῶν λίθων ἐν πῖς τεύχεσι, &c.
Anton. B. V. n. VIII. *As of square stones, when
either in walls, &c.*

Suidas, Τερατεία, ἰδιωλογία. παραδοξολογία.
πῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τερατῶν, καὶ ῥήτων περὶ ἐπιδῶν, &c.
Anton. B. I. n. III. *Those things which are spoken
by such as take upon them, &c.*

Suidas, τὸ παρὸν εὖ τίθεσθαι. There is no more
now in *Suidas* than so: which certainly is out
of *Antoninus*, B. VI. n. II. ἀρετὴ ἔν καὶ ὅτι παύτης τὸ
παρὸν εὖ θέσθαι. *That thou dost well acquit thy self of
that present duty.*

Divers other words there be, as καλαμίσκος, ἐν-
σωείδησι, &c. in the exposition of which, I am
persuaded that *Suidas* had a reference to *Anto-
ninus*; yet because he neither cites the passage,
nor names the Authour, I would not bring such
in this number.

TO THE READER.

THis Book (of what worth I say not; but
more men, I fear, will commend it,
than will know how to make use of it:)
after it had for so many ages undeservedly been
buried in darkness, is now first, if I may not
say brought unto light, yet at least made com-
mon and intelligible. Twice, it is true, with-
in these 80. years it hath already been set out
in its own Original Greek: and set out both
times with a Latin Translation, much revised and
corrected in the latter Edition. Yet such are those
Editions both of them, so confused, and so cor-
rupt; and such is the Translation in both the
Editions, so imperfect often, and impertinent,
that I say not so absurd and erroneous; as that
it is not easie to determine, whether it be harder
to understand *Antoninus* his meaning by the
Greek that is printed; or the Greek that is
printed, by the Translation of it: but that of
both we may boldly and peremptorily conclude;
of the one, that it cannot possibly be under-
stood, as it is printed; and of the other, that
it would be more for the credit of the Authour
(a man otherwise acknowledged very learned:)
if we did take no notice of it at all. I must add
besides, that there hath been many years ago a
certain Book, first written in Spanish, and since
translated into Italian, French, English, and how
many Tongues more I know not; pretended by
the Title to be a Translation of *M. Aurel. An-
toninus*. But that the Authour of it, (a learned
Spaniard)

To the Reader.

Spaniard) was in good earnest, I could never have believed, and would have thought I had done him great wrong to say it, had not I read his Prefaces, where he so earnestly by reasons, such as he could find, goes about to make his Title good, and as earnestly expostulates with men for their incredulity, who did not take his reasons for current and clear ones. I cannot but commend his intention, which certainly was to doe good; but this way I much abhor, and wonder as much at his judgment and discretion. Sure I am that by his whole Book it doth not appear, that he had ever so much as seen that himself, which this Title doth promise unto others, *M. Aurel. Antoninus* his Book: which either must be this here, or none. For besides this there is not any other, that ever was extant. For as for those other Writings of his, which either he himself in his second Book, or *Capitolinus* in his Life, or *Nicephorus* in his Ecclesiastical History (*lib. 3. cap. 31.*) or any others mention, they mention them as Books written and composed by him, but not as ever publicly extant; which if they had, *Suidas*, or whosoever they be, whom *Suidas* in his Dictionary, in the word *Marcus*, doth alledge, would not have omitted them. Thus much I thought good here briefly to acquaint the Reader with; who, if he please, may receive farther satisfaction by the ensuing Discourse.

A DIS-

(1)

A DISCOURSE

By way of

P R E F A C E :

CONCERNING

The Use and Subject of this Book:

The Authour *ANTONINVS*; And
this Translation of it.

OF all the several Sects and Professions of Philosophers that ever were known or heard of in the World, there was not any that ever did hold maxims and opinions so contrary to flesh and bloud; never any that was judged even by the learned Heathens themselves (witness learned Plutarch, who hath written a whole Book of this very subject:) so grossly and manifestly to oppose nature, and to overthrow all grounds and principles of humane sense or reason, as the Stoicks did. And yet of all Sects and Professions, never any that either with the best was of more credit, or with the vulgar more plausible. So plausible and popular, that there have been times, when the number of the Stoicks alone, did exceed all the followers and professors of all other Sects being put together. A thing the more to be wondred at, because that very reason, Christianity (though nothing so harsh in comparison:) hath ever by them of contrary

Lucian. in
Hermotimo.
& Is. C. ad
ista Pers.
Si Cynico
barbam pe-
tulans, &c.
P. 165.

B

trary professions, been much opposed and contradicted. Of this a main reason I conceive to have been, that the Stoicks, though by their particular Tenets and Opinions, they might seem of all others most to oppose nature, yet that which they proposed unto themselves as the end of their lives, and the ground of all their Philosophy, that which they did ever sound in the ears of men and press them with, was, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, to live according to nature. Μένειν πο δὲ ἡ φιλοσοφία μόνα θάλει, ἢ φύσις οὐ θέλει. Remember that Philosophy requireth no more at thy hands, than what thine own nature doth require, and leads thee unto; saith Antoninus:

B. V. n. IX. to live according to nature. Μένειν πο δὲ ἡ φιλοσοφία μόνα θάλει, ἢ φύσις οὐ θέλει. Remember that Philosophy requireth no more at thy

hands, than what thine own nature doth require, and leads thee unto; saith Antoninus:

B. VI. n. XXV. πὼς αὐτὸν δεῖ μὴ ἀπέρπειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δεῖξαι ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔστι καὶ συμφέροντα;

What a cruel and unnatural thing would it be to restrain men from the pursuit of those things which they conceive to themselves and their own nature, most proper and convenient?

See Ant.
B. V. p. I.

So they all speak, and that which they all generally did most beat upon, was this. Now whether the particular means which they did commend and propose, were indeed proper and natural unto that end, unto which they did propose them, I will not here dispute. For the end, whether true or pretended, is that which men usually take most notice of. As for the means, how direct or indirect to that end, is not so easily discerned. Their end therefore, being of it self so plausible and acceptable, I conceive it to have been the thing especially, which made their doctrine and Philosophy so too. And I am as verily persuaded, that a conceit and opinion many Christians

stians have, that most of those things which are reprov'd in them as sins and vices, agree best with their natures; and many, if not most, of those duties that are required of them as Christians, are against, not depraved and corrupted only, which is not properly nature, but absolutely against the nature of man: and in general, that divine law and humane sense and reason, are things contrary and opposite; is that as much as any thing that doth discourage them from the intent, practice, and study of those things which they by their profession cannot but acknowledge themselves bound unto. For it is not more natural to a man to love his own flesh, (which the Apostle witnesseth, no man ever hated:) than to love nature, and what he conceives to be according to nature. Though it be not so, yet if he conceive it so, he affects it naturally, and in time it becomes natural unto him indeed.

Now concerning Christianity, I know it is the opinion of many, that, matters of faith and the Sacraments onely excepted, there is nothing in the whole Gospel which is not juris naturalis, and most agreeable to humane reason. For my part, as I would not take upon me to maintain their opinion precisely true in all points and circumstances; so I must needs say, if we esteem that natural, which natural men of best account, by the mere strength of humane reason, have taught and taken upon them to maintain as just and reasonable, I know not any Evangelical precept, or duty belonging to a Christian's practice, (even the harshest, and those that seem to ordinary men most contrary to flesh and blood, not excepted,) but

upon due search and examination, will prove of that nature. I say, upon due search and examination. Many have touched upon this point, rather to shew the way unto others, than by way of undertaking themselves: among others, of late, the best able that I know now living to perform this, or any thing else that belongs to a general and complete Scholar, Mr. Hugo Grotius, in his collection and Translation of the Greek sentences. There be too, I know, that have undertaken much in this kind: but of whom (as many as I have seen:) I may boldly say (and the more boldly because I name none:) that in many respects they have performed but little. I wish it with all my heart, that some able and judicious man would think it worth his labour and pains: were it but to this end, that the harshness which many Christians (though Christians, yet flesh and blood they will say) do conceive to be in many divine precepts, might be mollified and lessened, when it shall appear that the very same things did not seem harsh to them, who (in comparison of them whom God hath called by more special and supernatural illumination,) were nothing but flesh and blood. That they who as men can so hardly prevail upon themselves to strive against nature, and to yield to those things which they conceive against all humane sense and reason; might be of another mind, when they shall see that mere natural men, who in humane sense and reason, of all others most excelled, have both esteemed themselves bound by nature, and others most unnatural that refused, to follow or to forbear those very things: ut quisvis arbitretur (saith Minutius F. though upon another occasion) aut nunc Christianos philo-

sophos

sophos esse, aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos. But not to prosecute this general any farther at this present: Of all Books in this kind that ever have been written by any Heathens, I know not any which either in regard of it self, (for the bulk thereof;) or in regard of the Authour, deserves more respect, than this of Marcus Antoninus; son by nature of Annus Verus (a man of great quality in Rome) and adopted son of Antoninus Pius, a Roman Emperour, whom also he succeeded in the Empire about the year of our Lord 162, or 163. The chiefest subject of the Book is, the vanity of the world and all worldly things, as wealth, honour, life, &c. and the end and scope of it, to teach a man how to submit himself wholly to God's providence, and to live content and thankfull in what estate or calling soever. But the Book, I doubt not, will sufficiently commend it self, to them who shall be able to reade it with any judgment, and to compare it with others of the same subject, written either by Christians or Heathens: so that it be remembred that it was written by a Heathen: that is, one that had no other knowledge of any God, than such as was grounded upon natural reasons merely; no certain assurance of the Immortality of the soul; no other light whereby he might know what was good or bad, right or wrong, but the light of nature, and humane reason. Which though it were, (such as it was) from God the Authour of Nature (as what is not?) yet in regard it was not by any revelation, or any other extraordinary means, is therefore called humane and natural. As for the Book then, to let it speak for it self.

In the Authour of it two main things I conceive very considerable, which because by the knowledge of them the use and benefit of the Book may be much greater than otherwise it would be; I would not have any ignorant of. The things are these: first, that he was a very great man, one that had good experience of what he spake; and, secondly, that he was a very good man, one that lived as he did write, and exactly (as far was possible to a natural man,) performed what he exhorted others unto.

For the first, I have always thought that it was not without God's especial Providence; that of all them that once were the peculiar people of God, he was chosen to write against the vain pleasures and delights of this world, who of all the rest had had most knowledge and experience of those things that he did write against. A poor man may from his heart perchance declaim against the vanity of wealth and pleasures; and a private man, against the vanity of honour, and greatness; both of them it may be from their hearts, but it is ever suspicious, and therefore of less power and efficacy. Suspicious I mean, that they are angry with that they would fain, and cannot get themselves; yea, and perchance inveigh of purpose, that by inveighing (an ordinary thing in the world) they may get that which they inveigh against. But at the best, that they make a virtue of necessity; that they speak against they know not what; and though they mean sincerely, as now; yet if they were in place themselves, God knows what mind they would be of. And the event, indeed, doth justify these

*these suspicions but too often. But when a man shall hear such a one as Solomon was, speaking in this manner: I said in my heart, go to now, I will prove thee with mirth, &c. I made me great works, &c. I made me gardens and orchards, &c. I made me pools of water, &c. I got me servants and maidens, &c. I gathered me silver and gold, &c. So I was great, &c. And whatsoever my eyes desired, I kept not from them, I withheld not my heart from any joy, &c. Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to doe; and behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the Sun: Is there any man so bewitched, and besotted with worldly wealth and pleasure, whom such a confession from such an one, will not move, for a-while at the least? And if this of Solomon, who at first had received such a measure of Grace and illumination from God, that it may be more justly wondred, that he ever did any thing contrary to this profession, than that he should profess so much; how much more should that confession of Antoninus move us, dilated here by him, and enlarged into XII. Books, and briefly expressed and summed up in these words of his eighth Book, πεπειραται καὶ πόσῃ πλάνηδ' εἰς, ἡδονῇ εὖδ' ἔστι ζῆν. B.VIII.n.1
ἢ ἐν συλλογισμοῖς, ἢ ἐν πλάτῃ, ἢ ἐν δόξῃ, ἢ ἐν δαπάνῃ, ἡδονῇ; Thou hast already had sufficient experience, that of those many things about which thou hast hitherto wandred, thou couldst not find happiness in any of them: not in syllogisms, and Logical subtilties; not in wealth, not in honour and reputation; not*

in pleasure : in none of all these. Of Antoninus I say, a mere Heathen, led by humane reason onely; Antoninus, a man for worldly state and greatness so far greater than Salomon, as Lord and Master I dare say of more great Kingdoms, than Salomon was of great towns in all his Kingdom; Antoninus, a man for his goodness and wisdom, by all men during his life, had in that honour and reputation, as never man either before him was, or (that we know of) ever after him.

But his goodness was the second consideration. It hath ever been the complaint of all ages : There hath ever been store enough of men that could speak well, and give good instructions : But great want of them that either could, or so much as endeavoured to doe as they spake and taught others to doe. And what is the good that such can doe ? The onely good I can conceive, is, that they persuade men as much as in them lies (and they go very effectually about it :) that τὸ εὐσεβὲς τὸ το καὶ ὅσιον πρὸς τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαλόμενον, κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἀλαζονικῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ σοφιστῶν, ἢ τῇ Διᾷ νομοθετῶν, εἰς φόβον καὶ ὀπίσθασιν ἢ ἀδικεῖν. That all this that we call vertue and godliness, so much spoken of amongst men, are but words and empty sounds; that there is no such thing really existent indeed, as piety and justice, but that it is a mere figment of some cunning jugglers and impostours, or at the best a pretty device of Law-makers and Founders of Commonwealths, to keep silly people in awe and fear. Can any man think otherwise (if otherwise he be not better grounded :) that shall hear them speak, and then look upon their actions ? Such therefore in my judgment

judgment might deserve far more thanks if they did forbear, and would rather lose the commendations of either a smooth tongue, or a ready pen, than to incur both the just suspicion of being Atheists themselves, and the certain guilt and crime of having made many others so. Be it therefore spoken to the immortal praise and commendation of this famous Antoninus, that as he did write, so he did live. Never did Writers so conspire to give all possible testimony of goodness, uprightness, innocency, and whatsoever could among Heathens be most commendable, as they have done to commend this One. They commend him, not as the best Prince onely, but absolutely as the best man, and best Philosopher that ever was. And it is his proper commendation, that being so commended, he is commended without exception. If any thing hath ever been talked against him, the Historians mention it but as a talk : not credited by them, nor by any that ever were of any credit. Thus the Heathens of Him. The Christians had but little reason to speak well of him, as having suffered many cruel persecutions under him : And in this case how free they have been (some of them,) even with all extremity to inveigh against other Emperours, though much commended and magnified by the Heathens, is not unknown. Yet I find not that ever they could fasten any thing upon our Antoninus, whereby to stain his reputation; that ever they did so much as object unto him, those many and grievous persecutions, which they did suffer under him, as his own act, or charge him therefore of cruelty. And though it be granted, that Antoninus gave way to those persecutions, which certainly he could not altogether

ther be ignorant of; yet to them that know the state of these days, it can be no wonder, that such a thing should happen in the days of such a Prince as Antoninus was. When Christians, besides the infamy of many horrible crimes, as common incest, homicide, &c. which (such was the power of calumny:) lay upon them; were generally accounted no better than mere Atheists and Epicures. For indeed, Atheists, Christians and Epicures, were commonly joined together as names, if not of the same signification, yet of very great affinity, and hardly distinguished by the vulgar, but that of the three, the Christian was thought the worst. Let it be then Antoninus his commendation, the greater and the more incredible in this age, the more the age is full of dissimulation and hypocrisie, that he was not (as now they rightly style themselves, whom the common received Names of Christians, and Protestants will not content, such is their Zeal and Purity, they think:) a Professour: as he spake and wrote, so he did. His meditations were his actions. His deeds (so still you remember Him a man and a Heathen) did agree with his sentences. *Ὁν ἡ πεποιθὶς, ἀλλ' ἔξ ἀρετῆς πεινῶν* *ἡμεῖς, πεποιθὶς, &c.* And again, *ὡς ἀνδρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀνὴρ ὢν, καὶ ἔδει πεποιθὶς εἶναι, &c.* That he did not onely as he spake, but what he did, he did it out of mere love to vertue. That it was a clear case, which no man doubted of, that he was in very deed a good man: so incapable was he of any dissimulation. So Dio of him, and so others.

And now that I have spoken so much of Antoninus his life, it will not be amiss to say somewhat of that

that surname, the Philosopher, which by many hath been given and appropriated to this Emperour. Insomuch as Xylander, though he found it not at all (as he confesseth) in his MS. yet thought it fitting to add it in the Title and Inscription of these Books, as his proper and usual Cognomen. But sure enough it is (as hath been observed by learned men,) that this Title of Philosopher was never taken by Antoninus himself, nor given unto him by others, as a proper surname; as his father Antoninus was surnamed PIUS, and others otherwise, but onely as a deserved Elogium and testimony, at the discretion of them that either did speak unto Him, or wrote of Him. And so indeed it was very commonly, and even by those learned and pious Christians, that directed Apologies unto Him for the Christians, adscribed unto him as an Elogium and Testimony: just indeed and deserved, but arbitrary, and not proper unto Him by way of a Cognomen or surname. But, an Elogium and Testimony of what think you? of his great learning (as we take learning now;) and progress in the Sciences? Reade him himself, and judge how much he would have esteemed such a commendation. A man would think, if Heathens, through their ignorance of the true God, and of his truth, had been mistaken in the true application of words of praise or dispraise; that we, by the help of a better light, might have rectified them, and not followed their examples. But now it is fallen out quite contrary. Who they be that the holy Scriptures usually call wise; who they, to whom they ascribe knowledge and understanding; and who they are, who by them are termed fools,

fools, blind, ignorant, and the like, is not unknown unto any. So spake the ancient Heathens, when they would speak properly. He that was an honest, upright, vertuous man, without dissimulation and hypocrisie, though he were such a one as had never been brought up to learning; yea, such a one as could neither reade nor write, was their σοφῶτα, πρῶτος διδάσκαλος, φιλόσοφος, their good Scholar, their learned Man, their Philosopher. His life and his actions were all that they stood upon; though indeed they were of opinion, that it was very difficult, if not altogether impossible, for a man to come to the knowledge of that which is right and wrong, just or unjust, and by consequent of true vertue, without much study and pains taking. On the other side, an unjust man, a cunning, an intemperate; in general, a vitious man, was their ἀπαιδίστατος, ἀμαθής, ἄσυντος, their Illiterate, their Ignorant, their Idiot. The most ordinary distinction was, of an Idiot, and a Philosopher. Neither was this the proper language of the Stoicks (which Seēt our Antoninus was much addicted unto,) but of the Platonicks likewise, and of most others. But the main and principal property, whereby they did distinguish a Philosopher from all other men, was that he did all things μετὰ τὴν ἀνατοχὴν, with a relation unto God and his Providence; ἀποφύγειν τὸν θεὸν ἐν παντί μάλιστα καὶ μακάριστον, as Epictetus (in Arrianus) speaketh. This you shall find that Antoninus doth much stand upon. For indeed they did esteem it the very character and essential note of a Philosopher. Insomuch as that if any man seemed never so just and upright in his actions, yet if it were not μετὰ τὴν ἀνατοχὴν, with reference to God,

and

and our dependences on Him, as the Supreme Cause and Moderatour of all things: they esteemed him little more than a mere Idiot.

Much more I had here to say concerning this matter, both in defence of Plato (whose name hath much suffered through some mens ignorance of the true sense of this word Philosophus) and for the clearing of many obscure places of Antoninus, which otherwise I think will hardly be understood. But because I fear it would make the body of this Preface to swell too much beyond the proportion of the rest, and that in the Notes it will come in well enough, I will reserve it unto that place.

See notes
upon B.
VIII. n. I.

Now for this my Translation of Antoninus, which is the last thing we are to speak of, were it so that this Book were as commonly known, and as easie to be got as many others of less worth are, I should be well content to spare the labour of this account, and refer it wholly to the judgment of the Reader. But forasmuch as by my own experience I know the Book, (though twice printed,) to be so rare, that it is not to be found in many private studies, and sometimes not for many years together, in any Book-seller's shop: (I was beholding to learned Mr. Holdsworth's well-furnished Library for the first sight, and long use of the latter and better Edition; as also for the use of many other Books:) and that the Latin Translation of Xylander hath been commended and approved by the most learned (doctissimus; eruditissimus Interpres; vir profundæ eruditionis, &c. So they speak of him:) I do think it very necessary, both that I should give the Reader that satisfaction, that I do not actum agere, and doe my self that right, that whereas I take upon me

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to translate Marcus Aurel. Antoninus Augustus, I may not be suspected to have translated Gulielmus Xylander Augustanus. Indeed what might be expected from Xylander's Interpretation, may be collected by his own ingenuous intimation, both in his Preface, where he is fain to apologize for it, that he durst undertake it, professing that in quibusdam he was constrained, *divinare & audacter à codice Græco aut usu communi recedere*; as also in his Notes, where his words are, *Sunt autem passim permulta, in quibus ariolo magis, quam interprete opus sit*: And that he doth so indeed, it doth but too manifestly appear by his Translation. For I dare boldly say, and doe him no wrong, that sometimes in a whole page, he hath not two lines of Antoninus his sense and meaning. Besides the liberty that he takes unto himself to supply of his own head, to leave out sometimes words, sometimes lines, to change and alter at his will; without any reason given for it, or so much as making the Reader acquainted with it. And whereas Xylander puts the fault of all this upon the corruption and imperfection of the Copy, I cannot altogether allow of it. For as I confess the faults and corruptions of it, if in the printed copies they have not been made more, than they were in the Manuscript (which I do not believe:) to be many; so of those many, I know none or very few, that may be termed incurable. And as for the Lacunæ of it, I hope that they neither in this Translation (and what ancient Book is there almost but hath some?) will not be found many. As for any greater hiatus, as perchance of many leaves together, if any shall suspect the Copy to have been defective in

in that kind, the method and composition of the Book being such, that it doth for the most part consist of certain Aphorisms and Canons, (they called them *κρίνας, θεσμίματα, δόγματα, νόμους λόγους, &c.*) without any certain order or series, either in regard of the whole (but that they all tend to one purpose;) or in regard of the parts themselves: as it is not possible by the matter it self for any man to determine how much more in this kind may have been written by Antoninus; so if there were never so much extant, yet how this that we have here, could thereby be made more perfect than it is, I do not see. Their conceit, who by reason of this independance of matters, would have the whole Book to be but excerpts and *Συνοψαί* of a greater and better compacted Work; there being so many other books both sacred and profane written in the same kind; and Epictetus (the Pattern of all latter Stoicks:) his *Enchiridion* among the rest; it can at the best pass but for a mere conceit, and needs I hope no other refutation.

To tell you then what I have done, and that you may be the better satisfied that I except not against Xylander's Interpretation without cause, it remains that for a Specimen I produce some few passages, by which it will be easie for any to judge of the rest. But first I must faithfully profess that my purpose in all this is not any ways to detract, either from Xylander himself, or from the judgment of those learned men, by whom he hath been highly commended, but rather to follow (after my best ability:) Xylander's own example; whom for his great pains, and labour in his lifetime to further and promote learning I acknowledge

ledge to have deserved much honour and respect from all that love learning. I might add that I shall deal with him more ingenuously too, than some others have done, who take upon them to correct some corrupt places of Antoninus, which Xylander in his Translation, whereof they take no notice, had already plainly corrected. But now to Antoninus.

Where Antoninus in his first Book saith, that he learned by his Father's example, that it is not impossible for a man that lives at the Court, ἡγούται ἰδιώτῃ συτέλλειν ἐμῷδιν, καὶ οὐ διὰ (reade οὐ διὰ, μὴ διὰ τῷτο.) τῷτο παπεινότητον ἢ ἐαδυμάττειν ἔχειν περὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ ἡγεμονικῷ ἀεχθῆναι δέοντα. To live almost a private man's life, for matter of worldly pomp and magnificence, and all outward shew and appearance (expressed by him before more at large :) and yet for all that, not to be a whit the more base and pusillanimous, or less stout or resolute in any publick affairs that shall require the power and authority of a Prince and Commander: he translates it, Sed licere ei proximum privato homini habitum sumere: imo vero eum splendorem, eos qui principes rempublicam gerere velint, demissiores, segnioresque efficere. which neither of it self affords any tolerable sense, and is as wide from Antoninus his meaning, as any thing that could have been conceived.

Bas. Edit. In the eighth Book Antoninus saith that ἡ κοινὴ φύσις—ἴσως καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ μαισμοῦς χεῖνων, ἰσῆς, αἰὲς, ἐκτελείαι, συμβάσις, ἐνέσις ποιῆται. That the common Nature (which was one of the many Synonyma's by which the Stoicks did express God,) doth

doth distribute all things in equality, as matter, form, duration, and the like; and then adds, οὐκ οὐκ εἶ, μὴ εἶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἴσῳ εὐρίσκει δὴ πᾶν τὸς; This equality thou shalt observe, not if absolutely thou shalt go to compare all the particulars of any one thing by themselves, with the particulars of another by themselves: ἀλλὰ εἰ συνάβῃς τὰ πάντα τῷδε, (it is printed, τὰ πάντα τῷδε, &c.) περὶ ἀδελφὰ τὰ τῷδε ἑτέρῃ; that is, but if thou consider all the particulars of any one thing together, with all the particulars of another together likewise. His meaning is, that every natural thing in his own kind, that is, after a Geometrical, though not Arithmetical equality, is equally perfect: an Ant as perfect in her quantity, as an Elephant and whale, so great and vast, in theirs; as strong for her little proportion of body, and other circumstances of her nature, and as long lived, as any other creature; and so of all other things, if all things be well considered. And this doth not onely extend to things of several kinds and natures; but even to those that are of the same. It is a very pleasant and usefull speculation, as it may be prosecuted and applied, and it is very fully expressed by Antoninus. After this (as his manner is,) abruptly passing to another matter, ἀναμνηστικὸν ἐκ ἑξῆς, saith he to himself (for so must the words be distinguished, which in the Greek are vitiously joined and confounded—τὰ πάντα τῷδε περὶ ἀδελφὰ τὰ τῷδε ἑτέρῃ ἀναμνηστικὸν ἐκ ἑξῆς ἀλλὰ, &c.) by way of objection, and then immediately answers, ἀλλὰ ὅβρις ἀνείσχειν ἑξῆς, ἀλλὰ ἡδονῶν καὶ πόνων καδυαυτερεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῷδε δὲ τῷδε ἐκτελεῖται ἢ ἑξῆς, &c. Thou hast no time

B. VIII.
n. VI.

C.

time nor opportunity to read Books; What then? Hast thou not time and opportunity to practise thy self, to forbear contempt and contumely: (*towards thy self, I understand it; that is, thy soul according to Plato's doctrine, followed and expressed by Antoninus, in those words at the beginning of the second Book, ὑβριζε, ὑβριζε ἑαυτὸν, ὧς ψυχῇ, &c.* And again at the end of the same Book more at large:) to resist and overcome all pains and pleasures, to condemn honour and vain-glory, and not onely to be angry with those whom thou dost find unsensible, and unthankfull towards thee, but also to have a care of them still, and of their welfare? Confer this with other like passages of Antoninus, both for form and matter, and you will think that nothing could be plainer. All this is expressed by Xylander: Considera autem æqualitatem eam inventurum te si singulas res examines; sin unam cum universis conferas, non item. And then he leaves a blank, and begins a new line; Atqui licet libidinem arce-re, voluptatibusque & doloribus superiorem esse, itemque gloriola: licet etiam stupidis & ingratis non irasci.

See B. V.
n. V. B.
VII. n.
xxxvii.

B. VII. n.
xviii.
Bas. edit.
234.

* See note
2. upon
B. II.

Some three or four pages from the beginning of the seventh Book, τὸ ἐπικαλὸν τῷ πρῶτῳ (saith Antoninus:) λίαν ᾤζα εὖσιν, ὅτι πολλὰ κίς ἐν ἀποθήσκῃ ἢ ἐν ἐλπίδι. ἢ [γὰρ εἰ] τὸ τελευτῶν ἀποβίβῃ, ὥστε ὅλως ἰδέσθαι μὴ διώσθαι. ἢ ἡ τὴν τὴν * ὁδοῦ πικρῶν, ὅτι πικρὰ τὴν λόγον. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ συναισθησις τῷ αἰσθάνειν [γὰρ τῷ μὴ αἰσθάνειν] εἰχρήσθαι, τίς ἐπὶ τῷ ζῆν αἰτία; That an angry countenance, (saith he) is much against nature, hence mayst thou gather, be-
cause

cause oftentimes it is the proper countenance of them that are at the point of death; [*and a fore-runner of death as it were.*] But were it so that all anger and passion were so thoroughly quenched in thee, that it were altogether impossible that it should be kindled any more, yet [*herein must not thou rest satisfied, but*] farther endeavour by good consequence of true ratiocination perfectly to conceive and understand, that all anger and passion is against reason: For if thou shalt not be sensible of thine innocency, as it is innocency; if that also shall be gone from thee, [*the comfort of a good conscience, that thou dost all things to thy utmost power according to Reason:*] what shouldst thou desire to live any longer for? All this is by Xylander contracted into these few words; Irati vultus omnino est contra naturam, quando sapius immoriendi sit prætextus, aut ad extremum extinctus est, ut omnino inflammari non potuerit. Hoc ipso intelligere labora, iram à ratione esse alienam. Nam si etiam sensus peccati nullus erit, quæ erit vivendi causa?

See B. III.
n. vij. x.
xliij.
B. VIII.
n. ij.
Page 251.

At the end of the fifth Book, Antoninus having spoken of some vanities, adds, ἀνδρῶν, ἐπιδόξῃ πὶ ταῦτα ἦν; καὶ ἄλλὰ τέτις ἀεισέδουσα. O man, hast thou forgotten what things these are? yea, but howsoever, they are things that other men much care for; saith he, by way of objection; then answers, διὰ τὸ ἐν καὶ σὺ μαρὸς γένῃ; ἐξουδυνῶ πῶς. Will thou therefore be a fool also? it is enough that thou hast already been one so long. And then passes to another matter: Ὅπως ἐπὶ κατὰ ληφθῆς, εὐμοιρῶν ἀνδρῶν.

τὸ δὲ εὖμοις, ἀγαθὴ μοῖρα σταντὴ ἀπονεμαί·
ἀγαθὴ δὲ μοῖρα, ἀγαθὴ ἔργα φυχῆς, ἀγαθὴ ὄρ-
μα, ἀγαθὴ ἐπιθυμία. Let death surprise a man
where and when it will: It is more than it can
doe to make him therefore unhappy. He is an
happy man, who (in his life-time) dealeth unto
himself a happy lot and portion. A happy lot
and portion is; good inclinations of the soul,
good motions and desires, good actions. This
passage cannot well be translated, because we have ne-
ver a word answerable to the Greek εὖμοις, which
Antoninus here elegantly and acutely plays upon,
which may signifie either in general a happy man,
or in particular one that dies happily: but properly
signifies one that hath obtained a good part or portion.
Howsoever, to render it as it may be rendred, the
sense is very tolerable. Now Xylander having found
the words somewhat confused, and incorrect, (for
it is printed, ἐν μὲν τῇ ὁμοιότητι καὶ ἀλλοιότητι εὖ-
μοις ἀνδρῶν τὸ δὲ, &c.) translates them: Prop-
terea tu quoque stultus es factus? Aliquando ut-
curique relictus, factus sum foelix: Foelicitas au-
tem est, &c.

At the end of the seventh Book, Antoninus his
words are, ἢ τὸ ὅτι φύσις ὅτι τὴν κοσμοποιίαν ὡρμη-
σεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἥτοι πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον κατ' ἐπιτολήσιν
γίνεσθαι, ἢ τὰ λογικά [it is printed, ἢ ἀλόγιστα] καὶ
τὰ κυριώτατά ἐστιν, ἐν' αὐτῇ ποιῆται ἰδίαν ὁρμὴν τὸ τῷ
κόσμῳ ἡγεμονικόν· εἰς πολλὰ σε γαλλωτέρεον πείσσει σὺ-
το μακροδιδόχον. That the place must be so read
and corrected (if any man make a question of it:)
I will be judged by Antoninus himself, B. VI.
num. 39. B. VII. n. 44. not to mention others, as
Arrianus Lib. 1. cap. 12. Ven. Edit. pag. 21.

The

The nature of the Universe, saith he, did once
certainly deliberate and resolve upon the cre-
ation of the world. Whatsoever therefore, since
that, is, and happens in the world, is either but
a consequent of that first and one deliberation;
(by which all things by a necessary and uninterrup-
ted series of causes, were ordained and appointed to
be:) or if so be that this Ruling rational part
of the World takes any thought and care of
things particular, They are surely his reasonable
and principal creatures, that are the proper ob-
ject of his particular care and providence. This
often thought upon, will much conduce to thy
tranquillity. I take κυριώτατα here, as spoken
of the same that λογικά· to which purpose he hath
other passages, that reasonable creatures are the
chiefest creatures. Yet if any man would rather
have it, ἢ αὐτοῖς τὰ κυριώτατά ἐστιν, ἐν' αὐτῇ, &c.
reasonable creatures are his chiefest objects, I
will not be against it, and it will be all one thing.
But who could bear with Xylander his Interpreta-
tion? Universi natura olim ad mundum fa-
bricandum se contulit: nunc autem vel omnia
quæ fiunt, consequentia fiunt sua: vel etiam in
præcipuis eorum, ad quæ se mundi gubernatrix
natura confert, rationi nullum locum esse &
consilio, tenendum est. Hoc si memoria te-
neas, multis in rebus animo ut sis tranquilliori,
efficiet.

An easie matter it were to add to these many
more such passages, if I thought it as necessary as
it would be easie. They that shall take the pains
(and it will be worth their pains I dare promise
them) to compare diligently the Translations with

Antoninus himself, will, I doubt not, before they have gone one or two Books over, be of my mind. I have of purpose made choice of such places especially, where I have made bold somewhat to correct the Text. I say bold, but no bolder, I will maintain, than any reasonable man must, and ought, that doth undertake any such work. For I have not (to my knowledge:) by my Translation altered any one place in this kind in the whole Book, but such as by certain proofs and demonstrations from Antoninus himself I can maintain. Those places that I thought any thing doubtfull, I have given account of them to the Reader in my Notes. And if I have left any for desperate, as either imperfect or not intelligible by me, I may truly say, that had I taken to my self but the tenth part of the liberty, which Xylander doth usually throughout the whole Book; I needed not to have left any such places at all. And I make no question, but that in so doing, I might have given to many content and satisfaction good enough. But considering how much this liberty is commonly abused, and how prejudicial it proves to good Authours, I have rather chosen sometimes to say less than I might, than to give unto others an example of this bold kind of dealing with ancient Authours. The chiefest ground of all the obscurity in the Book, is, that Antoninus having been all his life an indefatigable student, and so read a world of Writers of all sorts, his manner is in these his Books, as he read any thing that made for his present purpose, closely and briefly to allude unto it, by some short meditation upon it: sometimes barely to excerpt some words, which either he had an especial liking unto, or afterward intended farther

to meditate upon, without any mention of the place or Authour from whence they are taken. Now many of these Authours being quite perished, many of his allusions so close and obscure, that though the Authours be yet extant, yet it is not easie to find from whence, or of whom, nor to what intent or purpose: it must not be wondered, if not onely many places seem obscure, but some also of little worth and use; because it doth not appear, what farther use Antoninus had of them in his mind. Howsoever to them that are any thing versed in the writings of ancient Philosophers, Stoicks especially, there will not occur many such places. If a man take but Arrianus and Seneca, and compare them diligently with Antoninus, he will find a marvellous consent, and many obscure short places of Antoninus, illustrated and explained by their larger discourse. I have done it in some few places, which I thought could not well otherwise be understood. And for the rest, I leave them to every diligent Reader's industry. Neither indeed would I have put my self to the labour of writing any Notes at all, if the Book could as well have wanted them, as I could easily have found as well, or better to my mind, how to bestow my time. However as I thought some would be needfull, so did I think also, that in the former Books, I did give satisfaction to the Reader, I might afterwards be spared, and either be trusted my self, or trust to the Reader's diligence and ability for the rest. Wherefore by supplying a word or two in the Text, I thought I could help the sense, and illustrate the matter sufficiently; to spare my self a Note, and for the ease of the Reader, I have done

it. All such additions to the Text, you shall find within two such [] marks included. And whereas those former passages by me produced, wherein I except against the Latin Translation, are all such as could not be well translated without some correction of the Text, that it may not be thought, that in such places onely it is amiss, I have for the farther satisfaction of the Reader (the Books, as hath already been said, being so scarce and hard to be come by:) taken occasion in my Notes, now and then to instance in some other passages, wherein there can be no such exception.

In the Authour himself I fear exception will be taken, at many places, as mere repetitions; at some others wherein he seemeth to contradict what he had said before. But if the Readers consider, first, that what Antoninus wrote, he wrote it not for the publick, but for his own private use; and secondly, that Antoninus his words are so intermingled every where with his Excerpta, that it doth not well appear what is his own, and what is not: as in regard of the first consideration they will, I doubt not, allow him far more liberty than otherwise were fitting: so in regard of the second, I presume they will yield both those many suspected repetitions in the Books, and those few supposed contradictions, the one perchance to be but several collections of one subject, and to one purpose from several Authours; and the others certainly, rather the different opinions of different Authours concerning the same thing, than the contradictions of one man, inconstant to himself. And as for such places which may give offence, as repugnant to our Christian faith, and impious; as when he seemeth

to speak doubtfully of God and his Providence, and to adscribe all things to fatal Necessity, and the like: I shall but desire the Readers to remember who he was that wrote, and I hope they will desire no farther satisfaction in this point. For that any Christian should expect from any out of the Church, and without the Scriptures, perfect sound knowledge in these high points, would be no small wonder to me: it being both the happiness of every the meanest Christian, that he may know more in these mysteries, than the greatest Philosophers could ever with all their wit and learning attain unto; and the proper privilege of the Divine Scriptures, that from them onely all solid truth in points of this nature is to be expected. However, that Antoninus may not want any just defence that his cause doth afford, the Reader must farther be intreated not to judge of his opinions, by one or two short passages here and there occurrent, which whether they be his or no (as we have already said) is hard to determine; but to have a respect to other more large and peremptory passages concerning the same purpose else-where to be found. As for example, concerning God and his Providence, to B. II. num. VIII. B. VI. num. XXXIX. &c. and concerning fatal Necessity, not onely to the same B. II. num. VIII. but also to divers other places, as B. VIII. num. 6. 27. 30. 32. 46. &c. by which places, as it doth plainly appear, that he doth exclude all manner of Necessity from humane wills and actions: so doth it appear by other passages, as B. VIII. num. 33. that he did not altogether exclude from the power of Providence not even those actions of men that are most contrary to the will
of

of God: from which place moreover may appear what is that he often calls *εὐαγούλιω*, Fate, or Destiny; which in his meaning is no other than God's sovereign Power and Providence in ordering the matters of the world, not subject either to opposition or mutability: as by Hierocles in his *De Providentia*, by Plotinus, by Alexander Aphrodisæus, and generally by all Aristotle his Greek Interpreters, as Simplicius, Themistius, Philoponus, and many others it is interpreted. To which purpose he doth also expound the word Fortune, B. I. n. XVII. by which, other places, which otherwise perchance might be mistaken (as B. I. n. XIV. last words) must be expounded. And herein, you must know that Antoninus takes no more liberty to himself in using this word in the sense he doth, than Plato did, who although he disputes at large in his *X. de Legib.* that even the least things happen by Providence, and thinks it great impiety for a man to doubt of it: yet where he speaks of the uncertainty and instability of all worldly affairs, even of those that are settled with the best wisdom and discretion of men, he useth these and the like expressions, *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ἀνθρώποις νομοθετεῖν καὶ δὲ νόμοις οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀντιτάττειν ἀνθρώποις* that good laws oftentimes avail but little, for that in very deed it is chance and fortune, which for the most part is all in all in worldly affairs, &c. that is, in regard of us men, and of the secondary causes, not in regard of God. In which sense the use of the word even unto us Christians, is allowed by the best Schoolmen. Whether that also were Aristotle's meaning in his *Physicks*, where he treats of chance and fortune, I leave to others to consider, and shall be glad my self to judge as favourably as any other,

Plat. de
leg. lib. 4.

Aqu. 1. q.
22. art. 3.
&c.
Arist. Phys.
sic. lib. 2.
c. 4. & 5.

other, upon any, though but probable ground of reason. On the other side, although Antoninus doth every where absolutely maintain this liberty of man's will, and that he was not acquainted with the mystery of original sin, and natural concupiscence; yet shall you not find in him those blasphemies, in exaltation of this humane power and liberty, which you shall in Seneca, and other Stoicks: neither did he (it should seem, though but an Heathen:) so much rely upon it, but that he doth very piously commend prayers, as very powerfull and effectual unto vertue. See Lib. IX. Num. XL.

Now if Antoninus himself, being a Roman, for the propriety and facility of his expressions (wherein the Latin tongue, in matter of Philosophy, comes as short of the Greek, as the English doth of the Latin:) did in the composing of these his Books prefer the Greek tongue before his own mother-tongue; no man, I hope, will expect, that all things should in this Translation run so smoothly as in another kind of Translation haply they might. But herein I must confess my fear is for Antoninus, more than for my self. For, first, whereas he, being (I think) as well acquainted with ancient Writers and Philosophers as ever any was, doth every where very strictly and carefully observe their proper choice words and terms, which both make the sense it self more current, and pleasing; and for a Scholar to know them, and to be acquainted with them, is in many respects very usefull; This in the Translation must needs be lost, and by consequent so much lost to Antoninus, of his due praise and commendation. And, secondly, whereas in all these his twelve Books there be not many

ny lines (if any,) which, if well considered, will not be found either to be taken out of some ancient Authour, or at least by way either of Exception, Confirmation, Illustration, and the like, to either passage or opinion of some ancient to have some relation: as to the learned I know whatsoever is in this kind, be it otherwise what it will, cannot but be acceptable and usefull; so to others, I fear, many things for want of this use of it, which they are not capable of, will seem but dry and impertinent. In these two respects I cannot deny but I have done Antoninus some wrong to make him so vulgar, as I have done; and yet because I thought he might in other respects doe good to any that should reade him, if before the credit of one I have preferred the good of many, I have but done what Antoninus himself (as by these his Books may appear,) would have me, or any others doe in the like case.

And now in the last place, if any shall by these my pains receive any content, my desire is that they would thank him, by whose encouragement especially I did undertake this little work, my Reverend kind friend Doctour Lyndsell, the right worthy Bishop of Peterborough, a man for his singular worth and learning in all kind of literature, not to be named by any that know him, without expression of all due respect and admiration; and one to whom my self and my studies, of old, have been much beholding, as I shall ever most gladly acknowledge.

M. AV-

M. AUREL. ANTONINVS,
THE
ROMAN EMPEROUR,
His FIRST BOOK concerning
HIMSELF.

Wherein ANTONINUS recordeth, what and of whom, whether Parents, Friends or Masters, by their good examples, or good advice and counsel, he had learned.

Divided into Numbers or Sections.

[A Ntoninus Book VI. Num. XLIII. Whensoever thou wilt rejoyce thy self, call to mind the several gifts and vertues of those whom thou dost daily converse with: as for example, the industry of one, the modesty of another, the liberality of a third; of another some other thing. For nothing can so much rejoyce thee, as the Resemblances and Parallels of several vertues, eminent in the dispositions of them that live with thee, especially when all at once, as near as may be, they represent themselves unto thee. See therefore that thou have them always in a readines.]

Num. I.

O F my Grandfather Verus [I have learned] to be gentle and meek, and to refrain from all anger and passion. From the same and memory of him that begot me [I have learned both] shamefacedness, and manlike behaviour. Of my Mother [I have learned] to be religious, and bountifull; and to forbear, not onely to doe, but

1.

but to intend any evil; to content my self with a spare diet, and to fly all such excess as is incidental to great wealth. Of my great Grandfather, ¹ both to frequent publick Schools and Auditories; and to get me good and able Teachers at home; and that I ought not to think much, if upon such occasions, I were at excessive charges.

II. Of him that brought me up not to be fondly addicted to [either of the two great factions of the Coursers in the Circus, called] *Prasini*, and *Veneti*: nor [in the Amphitheatre] partially to favour [any of the Gladiatours, or Fencers, as either] the *Parmularii*, or the *Secutoriani*. Moreover, to endure labour; not to need many things; when I have any thing to doe, to doe it my self [rather than by others;] not to meddle with many businesses; and not easily to admit of any slander.

2.

III. Of *Diognetus*, not to busie my self about vain things, and not ² easily to believe those things, which are [commonly] spoken by such as take upon them to work wonders, and by Sorcerers [or, *Præstigiators*, and *Impostours*;] concerning the power of charms, and their driving out of *Dæmons*, [or, *evil spirits*;] and the like. Not to ³ keep *Coturnices*. [or, *Quails for the game*;] nor to be mad after such things. Not to be offended with other mens liberty of speech; and to apply my self [or, to become familiar] unto Philosophy. [Him also

3.

I must thank] that ever I heard first *Bacchius*, then *Tandasis*, and *Marcianus*: and that I did write ⁴ Dialogues in my youth, and that I took

4.

liking

liking to the [*Philosophers*] little couch and skins, and such other things, which by the Grecian discipline are proper [to those who profess Philosophy.]

IV. To *Rusticus* I am beholding, that I first ^{See B. xj. li. 27.} entred into the conceit that my life wanted some redress and cure. And then, that I did not fall into the ambition of [ordinary] *Sophists*, either to write tracts concerning the [common] *Liberties*, or to exhort men [unto virtue and the study of Philosophy] by [publick] orations; as also that I never by way of ostentation ^{5.} did affect to shew my self an active able man, [for any kind of bodily exercises.] And that I gave over the study of Rhetorik and Poetry, and ^{* ἀσκητογίας, not ἀσκητογίας. as was found by Xylander in his written Copy; and by him turned into ἀσκη. which he was sorry for afterwards. * ἐυδαλ-ἀδελφός. not (as printed) ἐυδαλ-ἀδελφός. 6.} of elegant neat language. That I did not use to waik about the house in my Senatour's robe, nor to doe any such things. Moreover [I learned of him] to write letters without any affectation or curiosity: such as that was, which by him was written to my Mother from *Sinoessa*: and to be easie and ^{*} ready to be reconciled and well pleased again with them that had offended me, as soon as any of them would be content to seek unto me again. To read with diligence; not to rest satisfied with a light and superficial knowledge, nor quickly to assent to things commonly spoken: whom also I must thank that ever I lighted upon *Epietetus* ⁶ his *Hypomnemata* [or, moral commentaries and commonefactions:] which also he gave me of his own.

V. From *Apollonius*, true liberty, and unvariable steadfastness, and not to regard any thing at all, though never so little, but right and reason: and always, whether in the sharpest pains, or after

7.

after the loss of a child, or in long diseases, to be the same man; who also was a present and visible example unto me, that it was possible for the same man to be both vehement and remiss: a man not subject to be vexed, and offended [*with the incapacity of his Scholars and Auditours*] in his lectures and expositions; and a true pattern of a man who, of all his good gifts and faculties, least esteemed in himself that his excellent skill and ability to teach and persuade others the common Theorems, [*and Maxims of the Stoick Philosophy.*] Of him also I learned, how to receive favours and kindneses (as commonly they are accounted,) from friends, so that I might not become obnoxious unto them, for them, nor more yielding [*upon occasion, than in right I ought;*] and yet so that I should not pass them neither, as an unsensible and unthankfull man.

8.

VI. Of *Sextus* mildness, and the pattern of a family governed with paternal affection; and a purpose to live according to nature: to be grave without affectation: to observe carefully the several dispositions of my friends, not to be offended with Idiots, nor unseasonably to set upon those that are carried with the vulgar opinions, with the Theorems and Tenets of Philosophers: [*his conversation*] being an example how a man might accommodate himself to all men and companies; so that though his company were sweeter and more pleasing, than any flatterers cogging and fawning; yet was it at the same time most respected and revered: who also had a proper happiness, and faculty, rationally

tionally, and methodically to find out, and set in order all necessary *Dogmata* [*or determinations*] and instructions for a man's life. A man without ever the least appearance of anger, or any other passion; able at the same time most exactly to observe the Stoick *Apathia*, [*or, unpassionateness*] and yet to be most tender-hearted: ever of good credit, and yet almost without any noise, or rumor: very learned, and yet making little shew.

VII. From *Alexander* the Grammarian, to be unproveable my self, and not reproachfully to reprehend any man for a barbarism, or a solecism, or any false pronunciation; but dexterously by way of answer, or testimony, or confirmation of the same matter (taking no notice of the word) to utter it as it should have been spoken; or by some other such close and indirect admonition, handsomly and civilly to tell him of it.

VIII. Of *Fronto*, to how much envy and fraud and hypocrisie the state of a Tyrannous King is subject; and how for the most part they who are commonly called *patricians*, [*or, patricii*, i. nobly born] are in some sort incapable [*or, void*] of natural affection.

IX. Of *Alexander* the Platonick, not often nor without great necessity to say, or to write to any man in a letter, *I am not at leisure* (nor in this manner still to put off those duties, which we owe to our friends and acquaintances (to every one in his kind,) under pretence of urgent [*or, instant*] affairs.

X. Of *Catulus*, not to condemn any friend's

expostulation, though unjust, but to strive to reduce him to his former disposition: Freely and heartily to speak well of all my masters [upon any occasion;] as it is reported of *Domitius*, and *Athenodorus*; and to love my children with true affection.

XII. From my brother *Severus*, to love truth and justice, and to be kind and loving to all them of my house and family; by whom also I came to the knowledge of *Thraseas*, and *Helvidius*, and *Cato*, and *Dio*, and *Brutus*. He it was also that did put me in the first conceit and desire of an equal commonwealth, administered by justice and equality; and of a Kingdom wherein should be regarded nothing more than the good and welfare [or, Liberty,] of the subjects. Of him also, to observe a constant tenour, (not interrupted with any other cares and distractions,) in the study and esteem of Philosophy: to be bountifull and liberal in the largest measure; always to hope the best; and to be confident that my friends love me. In whom I moreover observed open dealing towards those whom he reprov'd at any time, and that his friends might without all doubt or much observation know what he would, or would not; so open and plain was he.

XIII. From *Claudius Maximus*, in all things to endeavour to have power of my self, and in nothing to be carried about; to be chearfull and courageous in all sudden chances and accidents, as in sicknesses; to love mildness, and moderation, and gravity; and to doe my business, whatsoever it be, throughly, and without

See B.
VIII. num.
LVIII.

70.

querulousness. Whatsoever he said, all men believed him; that as he spake, so he thought, and whatsoever he did, that he did with a good intent. His manner was never to wonder at any thing; nor to be affrighted, [or, astonished;] never to be in haste, and yet never slow; nor to be perplexed, nor dejected, or at any time unseemly, [or, excessively] to laugh: nor to be angry, or suspicious, but ever ready to doe good, and to forgive, and to speak truth; and all this, as one that seemed rather of himself to have been straight and right, than ever to have been rectified, or redressed: neither was there any man that ever thought himself undervalued by him, or that could find in his heart, to think himself a better man than he. He would also be very pleasant and gracious.

XIII. In my Father, I observed his meekness; his constancy without wavering in those things, which after a due examination and deliberation, he had determined. How free from all vanity he carried himself in matter of honour and dignity, (as they are esteemed;) his laboriousness and assiduity, his readiness to hear any man, that had ought to say, tending to any common good: how generally and impartially he would give every man his due; his skill and knowledge, when rigour and extremity, or when remission and moderation was in season; how he did abstain from all unchaste love of youths; ^{* his} ^{* Gr. not-} moderate condescending to other mens occasions ^{as} ^{ὡς ὁ κοινὸς} an ordinary man, neither absolutely requiring of his friends, that they should wait upon him at his ordinary meals, nor that they should of necessity

cellity accompany him in his journies; and that whensoever any business upon some necessary occasions was to be put off and omitted before it could be ended, he was ever found when he went about it again, the same man that he was before. His accurate examination of things in consultations, and patient hearing of others. He would not hastily give over the search of the matter, as one easie to be satisfied with sudden notions and apprehensions. His care to preserve his friends; how neither at any time he would carry himself towards them with disdainfull neglect, and grow weary of them; nor yet at any time be madly fond of him. His contented mind in all things, his chearfull countenance, his care to foresee things afar off, and to take order for the least, without any noise or clamour. Moreover, how all acclamations and flattery were repressed by him: how carefully he observed all things necessary to the government, and kept an account of the common expences; and how patiently he did abide, that he was reprehended by some for this his strict and rigid kind of dealing. How he was neither a superstitious worshipper of the gods; nor an ambitious pleaser of men, or studious of popular applause; but sober in all things, and every where observant of that which was fitting; no affecter of novelties: in the use of those things which conduced to his ease and convenience, (plenty whereof his fortune did afford him,) without pride and bragging, yet with all freedom and liberty: so that as he did freely enjoy them without any anxiety or affectation when they were

were present; so when absent, he found no want of them. Moreover, that he was never commended by any man, as either a learned acute man, or an obsequious officious man, or a fine Oratour; but as a ripe mature man, a perfect sound man; one that could not endure to be flattered; able to govern both himself and others. Moreover, how much he did honour all true Philosophers, without upbraiding those that were not so; his sociableness, his gracious and delightfull conversation, but never unto satiety; his care of his body within bounds and measure, not as one that desired to live long, or over-studious of neatness and elegancy; and yet not as one that did not regard it: so that through his own care and providence, he seldom needed any inward Physick, or outward applications: but especially how ingenuously he would yield to any that had obtained any peculiar faculty, as either Eloquence, or the knowledge of the laws, or of ancient customs, or the like; and how he concurred with them, in his best care and endeavour that every one of them might in his kind, for that wherein he excelled, be regarded and esteemed: and although he did all things carefully after the ancient customs of his forefathers, yet even of this was he not desirous that men should take notice, that he did imitate ancient customs. Again, how he was not easily moved and tossed up and down, but loved to be constant, both in the same places and businesses; and how after his great fits of head-ach, he would return

fresh and vigorous to his wonted affairs. Again, that secrets he never had many, nor often, and such onely as concerned publick matters: His discretion and moderation, in exhibiting of the *Spectacula*, [or, publick sights and shows for the pleasure and pastime of the people:] in publick buildings, Congiaries, and the like. In all these things, ¹⁴ having a respect unto men onely as men, and to the equity of the things themselves, and not unto the glory that might follow. Never wont to use the baths at unseasonable hours; no great builder; never curious or solicitous, either about his meat, or about his workmanship, or colour of his cloths, or about any thing that belonged to external beauty. ¹⁵ His homely Countrey apparel, and such ordinarily as mean Villages could afford him. How he carried himself when he was in the Countrey towards that Custom-master, that excused himself, and desired some abatement [or, *desired him that he would forgive him.*] In all his conversation, far from all inhumanity, all boldness and incivility, all greediness and impetuosity; never doing any thing with such earnestness and intention, that a man could say of him, that he did sweat about it: but contrariwise, all things distinctly, as at leisure; without trouble; orderly, soundly, and agreeably. A man might have applied that to him, which is recorded of *Socrates*, that he knew how to want, and to enjoy those things, in the want whereof most men shew themselves weak; and in the fruition, intemperate: But to hold out firm and constant,

stant, and to keep within the compass of true moderation and sobriety in either estate, is proper to a man, who hath a perfect and invincible soul; such as he shewed himself in the sickness of *Maximus*.

XIV. From the gods [*I received*] that I had good grandfathers, and parents, a good sister, good masters, good domesticks, loving kinsmen, almost all that I have; and that I never through haste and rashness transgressed against any of them, notwithstanding that my disposition was such, as that such a thing (if occasion had been) might very well have been committed by me, but that it was the mercy of the gods, to prevent such a concurring of matters and occasions as might make me to incur this blame. That I was not long brought up by the Concubine of my Father; that I preserved the flower of my youth. That I took not upon me to be a man before my time, but rather put it off longer than I needed. That I lived under the government of my Lord and Father who would take away from me all pride and vain-glory, and reduce me to that conceit and opinion, that it was not impossible [*for a prince*] to live in the Court ¹⁶ without a troop of guards and followers, extraordinary apparel, such and such torches and statues, and other like particulars of state and magnificence; but that a man may reduce and contract himself almost to the state of a private man, and yet for all that not become the more base and remiss in those publick matters and affairs, wherein power and authority is requisite. That I have

had such a Brother, who by his own example might stir me up to think of my self; and by his respect and love, delight and please me. That I have got ingenuous children, and that they were not born distorted, nor with any other natural [or, bodily] deformity. That I was no great proficient in the study of Rhetorick and Poetry, and of other faculties, which perchance I might have dwelt upon, if I had found my self to go on in them with success. That I did betimes preferre those by whom I was brought up, to such places and dignities, which they seemed unto me most to desire; and that I did not put them off with hope and expectation, that (since that they were yet but young,) I would do the same hereafter. That I ever knew *Apollonius*, and *Rusticus*, and *Maximus*. That I have had occasion often and effectually to consider and meditate with my self, concerning that life which is according to nature, what the nature and manner of it is: So ¹⁷ that as for the gods and such suggestions, helps and inspirations, as might be expected from them, nothing did hinder, but that I might have begun long before to live according to nature; or that even now that I was not yet partaker and in present possession of that life, that I my self (in that I did not observe those inward motions and suggestions, yea, and almost plain and apparent instructions and admonitions of the gods,) was the only cause of it. That my body in such a life, hath been able to hold out so long. That I never had to doe with *Benedicta* and *Theodorus*, yea, and afterwards when

17.

when I fell into some fits of love, I was soon cured. That having been often displeased, with *Rusticus*, I never did any thing unto him for which afterwards I had occasion to repent. That it being so that my mother was to dye young, yet she lived with me all her latter years. That as often as I had a purpose to help and succour any that either was poor, or fallen into some present necessity, I never was answered [by my officers] that there was not ready money enough to doe it; and that I my self never had occasion to require the like succour from any other. That I have such a wife, so obedient, so loving, so ingenuous. That I had choice of fit and able men, to whom I might commit the bringing up of my children. That by dreams I have received help, as for other things, so in particular, how I might stay my casting of blood, and cure my dizziness; as that also that happened unto me at *Cajeta*, as * unto *Chryses* [when he Prayed by the sea shore.] And when I did first apply my self to Philosophy, that I did not fall into the hands of some Sophists, or spent my time either in reading the manifold volumes [of ordinary Philosophers,] nor in practising my self in the solution of arguments and fallacies, nor dwelt upon the studies of the Meteors, [and other natural curiosities.] All these things without the assistance of the gods, and * fortune, could not have been.

* See the Notes.

XV. In the countrey of the *Quadi* at *Grannua*, these.

Betimes in the morning say [or, fore-say,] to

* See n. XVII.

18.

to thy self, This day I shall have to doe with an idle, curious man, with an unthankfull man, a railer, a crafty, false, or an envious man; an ¹⁸ unsociable, uncharitable man. All these ill qualities have happened unto them, through ignorance of that which is truly good, and truly bad. But I that understand the nature of that which is good, that it [*only*] is to be desired; and of that which is bad, that it [*only*] is [*truly*] odious and shamefull: who know moreover, that this transgressor, whosoever he be, is my kinsman, not by the same blood and seed, but by participation of the same reason, and of the same *divine Particle*; How can I either be hurt by any of those, since it is not in their power, to make me incur any thing that is [*truly*] reproachfull? or angry, and ill affected towards him, who by nature is so near unto me? for we are all born to be fellow-workers, as the feet, the hands, and the eye-lids; as the rowes of the upper and under teeth: for such therefore to be in opposition, is against nature; and what is it to chafe at, and to be averse from, but to be in opposition?

* *πρὸς ἑαυτὸν*
707.

* See B.
III. n. XV.
19.

XVI. Whatsoever I am, is either flesh, or life, or [*that which we commonly call*] the mistress and over-ruling part of man; [*Reason.*] Away with thy books, suffer not thy mind any more to be distracted, and carried to and fro; * for it will not be; but as even now ready to dye, think little of thy flesh: ¹⁹ blood, bones and a skin; a Pretty piece of knit and twisted work, consisting of nerves, veins and arteries; [*think no more of it, than so.*] And as for thy life,

life, consider what it is: a wind; not one constant wind neither, but every moment of an hour let out, and sucked in again. The third, is thy ruling part; and here consider; Thou art an old man; suffer not that excellent part to be brought in subjection, and to become slavish: suffer it not to be drawn up and down with unreasonable and * *unsociable* lusts and motions, * *ἀκαταστάτως* as it were with wires and nerves; suffer it not See before any more, either to repine at any thing now Note 18. present, or to fear and fly any thing to come, which the Destiny hath appointed thee.

XVII. Whatsoever proceeds from the gods See B. III. [*immediately,*] that [*any man will grant,*] to- num. XII. tally depends from their divine providence. As for those things that [*are commonly said to*] happen by Fortune, even those must be conceived to have dependence from nature, or from that first and general connexion and concatenation of all those things, which [*embrace apparently*] by the divine Providence are administered and brought to pass. All things flow from thence: And whatsoever it is that is both necessary, and conducing to the whole; part of which thou art: and whatsoever it is that is requisite and necessary for the preservation of the general, must [*of necessity*] for every particular nature, be good and behovefull. And as for the whole, it is preserved, as by the perpetual mutation and conversion of the simple Elements one into another, so also by the mutation and alteration of things mixed and compounded. Let these things suffice thee; Let them be always unto thee as thy general rules and

rules and precepts. As for thy thirst after books, away with it with all speed, that thou die not murmuring and complaining, but truly meek and well satisfied, and from thy heart thankfull unto the gods.

THE SECOND BOOK.

Remember how long thou hast already put off these things, and how often a certain day and hour, as it were, having been set unto thee by the gods, thou hast neglected it. It is high time for thee to understand the true nature both of the world, whereof thou art a part; and of that Lord and Governour of the World, from whom, as a chanel from the spring, thou thy self didst flow: And that there is but a certain limit of time appointed unto thee, which if thou shalt not make use of to calm and allay the many distempers of thy soul, it will pass away and thou with it, and never after return.

II. Let it be thy earnest and incessant care as a Roman, and a man, to perform whatsoever it is that thou art about, with true and unfeigned gravity, natural affection, freedom and justice: and as for all other cares and imaginations, how thou mayest ease thy mind of them. Which thou shalt doe, if thou shalt go about every action as thy last action, free from all vanity, all passionate and wilfull aberration from right reason, and from all hypocrisie, and self-love, and dislike of those things, which by the

* fates

* fates [or, appointment of God,] have happened unto thee. Thou see'st that the things are but few, which for a man to hold on in a prosperous course, and to live a divine life, are requisite and necessary; for the gods will require no more of any man, that shall but keep and observe these things.

III. Doe, Soul, doe; abuse and contemn thy self; yet a while, and the time for thee to respect thy self will be at an end. Every man's happiness depends from himself, but behold thy life is almost at an end, whiles affording thy self no respect, thou dost make thy happiness to consist in the souls and conceits of other men.

IV. Why should any of these things that happen externally, so much distract thee? Give thy self leisure to learn some good thing; and cease roving and wandring, to and fro. Thou must also take heed of [or, avoid:] another kind of wandring, for they are idle in their actions, who toil and labour in this life, and have no certain scope to which to direct all their motions, and desires.

V. For not observing the state of another man's soul, scarce was ever any man known to be unhappy. But whosoever they be that intend not, and guide not by reason and discretion the motions of their own souls, they must of necessity be unhappy.

VI. These things thou must always have in mind: What is the nature of the Universe; and what is mine in particular: This unto that what relation it hath: what kind of part, of what kind of

See Pref. fol. 26.

See Pref. fol. 18. and Num. XIV. of this Bo.

1.

2.

of Universe it is: And that there is no body that can hinder thee, but that thou mayest always both do and speak those things which are agreeable to that nature whereof thou art a part.

3. VII. *Theophrastus*, where he compares sin with sin (as after a vulgar sense such things I grant may be compared :) says well and like a Philosopher, that those sins are greater which are committed through lust, than those which are committed through anger. For he that is angry seems with a kind of grief and close contraction of himself, to turn away from reason: but he that sins through lust, being overcome by pleasure, doth in his very sin bewray a more impotent and unmanlike disposition. Well then, and like a Philosopher, doth he say, that he of the two is the more to be condemned, that sins with pleasure, than he that sins with grief. For indeed this latter may seem first to have been wronged, and so in some manner through grief thereof to have been forced to be angry; whereas he who through lust doth commit any thing, did of himself merely resolve upon that action.

VIII. Whatsoever thou dost affect, whatsoever thou dost project, so doe, and so project all, as one who, for ought thou knowest, may at this very present depart out of this life. And as for death, if there be any gods, it is no grievous thing to leave the society of men. The gods will do thee no hurt thou maist be sure. But if it be so that there be no gods, or that they take no care of the world, why should I desire to live in a world void of gods,

gods, and of all divine providence? But gods there be certainly, and they take care for the world; and as for those things which be truly evil, as vice and wickedness; such things they have put in a man's own power, that he might avoid them if he would; and had there been any thing besides, that had been truly bad and evil, they would certainly have had a care of that also, that a man might have avoided it. But why should that be thought to hurt and prejudice a man's life in this world, which cannot any ways make man himself the worse in his own person? Neither must we think that the Nature of the Universe did either through ignorance pass these things, or if not as ignorant of them, yet as unable either to prevent, or better to order and dispose them. It cannot be that she through want either of power or skill, should have committed such a thing, as to suffer all things both good and bad, equally and promiscuously to happen unto all, both good and bad. As for life therefore, and death, honour and dishonour, labour and pleasure, riches and poverty, all these things happen unto men indeed, both good and bad, equally; but as things which of themselves are neither good nor bad; because of themselves, neither shameful nor praise-worthy.

IX. Consider how quickly all things are dissolved and resolved: the bodies and substances themselves, into the matter and substance of the world; and their memories into the general Age and Time of the world. Consider the nature of all worldly sensible things;

things; of those especially, which either ensnare by pleasure, or for their irksomeness are dreadfull, or for their outward lustre and shew are in great esteem and request, how vile and contemptible, how base and corruptible, how destitute of all true life and being they are.

6. X. It is the part of a man endowed with a good understanding faculty, to consider what they themselves are in very deed, * from whose bare conceits and voices, honour and credit do proceed: as also what it is to dye, and how if a man shall consider this by it self alone, *to dye*, and separate from it in his mind all those things which with it usually represent themselves unto us, he can conceive of it no otherwise than as of a work of nature, and he that fears any work of nature, is a very child. Now death, it is not only a work of nature, but also conducing to Nature.

7. XI. Consider with thy self how man, and by what part of his, is joined unto God, and how that part of man is affected, ⁷ when it is said to be *diffused*. There is nothing more wretched than that soul, which in a kind of circuit compasseth all things, searching (as he saith) *even the very depths of the Earth*; and by all signs and conjectures prying into the very thoughts of other mens souls; and yet of this is not sensible, that it is sufficient for a man to apply himself wholly, and to confine all his thoughts and cares to ⁸ the tendance of that Spirit, which is within him, and truly and really to serve him. His service doth consist in this,

this, that a man keep himself pure from all violent passion, and evil affection, from all sadness and vanity, and from all manner of discontent, either in regard of the gods, or men. For indeed whatsoever proceeds from the gods, deserves respect for their worth and excellency; and whatsoever proceeds from men, as they are our kinsmen, should by us be entertained, with love, always, sometimes, as proceeding from their ignorance of that which is truly good and bad, (a blindness no less, than that by which we are not able to discern between white and black:) with a kind of pity and compassion also.

9. XII. If thou shouldst live 3000, or as many 10000 of years, yet remember this, ¹⁰ that man can part with no life properly, save with that little part of life which he now lives: and that which he lives, is no other than that which at every instant he parts with. That then which is longest of duration, and that which is shortest, come both to one effect. For although in regard of that which is already past there may be some inequality, yet that time which is now present and in being is equal unto all men. And that being it which we part with [*whensoever we die*], it doth manifestly appear, that it can be but a moment of time that we then part with. For as for that which is either past or to come, a man cannot be said properly to part with it. For how should a man part with that which he hath not; These two things therefore thou must remember. First, that all things in the world from all eternity, by a perpetual re-

volution of the same times and things ever continued and renewed, are of one kind and nature; so that whether for a 100. or 200. years onely, or for an infinite space of time, a man see those things which are still the same, it can be no matter of great moment. And secondly, that that life which any the longest liver, or the shortest liver, parts with, is for length and duration the very same; for that only which is present, is that which either of them can lose, as being that onely which they have in for that which he hath not, no man can truly be said to lose.

11. XIII. Remember that all is but opinion and conceit; for those things are plain and apparent, which were spoken upon *Stoicism* the *Synike*, and as plain and apparent is the use that may be made of those things, if that which is true and serious to them, be received as well as that which is sweet and pleasing.

XIV. A man's soul doth wrong and disrespect it self, if it and especially, when as much as in it self lies, it becomes an *Apostate*, and as in were an exorcency of the world; for to be grieved and displeased with any thing that happens in the world, is direct *Apostasy* from the Nature of the Universe; part of which, all particular Natures of the world are. Secondly, when she either is averse from any man, or led by contrary desires and affections, tending to his hurt and prejudice; such as are the souls of them that are angry. Thirdly, when she is overcome by any pleasure or pain. Fourthly, when she doth dissemble, and covertly and fally, either doeth or saith any thing. Fifthly, when she doth

doth either affect or endeavour any thing to no certain end, but rashly and without due ratiocination, and consideration, how consequent or Inconsequent it is to the common end. For even the least things ought not to be done, without relation unto the end; and the end of the reasonable creatures is, to follow and obey him, who is the reason as it were, and the law of this * great City, and most ancient Common-wealth.

* See B.
X. n. 34.

XV. The time of a man's life is as a point; the substance of it ever flowing, the sense obscure; and the whole composition of the body, tending to corruption. His soul is restless, fortune uncertain, and fame doubtfull; to be brief, as a stream so are all things belonging to the body; as a dream, or as a smock, so are all that belong unto the soul. Our life is a warfare, and a mere pilgrimage. Fame after life is no better than oblivion. What is it then that will adhere and follow? One only thing, Philosophy. And Philosophy doth consist in this, for a man to preserve that Spirit which is within him, from all manner of contumelies and injuries, and above all pains or pleasures; never to doe any thing either rashly, or feignedly, or hypocritically: Wholly to depend on, [or, of] himself, and his own proper actions: all things that happen unto him, to embrace contentedly, as coming from Him from whom he Himself also came; and above all things, with all meekness and a calm chearfulness, to expect death, as being nothing else but the resolution of those Elements, of which every creature is composed.

And if the Elements themselves suffer, nothing by this their perpetual conversion of one into another; why should that dissolution and alteration, which is so common unto all, be feared by any? Is not this according to Nature? But nothing that is according to Nature can be evil.

Whilst I was at Carnuntus.

THE THIRD BOOK.

A Man must not onely consider how daily his life wasteth and decreaseth, and that but a very little [or, the lesser] portion of it is now behind; but this also, that if he live long, he cannot be certain, whether his understanding shall continue so able and sufficient, for either discreet consideration, in matter of businesses; or for contemplation, which is the thing whereon true knowledge of things both divine and humane doth depend. For if once he shall begin to dote, his respiration, nutrition, his imaginative, and appetitive, and other natural faculties, [*may still continue the same:*] he shall find no want of them. But how to make that right use of himself that he should, how to observe exactly in all things that which is right and just; how to redress and rectifie all [*wrong, or sudden*] apprehensions and imaginations, and even of

Book III. *His Meditations.*

of this particular, to consider duly, whether he should live any longer or no; for all such things, wherein the best strength and vigour of the mind is most requisite, [*his Power and ability*] will be already passed and gone. Thou must hasten therefore; not onely because thou art every day nearer unto death than other, but also because that intellective faculty in thee, whereby thou art inabled to know the true nature of things, and to order all thy actions by that knowledge, doth daily waste and decay: [*or, may fail thee before thou die.*]

II. This also thou must observe, that whatsoever it is that naturally doth happen to things natural hath somewhat in it self that is pleasing and delightfull; [*or, attractive:*] as a [*great*] loaf when it is baked, some parts of it cleave as it were, and part asunder, [*and make the crust of it rugged and unequal,*] and yet those parts of it, though in some sort it be against the art and intention of baking it self, that they are thus cleft and parted, [*which should have been, and were first made all even and uniform,*] they become it well nevertheless, and have a certain peculiar property to stir the appetite. So Figs are accounted fairest and ripest then, when they begin to shrink, and wither as it were. So ripe Olives, when they are next to putrefaction, then are they in their proper beauty. The hanging down of Grapes, the brow of a Lion, the froth of a foming wild Boar, and many other like things, though by themselves considered, they are far from any beauty, yet because they happen naturally, they both are comely and

delightfull; so that if a man shall with a profound mind and apprehension, consider all things in the world, even among all those things which are but mere accessories, and natural appendages as it were, there will scarce appear any thing unto him, wherein he will not find matter of pleasure and delight. So will he behold with as much pleasure the true *risus* of wild beasts, as those which by skilfull Painters, and other Artificers are imitated. So will he be able to perceive the proper ripeness and beauty of old age whether in man, or woman; and whatsoever else it is, that is beautifull and alluring * in whatsoever is with chaste and continent eyes, he will soon find out and discern. Those and many other things will he discern, not credible unto every one, but unto them onely who are truly and familiarly acquainted, both with nature it self, and all natural things [or, and all the works of nature.]

III. Hippocrates having cured many sicknesses, fell sick himself, and died. The *Caldeans* [and *Astrolagians*] having foretold the deaths of divers, were afterwards themselves surprised by the Bates. *Alexander* and *Bampeius*, and *Cain* *Cesar*, having utterly destroyed so many towns, and cut off in the fields so many thousands both of horse and foot, yet they themselves at last, were faine to part with their own lives. *Marcellus* having written so many naturall tracts concerning the [last and general] conflagration of the world, died afterwards ask filled with water within, and all bedaubed with dirt and dung without. Lice killed *Democritus*; and *Socrates*, another sort of vermine, [wicked; ungodly men]

* See the
Latine
Notes.

men.] How then stands the case? Thou hast taken ship, thou hast sailed, thou art come to land, go out, if to another life, there also shalt thou find gods, who are every where. If all life and sense shall cease, thou shalt thou cease also to be subject to either pains, or pleasures; and to serve and tend this vile Cottage; so much the viler, by how much that which ministers unto it doth excell; the one being a rational substance, and a spirit, the other nothing but earth and blood.

IV. Spend not the remnant of thy days in thoughts and fancies concerning other men, when it is not in relation to some common good, when by it thou art hindred from some other [better] work. That is, [spend not thy time] in thinking, what such a man doth, and to what end: what he saith, and what he thinks, and what he is about, and such other things [or, curiosities] which make a man to rove and wander from the care and observation of that part of himself, which is rational, and over-ruling. See therefore in the whole series and connexion of thy thoughts, that thou be carefull to prevent [or avoid] whatsoever is idle and impertinent; but especially, whatsoever is curious and malicious; and thou must use thy self to think onely of such things, of which if a man upon a sudden should ask thee, what it is that thou art now thinking, thou mayest answer freely and boldly, *This*, and *That*; that so by thy thoughts it may presently appear that all in thee is sincere, and peaceable; as becometh one that is made for society, and regards not

pleasures; nor gives way to any voluptuous imaginations at all [or, *to any longing thoughts or desires at all*]; free from all contentiousness, envy and suspicion; and from whatsoever else thou wouldest blush to confess thy thoughts were set upon. He that is such, is he surely that doth not put off to lay hold on that which is best indeed; a very Priest and Minister of the gods; well acquainted and in good correspondence with Him especially that is seated and placed within himself, [as in a Temple and Sacrary:] To whom also he keeps and preserves himself neither spotted by pleasure, nor daunted by pain; free from any manner of wrong, or contumely, [by a himself offered unto himself:] not capable of any evil [from others:] a wrestler of the best sort, and for the highest prize, that he may not be cast down by any passion or affection of his own; deeply died and drenched in righteousness, embracing and accepting with his whole heart whatsoever either happeneth or is allotted unto him. One who not often, nor without some great necessity tending to some publick good, mindeth what any other either speaks, or doeth, or purposeth: for those things onely that are in his own power [or, *that are truly his own*]; are the objects of his employments, and his thoughts are ever taken up with those things, which of the whole Universe are by the Fates [or, *Providence*] destinated and appropriated unto Himself. Those things that are his own and in his own power, he himself takes order for that they be good:

^a See B. II.
num. XIV.
^b See B. IV.
num. VII.

good: and as for those that happen unto him, he believes them to be so. For that lot and portion which is assigned to every one * as it is * See the
unavoidable and necessary, so is it always profitable: [or, is partly from without, unavoidable: and partly from within, depending of the will.] He remembers besides that whatsoever partakes of reason, is of kin unto him, and that to care for all men *generally*, is agreeing to the nature of a man: But as for honour and praise, that they ought not *generally* to be admitted and accepted of from all, but from such onely who live according to nature. As for them that do not, what manner of men they be at home, or abroad, day, or night, how conditioned themselves, with what manner of conditions [or, *with men of what conditions*] they moil and pass away the time together, he knoweth; and remembers right well: he therefore regards not such praise and approbation, as proceeding from them, who cannot like and approve themselves.

V. Do nothing against thy will, nor contrary to the community, nor without due examination, nor with reluctancy. Affect not to set out thy thoughts with curious neat language. Be neither a great talker, nor a great undertaker. Moreover, let thy god that is in thee to rule over thee, find by thee, that he hath to doe with a man; an aged man; a sociable man; a Roman; a Prince; one that hath ordered his life, as one that expecteth, as it were, nothing but the sound of the trumpet, sounding a retreat to depart out of this life with all readiness and

and expedition; as one who needs neither the oath [which ordinary soldiers take,] nor any witnesses, [to be the more strongly bound to this obedience and service; but of himself is ready to run at the first call of the trumpet.]

VI. A magnificent thing it is, [or, most comfortable,] as much as any thing; [so to compose thy self,] as to stand in no need [to enjoy thy happiness:] either of other mens help or attendance, or of that rest and tranquillity; which thou must be beholding to others for. Rather like one that is streight of himself [or, hath ever been streight] than one that hath been rectified.

See B. I.
n. XII.

VII. If thou shalt find any thing in this mortal life better than righteousness, than truth, temperance, fortitude: and in general, better than a mind contented both with those things which according to right and reason are done by thee through her help; and in those, which without her will and knowledge happen unto thee by the Providence; If, I say, thou canst find out any thing better than this; apply thy self unto it with thy whole heart; and that which is best wheresoever thou dost find it; enjoy [freely.] But if thou shalt find nothing worthy to be preferred before that Spirit which is within thee; if nothing better than to subject unto thee thine own lusts and desires, and not to give way to any fancies or imaginations before thou hast duly considered of them; nothing better than to withdraw thy self (to use Socrates his words) from all sensuality; and submit thy self unto the gods; and to have care of

of all men in general: If thou shalt find that all other things in comparison of this, are but vile, and of little moment; then give not way to any other thing, which being once, [though but] affected and inclined unto, it will no more be in thy power, without all distraction [as thou oughtest] to prefer and to pursue after that good, which is thine own and thy proper good. For it is not lawfull, that any thing that is of another [and inferiour] kind and nature, be it what it will, as either popular applause, or honour, or riches, or pleasures; should be suffered to confront and contest as it were, with that which is rational, and operatively good. For all these things, if once, though but for a while, they begin to please; they presently prevail, and pervert a man's mind, [or, turn a man from the right way.] Do thou therefore, I say, absolutely and freely make choice of that which is best, and stick unto it. Now, that [they say] is best, which is most profitable. If they mean profitable to man as he is a rational man, stand thou to it, and maintain it; but if they mean Profitable, as he is a creature [only,] reject it; and from this thy Tenet and Conclusion keep off carefully all plausible shews, and colours of external appearance, that thou maist be able to discern things rightly.

Greek
ἀπὸ τοῦ
οὐλάου
See B. VI.
num. XI.

VIII. Never esteem of any thing as profitable, which shall ever constrain thee either to break thy faith, or to lose thy modesty; to hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to dissemble; to last after any thing, that requirerh the secret of walls; or veils. But he that preferreth before

all

all things his Rational part and Spirit, and the sacred mysteries of vertue which issueth from it; he shall never lament and exclaim; never sigh, he shall never want either solitude or company: and which is chiefest of all, he shall live without either desire or fear. And as for life, whether for a long or short time he shall enjoy his soul thus compassed about with a body, he is altogether indifferent. For if even now he were to depart, he is as ready for it, as for any other action, which may be performed with modesty and decency. For all his life long, this is his onely care, that his mind may always be occupied in such intentions and objects as are proper to a rational sociable creature.

IX. In the mind that is [*once truly*] disciplined and purged, thou canst not find any thing, either foul or impure, or as (it were) festered: nothing that is either servile, or affected: no [*partial*] tie; no [*malitious*] averfeness; nothing obnoxious; nothing concealed. The life of such an one, Death can never surprise as imperfect; as of an Actour that should die before he had ended, or the Play it self were at an end, a man might speak.

X. Use thine opinative faculty with all honour and respect, for in her [*indeed*] is all: that thy opinion do not beget in thy understanding any thing contrary to either Nature, or the proper constitution of a Rational creature. The end and object of a Rational constitution, is, to doe nothing rashly, to be kindly affected towards men, and in all things willingly to submit unto the gods. Casting therefore all other things

things aside, keep thy self to these few, and remember withall that no man properly can be said to live more than that which is now present, which is but a moment of time. Whatsoever is besides, either is already past, or incertain. The time therefore that any man doth live is but a little, and the place where he liveth is but a very little corner of the earth, and the greatest fame that can remain of a man after his Death, even that is but little, and that too, such as it is whilst it is, is by the succession of silly mortal men preserved, who likewise shall shortly die, and [*even whiles they live*] know not what in very deed they themselves are: and much less can know one, who long before is dead and gone.

XI. To these fore-spoken ever-present helps and *mementoes*, let one more be added, Ever to make a particular description and delineation as it were of every object that presents it self to thy mind, that thou mayst wholly and thoroughly contemplate it, in its own proper nature, bare and naked; wholly, and severally; divided into its several parts and quarters: and then by thy self in thy mind, to call both it, and those things of which it doth consist, and into which it shall be resolved, by their own proper true Names and appellations. For there is nothing so effectual to beget true Magnanimity, as to be able truly and methodically to examine and consider all things that happen in this life, and so to penetrate into their natures, that at the same time, this also may concur in our apprehensions: What is the true use of it: and what is the true nature of this Universe, to which it is usefull?

See B. VI.
num. XI.

usefull? How much in regard of the Universe may it be esteemed? how much in regard of man, a Citizen of the supreme City, of which all other Cities in the World are as it were but houses and families?

XII. What is this that now my fancy is set upon? of what things doth it consist? how long can it last? which of all the virtues, is the proper vertue for this present use? as whether meekness, fortitude, truth, faith, sincerity, contentation, or any of the rest? Of every thing therefore thou must use thy self to say, This [*immediately*] comes from God, This by that fatal connexion and concatenation of things, or (which almost comes to one:) by some coincidental casualty. And as for this, it proceeds from my neighbour, my kinsman, my fellow: through his ignorance indeed, because he knows not what is truly natural unto him: But I know it, and therefore carry my self towards him according to the natural law of fellowship, that is, kindly, and justly. As for those things that of themselves are altogether indifferent, as in my best judgement I conceive every thing to deserve more or less, so I carry my self towards it.

XIII. If thou shalt intend that which is present, following the rule of right and reason carefully, solidly, meekly, and shalt not intermix any other businesses, but shalt study this [*only*] to preserve thy Spirit impolluted, and pure, and as one that were even now ready to give up the ghost, shalt cleave unto Him without either hope or fear of any thing, in all things that thou shalt

See B. I.
n. XVII.

See B. VI.
2. 30. VIII.
30. IX. 5.
24. X. 13.
33.

shalt either do or speak, contenting thy self with Heroical truth, thou shalt live happily; and from this there is no man that can hinder thee.

XIV. As Physicians [*and Chirurgeons*] have always their instruments ready at hand for all sudden cures, so have thou always thy *Dagimata* in a readinesse for the knowledge of things, both *divine* and *humane*: and whatsoever thou doest, even in the smallest things that thou doest, thou must ever remember that mutual relation and connexion that is between these two [*things divine, and things humane*]. For without relation unto God, thou shalt never perform aright any thing humane; nor on the other side any thing divine [*without some respect had to things humane*].

XV. Be not deceived. For thou shalt never live to reade thy moral Commentaries, nor the Acts of the ancient [*famous*] Romans and Grecians; nor those *Excerpta* from severall Books; all which thou hast provided and laid up for thy self, against thine old age. Hasten therefore to an end, and giving over all vain hopes, help thy self [*in time*], if thou carest for thy self, as thou oughtest to doe.

XVI. To *steal*, to *swear*, to *buy*, to *be* & *at rest*, to *see what is to be done* (which is not seen by the eyes, but by another kind of sight :) what these words mean, and how many ways to be understood, they do not understand. The body, the soul, the Understanding. [*As*] the senses [*naturally*], belong to the body, and the desires and affections to the soul, so do the *dogmata* to the understanding.

• See B.X.
n. XV.
B. XI.
n. XVI.
• See B.IV.
n. XXIX.
• See B.IV.
n. III.
• See B.IV.
n. XXIV.
B. VIII.
n. XXXVI.

XVII. To

See Pref.
pag. 12.
and notes
upon Book
VIII. 1.

XVII. To be capable of fancies and imaginations, is common to man and beast. To be violently drawn and moved by the lusts and desires [of the soul,] is proper to wild beasts and monsters; such as *Phalaris* and *Nero* were. To follow reason for ordinary duties and actions, is common to them also, who believe not that there be any gods, and [for their advantage would make no conscience] to betray their own Countrey; and who, when once the doors be shut upon them, dare do any thing. If therefore all things else be common to these likewise, it follows, that for a man to like and embrace all things that happen and are destinated unto him, and not to trouble and molest that Spirit which is seated in the temple of his own breast, with a multitude of [vain] fancies and imaginations, but to keep him propitious, and to obey him as a god, never either speaking any thing contrary to truth, or doing any thing contrary to Justice; is the onely true property of a good man. And such an one, though no man should believe that he liveth as he doth, either sincerely and conscionably, or chearfully and contentedly; yet is he neither with any man at all angry for it, nor diverted by it from the way that leadeth to the end of his life, at which it behooves a man to arrive with all quietness, purity and alacrity; in all things without any manner of compulsion fitted and accommodated to his proper lot and portion.

THE

THE FOURTH BOOK.

THAT inward mistress, part [of man,] if it be in its own true natural temper, is towards all worldly chances and events ever so disposed and affected, that it will easily turn and apply it self to that which may be, and is within its own power to compass, [when that cannot be which at first it intended.] For it never doth absolutely addict and apply it self to any one object, but whatsoever it is that it doth now intend and prosecute, it doth prosecute it with *exception and * Gr. *μὴ* reservation, so that whatsoever it is that falls out contrary [to its first intentions,] even that afterwards it makes its proper object. Even as the fire when it prevails upon those things that are in his way; by which things indeed a little fire would have been quenched, but a great fire doth soon turn to its own nature, and so consume whatsoever comes in its way: yea, by those very things it is made greater and greater.

II. Let nothing be done rashly and at random, but all things according to the most exact and perfect Rules of Art.

III. They seek for themselves private retiring-places, as Countrey villages, the sea-shoar, mountains; yea, thou thy self art wont to long much after such places. But all this [thou must know] proceeds from simplicity in the highest degree.

See B. X.
XXIV.

degree. At what time soever thou wilt, it is in thy power to retire into thy self, and to be at rest. For a man cannot retire any whither for to be more at rest, and freer from all business, than to his own soul. He especially who is before-hand provided of such things within, which whensoever he doth withdraw himself to look in, may presently afford unto him perfect ease and tranquillity. By ** tranquillity* I understand a decent orderly disposition and carriage free from all confusion and tumultuousness. Afford then thy self this retiring continually, and thereby refresh and renew thy self. Let those *[precepts]* be brief and fundamental, which as soon as thou dost call them to mind, may suffice thee to purge thy soul thoroughly, and to send thee away well pleased with those things, whatsoever they be, which now again, *[after this short withdrawing of thy soul into her self:]* thou dost return unto. For what is it that thou art offended at? Can it be at the wickedness of men, when thou dost call to mind this conclusion, that all reasonable creatures are made one for another? and that it is part of justice to bear with them? and that it is against their wills that they offend? and how many already, who *[once likewise]* prosecuted their enmities, suspected, hated, and fiercely contended, are now *[long ago]* stretcht out, and reduced unto Ashes? It is time for thee to make an end. As for those things which among the common chances of the world happen unto thee as thy particular lot and portion, canst thou be displeased with any of them, when thou dost

* Gr. *εὐ-
μαρτυρία.*

dost call that *[our ordinary]* Dilemma to mind, *Either a Providence, or [Democritus his] Atoms;* and with it, whatsoever we brought to prove, that the whole world is as it were one City? And as for thy body, what canst thou fear, if thou dost consider that thy Mind and Understanding, when once it hath recollected it self, and knows its own power, hath in this life and breath, (whether ** it run smoothly and gently, or whether harshly and rudely,*) no interest at all, but is altogether indifferent: and whatsoever else thou hast heard and affented unto concerning either pain or pleasure? But the care of thine honour and reputation will perchance distract thee. How can that be, if thou dost look back, and consider both how quickly all things that are, are forgotten, and what an immense chaos of eternity was before, and will follow after all things; and the vanity of praise, and the inconstancy and variableness of humane Judgements and opinions, and the narrowness of the place wherein it is limited and circumscribed? For the whole earth is but as one point; and of it, this inhabited part of it is but a very little part; and of this part, how many in number, and what manner of men are they that will commend thee? What remains then, but that thou often put in practice this kind of retiring of thy self to this little part of thy self; and above all things, keep thy self from distraction, and ** intend not any thing vehemently;* but be free and consider all things, ** as a man, [whose proper object is virtue,]* as a

* See B. V.
n. XX.
B. VII.
XXXV. II.
B. IX. XLI.

* Gr. *μὴ
καταλείπειν.*
* Gr. *ὡς
ἀνὴρ.*

* Gr. *ὡς ἀνθρώπου*.
See Note
XIV. and
XVIII.
upon B. I.
and B. V.
num. VI.

* man, [whose true nature is to be kind and sociable:] as a Citizen; as a mortal creature? Among other things, which to consider and look into thou must use to withdraw thy self, let those two be among the most obvious and at hand. One, that the things or objects themselves reach not unto the soul, but stand without still and quiet, and that it is from the opinion onely which is within, that all the tumult and all the trouble doth proceed. The next, that all these things, which now thou seest, shall within a very little while be changed, and be no more: and ever call to mind, how many changes and alterations in the world thou thy self hast already been an eye-witness of in thy time. This world is mere change, and this life, opinion.

IV. If to understand and to be reasonable be common unto all men, then is that reason, for which we are termed reasonable, common unto all. If reason in general, then is that reason also which prescribeth what is to be done, and what not, common unto all. If that, then Law. If Law, then are we fellow-Citizens. If so, then are we partners in some one Common-weal. If so, then the world is as it were a City. For what other Common-weal is it that all men can be said to be members of? From this Common City it is, that Understanding, Reason, and Law is derived unto us, for from whence else? For as that which in me is earthly, I have from some [common] earth; and that which is moist, from some other Element is imparted; as my breath and life hath its proper fountain; and that likewise which is dry and fiery in me: (for there

there is nothing which doth not proceed from something; as also there is nothing that can be reduced to mere nothing:) so also is there some [common beginning] from whence my understanding hath proceeded.

V. As generation is, so also death, a secret of Nature's wisdom; a mixture of Elements resolved into the same Elements again, a thing surely which no man ought to be ashamed of: in the series of other fatal events and consequences, which a rational creature is subject unto, not improper or incongruous; nor contrary to the natural and proper constitution of man himself.

VI. Such and such things from such and such causes, must of necessity proceed. He that would not have such things to happen, is as he that would have the fig-tree [grow] without any sap or moisture. In summe, remember this, that within a very little while, both thou and he shall both be dead, and after a little while more, not so much as your names and memories shall be remaining. See B. VI.
n. LII.
B. VIII.
n. XIII.

VII. Let opinion be taken away, and no man will think himself wronged. If no man shall think himself wronged, then is there no more any such thing as *wrong*. That which makes not man himself the worse, cannot make his life the worse, neither can it hurt him either inwardly or outwardly. It was expedient in nature that it should be so, and therefore necessary.

VIII. Whatsoever doth happen in the world, doth happen justly, and so, if thou dost well take heed, thou shalt find it. I say not onely in right order by a series of inevitable consequences,

but according to Justice, and as it were by way of equal distribution, according to the true worth of every thing. Continue then to take notice of it, as thou hast begun, and whatsoever thou doest, doe it not without this *proviso*, that it be a thing of that nature that a good man, (as the word *good* is properly taken) may doe it. This observe carefully in every action.

IX. Conceit no such things as he that wrongeth thee conceiveth, or would have thee to conceive, but look into the matter it self, and see what it is in very truth.

X. These two rules thou must have always in a readiness. First, doe nothing at all, but what Reason, proceeding from the Regal and supreme part, shall for the good and benefit of men suggest unto thee. And, secondly, if any man that is present shall be able to rectifie thee, or to turn thee from some [*erroneous*] persuasion, that thou be always ready to change thy mind, and this change to proceed, not from any respect of any pleasure or credit thereon depending, but always from some probable apparent ground of Justice, or from some publick good thereby to be furthered; or from some other such inducement.

XI. Hast thou Reason; I have. Why then makest thou not use of it? For if thy Reason doe her part, what more canst thou require?

XII. As a part hitherto thou hast had a particular subsistence: and now shalt thou vanish away into the common substance of him who first begot thee, or rather thou shalt be resumed again into that original rational substance, out of

of which all others have issued and are propagated. Many small pieces of Frankincense are set upon the same Altar, one drops first [*and is consumed,*] another after; and it comes all to one.

XIII. Within ten days [*if so it happen*] thou shalt be esteemed a god of them, who now if thou shalt return to the *Dogmata* and to the honouring of Reason, will esteem of thee no better than of a mere brute, and of an Ape.

XIV. Not as though thou hadst thousands of years to live. Death hangs over thee: whilst yet thou livest, whilst thou mayst be good.

XV. How much time and leisure doth he gain, who is not curious to know what his neighbour hath said, or hath done, or hath attempted; but onely what he doth himself, that it may be just and holy? or, to express it in *Agatho's* words, *Not to look about upon the evil conditions of others, but to run on straight in the line, without any loose and extravagant agitation?*

XVI. He who is greedy of credit and reputation after his death, doth not consider, that they themselves by whom he is remembred, shall soon after every one of them be dead; and they likewise that succeed those; untill at last all memory, which hitherto by the succession of men admiring, and soon after dying, hath had its course, be quite extinct. But suppose that both they that shall remember thee, and thy memory with them should be immortal, what is that to thee? I will not say to thee after thou art dead, but even to thee living. What is thy praise? but onely for a secret and politick confederation, which we call *εικονισμὸς*, or Dispensation:

sation: [*Publick praises and commendations, being ordinarily a strong motive to draw men to the love of vertue.*] For as for that, that it is the gift of nature [*whatsoever is commended in thee, what might be objected from thence,*] let that now that we are upon another consideration, be omitted as unseasonable. That which is fair and goodly, whatsoever it be, and in what respect soever it be, that it is fair and goodly, it is so of it self, and terminates in it self, not admitting praise as a part or member: that therefore which is praised, is not thereby made either better or worse. This I understand either of those things that are commonly called fair and good, as those which are commended even for the matter it self, or for curious workmanship. As for that which is truly good, what can it stand in need of [*to commend it*] more than either Justice or Truth; or more than either kindness or modesty? For which of all those either becomes good or fair, because commended; or dispraised suffers any damage? Doth the Emerald become worse in it self, or more vile, if it be not commended? Doth gold, or ivory, or purple? Is there any thing that doth, though never so common, as a knife, a flower, or a tree?

XVII. If so be that the souls remain after death [*say they that will not believe it,*] how is the air from all eternity able to contain them? How is the earth [*say I,*] ever from that time able to contain the bodies of them that are buried? For as here the change and resolution of dead bodies into another kind of subsistence, (*whatsoever it be,*) makes place for

for other dead bodies: so the souls after death transferred into the air, after they have conversed there a-while, are either by way of transmutation, or transfusion, or conflagration, received again into that original rational substance, from which all others do proceed; and so give way to those souls, who before coupled and associated unto bodies, [*now begin to subsist single.*] This, upon a supposition that the souls after death doe for a-while subsist single, may be answered. And here, (besides the number of bodies so buried and contained by the earth,) we may farther consider the number of several beasts, eaten by us men and by other creatures. For notwithstanding that such a multitude of them is daily consumed, and as it were buried in the bodies of the eaters, yet is the same place and body able to contain them, by reason of their conversion partly into bloud, partly into air and fire. What in these things is the speculation of truth? to divide things into that which is passive and material, and that which is active and formal.

XVIII. Not to wander out of the way, but upon every motion and desire to perform that which is just: and ever to be carefull to attain to the true natural apprehension of every fancy that presents it self.

XIX. Whatsoever is expedient unto thee, O World! is expedient unto me. Nothing can be unseasonable unto me as either coming before, or after its due time, which unto thee is seasonable. Whatsoever thy seasons bear, shall ever by me be esteemed as happy fruit, and increase.

increase. O Nature! from thee are all things, in thee all things subsist, and to thee all tend. Could he say of *Athens*, *Thou lovely City of Cereals*? and shalt not thou say of the World, *Thou lovely City of God*?

XX. They will say commonly, *Meddle not with many things, if thou wilt live cheerfully*. Certainly there is nothing better, than for a man to confine himself to necessary actions; to such and so many onely, as reason in a creature that knows it self born for society, will command and enjoin. This will not onely procure that cheerfulness, which from the goodness; but that also which from the paucity of actions doth usually proceed. For since it is so, that most of those things which we either speak or doe are unnecessary; if a man shall cut them off, it must needs follow that he shall thereby gain much leisure, and save much trouble; and therefore at every action a man must privately by way of admonition suggest unto himself, What! May not this that I now go about be of the number of unnecessary actions? Neither must he use himself to cut off actions onely, but thoughts and imaginations also, that are unnecessary; for so will unnecessary consequent actions the better be prevented and cut off.

XXI. Try also how a good man's life (of one who is well pleased with those things whatsoever, which among the common changes and chances of this world fall to his own lot and share; and can live well contented and fully satisfied in the justice of his own proper present action, and in the goodness of his disposition for the

the future :) will agree with thee. Thou hast had experience of that other kind of life: make now trial of this also. Trouble not thy self any more henceforth, reduce thy self unto perfect simplicity. Doth any man offend? It is against himself that he doth offend: [*why should it trouble thee?*] Hath any thing happened unto thee? It is well, whatsoever it be, it is that which of all the common chances of the world from the very beginning in the *series* of all other things that have happened, or shall happen, was destinated and appointed unto thee. To comprehend all in few words; Our life is short; we must endeavour to gain the present time with best discretion and justice. Use recreation with sobriety.

XXII. Either this world is a *κόσμος*, or a *comely piece*, because all disposed and governed by certain order: or if it be a mixture, though confused, yet still it is a *κόσμος*, a *comely piece*. For is it possible that in thee there should be any beauty at all, and that in the whole world there should be nothing but disorder and confusion? and all things in it too, [*by natural different properties*] one from another differenced and distinguished; and yet through-diffused, and by natural Sympathy one to another united, as they are?

XXIII. A black [*or, malign*] disposition, an effeminate disposition, an hard inexorable disposition, a wild inhumane disposition, a sheepish disposition, a childish disposition; a blockish, a false, a scurril, a fraudulent, a tyrannical: [*what then?*] If he be a stranger in the world that knows not

See B. VI.
n. xxxviii

See before
n. XV.

not the things that are in it ; why not he a stranger as well, that wonders at the things that are done in it?

XXIV. He is a true *fugitive*, that flies from reason, by which men are sociable. He *blind*, who cannot see with the eyes of his understanding. He *poor*, that stands in need of another, and hath not in himself all things needfull for this life. He an *Aposteme* of the world, who by being discontented with those things that happen unto him in the world, doth as it were *Apostatize*, and separate himself from common Nature's rational Administration. For the same nature it is that brings this unto thee, whatsoever it be that first brought thee into the world. He is a Separatist from the City [*of the whole world,*] who [*by irrational actions*] withdraws his own soul from the One and common soul of all rational Creatures.

XXV. There is, who without so much as a Coat ; and there is, who without so much as a Book, doth put Philosophy in practice. I am half naked, neither have I bread to eat, and yet I depart not from Reason, saith one. But, I say ; I want the food of good teaching and instructions, and yet I depart not from Reason.

XXVI. What Art and Profession soever thou hast learned, endeavour to affect it, and comfort thy self in it ; and pass the remainder of thy life as one who from his whole heart commits himself, and whatsoever belongs unto him, unto the gods : and as for men, carry not thy self either tyrannically, or servilely towards any.

XXVII.

XXVII. Consider in thy mind, for example's sake, the times of *Vespasian* : Thou shalt see but the same things ; some marrying, some bringing up children, some sick, some dying, some fighting, some feasting, some merchandizing, some tilling, some flattering, some boasting, some suspecting, some undermining, some wishing to dye, some fretting and murmuring at their present estate, some wooing, some hoarding, some seeking after Magistracies, and some after Kingdoms. And is not that their age quite over and ended ? Again, consider now the times of *Trajan*. There likewise thou seest the very self same things, and that age also is now over and ended. In the like manner consider other periods, both of times, and of whole nations, and see how many men, after they had with all their might and main intended and prosecuted some one worldly thing or other, did soon after drop away, and were resolved into the Elements. But especially thou must call to mind them, whom thou thy self [*in thy life-time*] hast known much distracted [*about vain things,*] and in the mean time neglecting to doe that, and closely and unseparably (as fully satisfied with it,) to adhere unto it, which their own proper constitution did require. And here thou must remember, that thy carriage in every business must be according to the worth and due proportion of it ; for so shalt thou not easily be [*tired out*] and vexed, if thou shalt not dwell upon small matters longer than is fitting.

XXVIII.

XXVIII. Those words which once were common and ordinary, are now become obscure and obsolete; and so the names of men once commonly known and famous, are now become in a manner obscure and obsolete names. *Camillus*, *Caeso*, *Volesius*, *Leonnatus*; and after a while, *Scipio*, *Cato*, then *Augustus*, then *Adrianus*, then *Antoninus Pius*: All these in a short time will be out of date, and [*as things of another world as it were*,] become fabulous. And this I say of them who once shined as the wonders of their Ages; for as for the rest, no sooner are they expired, than with them all their fame and memory. And what is it then that shall always be remembred? all is vanity. What is it that we must bestow our care and diligence upon? even upon this onely: That our minds and wills be just; that our actions be charitable; that our speech be never deceitfull: or, [*that our understanding be not subject to error*]; that our inclination be always set to embrace whatsoever shall happen unto us, as necessary, as usual, as ordinary, as flowing from such a beginning, and such a fountain, [*from which both thou thy self, and all things are*. Willingly therefore and wholly surrender up thy self unto that fatal concatenation, yielding up thy self unto the Fates to be disposed of at their pleasure.

XXIX. Whatsoever is now present, and from day to day hath its existence; all objects of memories, and the minds and memories themselves, incessantly consider; all things that are, have their being by change and alteration. Use thy

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thy self therefore often to meditate upon this, that the Nature of the Universe delights in nothing more, than in altering those things that are, and in making others like unto them. So that we may say, that whatsoever is, is but as it were the seed of that which shall be. For if thou think that that onely is seed, which either the earth or the womb receiveth, thou art very simple.

XXX. Thou art now ready to dye, and yet hast thou not attained to that perfect simplicity? thou art yet subject to many troubles and perturbations; not yet free from all fear and suspicion of external accidents; nor yet either so meekly disposed towards all men, as thou shouldest; or so affected as one whose onely study, and onely wisdom is, to be just in all his actions.

XXXI. Behold and observe, what is the state of their rational part; and those that the world doth account wise, see what things they flee and are afraid of; and what things they hunt after.

XXXII. In another man's mind and understanding thy evil cannot subsist, nor in any proper temper or distemper of the natural constitution of thy body, which is but as it were the coat or cottage of thy soul. Wherein then, but in that part of thee, wherein the conceit and apprehension of any misery can subsist? Let not that part therefore admit any such conceit, and then all is well. Though thy body, which is so near it, should either be cut or burnt, or suffer any corruption or putrefaction, yet let that part to which it belongs to judge of these, be

be still at rest; that is, Let her judge this, that whatsoever it is, that equally may happen to a wicked man and to a good man, is neither good nor evil. For that which happens equally to him that lives according to Nature, [*and to him that doth not,*] is neither according to nature, nor against it; [*and by consequent, neither good, nor bad.*]

See B. VI.
n. XXIII.

XXXIII. Ever consider and think upon the world, as being but one living substance, and having but one soul, and how all things in the world are terminated into one sensitive power, [*or, terminate into one general sense,*] and are done by one general motion as it were, and deliberation [*of that one soul;*] and how all things that are, concur in the cause of one another's being; and by what manner of connexion and concatenation all things happen.

XXXIV. What art thou, [*that better and divine part excepted*] but, as *Epictetus* said well, a wretched soul appointed to carry a carkase up and down?

XXXV. To suffer change can be no hurt; as no benefit it is, by change to attain to being. The age and time of the world is as it were a flood and swift current, consisting of the things that are brought to pass in the world. For as soon as any thing hath appeared, and is passed away, another succeeds; and that also will presently out of sight.

XXXVI. Whatsoever doth happen in the world, is [*in the course of nature*] as usual and ordinary as a Rose in the Spring, and fruit in Summer. Of the same nature is sickness and death,

flander,

flander, and lying in wait, and whatsoever else ordinarily doth unto fools use to be occasion either of joy or sorrow. That which succeeds, whatsoever it be, doth always very naturally, and as it were familiarly, follow upon that which was before. For thou must consider the things of the world, not as a loose independent number, consisting merely of necessary events; but as a discreet connexion of things orderly and harmoniously disposed. There is then to be seen in the things of the world, not a bare succession, but an admirable correspondence and affinity.

XXXVII. Let that of *Heraclitus* never be out of thy mind, that the death of earth is water, and the death of water is air, and the death of air is fire; and so on the contrary. Remember him also who was ignorant whether the way did lead, and how that Reason being the thing by which all things in the world are administered, and which men are continually and most inwardly conversant with, yet is the thing which ordinarily they are most in opposition with; and how those things which daily happen among them, cease not daily to be strange unto them; and that we should not either speak or doe any thing as men in their sleep, [*by opinion and bare imagination:*] for then we think we speak and doe; and that [*we must not be*] as children, who follow their fathers [*example,*] for best reason alledging their bare *καὶ δὲ πατρίαν*; or, As [*by successive tradition from our fore-fathers.*] we have received it.

XXXVIII. Even as if any of the gods should tell thee, thou shalt certainly dye to morrow, or next day, thou wouldst not (except thou wert extremely base and pusillanimous) take it for a great benefit, rather to dye the next day after, than to morrow: (for alas, what is the difference!) so [for the same reason] think it no great matter to dye rather many years after, than the very next day.

See num.
XLII.

XXXIX. Let it be thy perpetual meditation, how many Physicians who once looked so grim, and so tetrically shrunk their brows upon their Patients, are dead and gone themselves. How many Astrologers, after that in great ostentation they had foretold the death of some others; how many Philosophers, after so many elaborate tracts and volumes concerning either mortality, or immortality; how many brave Captains and Commanders, after the death and slaughter of so many; how many Kings and Tyrants, after they had with such horreur and insolency abused their power upon mens lives, as though themselves had been immortal; how many, that I may so speak, whole Cities [both

See notes. Men and Towns,] Helice, Pompeii, Herculannum, and others innumerable, are dead and gone? Run them over also, whom thou thy self, one after another, hast known in thy time to drop away. Such and such a one took care of such and such a ones burial; and soon after was buried himself. So one, so another: and all things in a short time. * For herein lieth all indeed, ever to look upon all things that belong unto man, as things for their continuance

* See B. V.
n. XXVII.
B. VII.
num. III.

[that

[that last but] from day to day; [or, that are but for a day:] and for their worth, most vile, and contemptible; as [for example, what is man?] That which but the other day [when he was conceived] was vile * snivel; and within few days shall be either an embalmed carcass, or mere ashes. Thus must thou according to [truth and] nature, thoroughly consider, how [man's life] is but for a very moment of time, and so depart meek and contented: even as if a ripe Olive falling, should praise the ground that bare her, and give thanks to the tree that begat her.

See notes:
* Greek
μυῖδες
See B. VI.
num. XI.

XL. Thou must be like a promontory of the sea, against which though the waves beat continually, yet both it self stands, and about it are those swelling waves stilled and quieted.

XLI. Oh, wretched I, to whom this mischance is happened! nay, happy I, to whom this thing being happened, I can continue without grief; neither wounded by that which is present, nor in fear of that which is to come. For, as for this, it might have happened unto any man; but every man having such a thing befallen him, could not have continued without grief. Why then should that rather be an unhappiness, than this a happiness? But however, canst thou, O man, term that unhappiness, which is no mischance to the nature of man? canst thou think that a mischance to the nature of man, which is not contrary to the [end, and] will of his nature? What then hast thou learned to be the will of man's nature? Doth that then which hath happened unto thee, hinder thee

thee from being just? or magnanimous? or temperate? or wise? or circumspect? or true? or modest? or free? or from any thing else of all those things in the present enjoying and possession whereof the nature of man is fully satisfied, as then enjoying all that is proper unto her? Now to conclude; upon all occasion of sorrow remember henceforth to make use of this *Dogma*, that to undergo this, whatsoever it is that hath happened unto thee, is in very deed no such thing of it self as unhappiness; but that to bear it generously is certainly great happiness.

XLII. It is but an ordinary course one, yet it is a good effectual remedy against the fear of death, for a man to consider in his mind the examples of such, who greedily and covetously (as it were) did for a long time enjoy their lives. What have they got more, than they whose deaths have been untimely? Are not they themselves dead at the last? as *Cadicianus*, *Fabius*, *Julianus*, *Lepidus*, or any other who in their life-time having buried many, were at the last buried themselves. The whole space of any man's life is but little; and as little as it is, with what troubles, with what manner of dispositions, and in the society of how wretched a body must it be passed? Let it be therefore unto thee altogether as a matter of indifferency. For if thou shalt look backward, behold what an infinite Chaos of time doth present it self unto thee; and as infinite a Chaos, if thou shalt look forward. In that which is so infinite, what difference can there be between that which liveth but three days, and * that which liveth three ages?

* Gr. ὁ
τελευτῶν
τελευτῶν
that is,
properly,
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stor's age:
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in any ages.

XLIII.

XLIII. Let thy course ever be the most compendious way. The most compendious is that which is according to nature: [*that is*] in all both words and deeds, ever to follow that which is most sound and perfect. For such a resolution will free a man from all trouble, strife, dissembling and ostentation.

THE FIFTH BOOK.

IN the morning, when thou findest thy self unwilling to rise, consider with thy self presently, it is to go about a man's work that I am stirred up. Am I then yet unwilling to go about that, for which I my self was born and brought forth into this world? Or was I made for this, to lay me down, and make much of my self in a warm bed? O but this is pleasing. And was it then for this that thou wert born, that thou mightest enjoy pleasure? Was it not in very truth for this, that thou mightest [*always*] be busie and in action? Seest thou not [*how all things in the world besides,*] how every Tree and Plant; how Sparrows and Ants, Spiders and Bees, how all in their kind are intent [*as it were*] orderly to perform whatsoever (towards the preservation of this orderly Universe; or, of this Universe, which doth consist of Order) naturally doth become and belong unto them? And wilt not thou doe that which belongs unto a man to doe? Wilt not thou run to doe that which thy nature doth require?

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require? But thou must have some rest. Yes, thou must. Nature hath of that also, as well as of eating and drinking, allowed thee a certain stint. But thou goest beyond thy stint, and beyond that which would suffice, and in matter of action, there thou comest short of that which thou mayest. It must needs be therefore, that thou dost not love thy self, for if thou didst, thou wouldst also love thy nature, and that which thy nature doth propose unto her self as her end. Others, as many as take pleasure in their trade and profession, can even pine themselves at their works, and neglect their bodies and their food for it; and dost thou less honour thy nature, than an ordinary mechanick his trade, or a good dancer his art? than a covetous man his silver, and a vain-glorious man applause? These, to whatsoever they take an affection, can be content to want their meat and sleep, to further that every one which they affect: and shall actions tending to the common good of humane society, seem more vile unto thee, or worthy of less respect and intention?

II. How easie a thing is it for a man to put off from him all turbulent adventitious imaginations, and presently to be in perfect rest and tranquillity?

III. Think thy self fit and worthy to speak or to doe any thing that is according to Nature, and let not the reproach, or report of some that may ensue upon it, [*ever*] deterre thee. If it be right and honest to be spoken or done, undervalue not thy self so much as to be discouraged from it. As for them, they have their own rational over-

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ruling part, and their own proper inclination; which thou must not stand and look about to take notice of, but go on streight, whither both thine own particular and the common nature do lead thee; and the way of both these is but one.

IV. I continue my course by actions according to nature, untill I fall and cease, breathing out my last breath into that air, by which continually breathed in I did live; and falling upon that earth, out of whose gifts and fruits my father gathered his seed, my mother her bloud, and my nurse her milk, out of which for so many years I have been provided, both of meat and drink. And lastly, which beareth me that tread upon it, and beareth with me that so many ways do abuse it, [*or, and so freely make use of it, so many ways to so many ends.*]

V. No man can admire thee for thy sharp acute language, [*such is thy natural disability that may.*] Be it so: yet there be many other [*good*] things, for the want of which thou canst not plead the want of natural ability. Let them be seen in thee, which depend wholly from thee; sincerity, gravity, laboriousness, contempt of pleasures; be not querulous, be content with little; be kind, be free; avoid all superfluity; all vain prating; be magnanimous. Dost not thou perceive, how many things there be, which notwithstanding any pretence of natural indisposition and unfitness, thou mightest have performed and exhibited, and yet still thou dost voluntarily continue drooping downwards? Or wilt thou say, that it is through defect

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of

of thy natural constitution, that thou art constrained to murmur, to be base and wretched, to flatter; now to accuse, and now to please, and pacifie thy body: to be vain-glorious, to be so giddy-headed and unsettled in thy thoughts? nay (witnesses be the Gods) of all these thou mightest have been rid long agoe: Onely this thou must have been contented with, to have born the blame of one that is somewhat slow and dull. Wherein thou must so exercise thy self, as one who neither doth much take to heart this his natural defect, nor yet pleaseth himself in it.

VI. Such there be, who when they have done a good turn to any, are ready to set them on the score for it, [*and to require retaliation.*] Others there be, who though they stand not upon retaliation, to require any, yet they think with themselves nevertheless, that such a one is their debtour, and they know [*as their word is*] what they have done. Others again there be, who when they have done any such thing, do not so much as know what they have done; but are like unto the Vine, which beareth her grapes, and when once she hath born her own proper fruit, [*is contented*] and seeks for no further recompence. As a Horse after a race, and a Hunting-dog when he hath hunted, and a Bee when she hath made her honey, look not for applause and commendation; so neither doth that man [*that rightly doth understand his own nature*] when he hath done a good turn: but from one doth pro-

See B. IV.
III.

proceed to doe another, even as the Vine after she hath once born fruit in her own proper season is ready for another time. Thou therefore must be one of them, who what they doe, barely doe it without any farther thought, and are in a manner unsensible of what they doe. Nay, [*but, will some reply perchance*] this very thing a rational man is bound unto, to understand what it is that he doeth. For it is the property, say they, of one that is naturally sociable, to be sensible that he doth operate sociably: nay, and to desire, that the party himself that is sociably dealt with, should be sensible of it too. [*I answer,*] That which thou sayest is true indeed, but the true meaning of that which is said thou dost not understand. And therefore art thou one of those first whom I mentioned. For they also are led by a probable appearance of reason. But if thou dost desire to *understand truly* what it is that is said, fear not that thou shalt therefore give over any sociable action.

VII. The form of the *Athenian's* prayer did run thus; *O rain, rain, good Jupiter, upon all the grounds and fields that belong to the Athenians.* Either we should not pray at all, or more absolutely and freely; [*and not every one for himself and his own onely.*]

VIII. As we say commonly, The Physician hath prescribed unto this man riding; unto another cold baths; unto a third, to go bare-foot: so it is alike to say, The Nature of the Universe hath prescribed unto this man sickness, or blindness, or some loss or damage, or some such thing. For as there, when we say of a Physician

Physician that he hath *prescribed* any thing, our meaning is, that he hath appointed this for that, as subordinate and conducing to health: so here, whatsoever doth happen unto any, is ordained unto him as a thing subordinate unto the Fates, and therefore do we say of such things, that they do *συμβαίνειν*, that is, *happen*, or, *fall together*; as of square stones, when either in walls or pyramids in a certain position they fit one another, and agree as it were in an harmony, the Masons say, that they doe *συμβαίνειν*; as if thou should'st say, *fall together*: so that in the general, [*though the things be divers that make it*] yet the consent or harmony it self is but one. And as the whole world is made up of all the particular bodies in it, one perfect and complete body, of the same nature that particular bodies are of; so is the Destiny of particular causes [*and events*] one general one, of the same nature that particular causes are. What I now say, even they that are mere Idiots are not ignorant of: for they say commonly *τὸ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ*, that is, *This his Destiny hath brought upon him*. This therefore is [*by the Fates*] properly and particularly brought upon this, as that unto this [*in particular*] is by the Physician prescribed. These therefore let us accept of in like manner, as we doe those that are prescribed unto us by our Physicians: For them also in themselves shall we find to contain many harsh things, but we nevertheless, in hope of health and recovery, accept of them. Let the fulfilling and accomplishment of those things which the common nature hath determined, be unto thee

thee as thy health. Accept then, and be pleased with whatsoever doth happen, though otherwise harsh and unpleasing, as tending to that end, to the health and welfare of the Universe, and to *Jove's* happiness and prosperity. For this, whatsoever it be, should not have been ^a *produced*, had it not ^b *conduced* to the good of the Universe. For neither doth any ordinary particular nature bring any thing to pass, that is not to whatsoever is within the sphere of its own proper administration and government agreeable and subordinate. For these two considerations then thou must be well pleased with any thing that doth happen unto thee. First, because that for thee properly it was brought to pass, and unto thee it was prescribed; and that from the very beginning by the *series* and connexion of the first causes, it hath ever had a reference unto thee. And secondly, because the good success and perfect welfare, and indeed the very continuance of Him that is the Administrator of the whole, doth in a manner depend on it. For the *whole* (because *whole*, therefore entire and perfect:) is maimed and mutilated, if thou shalt cut off any thing at all, whereby the coherence and contiguity (as of parts, so) of causes is maintained and preserved. Of which certain it is, that thou dost (as much as lieth in thee,) cut off, and in some sort violently take somewhat away, as often as thou art displeased [*with any thing that happeneth.*]

IX. Be not discontented, be not disheartned, be not out of hope, if often it succeed not so well with thee punctually and precisely to doe all

all things according to the right *dogmata*; but being once cast off, *return unto* them again: and as for those many and more frequent occurrences [*either of worldly distractions, or humane infirmities,*] which as a man thou canst not but in some measure be subject unto, be not thou discontented with them; but however, love and affect that [*onely*] which thou dost *return unto*: [*a Philosopher's life, and proper occupation after the most exact manner.*] And when thou dost return to thy Philosophy, return not unto it [*as the manner of some is after play and liberty as it were,*] to their School-Masters and Pedagogues; but as they that have sore eyes to their sponge and egg; or as another to his cataplasm; or as others to their fomentations: so shalt not thou make it a matter of ostentation at all to obey reason; but of ease and comfort. And remember that Philosophy requireth nothing of thee, but what thy nature requireth; and wouldest thou thy self desire any thing that is not according to nature? for which of these [*sayest thou; that which is according to Nature, or against it,*] is of it self more kind and pleasing? Is it not for that respect especially, that pleasure it self is to so many mens hurt and overthrow, most prevalent, [*because esteemed commonly most kind and natural?*] But consider well whether magnanimity rather, and true liberty, and true simplicity, and equanimity, and holiness; whether these be not most kind and natural. And prudence it self, what more kind and amiable than it, when thou shalt truly consider with thy self, what it is

is through all the proper objects of thy rational intellectual faculty, currently to goe on without any fall or stumble? As for the things of the world, their true nature is in a manner so involved with obscurity, that unto many Philosophers, and those no mean ones, they seemed altogether incomprehensible; and even to the Stoicks themselves, scarce, and not without much difficulty comprehensible; so that all assent of ours is fallible; for who is he that is infallible [*in his conclusions?*] From the nature of things, pass now unto their subjects and matter: how temporary; how vile are they? such as may be in the power and possession of some abominable loose liver, of some common strumpet, of some notorious oppressour and extortioner. Pass from thence to the dispositions of them that thou dost ordinarily converse with, how hardly do we bear even with the most loving and amiable? that I may not say, how hard it is for us to bear even with our own selves. In such obscurity and impurity [*of things,*] in such [*and so continual*] a flux both of the substances and time, both of the motions themselves and things moved, what it is that we can fasten upon; either to honour and respect especially, or seriously and studiously to seek after; I cannot so much as conceive. For indeed they are things contrary.

X. Thou must comfort thy self in the expectation of thy natural dissolution, and [*in the mean time*] not grieve at the delay; but rest contented in those two things. First, that nothing shall happen unto thee, which is not according to the nature of the Universe. Secondly,

condly, that it is in thy power, to doe nothing against thine own proper god, and [inward] Spirit. For it is not in any man's power to constrain thee to transgress against him.

XI. What is the use that now at this present I make of my soul? Thus from time to time and upon all occasions thou must put this question to thy self, What is now that part of mine which they call the rational mistress part, imployed about? Whose soul do I now properly possess? a child's? or a youth's? a woman's? or a tyrant's? some brute's, or some wild beast's soul?

XII. What those things are in themselves, which by the greatest part are esteemed good, thou mayest gather even from this. For if a man shall hear things mentioned as good, which are really good indeed, such as are prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude; after so much heard and conceived, he cannot endure to hear of any more; for the word good is properly spoken of them. But as for those which by the vulgar are esteemed good, if he shall hear them mentioned as good, he doth hearken for more. He is well contented to hear that what is spoken by the Comedian; is but familiarly and popularly spoken; so that even the vulgar apprehend the difference. For why is it else, that this offends not and needs not to be excused, [when vertues are styled good:] but that which is spoken in commendation of wealth, pleasure, or honour, we entertain it onely as merrily and pleasantly spoken? Proceed therefore, and enquire farther, whether it may not be that those things also, which being mentioned [upon the

stage

See the notes.

stage as the onely things which made a man truly rich and happy,] were merrily [and with great applause of the multitude] scoffed at with this jest, that they that possessed them, had not in all the world of their own (such was their affluence and plenty) so much as a place where to void their excrements: Whether, I say, these ought [not] also in very deed to be much respected, and esteemed of as the onely things that are truly good.

XIII. All that I consist of, is either form or matter. No corruption can reduce either of these unto nothing: for neither did I of nothing become a subsistent creature. Every part of mine then, will by mutation be disposed into a certain part of the whole world; and that in time into another part; and so in infinitum: by which kind of mutation, I also became what I am, and so did they that begot me, and they before them, and so upwards in infinitum. For so we may be allowed to speak, though the age and government of the world be to some certain periods of time limited and confined.

XIV. Reason, and rational power, are faculties which content themselves with themselves, and their own proper operations. And as for their first inclination and motion, that they take from themselves. But their progress is right to the end and object, which is in their way, as it were, and lieth just before them: [that is, which is feasible and possible, whether it be that which at the first they proposed to themselves, or no.] For which reason also such actions are termed *καλοῦσι*, to intimate the directness

See B. IV. n. I.
B. V. n. XVII.
B. VI. n. XLV.

of the way, [*by which they are atchieved.*] Nothing must be thought to belong to a man, which doth not belong unto him as he is a man. These [*the event of purposes*] are not things required in a man. The nature of man doth not profess any such things. The final ends and consummations [*of actions*] are nothing at all to a man's nature. The end therefore of a man, or that *summum bonum* whereby that end is fulfilled, cannot consist in the consummation of actions [*purposed and intended.*] Again, concerning these [*outward worldly*] things, were it so that any of them did properly belong unto man, then would it not belong unto man to condemn them, and to stand in opposition with them. Neither would he be praise-worthy that can live without them; or he good, (if these were good indeed,) who of his own accord doth deprive himself of any of them. But we see contrarywise, that the more a man doth withdraw himself from these [*wherein external pomp and greatness doth consist,*] or any other like these, or the better he doth bear with the loss of these, the better he is accounted.

XV. Such as thy thoughts and ordinary cogitations are, such will thy mind be in time. For the soul doth as it were receive its tincture from the phancies and imaginations. Dye it therefore and throughly soke it with the assiduity of these cogitations. As for example. Wheresoever thou mayest live, there it is in thy power to live well and happy: But thou mayest live at the Court, there then also mayest thou live well and happy. Again, that which every thing is made for, he is also made

made unto that, and cannot but naturally incline unto it. That which any thing doth naturally incline unto, therein is his end. Wherein the end of every thing doth consist, therein also doth his good and benefit consist. Society therefore is the proper good of a rational creature: For that we are made for society, it hath long since been demonstrated. Or can any man make any question of this, that whatsoever is naturally worse and inferiour, is ordinarily subordinated to that which is better? and that those things that are best, are made one for another? and those things that have souls, are better than those that have none? and of those that have, those best that have rational souls?

XVI. To desire things impossible is the part of a mad-man: But it is a thing impossible that wicked men should not commit some such things. Neither doth any thing happen to any man, which in the ordinary course of nature as natural unto him doth not happen. Again, the same things happen unto others also. And truly, if either he that is ignorant that such a thing hath happened unto him, or he that is ambitious to be commended for his magnanimity, can be patient, and is not grievéd; is it not a grievous thing, that either ignorance, or a vain desire to please and to be commended, should be more powerfull and effectual than true prudence? As for the things themselves, they touch not the soul, neither can they have any access unto it: neither can they of themselves any ways either affect it or move it: For she her self alone can affect and move her self, and according

See Note
upon B.IV.
n. III.

See B. VI.
n. VII.

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ding

ding as the *Dogmata* and opinions are, which she doth vouchsafe her self, so are those things which, as accessories, have any co-existence with her.

See B. IV.
n. I.

XVII. After one consideration, man is nearest unto us; as we are bound to doe them good, and to bear with them: but as he may oppose any of our true proper actions, so man is unto me but as a thing indifferent; even as the Sun, or the Wind, or some wild Beast. By some of these it may be, that some operation or other of mine may be hindred; however, of my mind and resolution it self there can be no lett or impediment, by reason of that ordinary constant, both *Reservation* [*wherewith it inclineth,*] and ready *Conversion* [*of objects, from that which may not be, to that which may be; which in the prosecution of its inclinations, as occasion serves, it doth observe.*] For by these the mind doth turn and convert any impediment whatsoever, to be her aim and purpose. So that what before was the impediment, is now the principal object of her working; and that which before was in her way, is now her readiest way.

XVIII. Honour that which is chiefest and most powerfull in the world, and that is it which makes use of all things, and governs all things, [*God.*] So also in thy self, honour that [*thy spirit or understanding*] which is chiefest, and most powerfull; and is of one kind and nature with that [*which we now spake of:*] For it is the very same, which being in thee, turneth all other things to its own

own use, and by whom also thy life is governed.

XIX. That which doth not hurt the City it self, cannot hurt any Citizen. This rule thou must remember to apply and make use of upon every conceit and apprehension of wrong. * If

the whole City be not hurt by this, neither am I certainly. And if the whole be not, why should I make it my private grievance? [*consider rather*] what it is wherein he is overseen [*that is thought to have done the wrong.*] [*Again,*

Often meditate how swiftly all things that subsist, and all things that are done in the world, are carried away, and as it were conveighed out of sight: For both the substances themselves, (we see) as a floud, are in a continual flux; and all actions in a perpetual change; and the causes themselves subject to a thousand alterations: neither is there any thing almost, that may ever be said to be now settled and constant. Next unto this, and which follows upon it, [*consider*] both the infiniteness of the time already passed, and the immense vastness of that which is to come, wherein all things are to be resolved, and annihilated. Art not thou then a very fool, who for these things art either puffed up with pride; or distracted with cares, or canst find in thy heart to make such moans, as for a thing that would trouble thee for a very long time? Consider the whole Universe, whereof thou art but a very little part; and the whole age of the world together, whereof but a short and very momentary portion is allotted unto thee; and all the Fates and Destinies together, of which how much is it that

* See the Latine notes. See n. 8. & 29. of this book; and in the Table, the World, at a City.

comes to thy part and share! [*Again:*] Another doth trespass against me. Let him look to that. He is master of his own disposition, and of his own operation. I for my part am in the mean time in possession of as much as the common nature would have me to possess: and that which mine own nature would have me doe, I doe.

XX. Let not that chief commanding part of thy soul be ever subject to any variation through any corporal either pain or pleasure, neither suffer it to be mixed with these, but let it both circumscribe it self, and confine those affections to their own proper parts and members. But if at any time they do reflect and rebound upon the mind and understanding, (as in an united and compacted body it must needs,) then must thou not go about to resist sense and feeling, it being natural. However let not thy understanding [*to this natural sense and feeling, which whether unto our flesh pleasant or painfull, is unto us nothing properly,*] add an opinion of either good or bad, [*and all is well.*]

See notes.

XXI. *To live with the Gods.* He liveth with the Gods, who at all times affords unto them the spectacle of a soul both contented and well pleased with whatsoever is afforded or allotted unto her; and performing whatsoever is pleasing to that Spirit, whom (being part of himself) *Jove* hath appointed to every man as his overseer and governour; which is every man his Intellect and Reason.

XXII. Be not angry, neither with him whose breath,

breath, neither with him whose *ala* [*or arme-holes*] are offensive. What can he doe? such is his breath [*naturally,*] and such are his *ala*; and from such, such an effect, and such a smell must of necessity proceed. O! but the man, (sayest thou) hath understanding in him, and might of himself know, that he by standing near cannot chuse but offend. And thou also (God bless thee,) hast understanding. Let thy reasonable faculty work upon his reasonable faculty; shew him his fault, admonish him. If he hearken unto thee, thou shalt cure him, and there will be no more occasion of anger.

XXIII. *Where there shall neither roarer be, nor harlot.* [*Why so?*] As thou dost purpose to live, when thou hast retired thy self [*to some such place, where neither roarer nor harlot is:*] so mayest thou here. And if they will not suffer thee, then mayest thou leave thy life [*rather than thy calling,*] but so as one that doth not think himself any ways wronged. Onely as one would say, Here is a smoak; I will not out of it. And what a great matter is this? Now till some such thing force me out, I will continue free; neither shall any man hinder me to doe what I will, and my Will shall ever be by the proper nature of a reasonable and sociable creature regulated and directed.

XXIV. That rational Essence by which the Universe is grounded, is for community and society; and therefore hath it both made the things that are worse for the best, and hath allied and knit together those which are best

See B. IV. n. III. and the notes upon this place.

as it were in an harmony. Seest thou not how it hath subordinated, and co-ordinated? and how it hath distributed unto every thing according to its worth? and those which have the pre-eminency and superiority above all, hath it united together into a mutual consent and agreement.

XXV. How hast thou carried thy self hither-to towards the Gods? towards thy Parents? towards thy Brethren? towards thy Wife? towards thy Children? towards thy Masters? thy foster-Fathers? thy Friends? thy Domesticks? thy Servants? Is it so with thee, that hitherto thou hast neither by word or deed wronged any of them? Remember withall through how many things thou hast already passed, and how many thou hast been able to endure; so that now the *Legend* of thy life is full, and thy charge is accomplished. Again, how many truly good things have certainly by thee been discerned? how many pleasures, how many pains hast thou passed over with contempt? how many things [externally] glorious hast thou despised? towards how many perverse unreasonable men hast thou carried thy self kindly and discreetly?

XXVI. Why should imprudent, unlearned souls trouble that which is both learned and prudent? And which is that that is so? she that understandeth the beginning and the end, and hath the true knowledge of that rational Essence, that passeth through all things subsisting, and through all ages [being ever the same,] disposing and dispensing (as it were) this

this Universe by certain periods of time.

XXVII. Within a very little while, thou wilt be either ashes, or a *skeleton*; and a Name, perchance; and perchance, not so much as a Name. And what is that but an [empty] sound, and a rebounding Echo? Those things which in this life are dearest unto us, and of most account, they are [in themselves] but vain, putrid, contemptible. [The most weighty and serious, if rightly esteemed, but] as puppies biting one another; or untoward children, now laughing, and then crying. As for faith, and modesty, and justice, and truth, they long since [as one of the Poets hath it] have abandoned this spacious Earth, and retired themselves into Heaven. What is it then that doth keep thee here, if things sensible be so mutable and unsettled, and the senses so obscure, and so fallible, and our Souls nothing but an exhalation of blood, and to be in credit among such, be but vanity? What is it that thou dost stay for? an Extinction, or a Translation: for either of them with a propitious and contented mind. But till that time come, what will content thee? what else, but to worship and praise the gods, and to doe good unto men; to bear with them, and to forbear to doe them any wrong; and for all external things belonging either to this thy wretched body, or life, to remember that they are neither thine, nor in thy power?

XXVIII. Thou mayest always speed, if thou wilt but make choice of the right way; if in the course both of thine opinions and actions, thou wilt observe a true method. These two things

be common to the souls, as of God, so of men, and of every reasonable creature: first, that [*in their own proper work*] they cannot be hindered by any thing: and secondly, that their happiness doth consist in a disposition to, and in the practice of righteousness; and that in these their desire is terminated.

See num.
XIX. and
B.X. n.VI.

XXIX. If this [*that makes my friend to lament*] neither be my wicked act, nor an act any ways depending from any wickedness of mine, and that by it the publick [*or, Universe*] is not hurt; what doth it concern me? And wherein can the publick be hurt? For thou must not altogether be carried by conceit [*and common opinion.*] As for help, thou must afford that unto them after thy best ability, and as their need shall require, though they sustain damage but in these middle [*or, worldly*] things; but however do not thou conceive that they are truly hurt thereby: for that is not right. But as that old foster-Father [*in the Comedy*] being now to take his leave, doth [*with a great deal of Ceremony*] require this foster-Child's *rhombus*, [*or, rattle-top, that he was wont to play with, for a remembrance of him;*] remembering nevertheless that it is but a *rhombus*, [*a rattle, or a bawble:*] so here also [*doe thou likewise.*] For indeed what is all this solemn declaiming and exclaiming at the *Rostra*. [*if it be rightly considered?*] O man! hast thou forgotten what those things are? yea, but they are things that others much care for, and highly esteem of. Wilt thou therefore be a fool too? Once I was; [*let that suffice.*]

XXX.

XXX. Let death surprize me when it will, and where it will, I may be *εὖ μοι* [*or, a happy man*] nevertheless. For he is a happy man, who [*in his life-time*] dealeth unto himself a happy lot and portion. A happy lot and portion is good inclinations of the soul, good desires, good actions.

THE SIXTH BOOK.

THE matter it self of which the Universe doth consist, is of it self very tractable and pliable. That rational Essence that doth govern it, hath in it self no cause to doe evil. It hath no evil [*in it self,*] neither can it doe any thing that is evil; neither can any thing be hurt by it. And all things are done and determined according to its will and prescript.

II. Be it all one unto thee, whether half frozen or well warm; whether onely slumbering or after a full sleep; whether discommended or commended thou doe thy duty; or whether dying or doing somewhat else; for that also *to dye*, must among the rest be reckoned as one of the duties and actions of our lives. [*Whensoever then the time of that duty shall be,*] then also must it suffice thee [*to make thee happy*] that then thou dost well acquit thy self of that present duty; [*or, that the present time is spent by thee upon a good action.*]

III. Look in, let not either the proper quality,
or

or the true worth of any thing pass thee, [*before thou hast fully apprehended it.*]

IV. All substances come soon to their change, and either they shall be resolved by way of exhalation, (if so be that all things shall be re-united into one substance,) or [*as others maintain,*] they shall be scattered and dispersed. As for that Rational Essence by which all things are governed, as it best understandeth it self, both its own disposition, and what it doeth, and what matter it hath to doe with, [*and accordingly doth all things; so we that doe not, no wonder, if we wonder at many things, the reasons whereof we cannot comprehend.*]

V. The best kind of revenge is, not to become like unto them.

See B. V.
n. XVI.

VI. Let this be thy onely joy, and thy onely comfort, from one sociable [*kind*] action [*without intermission*] to pass unto another, God being ever in thy mind.

VII. The rational commanding part, as it alone can stir up and turn it self; so it maketh both it self to be, and every thing that happeneth, to appear unto it self as it will it self.

VIII. According to the nature of the Universe all things [*particular*] are determined, not according to any other nature, either about, compassing and containing; or within, dispersed and contained; or without, depending. Either this Universe is a mere confused mass, and an intricate context of things, which shall in time be scattered and dispersed again; or it is an Union consisting of Order, and administered by providence. If the first, why should I desire to

to continue any longer in this *fortuit* confusion and commixtion? or why should I take care for any thing else, but that as soon as may be I may be Earth [*again?*] And why should I trouble my self any more [*whilst I seek to please the gods?*] Whatsoever I doe, Dispersion is my end; and will come upon me whether I will or no. But if the latter be, then am not I religious in vain; then will I be quiet and patient, and put my trust in Him who is the Governour of all.

IX. Whensoever by some present hard occurrences thou art constrained to be as it were troubled and vexed, return unto thy self as soon as may be, and be not out of tune longer than thou must needs: For so shalt thou be the better able to keep thy part another time, and to maintain the harmony, if thou dost use thy self to this continually; once out, presently to have recourse unto it, and to begin again.

X. If it were that thou hadst at one time both a stepmother and a natural mother living, thou wouldst honour and respect her also; nevertheless to thine own natural mother would thy refuge and recourse be continually. So let the Court and thy Philosophy be unto thee. Have recourse unto it often, and comfort thy self in her, by whom it is that those other things are made tolerable unto thee, and thou also in those things not intolerable unto others.

XI. How marvellous usefull is it for a man to represent unto himself meats, and all such things that are for the mouth, under a right apprehension

prehension and imagination? as for example; This is the carcase of a Fish, this of a Bird, and this of a Hog. And again more generally; This *Falernum*, [*this excellent highly commended wine*,] is but the bare juice of an ordinary Grape. This purple robe, but Sheeps hairs, died with the blood of a Shell-fish. So for *coitus*, it is but the attrition of an ordinary base entrail; and the excretion of a little * *vile snivel*, with a certain kind of convulsion: [*according to Hippocrates his opinion.*] How excellent usefull are these lively Fancies and Representations of things, thus penetrating and passing through the objects, to make their true nature known and apparent! This must thou use all thy life long, and upon all occasions; and then especially, when matters are apprehended as of great worth and respect, [*thy art and care must be*] to uncover them, and to behold their vileness, and to take away from them all those serious circumstances and expressions, under which they made so grave a shew. For outward pomp and appearance is a great juggler; and then especially art thou most in danger to be beguiled by it, when (to a man's thinking) thou most seemest to be employed about matters of moment.

XII. See what *Crates* pronounceth concerning *Xenocrates* himself.

XIII. Those things which the common sort of People do admire, are most of them such things as are very general, and may be comprehended under things merely natural, or naturally affected and qualified: as stones, wood, figs, vines, olives. Those that be admired by them that are
more

* Greek
μυζαειν.
See B. IV.
n. xxxix.

Gr. ὁ πῶρος.
See B. III.
n. VII.

more moderate and restrained, are comprehended under things animated; as flocks and herds. Those that are yet more gentle and curious, their admiration is commonly confined to reasonable creatures onely; not in general as they are reasonable, but as they are capable of art, or of some craft and subtle invention: or perchance barely to reasonable creatures; as they that delight in the possession of many slaves. But he that honours a reasonable soul in general, as it is reasonable and naturally sociable, doth little regard any thing else; and above all things is careful to preserve his own in the continual habit and exercise both of reason and sociableness: and thereby doth co-operate with him, of whose nature he doth also participate; [*God.*]

XIV. Some things hasten to be, and others to be no more. And even whatsoever now is, some part thereof hath already perished. Perpetual fluxes and alterations renew the world, as the perpetual course of time doth make the age of the world (of it self infinite) to appear always fresh and new. In such a flux and course of all things, what of these things that hasten so fast away should any man regard, since among all there is not any that a man may fasten and fix upon? as if a man would settle his affection upon some ordinary Sparrow flying by him, who is no sooner seen, than out of sight. For we must not think otherwise of our lives than as a mere exhalation of blood, or of an ordinary respiration of air. For what [*in our common apprehension*] it is, to breathe in the air, and to breathe it out again, which we doe daily; so much is it and no more, at once to
breathe

breathe out all thy respirative faculty into that common air from whence but lately (as being but from yesterday and to day,) thou didst first breathe it in, and with it, life.

XV. Not vegetative spiration, it is not surely (which Plants have) that [*in this life*] should be so dear unto us; nor sensitive respiration, the proper life of beasts, both tame and wild; nor this our imaginative faculty; nor that we are subject to be led and carried up and down by the strength and violence of our sensual appetites; or that we can assemble and live together; or that we can feed: for that in effect is no better, than that we can void the excrements of our food. What is it then that should be dear unto us? to hear a clattering noise? if not that, then neither to be applauded by the tongues of men. For the praises of many tongues is in effect no better than the clattering of so many tongues. If then neither applause, what is there remaining that should be dear unto thee? This I think: that [*in all thy motions and actions*] thou be moved, and restrained, according to thine own true natural constitution and construction onely. And to this even ordinary arts and professions do lead us: For it is that which every art doth aim at, that whatsoever it is that is by art effected and prepared, may be fit for that work that it is prepared for. This is the end that he that dresseth the Vine, and he that takes upon him either to tame Colts, or to train up Dogs, doth aim at. What else doth the education of Children, and all learned professions

essions tend unto? Certainly then it is that which should be dear unto us also. If in this particular it go well with thee, care not for the obtaining of other things. But is it so, that thou canst not but respect other things also? Then canst not thou be truly free; then canst thou not have self-content; then wilt thou ever be subject to passions. For it is not possible but that thou must be envious, and jealous, and suspicious of them who [*thou knowest*] can bereave thee of such things; and again, a secret underminer of them whom thou seest in present possession of that which is dear unto thee. To be short, he must of necessity be full of confusion within himself, and often accuse the gods, whosoever stands in need of these things. But if thou shalt honour and respect thy mind onely, that will make thee acceptable towards thyself, towards thy friends very tractable, and conformable and concordant with the gods; that is, accepting with praises whatsoever they shall think good to appoint and allot unto thee.

XVI. Under, above, and about, are the motions of the Elements; but the motion of virtue is none of those motions, but is somewhat more excellent and divine: Whose way (to speed and prosper in it) must be through a way that is not easily comprehended.

XVII. Who can chuse but wonder at them? They will not speak well of them that are at the same time with them, and live with them: yet they themselves are very ambitious,

See note upon the II. B. out of Epistle III, and m. XXXVI. of this VI. B.

See Job 28. 1, 2. to 12, 13, &c.

ous, that they that shall follow, whom they have never seen, nor shall ever see, should speak well of them. As if a man should grieve that he hath not been commended by them that lived before him.

XVIII. Do not ever conceive any thing impossible to man, which by thee cannot, or not without much difficulty, be effected; but whatsoever in general thou canst conceive possible and proper unto any man, think that very possible unto thee also.

XIX. Suppose that at the *Palastra* [or fencing-school] some body hath all torn thee with his nails, and hath broken thy head. Well, thou art wounded. Yet thou dost not exclaim; thou art not offended with him. Thou dost not suspect him for it afterwards, as one that watcheth to doe thee a mischief. Yea, even then, though thou dost thy best to save thy self from him, yet not from him as an enemy. It is not by way of any suspicious indignation, but by way of gentle and friendly declining. Keep the same mind and disposition in other parts of thy life also. For many things there be, which we must conceit and apprehend, as though we had had to doe with an antagonist at the *Palastra*. For, as I said, it is very possible for us to avoid and decline, though we neither suspect nor hate.

XX. If any body shall reprove me, and shall make it apparent unto me, that in any either opinion or action of mine I do err, I will most gladly retract. For it is the truth that I seek after, by which I am sure that never

never any man was hurt; and as sure, that he is hurt that continueth in any error or ignorance whatsoever.

XXI. I for my part will doe what belongs unto me: as for other things, whether things unsensible or things irrational; or if rational, yet deceived and ignorant of the true way, they shall not trouble or distract me. For as for those creatures which are not indued with reason, and all other things and matters of the world whatsoever, I freely and generously, as one indued with reason, of things that have none, make use of them. And as for men, towards them, as naturally partakers of the same reason, my care is to carry my self sociably. But whatsoever it is that thou art about, remember to call upon the gods. And as for the time, how long thou shalt live to doe these things, let it be altogether indifferent unto thee, for even three such hours are sufficient.

XXII. *Alexander* of *Macedon*, and he that dressed his Mules, when once dead, both came to one pass. For either they were both resumed into those original rational essences from whence all things in the world are propagated; or both after one fashion were scattered into Atoms.

XXIII. Consider how many different things, whether they concern our bodies, or our souls, in a moment of time come to pass in every one of us; and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all things that are done, can at one time subsist, and co-exist in that both *One* and *General*, which we call the *World*.

See B. IV.
n. xxxij.

XXIV. If any should put this question unto thee, how this word *Antoninus* is written; wouldst thou not presently fix thine intention upon it, and utter out in order every letter of it? And if any shall begin to gain-say thee, and quarrel with thee about it; wilt thou quarrel with him again, or rather go on meekly as thou hast begun, untill thou hast numbred out every letter? Here then likewise remember, that every duty that belongs unto a man doth consist of some certain letters or numbers as it were, to which without any noise or tumult keeping thy self, thou must orderly proceed to thy proposed end, forbearing to quarrel with him that would quarrel and fall out with thee.

XXV. Is it not a cruel thing to forbid men to affect those things which they conceive to agree best with their own natures, and to tend most to their own proper good and behoof? But thou after a sort deniest them this liberty, as often as thou art angry with them for their sins. For surely they are led unto those sins, whatsoever they be, as to their proper good and commodity. But it is not so [*thou wilt object perchance; and they are deceived.*] Thou therefore teach them better, and make it appear unto them: but be not thou angry with them.

XXVI. Death is a cessation from the impressions of the senses, the tyranny of the passions, the errors of the mind, and the servitude of the body.

XXVII. If in this kind of life thy body be able to hold out, it is a shame that thy soul should

should faint first, and give over. Take heed, lest [*of a Philosopher*] thou become a [*mere*] *Cesar* in time; and receive a new tincture [*from the Court.*] For it may happen, [*if thou dost not take heed.*] Keep thy self therefore truly simple, good, sincere, grave, free from all ostentation, a lover of that which is just, religious, kind, tender-hearted, strong and vigorous to undergo any thing that becomes thee. Endeavour to continue such as *Philosophy* [*hadst thou wholly and constantly applied thy self unto it,*] would have made and secured thee. Worship the gods; procure the welfare of men: this life is short. Charitable actions, and a holy disposition, is the onely fruit of this earthly life.

XXVIII. Doe all things as becometh the Discipline of *Antoninus* [*Pius.*] Remember his resolute constancy in things that were done by him according to reason, his equability in all things, his sanctity; the chearfulness of his countenance; his sweetness; and how free he was from all vain-glory; how carefull to come to the true and exact knowledge of matters in hand, and how he would by no means give over till he did fully and plainly understand the whole state of the business: and how patiently and without any contestation he would bear with them that did unjustly condemn him: how he would never be over-hasty in any thing; nor give ear to slanders and false accusations, but examine and observe with best diligence the several actions and dispositions of men. Again; how he was

no back-biter, not easily frightened, not suspicious, and in his language free from all affectation and curiosity: and how easily he would content himself with few things, as lodging, bedding, cloathing, and ordinary nourishment and attendance. How able to endure labour, how patient; able through his spare diet to continue from morning to evening without any necessity of withdrawing before his accustomed hours to the necessities of nature: his uniformity and constancy in matter of friendship. How he would bear with them that with all boldness and liberty opposed his opinions; and even rejoice if any man could better advise him: and lastly, how religious he was without superstition. [*All these things of him remember,*] that whensoever thy last hour shall come upon thee, it may find thee, as it did him, [*ready for it*] in the ^{*}possession of a good conscience.

* Gr. ἐν-
συνείδητι.

XXIX. Stir up thy mind, and recall thy wits again [*from thy natural dreams and visions:*] and when thou art perfectly awaken'd, and canst perceive that they were but dreams that troubled thee; as one newly awakened [*out of another kind of sleep,*] look upon these worldly things with the same mind as thou didst upon those, [*that thou sawest in thy sleep.*]

XXX. I consist of body and soul: unto my body all things are indifferent, for of it self it cannot affect one thing more than another with apprehension of any difference; as for my mind, all things which are not within

within the verge of her own operation, are indifferent unto her, and for her own operations, those altogether depend of her; neither doth she busie herself about any, but those that are present; for as for future and passed operations, those also are now at this present indifferent unto her.

XXXI. As long as the foot doth that which belongeth unto it to doe, and the hand that which belongs unto it, their labour, whatsoever it be, is not unnatural. So a man as long as he doth that which is proper unto a man, his labour cannot be against nature; and if it be not against nature, then neither is it hurtfull unto him. [*But if it were so that happiness did consist in pleasure,*] how came notorious robbers, impure, abominable livers, paricides and tyrants, in so large a measure to have their part of pleasures?

XXXII. Dost thou not see, how even those that profess mechanick arts, though in some respect they be no better than mere Idiots, yet they stick close to the course of their trade, neither can they find in their heart to decline from it? And is it not a grievous thing that an Architect, or a Physician shall respect the course and mysteries of their profession, more than a man the proper course and condition of his own nature, Reason, which is common to him and the gods?

XXXIII. Asia, Europe, what are they, but as corners of the whole world? of which the whole Sea is but as one drop; and the great mount

See B.VII.
n. XLIV.

Athos but as a clod; as all present time is but as one point of eternity. All, petty things; all, things that are soon altered, soon perished. And all things come from one beginning; either all severally and particularly deliberated and resolved upon, by the general Ruler and Governour of all; or all by necessary consequence. So that the dreadfull *hiatus* of a gaping Lion, and all poison, and all hurtfull things, are but (as the thorn and the mire) the necessary consequences of goodly fair things. Think not of these therefore, as things contrary to those which thou dost much honour and respect; but consider in thy mind the true fountain of all.

XXXIV. He that seeth the things that are now, hath seen all that either was ever, or ever shall be; for all things are of one kind, and all like one unto another. Meditate often upon the connexion of all things in the World; and upon the mutual relation that they have one unto another. For all things are after a sort folded and involved one within another, and by these means all agree well together. For one thing is consequent unto another, by local motion, by natural conspiracy and agreement, and by substantial union, [or, *reduction of all substances into one.*]

XXXV. Fit and accommodate thy self to that estate and to those occurrences, which by the destinies have been annexed unto thee; and love those men whom thy fate it is to live with; but love them truly. An instrument, a tool, an utensil, whatsoever it be,

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if it be fit for the purpose it was made for, it is as it should be, though he perchance that made and fitted it be out of sight and gone. But in things natural, that power which hath framed and fitted them, is, and abideth within them still: for which reason it ought also the more to be respected, and we are the more obliged (if we may live and pass our time according to her purpose and intention) to think that all is well with us, and according to our own minds. After this manner also, and in this respect it is, that he that is all in all doth enjoy his happiness.

XXXVI. What things soever are not within the proper power and jurisdiction of thine own Will [*either to compass or avoid,*] if thou shalt propose unto thy self any of those things as either good, or evil; it must needs be that according as thou shalt either fall into that which thou dost think evil, or miss of that which thou dost think good, so wilt thou be ready both to complain of the gods, and to hate those men, who either shall be so indeed, or shall by thee be suspected, as the cause either of thy missing of the one, or falling into the other. And indeed we must needs commit many evils, if we incline to any of these things, more or less, with an opinion of any difference. But if we mind and fanſie those things onely as good and bad, which wholly depend of our own Wills, there is no more occasion why we should either murmur against the gods, or be at enmity with any man.

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XXXVII.

XXXVII. We all work to one effect, some willingly, and with a rational apprehension of what we doe; others without any such knowledge. As, I think, *Heraclitus* in a place speaketh of them that sleep, that even they do work in their kind, and do confer to the general operations of the World. One man therefore doth co-operate after one sort, and another after another sort: but he that doth murmur, and to his power doth resist and hinder; even he as much as any [*doth co-operate.*] For of such also did the World stand in need. Now do thou consider among which of these thou wilt rank thyself. For as for him who is the Administratour of all, he will make good use of thee [*whether thou wilt or no,*] and make thee (as a part and member of the whole) so to co-operate with him, that whatsoever thou doest, shall turn to the furtherance of his own counsels and resolutions. But be not thou [*for shame*] such a part of the whole, as that * vile and ridiculous Verse (which *Chrysippus* in a place doth mention) is a part of the Comedy.

See B. viij.
n. xxxij.

* See the
Notes.

See B. IV.
n. XXII.
B. VII.
n. XXVI.
last lines.

XXXVIII. Doth either the Sun take upon him to doe that which belongs to the rain? or his son *Æsculapius* that which unto the Earth doth properly belong? How is it with every one of the stars in particular? Though they all differ one from another, [*and have their several charges and functions by themselves,*] do they not all nevertheless concur and co-operate to one end?

XXXIX. If so be that the gods have deliberated in particular of those things which should happen

happen unto me, I must stand to their deliberation, as discreet and wise. For that a god should be an imprudent god, is a thing hard even to conceive: and why should they resolve to doe me hurt? for what profit either unto them or the Universe (which they specially take care for) could arise from it? But if so be that they have not deliberated of me in particular, yet certainly they have of the whole in general; and those things which in consequence and coherence of this general deliberation happen unto me in particular, I am bound to embrace and accept of. But if so be that they have not deliberated at all, (which indeed is very irreligious for any man to believe: for then let us neither sacrifice, nor pray, nor respect our oaths, neither let us any more use any of those things, which we being persuaded of the presence and [*secret*] conversation of the gods among us, daily use and practise:) but, I say, if so be that they have not indeed [*either in general or particular*] deliberated of any of those things that happen unto us in this world; yet [*God be thanked, that*] of those things that concern my self, it is lawfull for me to deliberate my self, and all my deliberation is but concerning that which may be to me most profitable. Now that unto every one is most profitable, which is according to his own constitution and Nature. And my Nature is to be rational [*in all my actions,*] and as a good and natural member of a City and Common-wealth, towards my fellow-members ever to be sociably and kindly disposed and affected. My City and Countrey, as I am

Antoninus,

Antoninus, is *Rome*; as a man, the whole World. Those things therefore that are expedient and profitable to those Cities, are the onely things that are good and expedient for me.

XL. Whatsoever in any kind doth happen to any one, is expedient to the whole. And thus much [to content us] might suffice, [that it is expedient for the whole in general.] But yet this also shalt thou generally perceive, if thou dost diligently take heed, that whatsoever [doth happen] to any one man or men ****. And now I am content that the word *expedient*, should more generally be understood of [those things which we otherwise call] middle things, [or, things indifferent; as health, wealth, and the like.]

XLI. As the ordinary shews of the Theatre, and of other such places, when thou art presented with them, [affect thee;] as the same things still seen, and in the same fashion, make the sight ingratifull and tedious; so must all the things that we see all our life long affect us. For all things, above and below, are still the same, and from the same [causes.] When then will there be an end?

XLII. Let the several deaths of men of all sorts, and of all sorts of professions, and of all sorts of nations, be a perpetual object of thy thoughts, **** so that thou mayst even come down to *Philestio*, *Phœbus*, and *Origion*. Pass now to other generations. Thither shall we after many changes, where so many brave Oratours are; where so many grave Philosophers, *Heraclitus*, *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*. Where
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so many *Hero's* of the old times; and then so many brave Captains of the latter times; and so many Kings. After all these, where *Endoxus*, *Hipparchus*, *Archimedes*; where so many other sharp, generous, industrious, subtile, peremptory dispositions; and among others, even they that have been the greatest Scoffers and Deriders of the frailty and brevity of this our humane life; as *Menippus*, and others, as many as there have been such as he. Of all these consider, that they long since are all dead and gone. And what do they suffer by it? Nay, they that have not so much as a Name remaining, what are they the worse for it? One thing there is, and that onely, which is worth our while in this *World*, and ought by us much to be esteemed; and that is, according to truth and righteousness, meekly and lovingly to converse with false and unrighteous men.

XLIII. Whensoever thou wilt rejoice thy self, call to mind the several gifts and vertues of them whom thou dost daily converse with; as for example, the industry of the one, the modesty of another, the liberality of a third, of another some other thing. For nothing can so much rejoice thee, as the resemblances and parallels of several vertues, visible and eminent in the dispositions of those who live with thee; especially when all at once, as near as may be, they represent themselves unto thee. See therefore that thou have them always in a readiness.

XLIV. Dost thou grieve that thou dost weigh but so many pounds, and not 300 rather? Just

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as much reason hast thou to grieve that thou must live but so many years, and no longer. For as for bulk and substance thou dost content thy self with that proportion of it that is allotted unto thee, so shouldst thou for time.

XLV. Let us doe our best endeavours to perswade them; but however, if Reason and Justice lead thee to it, doe it, though they be never so much against it. But if any shall by force withstand thee, and hinder thee in it, convert [*thy vertuous inclinations from one object unto another, from Justice*] to contented æquanimity, and chearfull patience: so that what [*in the one*] is thy hindrance, thou mayst make use of it for the exercise of another virtue: and remember that it was with due exception and reservation, that thou didst at first incline and desire. For thou didst not set thy mind upon things impossible. Upon what then? that all thy desires might ever be moderated with this due kind of reservation. And this thou hast, and mayst always obtain [*whether the thing desired be in thy power or no. And what do I care for more, if*] that for which I was born, and brought forth into the world, [*to rule all my desires with reason and discretion,*] may be?

XLVI. The ambitious supposeth another man's act, [*praise and applause,*] to be his own happiness; the voluptuous his own sense and feeling; but he that is wise, his own action.

XVII. It is in thy power absolutely to exclude all manner of conceit and opinion as concerning

cerning this matter; and by the same means, to exclude all grief and sorrow from thy soul. For as for the things and objects themselves, they of themselves have no such power, whereby to beget and force upon us any opinion at all.

XLVIII. Use thy self when any man speaks unto thee, so to hearken unto him, as that in the *interim* thou give not way to any other thoughts; that so thou mayst (as far as is possible) seem fixed and fastned to his very soul, whosoever he be that speaks unto thee.

XLIX. That which is not good for the Beehive, [*or, whole swarm*] cannot be good for the Bee.

L. Will either passengers, or patients, find fault and complain, either the one if they be well carried, or the others if well cured? Do they take care for any more than this; the one, that their Ship-master may bring them safe to land; and the other, that their Physician may effect their recovery?

LI. How many of them who came into the world at the same time when I did, are already gone out of it?

LII. To them that are sick of the Jaundies, Hony seems bitter; and to them that are bitten by a mad Dog, the Water terrible; and to Children, a little Ball seems a fine thing. And why then should I be angry? or do I think that error and false opinion is less powerfull [*to make men transgress,*] than either choler [*immoderate and excessive*] to cause the Jaundies; or poison, to cause Rage?

LIII.

See B. V.
n. XIV.

See B. VII.
n. xxxiv.
B. VIII.
n. XIII.
&c.

LIII. No man can hinder thee to live as thy nature doth require. Nothing can happen unto thee, but what the common good of Nature doth require.

LIV. What manner of men they be whom they seek to please, and what to get, and by what actions: how soon time will cover and bury all things; and how many it hath already buried.

THE SEVENTH BOOK.

WHAT is Wickedness? It is that which many times and often thou hast already seen and known [in the world.] And so oft as any thing doth happen [that might otherwise trouble thee,] let this *memento* presently come to thy mind, that it is that which thou hast already often seen and known. Generally, above and below, thou shalt find but the same things. The very same things whereof ancient stories, middle-age stories, and fresh stories are full: whereof Towns are full, and Houses full. There is nothing that is new. All things that are, are both usual and of little continuance.

II. What fear is there that thy *Dogmata* [or, philosophical Resolutions and Conclusions,] should become dead in thee, [and lose their proper power and efficacy to make thee live happy,] as long as those proper and cor-relative fancies; and representations of things on which they mutu-

ally depend (which continually to stir up and revive is in thy power,) are still kept fresh and alive? It is in my power concerning this thing [that is happened, whatsoever it be,] to conceit that which is right and true. If it be, why then am I troubled? Those things that are without my understanding, are nothing to it at all: [and that is it onely which doth properly concern me.] Be always in this mind, and thou wilt be right.

III. [That which most men would think themselves most happy for, and would prefer before all things, if the gods would grant it unto them after their deaths,] thou mayst [whilst thou livest] grant unto thy self; to live again; see the things of the World again, as thou hast already seen them. For what is it else to live again? Publick shews and solemnities with much pomp and vanity, stage-plays, flocks and herds, conflicts and contentions, a bone thrown to a company of hungry Currs, a bait for greedy Fishes, the painfulness and continual burthen-bearing of wretched Ants, the running to and fro of terrified Mice, little Puppets drawn up and down with wires and nerves; [these be the objects of the world.] Among all these thou must stand stedfast, meekly affected, and free from all manner of indignation; with this right ratiocination and apprehension, that as the worth is of those things which a man doth affect, so is [in very deed] every man's worth [more or less.]

IV. Word after word, every one by it self, must the things that are spoken be conceived and

See B. IV.
n. xxxix.
B. V. num.
XXVII.

and understood; and so the things that are done, purpose after purpose, every one by it self likewise. And as in matter of purposes and actions, we must presently see what is the proper *[use and]* relation of every one; so of words must we be as ready, to consider of every one, what is the true meaning and signification of it *[according to truth and nature, however it be taken in common use.]*

See B. III.
num. XVI.
B. IV. n.
XXIV.

V. Is my reason and understanding sufficient for this or no? If it be sufficient, *[without any private applause, or publick ostentation]* I will make use of it for the work in hand, as of an Instrument which by nature I am provided of. If it be not, and that otherwise it belong not unto me particularly as a private duty, I will either give it over, or leave it to some other, that can better effect it: or I will endeavour it; but with the help of some other, who, with the joint help of my Reason, is able to bring somewhat to pass that will now be seasonable and usefull for the common good. For whatsoever I doe either by my self, or with some other, the onely thing that I must intend, is, that it be good and expedient for the publick. *[For as for praise, consider]* how many who once were much commended, are now already quite forgotten; yea, they that commended them, how even they themselves are long since dead and gone. Be not therefore ashamed, whensoever thou must use the help of others. For whatsoever it be that lieth upon thee to effect, thou must propose it unto thy self, as the scaling of walls is unto a Souldier. And what if thou through

through *[either]* lameness *[or some other impediment]* art not able to reach unto the top of the battlements alone, which with the help of another thou mayst? *[wilt thou therefore give it over, or go about it with less courage and alacrity, because thou canst not effect it all alone?]*

VI. Let not things future trouble thee. For if necessity so require that they come to pass, thou shalt (whensoever that is,) be provided for them with the same reason, by which whatsoever is now present is made both tolerable and acceptable unto thee. All things are linked and knit together, and the knot is sacred, neither is there any thing in the world that is not kind and natural in regard of any other thing. *[Or, that hath not some kind of reference and natural correspondence with whatsoever is in the world besides.]* For all things are ranked together, and by that decency of its due place and order that each particular doth observe, they all concur together to the making of one and the same κόσμος *[Or, World; as if you said, a comely piece, or an orderly composition.]* For all things throughout, there is but one and the same order; and through all things, one and the same god, the same substance, and the same Law. There is one common Reason, and one common Truth, that belongs unto all reasonable creatures: for neither is there more than one perfection of all creatures that ** are of the same kind, and partakers* of the same reason. ** ὁμογενεῖς καὶ μετέχοντες*

VII. Whatsoever is material, doth soon vanish away into the common substance of the whole;

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whole ; and whatsoever is made *formal* [or, *whatsoever doth animate that which is material*,] is soon resumed into the common Reason of the Whole, and the same and memory of any thing is soon swallowed up by the general Age and duration of the whole.

VIII. To a reasonable creature, the same action is both according to nature, and according to reason.

IX. *Streight* [of it self] *not made streight*.

X. As several members in one body united, so are reasonable creatures in a body divided and dispersed, all made and prepared for one common operation. And this thou shalt apprehend the better, if thou shalt use thy self often to say to thy self, I am μέλη, or a *member*, of the mass and body of reasonable substances. But if thou shalt say, I am μέρος, or a *part*, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart. The joy that thou takest in the exercise of bounty is not yet grounded upon a due ratiocination, and right apprehension of the nature of things. Thou dost exercise it as yet upon this ground barely, as a thing convenient and fitting; not, as doing good to thy self, [when thou doest good unto others.]

XI. Of things that are external happen what will to that which can suffer by external accidents. Those things that suffer let them complain themselves, if they will; as for me, as long as I conceive no such thing, that that which is happened is evil, I have no hurt, and it is in my power not to conceive any such thing.

XII.

XII. Whatsoever any man either doeth or saith, thou must be good; [not for any man's sake, but for thine own nature's sake:] as if either Gold, or the Emerald, or Purple, should ever be saying to themselves, Whatsoever any man either doeth or saith, I must still be an Emerald, and I must keep my colour.

XIII. [This may ever be my comfort and security:] my understanding, that ruleth over all, will not of it self bring trouble and vexation upon it self. This I say, it will not put if self in any fear, it will not lead it self into any concupiscence. If it be in the power of any other to compell it to fear or to grieve, let him doe it. But sure if it self do not of it self, through some [false] opinion or supposition, incline it self to any such disposition, [there is no fear.] For as for the body, why should I make the grief of my body to be the grief of my mind? If that it self can either fear or complain, let it. But as for the soul, which indeed can onely be truly sensible of either fear or grief, to which onely it belongs, according to its different imaginations and opinions to admit of either of these, or of their contraries; [thou mayst lock to that thy self, that] it suffer nothing. Induce her not to any such opinion or persuasion. The understanding is of it self sufficient unto it self, and needs not (if it self doth not bring it self to need) any other thing besides it self; and by consequent, as it needs nothing, so neither can it be troubled and hindered by any thing, if it self doth not trouble and hinder it self.

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XIV.

* See the
Latin
Notes.

XIV. What is *εὐδαιμονία* [or, happiness,] but * *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων*, [or, a good Demon, or, Spirit?] What then dost thou doe here, O opinion, by the gods I adjure thee, that thou get thee gone as thou camest: for I need thee not. Thou camest indeed [unto me] according to thy ancient wonted manner. [*It is that that all men have ever been subject unto. That thou camest therefore*] I am not angry with thee; onely be gone, [*now that I have found thee what thou art.*]

XV. Is any man so foolish as to fear change, to which all things [*that once were not*] owe their being? And what is it that is more pleasing and more familiar to the nature of the Universe? How couldst thou thy self use thy ordinary hot baths, should not the wood [*that heateth them*] first be changed? how couldst thou receive any nourishment from those things that thou hast eaten, if they should not be changed? Can any thing else almost (that is usefull and profitable) be brought to pass without change? How then dost not thou perceive, that for thee also [*by death*], to come to change, is a thing of the very same nature, and as necessary for the nature of the Universe?

XVI. Through the Substance of the Universe, as through a torrent, pass all particular bodies, being all of the same nature, and all joint workers with the Universe in self, as in one of our bodies so many members among themselves. How many such as *Chrysippus*, how many such as *Socrates*, how many such as

Epictetus,

Epictetus, hath the Age of the world long since swallowed up, and devoured? Let this come into thy mind ~~on~~ every occasion, be it either men or business, that thou hast occasion to think of, [*so the end that thy thoughts be not distracted, and thy mind too earnestly set upon any thing.*] Of all my thoughts and cares one onely thing shall be the object, that I my self doe nothing which to the proper constitution of man (either in regard of the thing it self, or in regard of the manner, or of the time of doing,) is contrary. The time when thou shalt have forgotten all things is at hand. And that time also is at hand, when thou thy self shalt be forgotten by all. [*Whilst thou art, apply thy self to that especially*] which unto man as he is a man is most proper and agreeable; and that is, for a man even to love them that transgress [*against him.*] This shall be, if at the same time [*that any such thing doth happen,*] thou call to mind, that they are thy Kinsmen; that it is through ignorance and against their wills that they sin; and that within a very short while after, both thou and he shall be no more. But above all things, that he hath not done thee any hurt; for that by him thy mind and understanding is not made worse or more vile than it was before.

XVII. The nature of the Universe, of the common substance of all things, as it were of so much wax, hath now perchance formed a Horse; and then destroying that figure, hath new tempered and fashioned the matter of it into the form and substance of a Tree; then

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that

that again into the form and substance of a man; and then that again into some other. Now every one of these doth subsist but for a very little while. As for dissolution, if it be no grievous thing to the chest or trunk, to be joined together; why should it be more grievous to be put asunder?

XVIII. An angry countenance is much against nature, and it is oftentimes the proper countenance of them that are at the point of death.

* See *Suidas*, and other ancients, who bear witness to *Anton.* that he was never seen to change his countenance through either anger or joy. But be it so, that all anger and passion is so thoroughly quenched in thee, that it is altogether impossible to kindle it any more: [*yet herein must thou rest satisfied;*] but farther endeavour, by good consequence of true ratiocination, perfectly to conceive and understand, that all anger and passion is against reason. For if thou shalt not be sensible of thine innocency; if that also shall be gone from thee, [*the comfort of a good conscience, that thou doest all things according to reason:*] what shouldest thou live any longer for? All things that now thou seest are but for a moment. That nature, by which all things in the world are administered, will soon bring change and alteration upon them, and then of their substances make other things, [*like unto them;*] and then soon after others again of the matter and substance of these: that so by these means the world may still appear fresh and new.

XIX. Whensoever any man doth trespass against thee, presently consider with thy self what it was that he did suppose to be good, what to be evil, when he did trespass. For this when

when thou knowest, thou wilt pity him; thou wilt have no occasion either to wonder, or to be angry. For either thou thy self dost yet [*live in that error or ignorance, as that thou dost*] suppose either that very thing that he doeth, or some other like [*worldly*] thing, to be good; and so thou art bound to pardon him, [*if he have done that which thou in the like case wouldest have done thy self.*] Or if so be that thou dost not any more suppose the same things to be good or evil that he doeth; how canst thou but be gentle unto him that is in an error?

XX. Fantasie not to thy self things future, as though they were present: but of those that are present, take some aside, that thou takest most benefit of, and consider of them particularly, how wonderfully thou wouldest want them, if they were not present. But take heed withall, lest that whilst thou dost settle thy contentment in things present, thou grow in time so to overprise them, as that the want of them (whensoever it shall so fall out) should be a trouble and vexation unto thee. Wind up thy self into thy self. Such is the Nature of thy reasonable commanding part, as that if it exercise justice, and have by that means tranquillity within it self, it doth rest fully satisfied with it self [*without any other thing.*]

XXI. Wipe off all opinion: Stay the force and violence of unreasonable lusts and affections: Circumscribe the present time: Examine whatsoever it be that is happened, either to thy self or to another: Divide all present objects, either in that which is formal or material;

* Συμπε-
ρεστικῶν.

rial; Think of the last hour. That which thy neighbour hath committed, where the guilt of it lieth, there let it rest. * *Extend thy mind to [or, Examine in order] whatsoever is spoken. Let thy mind penetrate both into the effects, and into the causes. Rejoice thy self with true simplicity and modesty; and that all middle things between virtue and vice are indifferent unto thee. [Finally,] Love mankind; obey God.*

XXII. *All things (saith he) are by certain order and appointment. And what if the Elements onely * * *. It will suffice to remember, that all things in general are by certain order and appointment: or if it be but few * *. And as concerning death, that either Dispersion, or the Atoms, or Annihilation, or Extinction, or Translation [will ensue.] And as concerning pain, that that which is intolerable is soon ended by death; and that which holds long must needs be tolerable; and that the mind in the mean time [which is all in all] may * by way of intercession, or interception [by stopping all manner of commerce and sympathy with the body,] still retain its own tranquillity. Thy understanding is not made worse by it. As for those parts that suffer, let them, if they can, declare their grief themselves. As for praise and commendation, view their mind and understanding, what estate they are in; what kind of things they flee, and what things they seek after: and that as in the sea-shore, whatsoever was before to be seen, is by the continual succession of new heaps of sand cast up one upon another,*

* ὅτι συνέ-
στι.
See B. V.
n. XX.
B. IX. n.
XLI.
See n. VI.
upon B. II.
and B. VII.
p. xxxiv.

another; soon hid and covered; so in this life, all former things by those which immediately succeed.

XXIII. Out of Plato. *He then whose mind is endowed with true magnanimity, who hath accustomed himself to the contemplation both of all times, and of all things in general; can this mortal life (thinkest thou) seem any great matter unto him? It is not possible, answered he. Then neither will such a one account death a grievous thing? By no means.*

XXIV. Out of Antisthenes. *It is a princely thing to doe well, and to be evil spoken of. It is a shamefull thing that the face should be subject unto the mind, to be put into what shape it will, and to be dressed by it as it will; and that the mind should not bestow so much care upon her self, as to fashion her self, and to dress her self as best becometh her.*

XXV. [Out of several Poets and Comicks.] *It will but little avail thee, to turn thine anger and indignation upon the things themselves [that have fallen cross unto thee.] For as for them they are not sensible of it, &c. Thou shalt but make thy self a laughing-stock both unto the gods and men, &c. Our life is reaped like a ripe ear of corn: one is yet standing, and another is down, &c. But if so be that I and my children be neglected by the gods, there is some reason even for that, &c. As long as right and equity is on my side, &c. Not to lament with them, Not to tremble, &c.*

XXVI. Out of Plato. *My answer, full of justice and equity, should be this: Thy speech is not right, O man, if thou supposest, that he that*
is

is of any worth at all, should apprehend either life or death as a matter of great hazard or danger; and should not make this rather his onely care, to examine his own actions, whether just or unjust; whether actions of a good, or of a wicked man, &c. For thus in very truth stands the case, O ye men of Athens! What place or station soever a man either hath chosen to himself, judging it best for himself, or is by lawfull authority put and settled in; therein do I think (all appearance of danger notwithstanding,) that he should continue, as one who feareth neither death, nor any thing else, so much as he feareth to commit any thing that is vicious and shamefull, &c. But, O noble Sir, consider, I pray, whether true generosity and true happiness do not consist in somewhat else rather, than in the preservation either of our or other mens lives. For it is not the part of a man that is a man indeed, to desire to live long, [or to make much of his life whilst he liveth:] But rather (he that is such) will in these things wholly refer himself unto the gods, and believing that which every woman can tell him, that no man can escape death; the onely thing that he takes thought and care for is this, that what time he liveth, he may live as well and as virtuously as he can possibly, &c. To look about, and with the eyes to follow the course of the stars and planets, as though thou wouldest run with them; and to mind perpetually the several changes of the Elements one into another. For such fancies and imaginations help much to purge away the dross and filth of this our earthly life, &c. That also is a fine passage of Plato's, where he speaketh of worldly things in these words: Thou must also

See B. IX.
n. XXIX.
B. XII.
n. XVIII.

as

as from some higher place look down, as it were, upon the things of this world; as flocks, armies, husband-mens labours, marriages, divorces, generations, deaths, the tumults of Courts, and places of judicatures, desert places, the several nations of Barbarians, publick festivals, mournings, fairs, markets. How all things [upon Earth] are pell-mell; See B. IV. and how [miraculously] things contrary one to another concur to the beauty and perfection of this Universe. n. XXII.

XXVII. To look back upon things of former ages, as upon the manifold changes and conversions of several Monarchies and Common-wealths. We may also fore-see things future, for they shall all be of the same kind; neither is it possible that they should leave the tune, or break the consort that is now begun, as it were, by these things that are now done and brought to pass in the World. It comes all to one therefore, whether a man be a spectatour of the things of this life but forty years, or whether he see them ten thousand years together: for what shall he see more? And as for those parts that came from the Earth, they shall return unto the Earth again; and those that came from Heaven, they also shall return unto those heavenly places. Whether it be a mere dissolution and unbinding of the manifold intricacies and intranglements of the confused Atoms; or some such dispersion of the simple and incorruptible Elements * * *. With meats and drinks and divers charms, they seek to divert the chanel, that they might not dye. Yet must we needs endure that blast of wind that cometh from above,

bove, though we toil and labour, never so much.

* Gr. *καλὸν βαλιώτερον*.
XXVIII. He hath * a stronger body, and is a better wrestler than I. [What then?] Is he more bountifull? is he more modest? Doth he bear all adverse chances with more equanimity; or with his neighbours offences with more meekness and gentleness than I?

XXIX. Where the matter may be effected agreeably to that Reason, which both unto the gods and men is common, there can be no just cause of grief or sorrow. For where the fruit and benefit of an action well begun and prosecuted according to the proper constitution of man may be reaped and obtained, [or, is sure and certain,] it is against reason that any damage should there be suspected. In all places, and at all times, it is in thy power religiously to embrace whatsoever [by God's appointment] is happened unto thee, and justly to converse with those men whom thou hast to doe with; and accurately to examine every fancy that presents it self, that nothing may slip and steal in, before thou hast rightly apprehended the true Nature of it.

XXX. Look not about upon other mens minds and understandings; but look right on forwards whether Nature, both that of the Universe, in those things that happen unto thee, and thine in particular, in those things that are to be done by thee, doth lead and direct thee. Now every one is bound to doe that which is consequent and agreeable to that end which by his true natural constitution he was ordained unto.

unto. As for all other things, they are ordained for the use of reasonable creatures: as in all things we see that that which is worse and inferiour, is made for that which is better. Reasonable creatures, they are ordained one for another. That therefore which is chief in every man's constitution, is, that he intend the common good. The second is, that he yield not to any lusts and motions of the flesh. For it is the part and privilege of the reasonable and intellectual faculty, that she can so bound her self, as that neither the sensitive nor the appetitive faculties may any ways prevail upon her. For both these are brutish. And [therefore] over both she challengeth mastery, and cannot any ways endure [if in her right temper,] to be subject unto either. And this indeed most justly. For by nature she was ordained to command all in the body. The third thing proper to man by his constitution is, to avoid all rashness and precipitancy; and not to be subject to error. To these things then let the mind apply her self, and go straight on [without any distraction about other things,] and she hath her end, [and by consequent her happiness.]

XXXI. As one who had lived, and were now to dye by right, whatsoever is yet remaining, bestow that wholly as [a gracious] overplus upon a virtuous life. Love and affect that onely, whatsoever it be that happeneth, and is by the Fates appointed unto thee. For what can be more reasonable? And as any thing doth happen unto thee [by way of cross or calamity,] call to

Gr. *κατὰ φύσιν*. See Pref.

to mind presently and set before thine eyes the examples of some other men, to whom the self-same thing did once happen likewise. Well, what did they? They grieved, they wondred, they complained. And where are they now? All dead and gone. Wilt thou also be like one of them? Or rather leaving these fickle dispositions to men of the world, (*or, men of as fickle minds as fickle bodies; ever changing, and soon changed themselves:*) let it be thine onely care and study, how to make a right use of all such accidents. For there is good use to be made of them, and they will prove fit matter for thee to work upon, if it shall be both thy *care* and thy *desire*, that whatsoever thou doest, thou thy self mayst like and approve thy self for it. And both these see that thou remember well, according as the diversity of the matter of the action that thou art about shall require. Look within; within is the fountain of all good: Such a fountain, where springing waters can never fail, so thou dig still deeper and deeper.

XXXII. Thou must use thy self also to keep thy body fixed and steady; free from all loose, fluctuant, either motion, or posture. And as upon thy face and looks, thy mind hath easily power over them to keep them to that which is grave and decent; so let it challenge the same power over the whole body also. But so observe all things in this kind, as that it be without any manner of affectation.

XXXIII. The art of true living in this world, is more like a wrestler's than a dancer's practice.

For

For in this they both agree, [*to teach*] a man, whatsoever falls upon him, that he may be ready for it, and that nothing may cast him down.

XXXIV. Thou must continually ponder and consider with thy self, what manner of men they be, and for their minds and understandings, what is their present estate, whose good word and testimony thou dost desire. For then neither wilt thou see cause to complain of them that offend against *their wills*; or find any want of their applause, if once thou dost but penetrate into the true source and ground both of their opinions and of their desires. *No soul* (saith he) *is willingly bereaved of the Truth*; and by consequent, neither of justice, or temperance, or kindness and mildness; nor of any thing that is of the same kind. It is most needfull that thou shouldest always remember this: For so shalt thou be far more gentle and moderate towards all men.

XXXV. What pain soever thou art in, let this presently come to thy mind, that it is not a thing whereof thou needest to be ashamed; neither is it a thing whereby thy understanding, that hath the government of all, can be made worse. For neither in regard of the substance of it, nor in regard of the end of it, (which is, to intend the common good;) can it alter and corrupt it. This also of *Epicurus* mayst thou in most pains find some help of, that it is *neither intolerable, nor eternal*; so thou keep thy self to the true bounds and limits [*of reason,*] and add not unto them the opinion [*of either good or evil.*] This also thou must consider, that many things

See B. VIII.
n. XIII.

things there be, which oftentimes unsensibly trouble and vex thee, [*as not armed against them with patience, because they go not ordinarily under the name of pains,*] which in very deed are of the same nature as pain; as to slumber unquietly, to suffer heat, to want appetite: when therefore any of these things make thee discontented, check thy self with these words. Now hath pain given thee the foil; Thy courage hath failed thee.

XXXVI. Take heed lest at any time thou stand so affected, though towards unnatural evil men, as ordinary men are commonly one towards another.

XXXVII. How know we whether *Socrates* were so eminent indeed, and of so extraordinary a disposition? For that he dyed more gloriously, that he disputed with the Sophists more subtilly, that he watched in the *Pagus* more assiduously, that being commanded to fetch [*innocent*] *Salaminius*, he refused to doe it more generously; all this will not serve. Nor that

* Gr. ἐν τῇ
ὁδοῖς αἰ-
βρενδύειν.
See Sui-
das.

* *he walked in the streets with much gravity and majesty*; as was objected unto him by his adversaries: which nevertheless a man may well doubt of, whether it were so or no, [*or, which above all the rest, if so be that it were true, a man would well consider of, whether commendable, or discommendable.*] The thing therefore that we must inquire into is this; What manner of soul *Socrates* had; whether his disposition was such, as that all that he stood upon and sought after in this world, was barely this, That he might ever carry himself justly towards men, and ho-

lily

lily towards the gods, neither vexing himself to no purpose at the wickedness of others, nor yet ever condescending to any man's evil fact, or evil intentions, [*through either fear, or ingagement of friendship.*] Whether of those things that happened unto him by God's appointment; he neither did wonder at any when it did happen, or thought it intolerable in the trial of it. And, lastly, whether he never did suffer his mind to sympathize with the senses and affections of the body. For we must not think that Nature hath so mixed and tempered it with the body, as that she hath not power to circumscribe herself, and by her self to intend her own ends and occasions.

XXXVIII. For it is a thing very possible, that a man should be a very divine man, and yet be altogether unknown. This thou must ever be mindfull of, as of this also, that a man's true happiness doth consist in very few things. And that although thou dost despair, that thou shalt ever be a good either Logician or Naturalist, yet thou art never the farther off by it from being either liberal, or modest, or charitable, or obedient unto God.

XXXIX. Free from all compulsion in all chearfulness and alacrity thou mayst run out thy time, though men should exclaim against thee never so much, and the wild beasts should pull in sunder the poor members * of this mass of flesh that compasseth thee about. For what in either of these or the like cases should hinder the mind to retain her own rest and tranquillity, consisting both in the right judgment

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of

* See the
Notes.

Gr. ἡ καὶ-
 σιν πρὸς
 πρὸς αὐτὸν.
 πρὸς αὐτὸν.
 ἡ καὶ πρὸς
 πρὸς αὐτὸν.
 πρὸς αὐτὸν.

of those things that happen unto her, and in the ready use of all present matters and occasions? So that her judgment may say to that which is *befallen her by way of cross*, This thou art in very deed, and according to thy true nature; notwithstanding that in the judgment of opinion thou dost appear otherwise: and her discretion to the present object, Thou art that which I sought for. For whatsoever it be that is now present, shall ever be embraced by me as a fit and seasonable object, both for my reasonable faculty, and for my sociable, or charitable, inclination to work upon. And that which is principal in this matter, is, that it may be referred either unto [the praise of] God, or to [the good of] men. For either unto God or man, whatsoever it is that doth happen in the world, hath in the ordinary course of nature its proper reference; neither is there any thing, that [in regard of nature] is either new or reluctant and intractable, but all things both usual and easie.

XL. Then hath a man attained to the estate of perfection in his life and conversation, when he so spends every day, as if it were his last day: never hot and vehement in his affections, nor yet so cold and stupid as one that had no sense; and free from all manner of dissimulation.

XLI. Can the gods, who are immortal, for the continuance of so many ages bear without indignation with such and so many sinners as have ever been; yea not onely so, but also take such care for them, that they want nothing? and dost thou so grievously take on, as one that could

could bear with them no longer; thou that art but for a moment of time; yea, thou that art one of those sinners thy self? A very ridiculous thing it is, that any man should dispense with vice and wickedness in himself, which is in his power to restrain; and should go about to suppress it in others; which is altogether impossible.

XLII. What object soever our reasonable and sociable faculty doth meet with, that affords nothing either for the satisfaction of reason, or for the practice of charity, she worthily doth think unworthy of her self.

XLIII. When thou hast done well, and another is benefited by thy action, must thou like a very fool look for a third thing besides, as that it may appear unto others also that thou hast done well, or that thou mayst in time receive one good turn for another? No man useth to be weary of that which is beneficial unto him. But every action according to Nature is beneficial. Be not weary then of doing that which is beneficial unto thee, whilst it is so unto others.

XLIV. The nature of the Universe did once certainly deliberate, and so resolve upon the creation of the World [before it was created; whatsoever it hath done since.] Now since that time, whatsoever it is that is and happens in the world, is either but a consequent of that one and first deliberation: Or if so be that this ruling rational part of the world takes any thought and care of things particular, they are surely

See B. VI.
 n. xxxiiij,
 xxxix.
 B. IX.
 n. XXVI.

his reasonable and principal creatures, that are the proper object of his particular care and providence. This often thought upon will much conduce to thy tranquillity.

THE EIGHTH BOOK.

THIS also, among other things, may serve to keep thee from vain-glory, if thou shalt consider, that thou now art altogether incapable of the commendation of one who all his life long, or from his youth at least, hath lived a Philosopher's life. For both unto others, and to thy self especially, it is well known, that thou hast done many things contrary to that perfection of life. Thou hast therefore been confounded in thy course, and henceforth it will be hard for thee to recover the Title and credit of a Philosopher. And to it also is thy calling and profession repugnant. If therefore thou dost truly understand what it is that is of moment indeed; as for thy fame and credit, take no thought or care for that: let it suffice thee, if all the rest of thy life, be it more or less, thou shalt live as thy nature requireth, [or, according to the true and natural end of thy making.] Take pains therefore to know what it is that thy nature requireth, and let nothing else distract thee. Thou hast already had sufficient experience, that of those many things about which thou hast hitherto wandred, thou couldest not find

find happiness in any of them. Not in Syllogisms and Logical subtilties, not in wealth, not in honour and reputation, not in pleasure. In none of all these. Wherein then is it to be found? In the practice of those things which the nature of man, as he is a man, doth require? How then shall he doe those things? If his *Dogmata*, or moral Tenets and Opinions (from which all motions and actions do proceed,) be right and true. Which be those *Dogmata*? Those that concern that which is good or evil: as that there is nothing truly good and beneficial unto man, but that which makes him just, temperate, courageous, liberal; and that there is nothing truly evil and hurtfull unto man, but that which causeth the contrary effects.

II. Upon every action that thou art about, put this question to thy self; How will this when it is done agree with me? Shall I have no occasion to repent of it? Yet a very little while and I am dead and gone, and all things are at an end. What then do I care for more than this, that my present action, whatsoever it be, may be the proper action of one that is reasonable; whose end is the common good; who in all things is ruled and governed by the same law [of right and reason,] by which God himself is?

III. *Alexander, Caius, Pompeius*; what are these to *Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates*? These penetrated into the true nature of things; into all causes, and all subjects: and upon these did they exercise their power and authority: [or, these were the objects of their power and jurisdiction:]

dition :] But as for those, as the extent of their
error was, [or, of their care and providence
in worldly matters,] so far did their slavery ex-
tend.

* Gr. *ἀπαγγέλλω*,
burst thy
self, pro-
perly.

IV. *What they have done, they will still doe, although thou shouldst * hang thy self.* First, Let it not trouble thee. For all things [both good and evil] come to pass according to the nature and general condition of the Universe, and within a very little while all things will be at an end; no man will be remembered: as now of *Hadrianus* (for example) and *Augustus*, it is already come to pass. Then, secondly, Fix thy mind upon the thing it self; look into it, and remembring thy self, that thou art bound nevertheless to be a good man, and what it is that thy nature requireth of thee as thou art a man, be not diverted from what thou art about, and speak that which seemeth unto thee most just: onely speak it kindly, modestly, and without hypocrisie.

V. That which the nature of the Universe doth busie her self about, is, that which is here, to transfer it thither, to change it; and thence again to take it away, and to carry it to another place. All things are but [*successive*] changes [*of one into another* :] So that thou needst not fear any new thing. For all things are usual and ordinary; and all things are disposed by equality.

VI. Every particular nature hath content, when in its own proper course it speeds. A reasonable nature doth then speed, when first in matter of fancies and imaginations it gives no

no consent to that which is either false or uncertain. Secondly, when in all its motions; and resolutions it takes its level at the common good onely, and desireth nothing, and flieth from nothing, but what is in its own power to compass or avoid. And, lastly, when it willingly and gladly embraceth whatsoever is dealt and appointed unto it by the common Nature. For it is part of it; even as the nature of any one leaf is part of the common nature of all plants and trees. But that the nature of a leaf is part of a nature both unreasonable and unsensible, and which [*in its proper end*] may be hindred; [*or, which is servile and slavish:*] whereas the nature of man is part of a common nature which cannot be hindred, and which is both reasonable and just. From whence also it is, that according to the worth of every thing, she doth make such equal distribution of all things, as of duration, substance, form, operation, and of events and accidents. But herein consider, not whether thou shalt find this equality in every thing absolutely and by it self; but whether in all the particulars of some one thing taken together, and compared with all the particulars of some other thing together likewise.

VII. Thou hast no time nor opportunity to reade. What then? Hast thou not time and opportunity to exercise thy self, not to wrong [*thy self*]; to strive against [*all carnal*] pleasures and pains, and to get the upper hand of them; to contemn honour and vain-glory; and not onely not to be angry with them whom

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towards

towards thee thou dost find unsensible and unthankfull, but also to have a care of them still, and of their welfare?

VIII. Forbear henceforth to complain of the troubles of a Courtly life, either in publick before others, or in private by thy self.

IX. Repentance is an inward and self re-presentation for the neglect or omission of somewhat that was profitable. Now whatsoever is good, is also profitable, and it is the part of an honest vertuous man to set by it, and to make reckoning of it accordingly. But never did any honest vertuous man repent of the neglect or omission of any [*carnal*] pleasure: no [*carnal*] pleasure then is either good or profitable.

X. This, what is it in it self, and by it self, according to its proper constitution? What is the substance of it? What is the matter, [*or, proper use?*] What is the form [*or, efficient cause?*] What is it for in this world, and how long will it abide? [*Thus must thou examine all things that present themselves unto thee.*]

XI. When thou art hard to be stirred up and awakened out of thy sleep, admonish thy self and call to mind, that; to perform actions tending to the common good, is that which thine own proper constitution, and that which the nature of man do require. But to sleep, is common to unreasonable creatures also. And what more proper and natural, yea what more kind and pleasing, than that which is according to Nature?

XII. As

XII. As every fancie and imagination presents it self unto thee, consider (if it be possible) the true nature and the proper qualities of it, and reason with thy self about it.

XIII. At thy first encounter with any one, say presently to thy self, This man, what are his opinions concerning that which is good or evil? as concerning pain, pleasure, and the causes of both; concerning honour and dishonour, concerning life and death; thus and thus. Now if it be no wonder that a man should have such and such opinions; how can it be a wonder that he should doe such and such things? I will remember then, that he cannot but doe as he doeth [*holding those opinions that he doth.*] And that as it is a shame for any man to wonder that a fig-tree should bear figs, so is it also to wonder that the World should bear any thing, whatsoever it is which in the ordinary course of nature it may bear. To a Physician also and to a Pilot it is a shame, either for the one to wonder that such and such a one should have an Ague; or for the other, that the winds should prove contrary.

XIV. Remember, that to change thy mind upon occasion, and to follow him that is able to rectifie thee, is equally ingenuous, [*as to find out at the first what is right and just, without help.*] For of thee nothing is required that is beyond the extent of thine own deliberation and judgment, and of thine own understanding.

XV. If it were thine act and in thine own power, why wouldst thou doe it? If it were not, whom

whom dost thou accuse? the atoms, or the gods? For to doe either is the part of a mad-man. Thou must therefore blame no body, but, if it be in thy power, redress what is amiss; if it be not, to what end is it to complain? For nothing should be done but to some certain end.

XVI. Whatsoever dyeth [*and falleth, however and wheresoever it dye and fall,*] it cannot fall out of the world. If here it have its abode and change, here also shall it have its dissolution into its proper elements. The same are the world's Elements, and the elements of which thou dost consist. And they when they are changed, they murmur not; [*why shouldst thou?*]

XVII. Whatsoever is, was made for something, as a Horse, a Vine. Why wonderest thou? The Sun it self can tell thee, for what work he was made: and so [*bath*] every god [*its proper sanction.*] What then wert thou made for? to disport and delight thy self? See how even common sense and reason cannot brook it.

XVIII. Nature hath its end as well in the end and final consummation of any thing that is, as in the beginning and continuation of it.

XIX. As one that tosseth up a Ball. And what is a Ball the better, if the motion of it be upwards; or the worse, if it be downwards; or if it chance to fall upon the ground? So for the Bubble; if it continue, what is it the better? and if it dissolve, what is it the worse? And so is it of a Candle too. [*And so must thou reason with*

with thy self, both in matter of fame, and in matter of death. For as for the body it self, (the subject of death) wouldst thou know the vileness of it?] Turn it about, [*that thou mayst behold it the worst side upwards as well as in its more ordinary pleasant shape:*] how doth it look when it is old and withered? when sick and pained? when in the act of lust and fornication? [*And as for fame,*] This life is short. But he that praiseth, and he that is praised; he that remembers, and he that is remembred, [*will soon be dust and ashes.*] Besides, it is but in one corner of this part of the World [*that thou art praised;*] and yet in this corner thou hast not the joint praises of all men, no, nor scarce of any one constantly. And yet the whole earth it self, what is it but as one point, [*in regard of the whole world?*]

XX. That which must be the subject of thy consideration, is either the matter it self, or the *Dogma*, or the operation, or the true sense and signification.

XXI. Most justly have these things happened unto thee: [*why dost not thou amend?*] O but thou hadst rather *become* good to morrow, than to be so to day.

XXII. Shall I doe it? I will; so the end of my action be to doe good unto men. Doth any thing by way of cross or adversity happen unto me? I accept it, with reference unto the Gods, and [*their providence;*] the fountain of all things, from which whatsoever comes to pass doth hang and depend.

XXIII. [*By one action judge of the rest.*] This bathing

bathing [*which usually takes up so much of our time*] what is it? Oil, sweat, filth; [*or, the sordes of the body:*] water, an excrementitious viscosity, [*the excrements of oil, and other ointments used about the body, and mixed with the sordes of the body:*] all base and loathsome. And such [*almost*] is every part of our life, and every [*worldly*] object.

XXIV. *Lucilla* [*buried*] *Venus*; then was *Lucilla* her self [*buried by others.*] So *Secunda*, *Maximus*, then *Secunda* her self. So *Epitunchanus*, *Diotimus*; then *Epitunchanus* himself. So *Antoninus Pius*, *Faustina* [*his wife;*] then *Antoninus* himself. This is the course of the world. First, *Celer*, *Adrianus*; then *Adrianus* himself. And those austere ones, those that foretold other mens deaths, those that were so proud and stately, where are they now? Those austere ones I mean, such as were *Charax*, and *Demetrius* the Platonick, and *Eudamon*, and others like unto those. They were but for one day; all dead and gone long since. Some of them no sooner dead, than forgotten. Others soon turned into fables. Of others, even that which was fabulous is now long since forgotten. This therefore thou must remember, that whatsoever thou art compounded of, shall [*soon*] be dispersed, and that thy life and breath, [*or, thy soul,*] shall either be no more, or shall be translated, and appointed to some certain place and station.

XXV. The true joy of a man is, to doe that which properly belongs unto a man. That which is most proper unto a man, is, First, to be kindly affected

affected towards them that are of the same kind and nature as he is himself; to contemn all sensual motions and appetites; to discern rightly all plausible fancies and imaginations; to contemplate the nature of the Universe; both it, and all things that are done in it. [*In which kind of contemplation*] three several relations [*are to be observed.*] The first, to the appearing secondary cause. The second, to the first original cause, God, from whom originally proceeds whatsoever doth happen in the World. The third and last, to them that we live and converse with: [*what use may be made of it to their use and benefit.*]

XXVI. If pain be an evil, either it is in regard of the body, (and that cannot be, *because the body of it self is altogether insensible:*) or in regard of the soul. But it is in the power of the soul to preserve her own peace and tranquillity, and not to suppose that pain is evil. For all judgement and deliberation, all prosecution or averfation is from within, whither the sense of evil [*except it be let in by opinion*] cannot penetrate.

XXVII. Wipe off all [*idle*] fancies, and say unto thy self incessantly, Now, if I will, it is in my power to keep out of this my soul all wickedness, all lust and concupiscences, all trouble and confusion: But on the contrary, to behold and consider all things according to their true nature, and to carry my self towards every thing according to its true worth. Remember then this thy power, that Nature hath given thee.

XXVIII.

Gr. ἡδὺν
ἀποφύγε-
τω. See
B. VII.
n. XIII.

XXVIII. Whether thou speak in the Senate, or whether thou speak to any particular, let thy speech be always grave and modest. But thou must not openly and vulgarly observe that sound and exact form of speaking [concerning that which is truly good and truly evil; the vanity of the world, and of worldly men:] which otherwise Truth and Reason doth prescribe.

XXIX. Augustus his Court, his Wife, his Daughter, his Nephews, his Sons in Law, his Sister, Agrippa, his Kinsmen, his domesticks, his Friends; Arcus, Metænas, his aruspices [or slayers of beasts for sacrifice and divination:] There thou hast the death of a whole Court together. Proceed now on to the rest [that have been since that of Augustus.] Hath death dealt with them otherwise, [though so many and so stately whilst they lived,] than it doth use to deal with any one particular man? Consider now the death of a whole kindred and family, as of that of the Pompeys, as that also that useth to be written upon some monuments, **HE WAS THE LAST OF HIS OWN KINDRED.** O, what care did his Predecessours take that they might leave a successour! yet, behold, at last one or other must of necessity be **THE LAST.** Here again therefore consider the death of a whole kindred.

XXX. Contract thy whole life to the measure and proportion of one single action. And if in every particular action thou dost perform what is fitting to the utmost of thy power, let it suffice thee, [or, think that thou hast lived long enough.] And who can hinder thee, but that thou

thou mayst perform what is fitting? But there may be some outward let and impediment. Not any that can hinder thee, but that whatsoever thou doest, thou mayst do it justly, temperately, and with the praise of God. Yea, but there may be somewhat whereby some operation or other of thine may be hindred. And then with that very thing that doth hinder, thou mayst be well pleased, and so by this gentle and equanimous conversion of thy mind unto that which may be, [instead of that which at first thou didst intend,] in the room of that former action there succeedeth another, which agrees [as well] with this contraction of thy life that we now speak of.

XXXI. Receive [temporal blessings] without ostentation, when they are sent; and [thou shalt be able] to part with them with all readiness and facility when they are taken from thee again.

XXXII. If ever thou sawest either a hand, or a foot, or a head lying by it self, in some place or other, as cut off from the rest of the body, such must thou conceive him to make himself, as much as in him lieth, that either is offended with any thing that is happened, (whatsoever it be) and as it were divides himself from it; or that commits any thing against the natural Law of mutual correspondence and society among men; or, [he that commits any act of uncharitableness.] Whosoever thou art that art such, thou art cast forth I know not whither out of the general unity, which is according to Nature. Thou wert born indeed a-part, but now thou hast

hast cut thy self off. However, herein is matter of joy and exultation, that thou mayst be united again. God hath not granted it unto any other part, that once separated and cut off, it might be re-united and come together again. But, behold, that **GOODNESS** [how great and immense it is!] which hath so much esteemed **MAN**. As at first he was so made, that he needed not, except he would himself, have rent or divided himself from the whole; so once divided and cut off, **IT** hath so provided and ordered it, that if he would himself, he might return, and grow together again, and be admitted into his former rank and place of a part, as he was before.

XXXIII. The Nature of the Universe as it hath imparted almost all her other faculties and properties unto every reasonable creature, so this in particular we have received from her, that as whatsoever doth oppose it self unto her, and doth withstand her in her purposes and intentions, she doth, though against its will and intention, bring it about to her self, to serve her self of it in the execution of her own destinated ends; and so [by this though not intended co-operation of it with her self] makes it part of her self [whether it will or no;] So may every reasonable Creature, what crosses or impediments soever it meets with [in the course of this mortal life,] it may use them as fit and proper objects, to the furtherance of whatsoever is intended, and absolutely proposed unto it self [as its natural end and happiness.]

XXXIV.

Seen. LIII.
B. XI.
n. VII.

Gr. ὁμο-
εὐπρία
καταλα-
βειν
Sec B. VI.
XXXVII.

XXXIV. Let not the general representation unto thy self of the wretchedness of this our mortal life trouble thee. Let not *thy mind wander up and down, and heap together in her thoughts the many troubles and grievous calamities which thou art as subject unto as any other. But as every thing in particular doth happen, put this question unto thy self, and say, What is it that in this present matter seems unto thee so intolerable? For thou wilt be ashamed to confess it. Then upon this presently call to mind, that neither that which is future, nor that which is past can hurt thee; but that onely which is present. (And that also is much lessened, if thou dost rightly circumscribe it.) And then check thy mind, if for so little a while (a mere instant) it cannot hold out with patience.

XXXV. What? are either *Pantheas* or *Pergamus* abiding to this day by their Master's tombs? or either *Chabrias* or *Diotimus* by that of *Adrianus*? O foolery! For what if they did? would their Masters be sensible of it? or if sensible, would they be glad of it? or if glad, were these immortal? Was not it appointed unto them also (both men and women,) to become old in time, and then to dye? And these once dead, what would become of these former? [And when all is done, what is all this for,] but for a bag of bloud and corruption; [or, a loathsome carcase?] See notes.

XXXVI. If thou beest quick-sighted, be so in matter of judgment, and best discretion, saith he.

XXXVII. In the whole constitution of a man, I

M

see

see not any vertue contrary to justice, whereby it may be resisted and opposed. But one whereby pleasure and voluptuousness may be resisted and opposed, I see, Continenence.

XXXVIII. If thou canst but withdraw conceit and opinion concerning that which may seem hurtfull and offensive, thou thy self art as safe as safe may be. Thou thy self? and who is that? Thy Reason? Yea, but I am not Reason. Well, be it so. However, let not thy Reason [or, *understanding*] admit of grief; and if there be any thing in thee that is grieved, let that (whatsoever it be,) conceive its own grief, [if it can.]

See before
n. XXVI.

XXXIX. That which is an hindrance of the senses, is an evil to the sensitive nature. That which is an hindrance of the appetitive and prosecutive faculty, is an evil to the sensitive nature. As of the sensitive, so of the vegetative constitution, whatsoever is an hindrance unto it, is also in that respect an evil unto the same. And so likewise, whatsoever is an hindrance unto the mind and understanding, must needs be the proper evil of the reasonable nature. Now apply all those things unto thy self. Do either pain or pleasure seize on thee? Let the senses look to that. Hast thou met with some obstacle or other in thy purpose and intention? If thou didst propose without due reservation and exception, now hath thy reasonable part received a blow indeed. But if in general thou didst propose unto thy self whatsoever might be, thou art not thereby either hurt, nor [properly] hindered. For in those things that properly belong

unto

unto the mind, she cannot be hindered by any man. It is not Fire, nor Iron, nor the Power of a Tyrant, nor the Power of a slandering Tongue, nor any thing else that can penetrate into her.

XL. If once round and solid, there is no fear that ever it will change.

XLI. Why should I grieve my self, who never did willingly grieve any other? One thing rejoiceth one, and another thing another. As for me, this is my joy; If my understanding be right and sound, as neither averse from any man, nor refusing any of those things which as a man I am subject unto; If I can look upon all things in the world meekly and kindly; accept all things, and carry my self towards every thing according to the true worth of the thing at self.

XLII. This time that is now present, bestow thou upon thy self. They that rather hunt for fame after death, do not consider, that those men that shall be hereafter, will be even such as these, whom now they can so hardly bear with: And besides, they also will be mortal men. But [to consider the thing in it self] if so many with so many voices shall make such and a sound, or shall have such and such an opinion concerning thee, what is it at all to thee?

XLIII. Take me and throw me where thou wilt: [I am indifferent.] For there also I shall have that Spirit which is within me propitious; that is, well pleased and fully contented, both in that constant disposition, and with those particular actions which to its own proper constitution are suitable and agreeable.

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XLIV.

See B. IV.
n. I.

* See Latin Notes.

XLIV. Is this then a thing of that worth, that for it my soul should suffer, and become worse than it was? as either basely dejected, * and cast down; or confounded within it self, or terrified? What can there be that thou shouldst so much esteem?

XLV. Nothing can happen unto thee, which is not incidental unto thee as thou art a man. As nothing can happen either to an ox, a vine, or to a stone, which is not incidental unto them; unto every one in his own kind. If therefore nothing can happen unto any thing which is not both usual and natural; why art thou displeased? Sure the common nature of all would not bring any thing upon any, that were intolerable. If therefore it be a thing external that causeth thy grief, [*know, that*] it is not that properly that doth cause it, but thine own conceit and opinion concerning the thing; which thou mayst rid thy self of when thou wilt. But if it be somewhat that is amiss in thine own disposition that doth grieve thee, mayst thou not rectifie thy *dogmata* [*or, moral Tenets and opinions?*] But if it grieve thee, that thou dost not perform that which seemeth unto thee right and just, why dost not thou chuse rather to perform it than to grieve? But somewhat that is stronger than thy self doth hinder thee. Let it not grieve thee then, if it be not thy fault that the thing is not performed. Yea, but it is a thing of that nature, as that thy life is not worth the while, except it may be performed. If it be so, upon condition that thou be kindly and lovingly disposed towards

towards all men, thou mayst be gone. For even then, as much as at any time, art thou in a very good estate of performance, when thou dost dye in charity with those that are an obstacle unto thy performance.

XLVI. Remember that thy mind [*is of that nature as that it*] becometh altogether unconquerable, when once recollected in her self; she seeks no other content than this, that she cannot be forced: yea, though it so fall out, that it be even against Reason it self that it doth bandy. How much less when by the help of Reason she is able to judge of things with discretion? And therefore let thy chief Fort and place of defence be a mind free from passions. A stronger place, (whereunto to make his refuge, and so to become impregnable,) and better fortified than this, hath no man. He that seeth not this, is unlearned. He that seeth it, and betaketh not himself to this place of refuge, is unhappy.

XLVII. Keep thy self to the first [*bare and naked*] apprehensions of things, as they present themselves unto thee, and add not unto them. It is reported unto thee, that such a one speaketh ill of thee. Well; that he speaketh ill of thee, so much is reported. But that thou art hurt thereby, is not reported: [*That is the addition of opinion, which thou must exclude.*] I see that my child is sick. That he is sick, I see; but that he is in danger of his life also, I see it not. Thus thou must use to keep thy self to the first notions and apprehensions of things, as they present themselves outwardly; and add not unto them

them from within thy self [*through mere conceit and opinion*:] and thou hast no hurt. Or rather add unto them; but as one that understandeth the true nature of all things that happen in the world.

XLVIII. Is the Cucumber bitter? set it away. Are Brambles in the way? avoid them. Let this suffice. * *Add not presently, speaking unto thy self,* What serve these things for in the World? For, this, one that is acquainted with the mysteries of Nature will laugh at thee for it; as a Carpenter would or a Shoe-maker, if meeting in either of their shops with some shavings, or small remnants of their work, thou shouldst blame them for it. And yet those men, it is not for want of a place where to throw them [*that they keep them in their shops for a while*:] but the nature of the Universe hath no such out-place: but herein doth consist the wonder of her art and skill, that she having once circumscribed her self within some certain bounds and limits, whatsoever is within her that seems either corrupted, or old, or unprofitable, she can change it into her self; and of these very things can make new things; so that she needeth not to seek else-where out of her self either for a new supply of matter and substance, or for a place where to throw out whatsoever is irrecoverably putrid and corrupt. Thus she, as for place, so for matter and art, is her self sufficient unto her self.

XLIX. Not to be slack and negligent, or loose and wanton in thy actions, nor contentious and troublesome in thy conversation, nor to

to rove and wander in thy fancies and imaginations. Not basely to contract thy soul; nor boisterously to sally out with it, [*or, furiously to launch out as it were*] nor ever to want employment.

L. They kill me, they cut my flesh; they persecute my person with curses. What then? May not thy mind for all this continue pure, prudent, temperate, just? As a fountain of sweet and clear water, though she be cursed by some stander-by, yet do her springs nevertheless still run as sweet and clear as before; yea, though either dirt or dung be thrown in, yet is it no sooner thrown than dispersed, and she cleared. She cannot be dyed [*or, infected*] by it. What then must I doe, that I may have [*within my self*] an ever-flowing Fountain, and not a Well? Beget thy self by continual [*pains and endeavours*] to [*true*] liberty with charity, and true simplicity and modesty.

LI. He that knoweth not what the world is, knoweth not where he himself is. And he that knoweth not what the world was made for, cannot possibly know either what are the qualities, or what is the nature of the world. Now he that in either of these is to seek, for what he himself was made is ignorant also. What then dost thou think of that man, who proposeth unto himself, as a matter of great moment, the noise and applause of men, who both where they are, and what they are themselves, are altogether ignorant? Dost thou desire to be commended of that man, who thrice in one hour

perchance doth himself curse himself? Dost thou desire to please him, who pleaseth not himself? or dost thou think that he pleaseth himself, who doth use to repent himself almost of every thing that he doeth?

* Gr. πνεύματι.

* Gr. σφύρα.

LII. Not onely now henceforth to ** have a common breath* [or, to hold correspondency of breath,] with that Air that compasseth us about; but ** to have a common mind* [or, to hold correspondency of mind] also with that rational substance which compasseth all things. For that also is of it self, and of its own nature (if a man can but draw it in as he should,) every where diffused; and passeth through all things, no less than the Air doth, if a man can but suck it in.

See before
p. xxxij.

LIII. Wickedness in general doth not hurt the World. Particular wickedness doth not hurt any other: onely unto him it is hurtfull [whosoever he be that offends,] unto whom [in great favour and mercy] it is granted, that whensoever he himself shall but first desire it, he may be presently delivered of it. Unto my Free-will my neighbour's free-will, whoever he be, (as his life, or his body) is altogether indifferent. For although we are all made one for another, yet have our minds and understandings each of them their own proper and limited jurisdiction. For else another man's wickedness might be my evil; which God would not have, that it might not be in another man's power to make me unhappy: [which nothing now can doe but mine own wickedness.]

LIV. The Sun seemeth to be shed abroad.
And

And indeed it is *diffused*, but not *effused*. For that *diffusion* of it is a *τάσις* or an extension. For therefore are the beams of it called *ἀκτίνες* from the word *ἐκτείνω*, to be stretched out and extended. Now what a Sun-beam is, thou mayst know if thou observe the light of the Sun, when through some narrow hole it pierceth into some room that is dark. For it is always in a direct line. And as by any solid body that it meets with in the way that is not penetrable by Air, it is divided and *abrupted*, and yet neither slides off, or falls down, but stayeth there nevertheless: such must the *diffusion* of the mind be; not an effusion, but an extension. What obstacles and impediments soever she meeteth with in her way, she must not violently and by way of an impetuous onset light upon them; neither must she fall down; but she must stand and give light unto that which doth admit of it. For as for that which doth not, [it is its own fault and loss, if] it bereave it self of her light.

LV. He that feareth Death, either feareth that he shall have no sense at all, or that his senses will not be the same. Whereas [he should rather comfort himself, that] either no sense at all, and so no sense of evil; or if any sense, then another life, and so no death [properly.]

LVI. All men are made one for another: either then teach them better, or bear with them.

LVII. The motion of the mind is not as the motion of a dart. For the mind when it is wary and cautelous, and by way of diligent circumspection

cumspection turneth her self many ways, may then as well be said to go streight on to the object, [*as when it useth no such circumspection.*]

See B. IX.
n. XVI.
B.I. n. XI.

LVIII. To pierce and penetrate into the estate of every ones understanding [*that thou hast to doe with :*] as also to make the estate of thine own open and penetrable to any other.

THE NINTH BOOK.

HE that is unjust, is also impious. For the Nature of the Universe having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should doe one another good, more or less, according to the severall persons and occasions; but in no wise hurt one another: it is manifest that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the most ancient and venerable of all the Deities. For the Nature of the Universe is the nature [*the common Parent of all, and therefore piously to be observed*] of all things that are; and that which now is, to whatsoever first was, and gave it its being, hath relation of bloud and kindred. She is also called *Truth*; and is the first cause of all truths. He therefore that willingly and wittingly doth lye, is impious in that he doth deceive, and so commit injustice: but he that against his will, in that he

he disagreeeth from the nature of the Universe, and in that striving with the nature of the World, he doth in his particular * violate the Gr. *general order of the world.* For he doeth no better than strive and war against it, who contrary to his own Nature applieth himself to that which is contrary to truth. For Nature had before furnished him with instincts and opportunities [*sufficient for the attainment of it :*] which he having hitherto neglected, is not now able to discern that which is false from that which is true. He also that pursues after pleasures, as that which is truly good, and flies from pains, as that which is truly evil, is impious. For such a one must of necessity oftentimes accuse that common Nature, as distributing many things both unto the evil and unto the good, not according to the deserts of either: as unto the bad oftentimes pleasures, and the causes of pleasures; so unto the good, pains, and the occasions of pains. Again, he that feareth pains and crosses in the World, feareth some of those things which sometime or other must needs happen in the World. And that we have already shewed to be impious. And he that pursueth after pleasures, will not spare [*to compass his desires*] to doe that which is unjust, and that is manifestly impious. Now those things which unto Nature are equally indifferent, (for she had not created both pain and pleasure, if both had not been unto her equally indifferent:) they that will live according to Nature, must in those things (as being of the same mind and disposition that she is) be

See n. V.
upon B.II.

be as equally indifferent. Whosoever therefore in either matter of pleasure and pain, death and life, honour and dishonour, (which things Nature in the administration of the world indifferently doth make use of,) is not as indifferent, it is apparent that he is impious. When I say that common Nature doth indifferently make use of them, my meaning is, that they happen indifferently in the ordinary course of things, which by a necessary consequence, whether as principal and accessory, come to pass in the World; according to that first and ancient deliberation of Providence, by which she from some certain beginning did resolve upon the creation of such a World, ** conceiving then in her womb as it were some certain rational generative seeds and faculties of things future, whether subjects, changes, successions; both such and such, and just so many.*

* Gr. συλ-
λαβῶσα
πνῶς λό-
γος.

II. It were indeed more happy and comfortable, for a man to depart out of this World, having lived all his life long clear from all falshood, dissimulation, voluptuousness, and pride. But if this cannot be, yet is it some comfort for a man [*joyfully*] to depart [*as*] weay, and out of love with those; rather than to desire to live, and to continue long in these wicked courses. Hath not yet experience taught thee to flie from the plague? For a far greater plague is the corruption of the mind, than any certain change and distemper of the common air can be. This is a plague of creatures, as they are living creatures; but that

that of men as they are men [*or reasonable.*]

III. Thou must not in matter of death carry thy self scornfully, but as one that is well pleased with it, as being one of those things that Nature hath appointed. For what thou dost conceive of these, of a *boy to become a young man, to wax old, to grow, to ripen, to get teeth, or a beard, or gray hairs; to beget, to bear, or to be delivered;* or what other action soever it be that is natural unto man according to the several seasons of his life; such a thing is it also *to be dissolved.* It is therefore the part of a wise man, in matter of death, not in any wise to carry himself either violently or proudly; but patiently to wait for it, as one of Nature's operations: that with the same mind as now thou dost expect when that which yet is but an *Embryo* in thy Wife's belly shall come forth, thou mayst expect also when thy soul shall fall off from that [*outward coat or skin,*] wherein [*as a child in the belly*] it lieth involved and shut up. But if thou desirest ** more popular, and [though not so direct and philosophical, yet]* a very powerfull and penetrative receipt against the fear of death; Nothing can make thee more willing to part with thy life, than if thou shalt consider, both what the subjects themselves are that thou shalt part with, and what manner of dispositions thou shalt no more have to doe with. True it is, that offended with them thou must not be by any means, but take care of them, and meekly bear with them. However, this thou mayst remember, that whensoever it happens that thou depart, it shall not be from men that held the same *Dogmata,*

[or,

See Note
upon B.
XI. n. III.

* Gr. ἡ-
συχὸν πα-
ρὰ φύσιν
ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ
οὐκ.

[or, opinions in point of life and practice] that thou dost. For that indeed, (if it were so) is the onely thing that might make thee averse from death, and willing to continue here, if it were thy hap to live with men that had obtained the same principles [or, belief] that thou hast. But now, what a toil it is for thee to live with men, whose course of life is so different from thine, thou seest: so that thou hast rather occasion to say, *Hasten, I thee pray, O death; lest I also in time forget my self.*

IV. He that sinneth, sinneth unto himself. He that is unjust, hurts himself, in that he makes himself worse than he was before. Not he onely that committeth, but he also that omitteth something, is oftentimes unjust.

V. If my present apprehension of the object be right, and my present action charitable, and this, towards whatsoever doth proceed from God, be my present disposition, to be well pleased with it, it sufficeth.

VI. To wipe away fancy, to use deliberation, to quench concupiscence, to keep the mind free to her self.

VII. Of all unreasonable creatures, there is but one unreasonable soul; and of all that are reasonable, but one reasonable Soul, divided betwixt them all. As of all earthly things there is but one Earth; and but one light that we see by; and but one air that we breathe in, as many as either breathe or see. Now whatsoever partakes of some common thing, naturally affects and enclines unto that whereof it is a part, being of one kind and nature with it. Whatsoever is earthly, presseth downwards to the common

mon Earth. Whatsoever is liquid, would flow together. And whatsoever is airy, would be together likewise. So that without some obstacle, and some kind of violence, they cannot well be kept asunder. Whatsoever is fiery, doth not onely by reason of the Elementary fire tend upwards; but here also is so ready to join, and to burn together, that whatsoever doth want sufficient moisture to make resistance, is easily set on fire. Whatsoever therefore is partaker of that reasonable common Nature [naturally] doth as much and more long after his own kind. For by how much in its own nature it excells all other things, by so much more is it desirous to be joined and united unto that which is of its own nature. As for unreasonable creatures then, they had not long been, but presently begun among them swarms, and flocks, and broods of young ones, and a kind of mutual love and affection. For [though but unreasonable, yet] a [kind of] soul these had; and therefore was that natural desire of union more strong and intense in them, as in creatures of a more excellent nature, than either in plants, or stones, or trees. But among reasonable creatures began Common-wealths, friendships, families, publick meetings, and even in their wars conventions and truces. Now among them that were yet of a more excellent nature, as the stars and planets, though by their nature far distant one from another, yet even among them began some mutual correspondency and unity. So proper is it to excellency in a high degree to affect

affect unity, as that even in things so far distant, it could operate unto a mutual Sympathy. But now behold, what is now come to pass. Those creatures that are reasonable, are now the onely creatures that have forgotten their natural affection and inclination of one towards another. Among them alone [*of all other things that are of one kind*] there is not to be found a general disposition to flow together. But though they fly from Nature, yet are they stopt in their course, and apprehended. Doe they what they can, Nature doth prevail. And so shalt thou confess, if thou dost observe it. For sooner mayst thou find a thing earthly where no other earthly thing is; than find a man that [*naturally*] can live by himself alone.

VIII. Man, God, the World, every one in their kind, bear some fruits. All things have their proper time *to bear*. Though by custome, the word it self is in a manner become proper unto the Vine, and the like, yet is it so nevertheless as we have said. As for reason, that beareth both common fruit for the use of others; and peculiar, which it self doth enjoy. What it self is in it self, it begets in others, and so doth multiply.

IX. Either teach them better, if it be in thy power; or if it be not, remember that for this use [*to bear with them patiently*] was mildness and goodness granted unto thee. The gods themselves are good unto such; yea and in some things, (as in matter of health, of wealth, of honour,) are content often to further their endeavours: so good

good and gracious are they. And mightest thou not be so too? or, tell me, what doth hinder thee?

X. Labour not as one [*to whom it is appointed to be*] wretched, nor^t as one that either would be pitied, or admired; but let this be thine onely care and desire, so always and in all things to prosecute or to forbear, as the law of Charity [*or, mutual society*] doth require.

XI. This day *I did come out* of all my trouble. Nay, I *have cast out* all my trouble; it should rather be. For that which troubled thee, whatsoever it was, was not *without* any where, [*that thou shouldest come out of it;*] but *within* in thine own opinions, from whence it must be *cast out*, before thou canst truly and constantly be at ease.

XII. All those things, for matter of experience, are usual and ordinary; for their continuance, but for a day; and for their matter, most base and filthy. As they were in the days of those whom we have buried; so are they now also, and no otherwise.

XIII. The things themselves [*that affect us*] they stand without doors; neither knowing any thing themselves, nor able to utter any thing to others concerning themselves. What then is it that passeth verdict on them? The understanding.

XIV. As vertue and wickedness consist not in passion, but in action; so neither doth the true good or evil of a reasonable charitable man consist in passion, but in operation and action.

XV. To the stone that is cast up, when it comes
N down

affect unity, as that even in things so far distant, it could operate unto a mutual Sympathy. But now behold, what is now come to pass. Those creatures that are reasonable, are now the onely creatures that have forgotten their natural affection and inclination of one towards another. Among them alone [*of all other things that are of one kind*] there is not to be found a general disposition to flow together. But though they fly from Nature, yet are they stopt in their course, and apprehended. Doe they what they can, Nature doth prevail. And so shalt thou confess, if thou dost observe it. For sooner mayst thou find a thing earthly where no other earthly thing is; than find a man that [*naturally*] can live by himself alone.

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N down

down it is no hurt unto it; as neither benefit, when it doth ascend.

XVI. Sift their minds and understandings, and behold what men they be whom thou dost stand in fear of, what they shall judge of thee, what they themselves judge of themselves.

XVII. All things that are in the world are always in the state of alteration. Thou also art in a perpetual change, yea and under corruption too, in some part: and so is the whole world.

XVIII. It is [*not thine, but*] another man's sin. [*Why should it trouble thee?*] Let him look to it whose sin it is.

XIX. Of an operation and of a purpose there is *an ending*, [*or of an action and of a purpose we say commonly, that it is at an end:*] from opinion also there is an [*absolute*] cessation, which is as it were the death of it. In all this there is no hurt. Apply this now to a man's age; as first, a child, then a youth, then a young man, then an old man: every change from one age to another is a kind of death. And all this while here is no matter of grief yet. Pass now unto that life, first, that which thou livedst under thy Grandfather, then under thy Mother, then under thy Father. And thus when through the whole course of thy life hitherto thou hast found and observed many alterations, many changes, many kinds of *endings* and cessations, put this question to thy self, What matter of grief or sorrow dost thou find in any of these? [*or, what dost thou suffer through any of these?*] If in none of these, then neither in the

the *ending* and consummation of thy whole life, [*which also is but*] a cessation and change.

XX. [*As occasion shall require,*] either to thine own Understanding, or to that of the Universe, or to his [*whom thou hast now to do with,*] let thy refuge be with all speed. To thine own, that it resolve upon nothing against justice. To that of the Universe, that thou mayst remember, part of whom thou art. Of his [*whom thou hast now to do with,*] what thou mayst consider, whether in the estate of ignorance, or of knowledge. And then also must thou call to mind, that he is thy Kinsman.

XXI. As thou thy self [*whoever thou art*] wert made for the perfection and consummation [*being a member of it*] of a common society; so must every action of thine tend to the perfection and consummation of a life that is [*truly*] sociable. What action soever of thine therefore that either immediately or afar off hath not reference to the common good, that is an exorbitant and disorderly action; yea, it is seditious, as one among the people whom from such and such a consent and unity, should factiously divide and separate himself.

XXII. Childrens anger, mere baubles, wretched souls bearing up dead bodies, *that they may not have their fall so soon*: Even as it is in that common dirge-song, [*or, bearing up dead bodies, that the number of the dead may not be full so soon.*]

XXIII. Go to the *quality* of the cause [*from which the effect doth proceed.*] Behold it by it self

self bare and naked, separated from all that is material. Then consider the utmost bounds of time which that cause, thus and thus qualified, can subsist and abide.

XXIV. Infinite are the troubles and miseries that thou hast already been put to, by reason of this onely, because that for all happiness it did not suffice thee, [or, *that thou didst not account it sufficient happiness,*] that thy understanding did operate according to its natural constitution. It is time to make an end, [and to begin a new course.]

XXV. When any shall either impeach thee with false accusations, or hatefully reproach thee, or shall use any such carriage towards thee, get thee presently to their minds and understandings, and look in them, and behold what manner of men they be. Thou shalt see that there is no such occasion why it should trouble thee, what such as they are think of thee. Yet must thou love them still, for by nature they are thy friends. And the gods themselves, in those things that they seek from them as matters of great moment, are well content, all manner of ways (*as by dreams and oracles*) to help them [*as well as others.*]

XXVI. Up and down, from one age to another, goe the ordinary things of the world; being still the same. And either of every thing in particular [*before it come to pass,*] the mind of the Universe doth consider with it self and deliberate; and if so, then submit [*for shame*] unto the determination of [*such an excellent*] Understanding: or once for all it did

did resolve upon all things in general; and since that, whatsoever happens, happens by a necessary consequence; and all things *indivisibly in a manner, and inseparably*, hold one of another. In summe, either there is a God, and then all is well; or if all things goe by chance and fortune, yet mayst thou use thine own Providence [*in those things that concern thee properly, and then thou art well.*]

XXVII. Within a while the Earth shall cover us all, and then she her self shall have her change. And then the course will be, from one period of eternity unto another, and so a perpetual eternity. Now can any man that shall consider with himself in his mind the several rollings [*or, successions*] of so many changes and alterations, and the swiftness of all these rollings; can he otherwise but contemn in his heart, and despise all worldly things? The Cause of the Universe [*or, the general cause*] is as it were a strong torrent, it carrieth all away.

XXVIII. And these your professed Politicians, the onely true practick Philosophers of the world, (as they think of themselves) * *so full of affected gravity, [or, such profess'd lovers of vertue and honesty,*] what wretches be they in very deed? how vile and contemptible in themselves? O man! what a doe dost thou keep? Doe what thy nature doth now require. Resolve upon it, if thou mayst: and take no thought, whether any body shall know it or not. Yea, but [*sayst thou*] I must not expect a Plato's Common-wealth. If they profit though

never so little, I must be content; and think much even of that little progress. Doth then any of them forsake their former [*false*] opinions [*that I should think they profit?*] For without a change of opinions, alas! what is all that ostentation, but mere wretchedness of slavish minds, that groan privately, and yet would make a shew of obedience [*to Reason and Truth?*] Go to now, and tell me of *Alexander* and *Philippus*, and *Demetrius Phalereus*. Whether they understood what the common nature requireth, and could rule themselves or no, they know best themselves. But if they kept a life, and swaggered; I (God be thanked) am not bound to imitate them. The effect of true Philosophy is, unaffected simplicity and modesty. Persuade me not to ostentation and vain-glory.

See B. VII.
n. XXVI.

XXIX. From some high place as it were to look down, and to behold, here flocks, and there sacrifices without number; and all kind of navigation; some in a rough and stormy sea, and some in a calm: the general differences [*or, different estates*] of things, some, that are now first upon being; the several and mutual relations of those things that are together; and some other things that are at their last. Their lives also who were long ago, and theirs who shall be after thee, and the present estate and life of those many nations of Barbarians that are now in the World, thou must likewise consider in thy mind. And how many there be who never so much as heard of thy Name, how many that will soon forget it; how many who but

but even now did commend thee, within a very little while, perchance, will speak ill of thee. So that neither fame, nor honour, nor any thing else that this world doth afford, is worth the while. The summe then of all; Whatsoever doth happen unto thee, whereof God is the cause, to accept it contentedly: whatsoever thou doest, whereof thou thy self art the cause, to doe it justly: which will be, if both in thy resolution and in thy action thou have no farther end, than to doe good unto others; as being that which *by thy natural constitution* [*or, as a man,*] thou art bound unto.

XXX. Many of those things that trouble and straiten thee, it is in thy power to cut off, as wholly depending from mere conceit and opinion, and then thou shalt have room enough.

XXXI. To comprehend the whole world together in thy mind, and the whole course of this present age, to represent it unto thy self, and to fix thy thoughts upon the sudden change of every particular object. How short the time is from the generation of any thing, unto the dissolution of the same; but how immense and infinite both that which was before the generation, and that which after the generation of it shall be. All things that thou seest will soon be perished, and they that see their corruptions will soon vanish away themselves. He that dieth a hundred years old, [*or, extreme old,*] and he that dieth young, shall come all to one.

XXXII. What are their minds and understandings,

standings, and what the things that they apply themselves unto? what do they love, and what do they hate for? Fancie to thy self the estate of their souls openly to be seen. When they think they hurt them shrewdly whom they speak ill of, and when they think they doe them a very good turn whom they commend and extoll; O how full are they then of conceit and opinion!

XXXIII. Loss and corruption is in very deed nothing else but change and alteration; and that is it which the Nature of the Universe doth most delight in, by which and according to which, whatsoever is done, is well done. For that was the estate of worldly things from the beginning, and so shall it ever be. Or wouldst thou rather say, that all things in the world have gone ill [*from the beginning for so many Ages,*] and shall ever go ill? And then among so many Deities, could no Divine power be found all this while, that could rectifie the things of the world? Or is the world to incessant woes and miseries for ever condemned?

XXXIV. How base and putrid every common matter is! Water, dust, [*and from the mixture of these*] bones, and all that loathsome stuff [*that our bodies do consist of;*] so subject to be infected and corrupted. And again [*those other things that are so much prized and admired, as*] marble-stones [*what are they but, as it were*] the Kernels of the Earth? gold and silver, [*what are they, but as*] the more gross dregs of the Earth? Thy [*most royal*] appa-
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rel, for matter, it is but as it were the hair [*of a silly sheep;*] and for colour, the very bloud [*of a shel-fish*] Of this nature are all other things. Thy life it self is some such thing too; [*a mere exhalation of bloud:*] and it also apt to be changed into some other common thing.

XXXV. Will this querulousness, this murmuring, this complaining, and dissembling [*or apish complying*] never be at an end? What then is it that troubleth thee? Doth any new thing happen unto thee? What dost thou so wonder at? At the cause, or the matter? Behold either by it self, [*is either of that weight or moment indeed?*] And besides these, there is not any thing. But thy duty towards the gods also, it is time that thou shouldst acquit thy self of it with more goodness and simplicity.

XXXVI. It is all one to see these things for a hundred years together, or but for three years.

XXXVII. If he have sinned, his is the harm, not mine. But perchance he hath not.

XXXVIII. Either all things by the providence of Reason happen unto every particular, as a part of one general body; and then it is against reason that a part should complain of any thing that happens for the good of the Whole: or if [*according to Epicurus*] Atoms [*be the Cause of all things,*] and [*that life be*] nothing else but an accidentary confusion of things, and [*death nothing else but*] a mere Dispersion, [*and so of all other things;*] what dost thou trouble thy self for?

XXXIX. Sayst thou unto that Rational part, thou art dead; corruption hath taken hold

hold on thee? Doth it then also void excrements? Doth it, like either Oxen or Sheep, graze or feed; [*that it also should be mortal, as well as the body?*]

XL. Either the gods can doe nothing for us at all, or they can still and allay all the distractions and distempers of thy mind. If they can doe nothing, why dost thou pray? If they can, why wouldst thou not rather pray, that they will grant unto thee, that thou mayst neither fear nor lust after any of those [*worldly*] things [*which cause these distractions and distempers of it?*] Why not rather, that thou mayst not at either their absence or presence be grieved and discontented; than either that thou mayst obtain them, or that thou mayst avoid them? For certainly it must needs be, that if the gods can help us in any thing, they may in this kind also. But thou wilt say perchance, In those things the gods have given me my liberty: and it is in mine own power to doe what I will. But if thou mayst use this liberty, rather to set thy mind at true liberty, than wilfully with baseness and servility of mind to affect those things, which [*either to compass or to avoid*] is not in thy power; wert not thou better? And as for the gods, who hath told thee that they cannot help us even in those things that they have put in our own power? Whether it be so or no, thou shalt soon perceive, if thou wilt but try thy self and pray. One prayeth that he may compass his desire, to lie with such or such a one; pray thou that thou mayst not lust to lie with her. Another,
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how he may be rid of such a one; pray thou that thou [*mayst so patiently bear with him, as that thou*] have no such need to be rid of him. Another, that he may not lose his child; pray thou that thou mayst not fear to lose him. To this end and purpose let all thy prayers be, and see what will be the event?

XLI. In my sickness (saith Epicurus of himself,) my discourses were not concerning the nature of my disease, neither was that the subject of my talk to them that came to visit me; but in the consideration and contemplation of that which was of especial weight and moment, was all my time bestowed and spent, and among others in this very thing, how my mind by a natural and unavoidable sympathy, partaking in some sort with the present indisposition of my body, might nevertheless keep herself free from trouble, and in present possession of her own proper happiness. Neither did I, saith he, leave the ordering of my body to Physicians altogether to doe with me what they would, as though I expected any great matter from them, [*or, as though I thought it a matter of such great consequence, by their means to recover my health:*] for my present estate, methought, liked me very well, and gave me good content. Whether therefore in sickness (if thou chance to sicken,) or in what other kind of extremity soever, endeavour thou also to be in thy mind so affected, as he doth report of himself: not to depart from thy Philosophy for any thing that can befall thee, nor to give ear to the discourses of silly people and mere naturalists.

XLII. It is common to all trades and professions to mind and intend that onely which now they are about, and the instrument whereby they work.

XLIII. When at any time thou art offended with any ones impudency, put presently this question to thy self; What? Is it then possible that there should not be any impudent men in the world? Certainly it is not possible. Desire not then that which is impossible. For this one, (thou must think) whosoever he be, is one of those impudent ones that the world cannot be without. So of the subtile and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of every one that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thy self. For whilst in general thou dost thus reason with thy self, that the kind of them must needs be in the world, thou wilt be the better able to use meekness towards every particular. This also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every such occasion, presently to consider with thy self, what proper vertue nature hath furnished man with against such a vice, [or, *to encounter with a disposition vitious in this kind.*] As for example, against the unthankfull, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote; and so against another [vitious in another kind] some other peculiar faculty. And generally, is it not in thy power to instruct him better that is in an error? For whosoever sinneth, doth in that decline from his purposed end, and is certainly deceived. And again, what art thou the worse for his sin? For thou shalt not find that any one of these against whom thou art incensed, hath

hath in very deed done any thing whereby thy mind (the onely true subject of thy hurt and evil) can be made worse than it was. And what a matter of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is *unlearned* doe the deeds of one that is *unlearned*? Shouldst not thou rather blame thy self, who, when upon very good grounds of reason, thou mightest have thought it very probable that such a thing would by such a one be committed, didst not onely not foresee it, but moreover dost wonder at it, that such a thing should be? But then especially, when thou dost find fault with either an unthankfull or a false man, must thou reflect upon thy self. For without all question thou thy self art much in fault, if either of one that were of such a disposition, thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee: or when unto any thou didst a good turn, thou didst not there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end; nor didst think that from the action it self thou hadst received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done. For what wouldst thou have more? Unto him that is a man thou hast done a good turn: doth not that suffice thee? What thy nature required, that hast thou done. Must thou be rewarded for it? As if either the eye for that it seeth, or the feet for that they go, should require satisfaction. For as these being by nature appointed for such an use, can challenge no more than that they may work according to their natural constitution: so man being born to doe good unto others, whensoever he doeth a real good unto any [by helping them

out of error;] or though but in *middle* things, [as in matter of wealth, life, preferment, and the like] doth help to further their desires; he doth that for which he was made, and therefore can require no more.

THE TENTH BOOK.

O My soul, the time, I trust, will be, when thou shalt be good, simple, single, more open and visible, than that body by which thou art inclosed. Thou wilt one day be sensible of their happiness, whose end is love, and their affections dead to all worldly things. Thou shalt one day be full, and in want of no external thing: not seeking pleasure from any thing, either living or unsensible, that this World can afford; neither wanting time for the continuation of thy pleasure, nor place and opportunity, nor the favour either of the weather or of men. When thou shalt have content in thy present estate, and all things present shall add to thy content: when thou shalt persuade thy self, that thou hast all things, at present; all for thy good, and all by the providence of the gods: and of things future also shalt be as confident, that whatsoever they shall think fit to send, it will all doe well, as tending to the maintenance and preservation in some sort of his perfect welfare and happiness, who is perfection of life, of goodness, justice,

See B. V.
D. VIII.
last lines.

justice, and beauty; who begets all things, and containeth all things in himself; and in himself doth recollect all things from all places that are dissolved, that of them he may beget others again like unto them. Such one day shall be thy disposition, that thou shalt be able, both in regard of the gods, and in regard of men, so to fit and order thy conversation, as neither to complain of them at any time, for any thing that they doe; nor to doe any thing thy self, for which thou mayst [*justly*] be condemned.

II. As one who is altogether governed by nature, let it be thy care to observe what it is that thy nature [*in general*] doth require. That done, if thou find not that thy nature, as thou art a living sensible creature, will be the worse for it, thou mayst proceed. Next then thou must examine, what thy nature, as thou art a living sensible creature, doth require. And that, whatsoever it be, thou mayst admit of and doe it, if thy nature, as thou art a reasonable living creature, will not be the worse for it. Now whatsoever is reasonable, is also *sociable*. Keep thy self to these rules, and trouble not thy self about idle things.

III. Whatsoever doth happen unto thee, thou art naturally by thy natural constitution either able, or not able, to bear. If thou beest able, be not offended, but bear it according to thy natural constitution [or, *as nature hath enabled thee.*] If thou beest not able, be not offended. For it will soon make an end of thee, and it self (whatsoever it be) at the same

same time end with thee. But remember, that whatsoever by the strength of opinion, grounded upon a certain apprehension of both [true] profit and duty, thou canst conceive tolerable; that thou art able to bear that by thy natural constitution.

See B. VIII.
n. XIV,
XXX.

IV. Him that offends, to teach with love and meekness, and to shew him his error. But if thou canst not, then to blame thy self; or rather not thy self neither, [*if thy will and endeavours have not been wanting.*]

V. Whatsoever it be that happens unto thee, it is that which from all time was appointed unto thee. For by the same coherence of causes, by which thy substance from all eternity was appointed to be, was also whatsoever should happen unto it destined and appointed.

VI. Either [*with Epicurus, we must fondly imagine*] the Atoms [*to be the cause of all things;*] or [*we must needs grant*] a Nature. Let this then be thy first ground, that thou art part of that Universe which is governed by Nature. Then, secondly, that to those parts that are of the same kind and Nature as thou art, thou hast relation of kindred. For of these if I shall always be mindfull, first as I am a part, I shall never be displeased with any thing that falls to my particular share of the common chances of the world. For nothing that is behovefull unto the whole, can be [*truly*] hurtfull to that which is part of it. For this being the common privilege of all natures, that they contain nothing in themselves that is hurtfull unto them; it cannot be that the nature of the Universe (whose privilege be-
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yond other particular natures, is, that she cannot against her will by any higher external cause, be constrained,) should beget any thing [*and cherish it in her bosom*] that should tend to her own hurt and prejudice. As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an Universe, I shall not be displeased with any thing that happens. And as I have relation of kindred to those parts that are of the same kind and nature that I am, so I shall be carefull to doe nothing that is prejudicial to the community, but in all my deliberations shall they that are of my Kind ever be; and the common good, that which all my intentions and resolutions shall drive unto; as that which is contrary unto it, I shall by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid. These things once so fixed and concluded, as thou wouldest think him an happy Citizen, whose constant study and practice were for the good and benefit of his fellow-Citizens, and the carriage of the City such towards him, that he were well pleased with it, so must it needs be with thee, that thou shalt live a happy life.

VII. All parts of the world, (all things I mean that are contained within the whole world,) must of necessity at some time or other come to corruption; Alteration I should say, to speak truly and properly; but that I may be the better understood, I am content at this time to use that more common word. Now say I, if so be that this be both hurtfull unto them, and yet unavoidable, would not, thinkest thou, the whole it self be in a sweet case, all
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the parts of it being subject to alteration, yea and by their making it self fitted for corruption, as consisting of things different and contrary? And did nature then either on her self thus project and purpose the affliction and misery of her parts, and therefore of purpose so made them, not onely that haply they might, but of necessity that they should fall into evil? or did not she know what she did, when she made them? For either of these two to say, is equally absurd. But to let pass nature in general, and to reason of things particular according to their own particular natures; how absurd and ridiculous is it, first to say, that all parts of the whole are, by their proper natural constitution, subject to alteration; and then when any such thing doth happen [as when one doth fall sick and dyeth] to take on, and wonder as though some strange thing had happened? Though this besides might move not so grievously to take on when any such thing doth happen, that whatsoever is dissolved, it is dissolved into those things whereof it was compounded. For every dissolution is either a mere dispersion of the Elements into those Elements again whereof every thing did consist; or a change of that which is more solid, into Earth, and of that which is pure and subtile [or, spiritual] into air. So that [by this means nothing is lost, but] all resumed again into those rational generative seeds of the Universe; and this Universe, either after a certain period of time to be consumed by fire, or by continual changes to be renewed, and so for ever to endure.

Now

Now that solid and spiritual that we speak of, thou must not conceive it to be that very same which at first was, when thou wert born. For, alas! all this that now thou art in either kind [either for matter of substance, or, of life;] hath but two or three days ago partly from meats eaten, and partly from air breathed in, received all its ^{*} influx, [being the same then, which it was at first when thou wert born, in no other respect than a running river, maintained by the perpetual influx and new supply of waters, is the same.] That therefore which thou hast since received, not that which came from thy Mother, is that which comes to change [and corruption.] But suppose that that [for the general substance, and more solid part of it,] should still cleave unto thee never so close; yet what is that to the proper qualities and affections of it, [by which persons are distinguished] which certainly are quite different?

VIII. Now that thou hast taken these names upon thee of good, modest, true; of εὖμερον; σὺμμερον; ὑπερμερον; take heed lest at any times [by doing any thing that is ordinary,] thou be but improperly so called, and lose thy right to these appellations. Or if thou do, return unto them again with all possible speed. And remember, that the word εὖμερον notes unto thee an intent and intelligent consideration of every object that presents it self unto thee, without distraction. And the word σὺμμερον, a ready and contented acceptation of whatsoever by the appointment of the common nature happens unto thee. And the word ὑπερμερον, a super-ex-

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tension

ension [or, a transcendent, and outreaching disposition] of thy mind, whereby it passeth by all bodily pains and pleasures, honour and credit, death, and whatsoever is of the same Nature, [as matters of absolute indifferency, and in no wise to be stood upon by a wise man.] These then if inviolably thou shalt observe, and shalt not be ambitious to be so called by others, both thou thy self shalt become a new man, and thou shalt begin a new life. For to continue such as hitherto thou hast been, to undergo those distractions and distempers [as thou must needs] for such a life [as hitherto thou hast lived,] is the part of one that is very foolish, and is over-fond of his life. Whom a man might compare to one of those half-eaten wretches, matched in the Amphitheatre with wild beasts; who, as full as they are all the body over with wounds and blood, desire for a great favour, that they may be reserved till the next day, then also, and in the same estate to be exposed to the same nails and teeth as before. Away therefore, ship thy self, and [from the troubles and distractions of thy former life] convey thy self as it were unto these few Names; and if thou canst abide in them [or, be constant in the practice and possession of them,] continue there [as glad and joyfull] as one that were translated unto some such place [of bliss and happiness,] as [that which by Hesiod and Plato is called] the Islands of the Blessed, [by others called the Elysian fields.] And whensoever thou findest thy self, that thou art in danger of a relapse, and that thou art not able to

to master and overcome [those difficulties and temptations that present themselves in thy present station:] get thee into thy private corner, where thou mayst be better able. Or if that will not serve, forsake even thy life rather. But so that it be not in passion, but in a plain voluntary modest way: this being the onely commendable action of thy whole life, that thus thou art departed: [or, this having been the main work and business of thy whole life, that thou mightest thus depart.] Now for the better remembrance of those names that we have spoken of, thou shalt find it a very good help, to remember the gods [as often as may be;] and that the thing which they require at our hands, of as many of us as are by nature reasonable creatures; is not that [with fair words, and outward shew of piety and devotion] we should flatter them, but that we should become like unto them: and that as all other natural creatures, the Fig-tree for example, the Dog, the Bee, both doe, all of them, and apply themselves unto that which by their natural constitution is proper unto them; so Man likewise should doe that which by his Nature, as he is a Man, belongs unto him.

IX. Toys and fooleries [at home;] wars [abroad;] sometimes terror, sometimes sorrow, [or, stupid sloth:] this is thy daily slavery. By little and little [if thou dost not better look to it] those sacred Dogmata will be blotted out of thy mind. How many things be there, which when, as a mere naturalist, thou hast barely considered of according to their nature, thou dost

let pass without any farther use? Whereas thou shouldst in all things so join action and contemplation, that thou mightest both at the same time attend all present occasions, to perform every thing duly and carefully; and yet so intend the contemplative part too, that no part of that delight and pleasure which the contemplative knowledge of every thing, according to its true nature, doth of its self afford, might be lost. [Or, that the true and contemplative knowledge of every thing according to its own nature, might of its self, (action being subject to many lets and impediments) afford unto thee sufficient pleasure and happiness.] Not apparent indeed, but not concealed. And when shalt thou attain to the happiness of true Simplicity, and unaffected gravity? When shalt thou rejoice in the certain knowledge of every particular object according to its true Nature: as what the matter and substance of it is; what the use it is for in the world; how long it can subsist; what things it doth consist of; who they be that are capable of it, and who they that can give it and take it away?

X. As the Spider, when it hath caught the Fly that it hunted after, is not a little proud, nor meanly conceited of it self; as he likewise that hath caught an Hare, or hath taken a Fish with his * net; as another for the taking of a Boar, and another of a Bear: so may they be proud, and applaud themselves for their valiant acts against the Sarmatae [or, Northern Nations lately defeated.] For these also, [these famous soldiers and warlike men,] if thou dost look into

* Gr. *cor-*
20.

See notes.

into their minds and opinions, what doe they for the most part but hunt after prey?

XI. To find out, and set to thy self some certain way and method of contemplation, whereby thou mayst clearly discern and represent unto thy self the mutual change of all things, the one into the other. Bear it in thy mind evermore, and see that thou be thoroughly well exercised in this particular. For there is not any thing more effectual to beget true magnanimity.

XII. He hath got loose from, [or, he hath shaken off the bonds of] his body, and perceiving that within a very little while he must of necessity bid the World farewell, and leave all these things behind him, he wholly applied himself, as to righteousness in all his actions, so to the common Nature in all things that should happen unto him. And contenting himself with these two things, to doe all things justly, and whatsoever God doth send to like well of it; what others shall either say or think of him, or shall doe against him, he doth not so much as trouble his thoughts with it. To go on streight, whether right reason directed him, and in so doing to follow God, was the onely thing that he did mind, that, his onely business and occupation.

XIII. What use is there of suspicion at all? [or, why should thoughts, of mistrust and suspicion concerning that which is future, trouble thy mind at all?] What now is to be done, if thou mayst search and enquire into that, what needest thou care for more? And if thou art well

able to perceive it alone, let no man divert thee from it. But if alone thou dost not so well perceive it, suspend thine action, and take advice from the best. And if there be any thing else that doth hinder thee, go on with prudence and discretion, according to the present occasion and opportunity, still proposing that unto thy self which thou dost conceive most right and just. For to hit that aright, and to speed in the prosecution of it, must needs be happiness, since it is that onely which we can [*truly and properly be said to*] miss of, [*or, miscarry in.*]

XIV. What is that that is slow, and yet quick? merry, and yet grave? He that in all things doth follow Reason for his guide.

XV. In the morning as soon as thou art awakned, [*when thy judgment before either thy affections or external objects have thought upon it, is yet most free and impartial:*] put this question to thy self, whether if that which is right and just be done, the doing of it by thy self, or by others [*when thou art not able thy self,*] be a thing material or no. For sure it is not. And as for these that keep such a life, and stand so much upon the praises or dispraises of other men; hast thou forgotten what manner of men they be? that such and such upon their beds, and such at their board: what their ordinary actions are; what they pursue after, and what they fly from: what thefts and rapines they commit, if not with their hands and feet, yet with that more pretious part of theirs, their minds; which (would it but admit of them.)
might

might enjoy faith, modesty, truth, justice, a good spirit.

XVI. Give what thou wilt, and take away what thou wilt, saith he that is well taught and truly modest, to him that gives, and takes away. And it is not out of a stout and peremptory resolution, that he saith it, but in mere love, and humble submission.

XVII. Thy life is almost at an end: so live henceforth, [*as indifferent to the world, and all worldly objects*] as one who liveth by himself alone upon some desert hill. For whether here or there, if the whole world be but as one Town, it matters not much for the place. Let them behold, and see a Man, that is a Man indeed, living according to the true nature of man. If they cannot bear with me, let them kill me. For better were it to dye, than so to live [*as they would have me.*]

XVIII. Make it not any longer a matter of dispute or discourse, what are the signs and proprieties of a good man; but really and actually be such a one.

XIX. Ever to represent unto thy self, and to set before thee, both the general Age and time of the World, and the whole Substance of it. And how all things particular in respect of these are for their substance, as one of the least seeds that is, [*or as the seed that is in a Fig:*] and for their duration, as the turning of the Pestle in the Mortar once about. Then to fix thy mind upon every particular object of the World, and to conceive it, (as it is indeed,) as already being in the state of dissolution, and of change;
tending

tending to some kind of either putrefaction or dispersion, or whatsoever else it is that is the death as it were of every thing in his own kind.

XX. Consider them through all actions and occupations of their lives: as when they eat, and when they sleep; when they are in the act of necessary exoneration, and when in the act of lust. Again, when they either are in their greatest exultation, and in the middle of all their pomp and glory; or being angry and displeased, in great state and majesty, as from an higher place, they chide and rebuke. How base and slavish, but a little while ago, they were fain to be, that they might come to this; and within a very little while what will be their estate, [when death hath once seized upon them.]

XXI. That is best for every one, that the common Nature of all doth send unto every one; and then is it best, when she doth send it.

XXII. *The Earth [saith the Poet] doth often long after the rain. So is the glorious Sky often as desirous to fall upon the Earth: which argues a mutual kind of love between them. And so [say I] doth the world bear a certain affection of love to whatsoever shall come to pass. With thine affections shall mine concur, O World. The same (and no other,) shall the object of my longing be, which is of thine. Now that the world doth love, as it is true indeed, so it is as commonly said and acknowledged, when [according to the Greek phrase, imitated by the Latins, of things that*
use

use to be.] we say commonly, that they *love to be.*

XXIII. Either thou dost continue in this kind of life, and that is it which so long thou hast been used unto [and therefore tolerable:] or thou dost retire [or, leave the World,] and that of thine own accord, [and then thou hast thy mind:] or thy life is cut off, and then [mayst thou rejoyce that] thou hast ended thy charge. One of these must needs be. Be therefore of good comfort.

XXIV. Let it always appear, and be manifest unto thee, that solitariness and Desert places, [by many Philosophers so much esteemed of and affected,] are of themselves but thus and thus; and that all things are here [to them that live in Towns, and converse with others,] as they are [the same nature every where to be seen and observed,] to them that have retired themselves to the top of Mountains, and to desert Havens, or what other [desert and inhabited] places soever. For any where [if thou wilt] mayst thou quickly find and apply that to thy self, which Plato saith [of his Philosopher,] in a place; [as private and retired] saith he, [as if he were] shut up and inclosed about in some Shepherd's lodge, on the top of a hill. There by thy self to put these questions to thy self [or, to enter into these considerations:] What is my chief and principal part, which hath power over the rest? What is now the present estate of it, as I use it; and what is it that I employ it about? Is it now void of reason or no? Is it free, and separated; or so affixed, so congealed and grown together,

See B. IV.
N. III.

ther, as it were, with the flesh, that it is swayed by the motions and inclinations of it?

XXV. He that runs away from his Master, is a fugitive. But the Law is every man's Master. He therefore that forsakes the Law, is a fugitive. So is he, whosoever he be, that is either sorry, angry, or afraid of, or for any thing that either hath been, is, or shall be by his appointment, who is the Lord and Governour of the Universe. For he truly and properly is Νόμος [or, the Law] as the onely νόμος [or, distributor and dispenser] of all things that happen unto any one in his lifetime. Whosoever then is either sorry, angry, or afraid, is a fugitive.

XXVI. From man is the seed. That once cast into the womb, man hath no more to doe with it. Another Cause succeedeth, and undertakes the Work, and in time brings a Child (that wonderfull effect from such a beginning,) to perfection. Again, Man lets food down through his throat; and that once down, he hath on more to doe with it. Another Cause succeedeth, and distributeth this food into the Senses, and the affections; into life, and into strength; and doth with it those other many and marvellous things that belong unto man. These things therefore that are so secretly and invisibly wrought and brought to pass, thou must use to behold and contemplate; and not the things themselves onely, but the power also by which they are effected; that thou mayst behold it, though not with the eyes of the body, yet as plainly and visibly as thou canst see and discern the [outward] efficient

ent cause of the depression and elevation of any thing.

XXVII. Ever to mind and consider with thy self, how all things that now are, have been heretofore much after the same sort, and after the same fashion that now they are: and so to think of those things which shall be hereafter also. Moreover, whole *dramata*, and uniform scenes, [or, scenes that comprehend the lives and actions of men of one calling and profession,] as many as either in thine own experience thou hast known, or by reading of ancient Histories; (as the whole Court of *Adrianus*, the whole Court of *Antoninus Pius*, the whole Court of *Philippus*, that of *Alexander*, that of *Cræsus*;) to set them all before thine eyes. For thou shalt find that they are all but after one sort and fashion: [or, all of the same kind and nature:] onely, that the actors were others.

XXVIII. As a Pig that flings and cries when his throat is cut, fantasie to thy self every one to be, that grieves [for any worldly thing] and takes on. Such a one is he also, who upon his bed alone doth bewail the miseries of this our mortal life. And remember this, that unto reasonable creatures onely it is granted that they may willingly and freely submit unto Providence: but absolutely to submit, is a necessity imposed upon all creatures equally.

XXIX. Whatsoever it is that thou goest about, consider of it by thy self, and ask thy self, What? because I shall doe this no more when I am dead, should therefore death seem grievous unto me?

XXX.

See B. VII.
N. XIX.

XXX. When thou art offended with any man's transgression, presently reflect upon thy self, and consider what thou thy self art guilty of in the same kind. As that thou also perchance dost think it a happiness either to be rich, or to live in pleasure, or to be praised and commended, and so of the rest in particular. For this if thou shalt call to mind, thou shalt soon forget thine anger: especially when at the same time this also shall concur in thy thoughts, that he was constrained [*by his error and ignorance*] so to doe: For how can he chuse [*as long as he is of that opinion?*] Do thou therefore, if thou canst, take away that from him that forceth him to doe as he doth.

XXXI. When thou seest *Satyro*, think of *Socraticus* and *Eutyches*, or *Hymen*; and when *Euphrates*, think of *Eutychio* and *Sylvanus*; when *Alciphron*, of *Tropæophorus*; when *Xenophon*, of *Crito*, or *Severus*. And when thou dost look upon thy self, fanſie unto thy self some one or other of the *Cæsars*; and so for every one, some one or other that hath been for estate and profession answerable unto him. Then let this come to thy mind at the same time; And where now are they all? No where, or any where? For so shalt thou at all times be able to perceive how all worldly things are but as the smoke, [*that vanisheth away*:] or, indeed, mere nothing. Especially when thou shalt call to mind this also, that whatsoever is once changed, shall never be again as long as the world endureth. And thou then, how long shalt thou endure. And why doth

doth it not suffice thee, if vertuously, and as becometh thee, thou mayst pass that portion of time, how little soever it be, that is allotted unto thee?

XXXII. What a subject, and what a course of life is it, that thou dost so much desire to be rid of? For all these things what are they, but fit objects for an understanding, that beholdeth every thing accurately and according to its true nature, to exercise it self upon? Be patient therefore, untill that (as a strong stomach that turns all things into its own nature; and as a great fire that turneth into flame and light whatsoever thou dost cast into it;) thou have made these things also familiar, and as it were natural unto thee.

XXXIII. Let it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee, that thou art not truly simple, [*or, sincere and open*], or not good. Let him be deceived whatsoever he be that shall have any such opinion of thee. For all this doth depend of thee. For who is it that should hinder thee from being either truly simple or good? Do thou onely resolve rather not to live, than not to be such. For indeed neither doth it stand with reason that he should live that is not such.

XXXIV. [*Wouldst thou now be happy?*] Doe that and speak that, whatsoever it be, that may now upon this present occasion according to best reason and discretion either be said or done: (for whatsoever it be, it is in thy power either to doe it or to say it, and therefore seek not any pretences as though thou wert hindered;) and thou hast thy wish. For untill such time

time that thou be so minded and affected, as that, what pleasure is unto the voluptuous, be unto thee, to doe in every thing that presents it self whatsoever may be done conformably and agreeably to the proper constitution of man, [or, to man as he is a man:] thou wilt never cease groaning and complaining. For thou must account that pleasure, whatsoever it be, that thou mayst doe according to thine own Nature. And to doe this, every place will fit thee. Unto the *Cylindrus* [or, roller] it is not granted to move every where according to its own proper motion; as neither unto the water, nor unto the fire, nor unto any other thing, that either is merely natural, or natural and sensitive, but not rational. For many things there be that can hinder their operations. But of the mind and understanding this is the proper privilege, that according to its own nature, and as it will it self, it can pass through every obstacle that it finds, and keep streight on forwards. Setting therefore before thine eyes this happiness, and felicity of thy mind, whereby it is able to pass through all things, [and is capable of all motions, whether,] as the fire, upwards, or as the stone, downwards, or as the *Cylindrus*, through that which is sloping; [content thy self with it, and] seek not after any other thing. For all other kind of hindrances [that are not hindrances of thy mind] either they are proper to the body, or merely proceed from the opinion. Reason not making that resistance that it should, but basely and cowardly suffering it self to be foiled; and

and of themselves can neither wound, nor doe any hurt at all. Else must he of necessity, who-soever he be that meets with any of them, become worse than he was before. For so is it in all other subjects, that that is thought hurtfull unto them whereby they are made worse. But here contrariwise, man (if he make that good use of them that he should) is rather the better and the more praise-worthy for any of those kind of hindrances, than otherwise. But generally remember that nothing can hurt a natural Citizen, that is not hurtfull unto the City it self; nor any thing hurt the City, that is not hurtfull unto the Law it self. But none of these casualties or external hindrances do hurt the Law it self; [that is, the providence of Almighty God, who doth over-rule all things in the world, and of his infinite wisdom dispenseth all particular events to the general good and preservation of the Universe:] neither therefore do they hurt either City or Citizen.

XXXV. [As he that is bitten by a mad Dog, is afraid of every thing almost that he seeth: so] unto him whom the Dogmata have once bitten [or, in whom true knowledge hath made an impression] every thing almost [that he sees or reads,] be it never so short or ordinary, doth afford a good memento, to put him out of all grief and fear; as that of the Poet, *The winds blow upon the trees, and their leaves fall upon the ground. Then do the trees begin to bud again, and by the spring-time they put forth new branches. So is the generation of men; some come into the world, and others go out of it.* Of these leaves

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then

See B. VI.
N. LII.

then thy Children are. And they also that applaud thee so gravely, [*or, that applaud thy speeches with that their usual acclamation, αἰνέσας, O truly spoken!*] and speak well of thee; as on the other side, they that stick not to curse thee, they that privately and secretly dispraise and deride thee, they also are but leaves. And they also that shall follow, in whose memories the names of men famous after death is preserved, they are but leaves neither. For even so is it of all these [*worldly*] things. Their Spring comes, and they are put forth. Then blows the wind, and they go down. And then in lieu of them grow others out of the wood [*or, common matter of all things,*] like unto them. But, to endure but for a while, is common unto all. Why then shouldst thou so [*earnestly*] either seek after these things, or fly from them, as though they should endure for ever? Yet a little while,

* Gr. καὶ
καταμύσσει.

* and thine eyes will be closed up, and for him that carries thee to thy grave shall another mourn within a while after.

XXXVI. A good eye must be good to see whatsoever is to be seen, and not green things onely. For that is proper to fore eyes. So must a good ear and a good smell be ready for whatsoever is either to be heard or smelt: and a good stomach as indifferent to all kinds of food, as a millstone is to whatsoever it was made for to grind. As ready therefore must a sound understanding be for whatsoever shall happen. But he that saith, *O that my Children might live!* and, *O that all men might commend me for whatsoever I doe!* is as an eye that seeks after

after green things; or as teeth after that which is tender.

XXXVII. There is not any man that is so happy in his death, but that some of those that are by him when he dyes, will be ready to rejoyce at his [*supposed*] calamity. Is it one that was vertuous and wise indeed? Will there not some one or other be found, who thus will say to himself, *Well, now at last shall I be at rest from this Pedagogue.* He did not indeed otherwise trouble us much: but I know well enough that in his heart he did much condemn us. Thus will they speak of the vertuous. But as for us, alas! how many things be there, for which there be many that would be glad to be rid of us? This therefore if thou shalt think of whensoever thou dyest, thou shalt dye the more willingly, when thou shalt think with thy self, I am now to depart from that World, wherein those that have been my nearest friends and acquaintance, they whom I have so much suffered for, so often prayed for, and for whom I have taken such care; even they would have me dye, hoping that after my death they may perhaps live happier than they did before. What then should any man desire to continue here any longer?

* Nevertheless, whensoever thou dyest, thou must not be less kind and loving unto them for it; but as before, so then, continue to be their friend, to wish them well, and meekly and gently to carry thy self towards them; but yet so, that on the other side, it make thee not the more unwilling to dye. But as it fareth with them that dye an easie quick death, whose soul

* See notes.

is soon separated from their bodies, so must thy separation from them be. To these had nature joyned and annexed me: now she parts us; I am ready to depart, as from friends and kinsmen, but yet without either reluctancy or compulsion. For this also is according to Nature.

XXXVIII. Use thy self, as often as thou seest any man doe any thing, presently (if it be possible) to say unto thy self, What is this man's end in this his action? But begin this course with thy self first of all, and diligently examine thy self [*concerning whatsoever thou doest.*]

XXXIX. Remember, that that which sets a man at work, and hath power over the affections to draw them either one way, or the other way, is [*not an external thing properly, but*] that which is hidden within [*every man's Dogmata and opinions:*] That, that is Rhetorick, that is life; that (to speak true) is man himself. As for [*thy body,*] which as a vessel [*or, a case,*] compasseth thee about, and the many and curious instruments that it hath annexed unto it, let them not trouble thy thoughts. For of themselves they are but as a Carpenter's Axe, but that they are born with us, and naturally sticking unto us. But otherwise, without the inward cause that hath power to move them, and to restrain them, those parts are of themselves of no more use unto us, than the Shuttle is of it self to the Weav'ster, or the Pen to the Writer, or the Whip to the Coach-man.

THE ELEVENTH BOOK.

THE natural properties and privileges of a reasonable soul are; That she seeth her self that she can order and compose her self; that she makes her self as she will her self; that she reaps her own fruits whatsoever; whereas Plants, Trees, unreasonable creatures, what fruit soever they bear, (be it either fruit properly, or analogically onely) they bear it unto others, and not to themselves. Again, Whensoever and wheresoever [*sooner, or later*] her life doth end, she hath her own end nevertheless. For it is not with her, as with Dancers and Players, who if they be interrupted in any part of their action, the whole action must needs be imperfect: but she, in what part of time or action soever she be surprized, can make that which she hath in her hand, whatsoever it be, complete and full, so that she may depart with that comfort, *I have lived; neither want I any thing of that which properly did belong unto me.* Again, she compasseth the whole World, and penetrateth into the Vanity and mere outside (wanting substance and solidity) of it, and stretcheth her self unto the infiniteness of eternity; and the revolution [*or, restauration*] of all things after a certain period of time, to the same state and place as before, she fetcheth about, and doth comprehend in her self; and considers withall, and sees clearly this, that

neither they that shall follow us shall see any new thing that we have not seen, nor they that went before any thing more than we: but that he that is once come to forty (if they have any wit at all) can in a manner (for that they are all of one kind) see all things, both passed and future. As proper is it and natural to the soul of man to love her neighbours, to be true and modest, and to regard nothing so much as her self: which is also the property of the Law: whereby [*by the way*] it appears, that sound reason and justice comes all to one, [*and therefore that justice is the chief thing that reasonable creatures ought to propose unto themselves as their end.*]

See B. XII.
N. VI.

II. A pleasant song or dance, the *Pancratiastes* exercise, [*sports that thou art wont to be much taken with,*] thou shalt easily contemn, if thou shalt divide the harmonious voice into so many particular sounds whereof it doth consist, and of every one in particular shalt ask thy self, whether this or that sound is it that doth so take [*or, conquer*] thee. For thou wilt be ashamed of it. And so for dance, if accordingly thou shalt consider it in every particular motion and posture by it self: and so for the wrestler's exercise too. Generally then, whatsoever it be, besides virtue, and those things that proceed from virtue, [*that thou art subject to be much affected with*] remember presently thus to divide it, and by this kind of division in each particular, to attain unto the contempt of the whole. Thus thou must transfer and apply to thy whole life also.

III. That

III. That soul which is ever ready, even now presently (if need be) to be separated from the body, whether by way of Extinction, or Dispersion, or Continuation [*in another place and estate,*] how blessed and happy is it? But this readiness of it, it must proceed, not from an obstinate and peremptory resolution of the mind, violently and passionately set upon opposition, (as Christians are wont;) but from a peculiar judgment, with discretion and gravity, so that others may be persuaded also and drawn to the like example, but without any noise and passionate exclamations.

IV. Have I done any thing charitably; then am I benefited by it. See that this upon all occasions may present it self unto thy mind, and never cease to think of it. What is thy profession? to be good. And how should this be well brought to pass, but by certain Theorems and Doctrines; some concerning the Nature of the Universe, and some concerning the proper and particular constitution of man [*or, by the true and Theorematical knowledge both of the nature of the Universe, &c.*]

V. Tragedies were at first brought in and instituted, to put men in mind of worldly chances and casualties: That these things in the ordinary course of nature did so happen; That men that were much pleased and delighted by such accidents upon this stage, might not by the same things upon a greater stage be grieved and afflicted: For here you see what is the end of all such things; and that even they that cry out so mournfully *To Citharon*, must bear them

P 4

[for

Gr. *κατὰ
ψυχὴν πα-
ρουσταί-
ν.*
Notes.

[for all their cries and exclamations,] as well as others. And in very truth many good things are spoken by these Poets, as that (for example) is an excellent passage: *But if so be that I and my two children be neglected by the Gods, they have some reason even for that, &c.* And again, *It will but little avail thee to storm and rage against the things themselves, &c.* Again, *To reap ones life, as a ripe ear of corn;* and whatsoever else is to be found in them that is of the same kind. After the Tragedy, the *Comœdia vetus*, or ancient Comedy was brought in, which had the * liberty to inveigh against personal vices; being therefore through this her freedom and liberty of speech of very good use and effect, to restrain men from pride and arrogance. To which end it was, that *Diogenes* took also the same liberty. After these, what were either the *Media*, or *Nova Comœdia* admitted for, but merely (or for the most part at least) for the delight and pleasure of curious and excellent imitation? * *It will steal away; look to it, &c.* Why, no man denies but that these also have some good things, [whereof that may be one:] But the whole drift and foundation of that kind of *Dramatical Poetry*, what is it else but as we have said?

VI. How clearly doth it appear unto thee, that no other course of life could fit a true Philosopher's practice better than this very course that thou art now already in?

VII. A branch cut off from the continuity of another branch, must needs be cut off from the whole tree: so a man that is divided from another man,

man, is divided from the whole Society. A branch is cut off by another; but he that hates and is averse, cuts himself off from his neighbour, and knows not that at the same time he divides himself from the whole body, [or, *corporation.*] But herein is the gift and mercy of God, the Author of this society, in that, [once cut off] we may grow together and become part of the Whole again. But if this happen often, [the misery is that] the farther a man is run in this division, the harder he is to be re-united and restored again: and however, the branch which, once cut off, afterwards was grafted in, Gardeners can tell you is not like that which sprouted together at first, and still continued in the unity of the body.

VIII. * *To grow together like fellow-branches* [in * Gr. ὁμο-
matter of good correspondence and affection;] but *δομεῖν*
not in matter of opinions. They that shall op- *μιν, μὴ ἰ-*
pose thee in thy right courses, as it is not in their *μοδὲ γμα-*
power to divert thee from thy good action, so *τὴν δ' ἐγ-*
neither let it be to divert thee from thy good af-
fection towards them. But be it thy care to
keep thy self constant in both; both in a right
judgment and action, and in true meekness to-
wards them, that either shall doe their endea-
vour to hinder thee, or at least will be dis-
pleased with thee [for what thou hast done.] For
to fail in either (either in the one to give over
for fear, or in the other to forsake thy natural
affection towards him who by nature is both thy
friend and thy kinsman,) is equally base, and
much favouring of the disposition of a coward-
ly fugitive soldier.

IX.

IX. It is not possible that any nature should be inferiour unto art, since that all arts imitate nature. If this be so; that the most perfect and general nature of all natures should [*in her operation*] come short of the skill of arts, is most improbable. Now common it is to all arts, to make that which is worse for the better's sake. Much more then doth the common Nature doe the same. Hence is the first ground of Justice. From Justice all other Vertues have their existence. For Justice cannot be preserved, if either we settle our minds and affections upon worldly things; or be apt to be deceived, or rash and inconstant.

X. The things themselves (which either to get or to avoid thou art put to so much trouble,) come not unto thee themselves; but thou in a manner goest unto them. Let then thine own judgment and opinion concerning those things be at rest; and as for the things themselves, they stand still and quiet, without any noise or stir at all: and so shall all pursuing and flying cease.

XI. Then is the Soul [*as Empedocles doth liken it,*] like unto a *Sphere*, or *Globe*, when she is all of one form and figure: When she neither [*greedily*] stretcheth out her self, unto any thing, nor [*basely*] contracts her self, or lies flat and dejected; but shineth all with light, whereby she doth see and behold the true nature, both that of the Universe, and her own in particular.

XII. Will any contemn me? let him look to that, [*upon what grounds he doth it:*] my care shall

shall be, that I may never be found either doing or speaking any thing that doth truly deserve contempt. Will any hate me, let him look to that. I for my part will be kind and loving unto all, and even unto him that hates me [*whosoever he be*] will I be ready to shew his error, not by way of exprobration, or ostentation of my patience, but ingenuously and meekly: such as was that famous *Phocion*, if so be that he did not dissemble. For it is inwardly that these things must be: that the gods [*who look inwardly, and not upon the outward appearance,*] may behold a man truly free from all indignation and grief. For what hurt can it be unto thee [*whatsoever any man else doth,*] as long as thou mayst doe that which is proper and suitable to thine own nature? Wilt not thou (a man wholly appointed to be both *what*, and *as* the common good shall require,) accept of that which is now seasonable to the nature of the Universe?

XIII. They contemn one another, and yet they seek to please one another: and whilst they seek to surpass one another [*in worldly pomp and greatness,*] they most debase and prostitute themselves [*in their better part*] one to another.

XIV. How rotten and unsincere is he that saith, I am resolved to carry my self hereafter towards you with all ingenuity and simplicity! O man, what dost thou mean? what needs this profession of thine? the thing it self will shew it. It ought to be written upon thy forehead. No sooner is thy voice heard, than thy countenance must

must be able to shew what is in thy mind: even as he that is loved knows presently by the looks of his sweet-heart what is in her mind. Such must he be for all the world that is truly simple and good, as he whose arm-holes are offensive, that whosoever stands by, as soon as ever he comes near him, may as it were smell him whether he will or no. But the affectation of simplicity is in no wise laudable. There is nothing more shamefull than perfidious friendship. Above all things, that must be avoided. [*However*] true goodness, simplicity and kindness cannot so be hidden, but that [*as we have already said*] in the very eyes and countenance they will shew themselves.

XV. To live happily is an inward power of the Soul, when she is affected with indifferency [*or, indifferently affected*] towards those things that are by their nature indifferent. To be thus affected, she must consider all worldly objects both divided and whole: remembring withall that no object can of it self beget any opinion in us, neither can come to us, but stands without still and quiet; but that we our selves beget, and as it were print in our selves opinions concerning them. Now it is in our power, not to print them; and [*if they creep in*] and lurk in some corner, it is in our power to wipe them off. Remembring moreover that this care and circumspection of thine is to continue but for a-while, and then thy life will be at an end. And what should hinder, but that thou mayst doe well with all these things? For if they be according to nature, rejoyce in them, and let them be pleasing and acceptable unto thee.

thee. But if they be against Nature, seek thou that which is according to thine own Nature, and whether it be for thy credit or no, use all possible speed [*for the attainment of it*]; for no man ought to be blamed, for seeking his own good and happiness.

XVI. Of every thing [*thou must consider*] from whence it came, of what things it doth consist, and into what it will be changed: what will be the nature of it [*or, what it will be like unto*] when it is changed, and that it can suffer no hurt by this change. [*And as for other mens either foolishness, or wickedness, that it may not trouble or grieve thee;*] First, generally thus; What reference have I unto these? and that we are all born for one another's good. Then [*more particularly*] after another consideration; as a Ram is first in a flock of Sheep, and a Bull in a herd of Cattell, so am I born to rule over them. Begin yet higher, even from this: If *Atoms* be not the beginning of all things, [*than which to believe nothing can be more absurd,*] then must we needs grant that there is a Nature that doth govern the Universe. If such a Nature, then are all worse things made for the better's sake; and all better for one another's sake. Secondly, What manner of men they be, at board and upon their beds, and so forth. But, above all things, how they are forced by their opinions that they hold, to doe what they doe; and even those things that they doe, with that pride and self-conceit they doe them. Thirdly, that if they doe these things rightly, thou hast no reason to be grieved. But if not rightly, it must needs

needs be that they doe them against their wills, and through mere ignorance. For as [*according to Plato's opinion*] no soul doth willingly err, so by consequent neither doeth it any thing otherwise than it ought, but against her will. Therefore are they grieved whensoever they hear themselves charged either of injustice, or unconscionableness, [or, unthankfulness,] or covetousness, or, in general of any injurious kind of dealing towards their neighbours.

4. *Fourthly*, That thou thy self dost transgress in many things, and art even such another as they are. And though perchance thou dost forbear the very act of some sins, yet hast thou in thy self an habitual disposition to them, but that either through fear, or vain-glory, or some such other sinister respect, thou art restrained.

5. *Fifthly*, That whether they have sinned or no, thou dost not understand perfectly. For many things are done * *by way of discreet policy*; and generally a man must know many things first, before he be able truly and judiciously to judge

* Gr. *αἰσχρονομία*.

6. of another man's action. *Sixthly*, That whensoever thou dost take on grievously, or makest great woe, [*little dost thou remember then*] that a man's life is but for a moment of time, and that within a-while we shall all be in our graves.

7. *Seventhly*, That it is not the sins and transgressions themselves that trouble us properly; for they have their existence in their minds and understandings onely, [*that commit them* :] but our own opinions concerning those sins. Remove then, and be content to part with that conceit of thine, that it is a grievous thing, and thou

thou hast removed thine anger. But how should I remove it? [*How?*] Reasoning with thy self that it is not shamefull. For if that which is shamefull be not the onely true evil that is, thou also wilt be driven [*whilst thou* See B. VI. n. XV. *dost follow the common instinct of Nature, to avoid that which is evil,*] to commit many unjust things, and to become a thief, and any thing, [*that will make to the attainment of thy intended worldly ends.*] *Eighthly*, How many things may and do oftentimes follow upon such fits of anger and grief; far more grievous in themselves than those very things which we are so grieved or angry for. *Ninthly*, That meekness is a thing unconquerable, if it be true and natural, and not affected, or hypocritical. For how shall even the most fierce and malicious that thou shall conceive, be able to hold on against thee, if thou shalt still continue meek and loving unto him; and that even at that time when he is about to doe thee wrong, thou shalt be well disposed and in good temper, with all meekness to teach him, and to instruct him better? [*As for example;*] *My son, we were not born for this, to hurt and annoy one another: It will be thy hurt, not mine, my son: and so to shew him forcibly and fully, that it is so in very deed; and that neither Bees doe it one to another, nor any other creatures that are naturally sociable. But this thou must doe not scoffingly, nor by way of exprobration, but tenderly without any harshness of words. Neither must thou doe it by way of exercise or ostentation, that they that are by and hear thee, may admire thee:*

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thee: but so always that no body be privy to it, but himself alone; yea, though there be more present at the same time. These nine particular heads, as so many gifts from the Muses, see that thou remember well: and begin one day, whilst thou art yet alive, to be a man indeed. But on the other side thou must take heed as much to flatter them as to be angry with them: for both are equally uncharitable, and equally hurtfull. And in thy passions, take it presently to thy consideration, that to be angry, is not the part of a man, but that to be meek and gentle, as it savours of more humanity, so of more manhood. That in this there is strength and nerves [or, *vigour*] and fortitude; whereof anger and indignation is altogether void. For the nearer every thing is unto *unpassionateness*, the nearer it is unto power. And as grief doth proceed from weakness, so doth anger. For both [*both he that is angry and that grieveth*] have received a wound, and cowardly have as it were yielded themselves [*unto their affections.*] If thou wilt have a *Tenth* also, receive this *Tenth* gift from [*Hercules*] the Guide and Leader of the Muses: That it is a mad man's part, to look that there should be no wicked men in the World, because it is impossible. Now for a man to brook well enough, that there should be wicked men in the World, but not to endure that any should transgress against himself, is against all equity, and indeed tyrannical.

XVII. Four several dispositions, [or, *inclinations*] there be of the mind and understanding, which

which to be aware of thou must carefully observe: and whensoever thou dost discover them, thou must rectifie them, saying to thy self concerning every one of them, *This* imagination is not necessary; *This* is uncharitable: *This* thou shalt speak as another man's slave, or instrument; than which nothing can be more senseless and absurd: For the *Fourth*, thou shalt sharply check and upbraid thy self, for that thou dost suffer that more divine part in thee to become subject and obnoxious to that more ignoble part of thy body, and the gross lusts and concupiscences thereof.

XVIII. What portion soever, either of air or fire, there be in thee, although by nature it tend upwards, submitting nevertheless to the ordinance of the Universe, it abides here below in this mixt body. So whatsoever is in thee, either earthy or humid, although by nature it tend downwards, yet is it against its nature both raised upwards, and standing [or, *consistent.*] So obedient are even the Elements themselves to the Universe, abiding patiently wheresoever (though against their Nature) they are placed, untill the sound as it were of their retreat and separation. Is it not a grievous thing then, that thy reasonable part onely should be disobedient, and should not endure to keep its place: yea, though nothing be enjoined it contrary unto it, but that onely which is according to its Nature? For [*we cannot say of it when it is disobedient, as we say of the fire, or air,*] that it tends upwards towards its proper Element, for then goes it the quite contrary way.

way, [or, For we cannot say of it, as of the Elements, that it suffers against its own nature to be obedient: but rather when disobedient, then goes it a quite contrary course to that which is natural unto it.] For the motion of the mind to any injustice, or incontineny, or to sorrow, or to fear, is nothing else but a separation from nature. Also when the mind is grieved for any thing that is happened [by the divine Providence] then doth it likewise forsake its own place. For it was ordained unto holiness and godliness, [which specially consists in an humble submission to God and his Providence in all things;] as well as unto Justice: these also being part of those duties, which as naturally sociable we are bound unto; and without which we cannot happily converse one with another [or, without which, common societies cannot prosper:] yea and the very ground and fountain indeed of all just actions.

XIX. He that hath not one and the self-same general end always as long as he liveth, cannot possibly be one and the self-same man always. But this will not suffice, except thou add also what ought to be this general end. For as the general conceit and apprehension of all those things which upon no certain ground are by the greater part of men deemed good, cannot be uniform and agreeable, but that onely which is limited and restrained by some certain proprieties and conditions, as of community: [that nothing be conceived good, which is not commonly and publickly good:] so must the end also that we propose unto our selves be common and sociable.

See B.XII.
n. I.

ciable. For he that doth direct all his own private motions and purposes to that end, all his actions will be agreeable and uniform; and by that means he will be still the same man.

XX. Remember the fable of the countrey mouse and the city mouse, and the great fright and terrour that this was put into.

XXI. Socrates was wont to call the common conceits and opinions of men, the common Lammie, or hugbears, of the world: the proper terrour of silly children.

XXII. The Lacedaemonians, at their publick spectacles, were wont to appoint seats and forms for their strangers in the shadow; they themselves were content to sit any where.

XXIII. What Socrates answered unto Perdiccas, why he did not come unto him, Lest of all deaths I should dye the worst kind of death, said he: that is, not be able to requite the good that hath been done unto me.

XXIV. In the ancient mystical letters of the Ephesians, [commonly called Ephesia littera] there was an Item, that a man should always have in his mind some one or other of the Ancient Worthies.

XXV. The Pythagoreans were wont betimes in the morning, the first thing they did, to look up unto the heavens, to put themselves in mind of them who constantly and unvariably did perform their task: as also to put themselves in mind of orderliness [or, good order] and of purity, and of naked simplicity. For no star or planet hath any cover before it.

XXVI. How Socrates looked, when he was
Q 2 fain

tain to gird himself with a skin, Xantippe his wife having taken away his clothes, and carried them abroad with her; and what he said to his fellows and friends, who were ashamed, and out of respect to him, did retire themselves when they saw him thus decked.

XXVII. In matter of writing or reading thou must needs be taught before thou canst doe either: much more in matter of life. For thou art born a mere slave, [*to thy senses and brutish affections;*] destitute [*without teaching*] of all true knowledge and sound reason.

XXVIII. *My heart smiled within me. They will accuse even Vertue her self, with most hainous and opprobrious words.*

XXIX. As they that long after [*green*] figs in winter, [*when they cannot be had;*] so are they that long after children, before they be granted them.

XXX. *As often as a Father kisseth his Child, he should say secretly with himself (said Epictetus,) To morrow perchance shall he dye. But these words be ominous. No words ominous (said he) that signifie any thing that is natural: In very truth and deed not more ominous than this, To cut down grapes when they are ripe. Green grapes, ripe grapes, dried grapes [or, raisins:] so many changes and mutations of one thing, not into that which was not absolutely [or, into so many several substances,] but rather so many successions of time in one and the self-same subject and substance, [or, so many several changes and mutations, not into that which*
hath

hath no being at all, but into that which is not yet in being.]

XXXI. *Of the free will there is no thief or robber: out of Epictetus; Whose is this also: That we should find a certain art and method of assenting; and that we should always observe with great care and heed the inclinations of our minds, that they may always be with their due restraint and reservation, always charitable, and according to the true worth of every present object. And as for earnest longing, that we should altogether avoid it: and to use averfeness in those things onely that wholly depend of our own wills. It is not about ordinary petty matters, believe it, that all our strife and contention is, but whether [with the vulgar] we should be mad, or [by the help of Philosophy] wise and sober, said he.*

XXXII. *Socrates said, What will ye have? the souls of reasonable, or unreasonable creatures? Of reasonable. But what? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect? or of those whose reason is vitiated and corrupted? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect. Why then labour ye not for such? Because we have them already. What then do ye so strive and contend between you?*

THE TWELFTH BOOK.

Whatsoever thou dost hereafter aspire unto, thou mayst even now enjoy and possess, if thou dost not envy thy self thine own happiness. And that will be, if thou shalt forget all that is past, and for the future refer thy self wholly to the divine providence; and shalt bend and apply all thy present thoughts and intentions to holiness and righteousness. To holiness, in accepting willingly whatsoever is sent by the divine Providence, as being that which the nature of the Universe hath appointed unto thee, which also hath appointed thee for that, whatsoever it be. To righteousness, in speaking the Truth freely, and without ambiguity; and in doing all things justly and discreetly. Now in this good course, let not other mens either wickedness, or opinion, or voice hinder thee: no, nor the sense of this mass of flesh that compasseth thee: for let that which suffers look to it self. If therefore whensoever the time of thy departing shall come, thou shalt readily leave all things, and shalt respect thy mind onely, and that divine part of thine, and this shall be thine onely fear, not that some time or other thou shalt cease to live, but that thou shalt never begin to live according to Nature: then shalt thou be a man indeed, worthy of that world from which thou hadst thy beginning; then shalt thou cease to be a stranger

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VII. num.
XXXIX.

ger in thy Countrey, and to wonder at those things that happen daily, as things strange and unexpected; and anxiously to depend on divers things *[that are not in thy power.]*

II. God beholds our minds and understandings bare and naked from these material vessels, and outsides, and all earthly dross. For with his simple and pure understanding he pierceth into our inmost and purest parts, which from His, as it were by a water-pipe and chanel, first flowed and issued. This if thou also shalt use to doe, *[to look upon thy self as consisting of a bare soul and understanding, all other parts being no parts of thee but improperly,]* thou shalt rid thy self of that manifold luggage wherewith thou art round about encumbered. For he that does not regard either his body, or his cloathing, or his dwelling, or any such external furniture, *[as either part of himself, or properly belonging unto him,]* must needs gain unto himself great rest and ease. Three things there be in all which thou dost consist of, thy body, thy life, and thy mind. Of these the two former are so far forth thine, as that thou art bound to take care for them. But the third alone is that which is properly thine. If then thou shalt separate from thy self (that is, from thy mind) whatsoever other men either doe or say, or whatsoever thou thy self hast heretofore either done or said; and all troublesome thoughts concerning the future, and whatsoever (as either belonging to thy body or life,) is without the jurisdiction of thine own will, and whatsoever in the ordinary course of humane chances

and accidents doth happen unto thee; so that thy mind (keeping her self loose and free from all outward co-incidental intanglements, always in a readiness to depart,) shall live by her self, and to her self, doing that which is just, accepting whatsoever doth happen, and speaking the truth always: If, I say, thou shalt separate from thy mind whatsoever by sympathy might adhere unto it, and all time both past and future, and shalt make thy self in all points and respects like unto *Empedocles* his [allegorical] Sphere, all-round and circular, &c. and shalt think of no longer life than that which is now present; Then shalt thou be truly able to pass the remainder of thy days without troubles and distractions, nobly and generously disposed, and in good favour and correspondency with that Spirit which is within thee.

III. I have often wondered, how it should come to pass, that every man loving himself best, should more regard other mens opinions concerning himself than his own. For if any God or grave Master standing by, should command any of us to think nothing by himself, but what he should presently speak out; no man were able to endure it, though but for one day. Thus do we fear more what our neighbours will think of us, than what we our selves.

IV. How comes it to pass, that the gods having ordered all other things so well and so lovingly, should be overseen in this one onely thing, that whereas there have been some very good men, that have made many covenants as it were with God, and by many holy actions and outward

ward services contracted a kind of familiarity with Him; and these men when once they are dead, should never be ** restored to life*, but be extinct for ever? But this thou mayst be sure of, that this (if it be so indeed) would never have been so ordered by the gods, had it been fit otherwise. For certainly it was possible, had it been more just so; and had it been according to Nature, the Nature of the Universe would easily have born it. But now because it is not so, (if so be that it be not so indeed) be therefore confident that it was not fit it should be so. For thou seest thy self, that now seeking after this matter, how freely thou dost argue and contest with God. But were not the gods both just and good in the highest degree, thou durst not thus reason with them. Now if just and good, it could not be that in the creation of the world, they should either unjustly or unreasonably oversee any thing.

V. Use thy self even unto those things that thou dost at first despair of. For the left hand, we see, which for the most part lieth idle, because not used, yet doth it hold the bridle with more strength than the right, because it hath been used unto it.

VI. Let these be the objects of thy ordinary meditation: to consider what manner of men both for soul and body we ought to be, whensoever death shall surprise us: the shortness of this our mortal life: the immense vastness of the time that hath been before, and will be after us: the frailty of every worldly materi-

* Gr. αὐ-
τὸ ζῆναι.
See Suidas
in ἀναβί-
βαι.
See n. IV.
upon B.II.

material object: All these things to consider, and behold clearly in themselves, all disguise-ment of external outside being removed and taken away. Again, to consider the efficient causes of all things: the proper ends and references of all actions: what pain is in it self, what pleasure, what death, what fame or honour: how every man is the true and proper ground of his own rest and tranquillity, and that no man can truly be hindred by any other: that all is but conceit and opinion. As for the use of the *Dogmata*, thou must carry thy self in the practice of them, rather like unto a *Rancratiaſtes*, [or, one that at the same time fights and wrestles, using both hands and feet, &c.] than a *Gladiator*. For this, if he lose his sword that he fights with, he is gone: whereas the other hath still his hand free, which he may easily turn and manage at his will.

VII. All worldly things thou must behold and consider, dividing them into matter, form and reference, [or, *their proper end*.]

VIII. How happy is man in this his power [that hath been granted unto him,] that he needs not doe any thing but what God shall approve, and that he may embrace contentedly whatsoever God doth send unto him?

IX. * Whatsoever doth happen in the ordinary course and consequence of natural events, neither must the gods, (for it is not possible that they either wittingly or unwittingly should doe any thing amiss;) nor men be accused; for it is through ignorance, and therefore against their wills, that they doe any

any thing amiss. None then must be accused: X. How ridiculous and strange is he, that wonders at any thing that happens in this life in the ordinary course of nature!

XI. Either Fate, and that an absolute necessary, and unavoidable decree; or a placable and flexible Providence; or All is a mere casual Confusion, void of all order and government. If an absolute and unavoidable Necessity, why dost thou resist? If a placable and exorable Providence, make thy self worthy of the divine help and assistance. If all be a mere Confusion without any Moderatour or Governour, then hast thou reason to congratulate thy self, that in such a general flood of Confusion, thou thy self hast obtained a reasonable Faculty, whereby thou mayst govern thine own life and actions. But if thou beest carried away with the flood, it must be thy body perchance, or thy life, or some other thing that belongs unto them that is carried away: thy mind and understanding cannot. Or should it be so, that the light of a candle is indeed still bright and lightsome untill it be put out: and should Truth, and Righteousness, and Temperance cease to shine in thee whilst thou thy self hast any being?

XII. At the conceit and apprehension that such and such a one hath sinned, [that reason with thy self.] What do I know whether this be a sin indeed, as it seems to be? But if it be, what do I know but that he himself hath already condemned himself for it? And that is all one as if a man should scratch and

and tears his own face, [*an object of compassion rather than of anger.*] Again, that he that would not have a vicious man to sin, is like unto him that would not have moisture in the fig, nor children to weep, nor a horse to neigh, nor any thing else that in the course of nature is necessary. For what shall he doe that hath such an habit? If thou therefore beest ** powerfull and eloquent*, remedy it if thou canst.

* Gr. *ἐν
δυνάμει*.

XIII. If it be not fitting, doe it not. If it be not true, speak it not. Ever maintain thine own purpose and resolution free from all compulsion and necessity; and always set the Universe before thine eyes.

XIV. Of every thing that presents it self unto thee, to consider what the true nature of it is, and to unfold it, as it were, by dividing it into that which is formal, that which is material, the true use or end of it, and the just time that it is appointed to last.

XV. It is high time for thee to understand that there is somewhat in thee better and more divine than either thy passions, or thy sensual appetites and affections. What is now the object of my mind? is it fear, or suspicion, or lust, or any such thing? To doe nothing rashly without some certain end; let that be thy first care. The next, to have no other end than the common good. For, alas! yet a little while, and thou art no more: no more will any, either of those things that now thou seest, or of those men that now are living, be any more. For all things are by nature appointed [*soon*] to be changed, turned and corrupted.

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that other things might succeed in their room.

XVI. [*Remember*] that all is but opinion, and all opinion depends of the mind. Take thine opinion away, and then as a Ship that hath stricken in within the arms and mouth of the harbour, *a present calm; all things safe and steady; a Bay not capable of any storms and tempests:* [*as the Poet hath it.*]

XVII. No operation whatsoever it be, ceasing for a while, can be truly said to suffer any evil, because it is at an end. Neither can he that is the Authour of that operation, for this very respect, because his operation is at an end, be said to suffer any evil. Likewise then, neither can the whole body of all our actions, (which is our life,) if in time it cease, be said to suffer any evil for this very reason, because it is at an end: nor He truly be said to have been ill affected, that did put a period to this series of actions. Now this time or certain period depends of the determination of Nature: sometimes of particular nature, as when a man dyeth old; but of nature in general, however; the parts whereof thus changing one after another, the whole world still continues fresh and new. Now that is ever best and most seasonable, which is for the good of the Whole. Thus it appears that death of it self can neither be hurtfull to any in particular, because it is not a shamefull thing; (for neither is it a thing that depends of our own will, nor of it self contrary to the common good:) and generally, as it is both expedient and reasonable to the Whole, that in that respect it must

must needs be good. It is that also which is brought unto us by the order and appointment of the divine providence; so that he whose will and mind in these things runs along with the divine ordinance, and by this concurrence of his will and mind with the Divine providence, is lead and driven along as it were by God himself, may truly be termed and esteemed the *Θεοπρόβουλος*, or *Divinely led and inspired*.

XVIII. These three things thou must always have in a readiness: First concerning thine own actions, whether thou doest nothing either idly, or otherwise than justice and equity do require: and concerning those things that happen unto thee externally, that either they happen unto thee by chance, or by providence; either of which to accuse, is equally against reason. Secondly, what our bodies are like unto [or, *what are the beginnings of our bodies*] whilst yet rude and imperfect, untill they be *animated*; and from their *animation* untill their expiration: of what things they are compounded, and into what things they shall be dissolved. Thirdly, [how vain all things will appear unto thee] when, from on high as it were, looking down, thou shalt contemplate all things upon Earth, and the wonderfull mutability that they are subject unto: considering withall both the immenseness of that Air and of that Heaven [or, *the infinite both greatness and variety of things æreal and things celestial*], that are round about it; and that as often as thou shalt behold them, thou

See B.VII.
n. XXVI.

thou shalt still see the same; as the same things, so the same shortness of continuance of all those things. And, behold, These be the things that we are so proud and puffed up for.

XIX. Cast away from thee opinion, and thou art safe. And what is it that hinders thee from casting of it away! When thou art grieved at any thing, hast thou forgotten that all things happen according to the Nature of the Universe; and that him onely it concerns who is in fault; and moreover, that what is now done, is that which from ever hath been done in the world, and will ever be done, and is now done every where: how nearly all men are allied one to another by a kindred not of blood, nor of seed, but of the same mind? Thou hast also forgotten that every man's mind partakes of the Deity, and issueth from thence; and that no man can properly call any thing his own, no not his child, nor his body, nor his life, for that they all proceed from that One [who is the giver of all things:] That all things are but opinion; that no man lives properly, but that very instant of time which is now present; [or, *that all life properly doth consist in this present instant of time separated from that which is either past or future*:] And therefore that no man [whensoever he dyeth] can properly be said to lose any more than an instant of time.

See B. II.
n. XII.

XX. Let thy thoughts ever run upon them, who once for some one thing or other were moved with extraordinary indignation; who were once in the highest pitch of either honour or

or calamity, or mutual hatred and enmity; or of any other fortune or condition whatsoever. Then consider what's now become of all those things. All is turned to smoky; all to ashes, and a mere fable; and perchance not so much as a fable. As also whatsoever is of this Nature, as *Fabius Catullinus* in the field, *Lucius Lupus*, and *Stertinius* at *Baia*, *Tiberius* at *Caprea*, *Velius Rufus*, and all such examples of vehement prosecution in worldly matters; let these also run in thy mind at the same time; and how vile every object of such earnest and vehement prosecution is; and how much more agreeable to true Philosophy it is, for a man to carry himself in every matter that offers it self, justly and moderately, as one that followeth the gods with all simplicity. For, for a man to be proud and high-conceited, that he is not proud and high-conceited, is of all kind of pride and presumption the most intolerable.

XXI. To them that ask thee, Where hast thou seen the gods, and how knowest thou certainly that there be gods, that thou art so devout in their worship? I answer first of all, that even to the very eye they are in some manner visible and apparent. Secondly, neither have I ever seen mine own soul, and yet I respect and honour it. So then for the gods, by the daily experience that I have of their power [and providence towards my self and others,] I know certainly that they are, and therefore worship them.

XXII. Herein doth consist happiness of life, for a man to know thoroughly the true Nature of

of every thing; What is the matter, and what is the form of it: with all his heart and soul, ever to do that which is just, and to speak the truth. What then remaineth, but to enjoy thy life in a course and coherence of good actions, one upon another immediately succeeding, and never interrupted, though for never so little a while?

XXIII. There is but one light of the Sun, though it be intercepted by walls and mountains, and other thousand objects. There is but one common substance of the whole World, though it be concluded and restrained into several different bodies, in number infinite. There is but one common soul, though divided into innumerable particular essences and natures. So is there but one common intellectual soul, though it seem to be divided. And as for all other parts of those Generals which we have mentioned, as either sensitive souls or subjects, these of themselves (as naturally irrational) have no common mutual reference one unto another, though many of them contain a Mind [or, Reasonable Faculty] in them, whereby they are ruled and governed [or, that hath power and authority over them.] But of every reasonable mind this is the particular nature, that it hath reference to whatsoever is of her own kind, and desireth to be united: neither can this common affection, or mutual unity and correspondency, be here intercepted or divided, or confined to particulars [as those other common things are.]

XXIV. What dost thou desire? To live long. What? To enjoy the operations of a sensitive
R soul,

Gr. πᾶν τὸ
κατὰ φύσιν
ἐστίν.

soul, or of the appetitive Faculty? or wouldst thou grow, and then decrease again? Wouldst thou long be able to talk, to think and reason with thy self? which of all these seems unto thee a worthy object of thy desire? Now if of all these thou dost find that they be but little worth in themselves, proceed on unto the last, which is, In all things to follow God and Reason. But for a man to grieve that by death he shall be deprived of any of these things, is both against God and Reason.

XXV. What a small portion of vast and infinite eternity it is, that is allowed unto every one of us, and how soon it vanisheth into the general age of the world: of the common substance, and of the common soul also what a small portion is allotted unto us; and in what a little clod of the whole Earth (as it were) it is that thou dost crawl. After thou shalt rightly have considered these things with thy self, fantasie nor any thing else in the world any more to be of any weight or moment but this, to doe that onely which thine own nature doth require; and to conform thy self to that which the common Nature doth afford.

XXVI. What is the present estate of my understanding? For berein lieth all indeed. As for all other things, they are without the compass of mine own will: and if without the compass of my will, then are they as dead things unto me, and as it were mere smoak.

XXVII. To stir up a man to the contempt of death, this among other things is of good power and efficacy, that even they who esteemed pleasure

pleasure to be happiness, and pain misery, did nevertheless [*many of them*] contemn death [*as much as any.*] And can death be terrible to him, to whom that onely seems good which [*in the ordinary course of nature*] is seasonable? to him, to whom whether his actions be many or few, so they be all good, is all one; and who whether he behold the things of the world [*being always the same*] either for many years, or for few years onely, is altogether indifferent? O man! as a Citizen thou hast lived and conversed in this great City [*the world.*] Whether just for so many years, or no, what is it unto thee? Thou hast lived (thou mayst be sure) as long as the Laws and Orders of the City required; which may be the common comfort of all. Why then should it be grievous unto thee, if not a Tyrant, nor an unjust Judge, but the same nature that brought thee in, doth now send thee out of the world? As if the *Prator* should fairly dismiss him from the *scene* [*or stage*] whom he had taken in to act a while. Oh, but the play is not yet at an end; [*or, I have not yet pronounced all the five parts;*] there are but three Acts yet acted. Thou hast well said: for in matter of life, three Acts [*or, Parts*] is the whole Play. Now to set a certain time to every man's acting, belongs unto him onely, who as first he was the cause of thy *composition*, so is he now of thy dissolution. As for thy self, thou hast to doe with neither. Go thy ways then well pleased and contented: for so is he that dismisseth thee.

F I N I S.



NOTES UPON ANTONINUS.

UPON

The First Book.

THE inscription of these Books is, *M. Antoninus ὁς ἐς ἐαυτὸν* which I verily believe to be *Antoninus's* own; because both for propriety and obscurity so suitable to these his Books. For as no other Title could fit the subject of these Books better, if rightly understood; so is the obscurity of it such, that few I think have penetrated into the true meaning of it. Not they, I believe, (as that ancient Greek Author, whom *Snidas* doth allege) who expound it, *τὸ ἰδίῳ βίῃ διαγογῆναι* much less they (as *Xylander* and many others) who translate it, *De vita sua*. *Canterus* comes nearer: *De officio suo*. But, *De seipso* (as *Xylander* himself in his first Edition had well rendred it, but ill expounded it, *sen vita sua*;) or *De se*; as my Father (of blessed memory) doth render it in divers places,

is both more literal, and more true by far. Now by *αὐτὸν*, you must know, the *Stoicks* understood *τὸ νῦν καὶ τὰ δόγματα*, a man's reason or intellectual part, and his opinions, by which he did frame and order the course of his life. Of all other things whatsoever, they held, that they were little or nothing at all unto man; (and therefore termed them *ἀδιάφορα*, or *things indifferent*;) his mind and his opinions (in their judgment,) being the onely thing that every man in himself could properly call *Himself*. *Μηδὲ ποτὶς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, μήτ' ἐπαινεῖτε μήτε ψέγετε, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δόγματων.* Ταῦτα γὰρ ὅτι τὰ ἴδια ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, τὰ καὶ τὰς πράξεις αἰσχρὴς ἢ καλὰς ποιεῖν τε. *Never either commend or discommend any man for ordinary common things, (which men usually are either commended or discommended for:) but onely for his Dogmata, or certain Tenets in points of life and practice. For they onely are that which every man may truly account his own, and that onely which can make actions either shamefull or praise-worthy.* See *Antoninus* himself Book VIII. Number (as for the ease and convenience of the Reader we have divided him) XXXVIII. And again B. X. N. XXXVIII. XII. 2. 26. See *Plato* himself at large in his *Alcibiades*, &c. and out of him *Amblicus* in his *Protrepticks*, and *Julian* the *Apostate* in his 2^d Oration. *Apuleius de Deo Socr.* Si cotidiana eorum ara dispungas, invadies in rationibus multa prodigè profusa, & in Semet nihil. Ip sui dico Damonis cultum. If thou shalt run over their ordinary expenses (saith he) thou shalt find that upon many other occasions they have been very prodigal and excessive; but upon themselves at little or no cost at all. Upon their

their own *Demon* [or, *Spirit*: See note 8. upon Book II.] I mean, &c. So much upon the Title of this Book was by me written at the first, when I first set out this translation of *Antoninus*, A. D. 1634. and 1635. Eight years after, to wit, A. D. 1643. I did set him out in Greek and Latin, with larger and more elaborate Notes and Animadversions, as it became me, having now to doe with all the learned of *Europe*, to whom I was accountable for what I had done, being the first man (since the *παλιγγενεσία* of good learning and literature: *absit invidia verbo*;) that had taken upon me publickly, to make this divine work of the best and most learned of all the Emperours that ever were, intelligible and usefull: as in the Prefaces, both Latin and English, hath been more largely discoursed. In those Latin Notes before mentioned, I have largely disputed and proved, that the true and exact interpretation of this Title, *Εἰς ἑαυτὸν*, is, *Of himself, and to himself*: neither do I see, or much fear, what can be opposed against it by any man. But it is very strange to me, and such kind of dealing as I have not known before, that some that have set out this Authour since, in Greek and Latin with Commentaries; though they take very good notice of my English Translation (the first Edition of it) and of the Notes there; yet they take no notice at all (nor once mention it, that I know of,) of the Latin; nor of those more elaborate Notes and Animadversions we spake of. I am sure, they could not say they had never seen it, (a thing very improbable, however;) who have said and acknowledged, they had it in their Study ever since it

came out. I beseech the Reader (if so far impartial) to read and ponder what is written by me, in those Latin Notes, upon this Title; and what is set out by them, so many years after, upon the same. For my part, though I never thought my self worthy of half the thanks (and praises, I might add) which I have received from all parts, for what I have done upon this Authour: not to speak of great preferment offered me beyond the Seas, for it: nor, yet, can modestly entertain so great an opinion of my self. Yet I must say, and acknowledge, that since I have heard of the endeavours of many to cry down what, I believe, they never read, or understood: (but this is it, not to be of the faction.) I am now forced to think much better of it, and to applaud my self more than ever I did before. It was never my intention to write Commentaries (though I do not except against those that have done it; but rather think them worthy of many thanks, since there be that need and like such,) upon the Book; and I have given my reason in my Latin Notes, p. 10, 11. upon those words there, μήτε παρσιανοί, &c. I wish I may live and have an opportunity to set out my Latin Notes, with some Additions, which may be of some consequence to the Book, and the right understanding of it, in divers places.

1. Both to frequent publick Schools.] τὸ μὴ εἰς δημοσίας διατεβὰς φοιτῆσαι, rendred by Xylander, ut ne in publicos ludos commearem, sed, &c. which by the plain and evident testimony of ancient Writers will appear most false. Witness the
anci-

ancient Authour cited by Suidas, who speaking of Antoninus, ἀνερωτῆς μὲν καὶ ἄλλων γινόμενος, ὅστις δὴκυσεν καὶ Σέξτου ἐκ Βοιωτίας φιλοσοφῆν ἐπ' αὐτῆς Ρώμης (saith he with great admiration:) θαμίζων αὐτῇ καὶ φαισῶν ἐν δούραις. And that he did so to his dying day appeareth by that which followeth in the same writer. *Tantum in eo studium Philosophiæ fuit* (they are the words of Julius Capitolinus in his life:) *ut adscitus jam in Imperatoriam dignitatem, tamen ad domum Apollonii discendi causa veniret. Audivit & Sextum Cheronensem, &c.* And again, *Studuit & Juri, audiens L. Volusium, &c. Frequentavit & declamatorum Scholas publicas, &c.* So much I think will suffice, to make any man confess that it must be written, as I have interpreted it, not τὸ μὴ, but τὸ μὴ εἰς δημοσίας, &c. or without any pronoun (if any man had rather have it so, because it is omitted in most places, though expressed in some towards the end,) τὸ εἰς δημ. &c.

2. Not easily to believe those things which are commonly, &c.] The words are, καὶ τὸ ἀπιστηκὸν (ἀπιστηκὸν in the Second Edition:) τοῖς ὑπὸ τῷ περὶ ἀπομνημονεύων, &c. Xylander in his Translation corrects it, ἀπιστηκὸν which is very probable. Suidas cites it, ἐπιστηκὸν, which I cannot altogether reject, because ἐπιστήμη and ἐπιστάμεν are words that Antoninus doth often use, and to this purpose: as where he saith, ὅτι εἰ καὶ μάλιστα ἂν τις ἐπιστάμεν, εἴπω ἀληθὲς ἦν. But in this sense I must confess, it should rather have been, ἐπιστηκὸν περὶ τῶν λεγόμενων. However, that Antoninus by these words doth understand the
Christians,

Christians, I think probable for these reasons. First, because (as appeareth by the ancients) Christians were ordinarily accounted by the Heathens, and Christ himself held by them to have been a great Magician. Secondly, that the Heathens themselves, not onely upon other occasions, but especially for Dæmoniacks, and such as were possessed, made often use of Christians, appeareth by more than one passage of *Tertullian*: and in particular, how *Lucilla*, daughter to this *Antoninus*, infested with the Devil, was cured by one *Abercius*, Bishop of *Hieropolis*, may be seen by the acts and particulars of it yet extant. Whether also those laws of *Antoninus*, made against them, *qui sub obtentu & monitu deorum quadam vel renunciant vel jactant, vel scientes effingant, quo leves hominum animi superstitione Numinis terrentur*, mentioned by *Ulpianus* and *Modestinus*, were made against Christians, as some are of opinion, I will not determine. Now if so be that *Antoninus* doth here intend the Christians, I do not see, how he could altogether discredit the truth of their strange and miraculous operations: especially if we give credit to those acts extant, not as yet, that I know of, questioned by any: and if he did not intend them particularly, (which I confess is not necessary that we should believe,) then that in general he should discredit all such operations as were accounted miraculous and supernatural, is much less credible; whenas (besides many good reasons that might be given to the contrary,) the Christians themselves (as *Athenagoras* who then lived) did not deny, but that strange things in that kind were done and brought to pass among

among the very Heathens. *Τὸ μὲν δὲ καὶ τόπους καὶ πόλεις καὶ ἔθνη γίνεσθαι πυναι ἐπ' οὐράνιαις εἰδωλῶν ἐνεργίαις, ἐδ' ἡμεῖς ἀνυπερέσθω·* That in some certain places and towns of several Nations some operations (or, wonderfull effects) are brought to pass in the name of Idols, is not by us denied: faith he in his *Apolo-logy*. I say therefore, except we much restrain *Antoninus* his words, of such and such impostours, and of such and such wonders; I do not see how he could profess that he did ἀπιστεῖν but ἐπιστῆσαι well he might; that is, first with best discretion and diligence examine things before he did believe them: and then, in case the truth did appear, yet not as one of the silly multitude, to stand amazed with a superstitious kind of astonishment, but as a wise man to consider of the causes and possibility of all such whether onely seeming, because secret; or truly and really supernatural events and operations. For these reasons I conceive it should have been either τὸ ἐπιστατικὸν περὶ τῶν λεγόμενων, he did consider of them with discretion: or, τὸ μὴ ἐπιστατικὸν τοῖς λεγόμεν. at least; that he gave no great heed to such things; rather than so absolutely τὸ ἀπιστητικὸν, that he did not believe. But I determine it not. All this while, though my matter did in a manner lead me unto it, have I forbore to mention that great wonder, which in the days, and in the very presence of this *Antoninus*, happened in his Wars of *Germany*, when God at the same time by a miraculous rain from Heaven, both revived the *Romans*, which were now at the last cast, having lost already many of their number, which perished for want of water; and overthrew their enemies in the height of their greatest

greatest hopes and security: acknowledged by all generally, as well Heathens as Christians, miraculous; but by the Heathens ascribed, by some of them, to God immediately; by others, to art Magick; and by the Christians, both Fathers and Historians, to the Name of Christ, at the Intercession of some Christian Soldiers of the Army. Before I would ground any thing upon this story, I must first profess my mind concerning some circumstances of it, wherein I may perchance be found to differ from others; and that I would be loth to doe but upon very good grounds, which would require a large discourse; and therefore it is that I have declined it. I will onely tell you (because it may concern *Antoninus*, that you know it) what learned men have judged of those letters, which in these days go under *Antoninus* his Name written by him to the Senate about this matter (produced by *Baron.* and others;) which is, that they are either *suppositiæ*, aut *saltem interpolatæ*. *Capp. Hist. Eccles. p. 42.* See *Scaliger* upon *Eusebius*; and *Salmatius* in *Aug. Hist. scriptores*.

3. Not to keep *coturnices* [μὴ ὀρνυροβοτάν. How marvellously and even madly some men were wont to affect such things, may appear by the composition of the word ὀρνυρομανία, which among other examples of the like composition, as γυναικομανία, &c. is set down by *Athenaus*, lib. 11.

4. I did write *Dialogues* in my youth] in imitation of *Plato* and others: to good purpose, as *Antoninus* did it; but not as many others, who took a pride

pride in it, and thought themselves fine fellows for it. ἰδὲ πῶς διάλογος σωπιδνμ. Behold how bravely I can write *Dialogues*: saith a vain-glorious *Stoick*, *Arr. lib. 2. cap. 1.* The next words may be conferred with those of *Capitolinus* in this Emperour's life: *Duodecimum annum ingressus habitum philosophi sumpsit, & deinceps tolerantiam, cum studeret in pallio, & humi cubaret: vix autem matre agente instrato pellibus lectulo accubaret.* Thus may many other places be compared with the like either of *Capitolinus*, or others that have written his life, or, of him, which will be no great labour for any to doe, that desires to understand this Book, and would be too tedious for me to undertake: which I desire the Reader to take notice of.

5. That I did never affect by way of ostentation] ἢ παντασιπλήκτως τὸν ἀσκητικόν, &c. Of this kind of vanity see *Epietetus* in *Arrianus* at large, lib. 6. cap. 12. πρὶ ἀσκήσεως, *Sen. Ep. XV. Stulta est, mi Lucili, & minimè conveniens literato viro occupatio exercendi lacertos, &c.*

6. *Epietetus* his *Hypomnemata*] collected and set out by *Arrianus* his Scholar, and so called and intituled by *Arrianus* himself, in his Preface before the said Books: as Learned Mr. *Patrick Young*, the worthy Keeper of the King's Library, and my kind friend, had noted in the Margin of that *Antoninus* which he did lend me.

7. A man not subject to be vexed] *Antoninus* his words are, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐξηγήσει μὴ δεχέσθαι πόνον.

πικόν· καὶ τὸ ἰδεῖν ἀνθρώπων σαφῶς ἐλαχιστὸν ἢ αὐτῶ καλῶν
 ἡγεμόνων πλὴν ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ πλὴν ἐντρέχειαν τὴν περὶ τὸ
 παραδιδόναι τὰ θεωρήματα· καὶ τὸ μαθεῖν πῶς δεῖ λαμβάνειν
 τὰς δοκίμας χεῖρας ὡς φίλων, μήτε ἐξηπλώμερον διὰ
 ταῦτα, μήτε ἀναιδήτως ὡς ἀσέμνοντα. *Xylander*
translates them, Tum etiam ut in percipienda
doctrina me non morosum praberem, sed circumspice-
rem de homine qui palam experientiam, & in tradendis
scientiis facultatem minimum suorum bonorum putaret,
præterea modum beneficia (ut iis videntur) ab amicis
accipiendi, ne vel accepta ea nos viliores redderent,
vel, &c. The reason of that limitation, τὰς δοκίμας
 (as commonly they are accounted,) added by *Antoninus*
 to the word χεῖρας, is, because that favours and
 courtesies may be thought a thing arbitrary, which
 either to perform or to omit wholly depends of
 our own good will and discretion; whereas all
 possible good turns and good offices of what kind
 or extent soever, that one man can perform unto
 another, are, by *Antoninus* his Philosophy, mere
 duties of nature and right reason: which all men,
 as men, are equally obliged unto. So afterwards
 using the word πῶς of things external and world-
 ly against the precise decrees of the *Stoicks*, he
 restrains it likewise with a δοκίμας, τὰς δοκίμας
 πῶς· honours and dignities, as commonly they are
 accounted.

8. Not to be offended with Idiots, nor unseasona-
 bly to set] τὸ ἀνεκπικνὸν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἀθεωρήτων
 τῶν οἰομένων. There was not any thing more or-
 dinary with their vain-glorious affected *Stoicks*,
 than in all places and upon all occasions, *semper*
crepare Theoremata, To be ever talking and dis-
 puting

puting about their Theorems and proper Tenets:
 so that this very word *Theoremata* became almost
 infamous, through their abuse and vanity. To
 repress this abuse the learned *Stoicks*, who are
 yet extant, have many caveats and serious admo-
 nitions. But most pertinent here are *Epicetus* his
 words, cap. 68. μὴ λάλει τὸ πολὺ ἐν ἰδιώταις περὶ τῶν
 θεωρημάτων, which he repeats in the very next
 chapter also. οἷσις and οἷεσσι are words so frequent
 and ordinary, in the writings of the *Stoicks*
 appropriated by them to them, that they called
Idiots, or *worldly men*, as creatures that in very
 deed see nothing as it is, nor know the true nature
 of any thing, but are altogether led by fancies
 and opinions; that I shall not need to produce
 any examples. Now for the word ἀθεωρήτων, that
 I offer it no violence to translate it as I do, may
 appear by this passage of *Diog. Laertius*, who
 writes that the *Stoicks* called vertues some θεωρη-
 ματικὰς, τὰς ἐχούσας πλὴν σύστασιν ἐκ θεωρημάτων, and
 some ἀθεωρήτους, ὅτι μὴ ἔχουσιν συγκατάθεσιν, &c.
 If this would not serve, with little alteration it
 might have been read to the same purpose τῶν
 ἰδιωτῶν, τῶν ἀθεωρήτων, τῶν οἰομένων. For in the
Stoicks language οἱ ἰδιῶται, οἱ ἀθεωρήτοι (taken in
 another sense) and οἱ οἰόμενοι are all one thing; as
 I could easily have shewed.

9. Who are commonly called εὐπατρίδαι] His
 meaning by these words I take to be no other,
 than, That many great Men (partly because they
 think it becomes not their gravity so well to take
 any thing much to heart, and partly for other
 reasons, easie to be guessed at by them that are
 acquainted

acquainted with ancient Histories :) are not commonly so tender-hearted. Some such thing it was that *Antoninus Pius* alluded unto, when in excuse of this our *Antoninus* his (as it was thought by others) unseemly lamentation for the death of his Foster-father, he used these words: *Permitte illi ut homo sit, neque enim vel Philosophia, vel Imperium tollit affectus*. And whereas I render the words before, (οἷα ἢ τυραννικὴ βασιλεία, &c.) the state of a tyrannous King: it may be the words import no more than what I find recorded by the Historians, that when *Antoninus* first came to the Empire, he disputed among his friends, *quæ mala in se contineret Imperium*. The word ἐλαθρεία, some lines after, I might have translated, I know, more literally: especially those words of *Capitolinus* being considered, *cum populo non aliter egit, quàm est actum sub civitate libera*. But then would it have been taken by many of the Vulgar quite contrary to *Antoninus* his meaning: whose meaning we may best know by his form of Government, which he never went about to alter, that I know of. *Finis justî imperii* (to use *Amm. Marcellinus* his words) *ut sapientes docent, utilitas obedientiam astimatur & salus*. He might also allude perchance to that ἐλαθρεία that he speaketh of, *Lib. IX. n. 40. and n. 5. of this first Book*. And the rather, because I find there was a report among the people concerning this Emperour, *quod populum sublati voluptatibus vellet cogere ad philosophiam*. *Jul. Capitol.* in his life.

10. From *Claudius Maximus*] It is printed,
 ᾠδὴ κλη-

παράκλησις. Μαξίμου, &c. whereas in all other examples from the beginning to the end, it is constantly παρὰ. as παρὰ τῆς πάππας, παρὰ Διογένην, παρὰ Ραβίην, &c. But that here also it must of necessity be so, may be collected by these words following some few lines after, καὶ πάντας αὐτῷ πείθειν, &c. which words if you refer to ᾠδὴ κλησις, you cannot possibly make any sense of. But if unto παρὰ, it will be here, as in other places, where this παρὰ must be paraphrased, not onely, *I have learned from*, but also, *I have observed in*; as in the example immediately before, παρὰ τῶ ἀδελφοῦ μου Σευήρου, καὶ τῶ μηδὲν σοφασμῶ. τοῦ φίλου αὐτοῦ, &c. It was written it seems παρὰ κλ. Μαξίμου, &c. which was turned into ᾠδὴ κλησις. That this *Maximus*'s forename was *Claudius*, we learn by the Historians. *Capitolinus*; *Audivit & Sextum Charonensem, Plutarchi nepotem, Junium Rusticum, Claudium Maximum & Ginnarum Catulum, Stoicos*.

Hence therefore may their error be clearly refuted (in which I wonder so many great men have been) who confound this *Claudius Maximus* with that other *Maximus Tyrius*, mentioned by *Eusebius*, whose works (or part of them at least) are yet extant; whenas besides the difference of the Names, this also should have moved them to be of another mind, that the one was a profest Stoick, and the other a Platonick. As for *Eusebius* therefore, who may seem to have been in the same error, and indeed to have led others into it, his Greek words are miscited and mistaken, (though the mistake be ancient it seems;) and must of necessity be corrected by the Latin, as they are yet remaining in
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best Editions, being of S. Jerom's interpretation.

11. And patient hearing of others] in the Greek τὸ ζητητικὸν ἀκροῶς ἐν τοῖς συμβουλίοις, καὶ ὀπίμονον, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ παραπλήν τ' ἐρδύνει ἀκριδὲς τ' ἀσχετοῖς φαντασίαις, which words do not well hang together, as any man may see. My Father in his Notes upon *Jul. Capitol.* cites this place, and writes it thus: ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ, Παραπλήν τ' ἐρδύνει, &c. which may very well be, if you conceive those words, Παραπλήν τ' ἐρδύνει, ἀκριδὲς, &c. (as it seems my Father would have it,) not as *Antoninus's* own words, but as taken by him from some other, and here applied; as indeed he doth often; and so here perchance. Otherwise, I should like better, that the words were thus read, καὶ ὀπίμονον ἀλλ' ἢ παραπλήν τῆς ἐρδύνει, &c. which I have followed in my translation.

12. And kept an account of the common expenses] καὶ ταμειρικὸν τῆς κοινῆς, καὶ οὐκ ἐξουσιαστικὸν τῆς ἐμῆς οὐσίας. πινὼν καὶ λαμβάνων. *Capitolinus* in his life, *Rationes omnium provinciarum apprime scivit, & vestigavit, &c.* This book of accounts was called *Rationarium imperii*: and it was kept very strictly by many Emperours, but not so strictly by any as by this *Antoninus*, who therefore was called by some in scorn *ταμειροπότης*, as *Xiphilinus* recordeth; and is here intimated by our *Antoninus*, who toucheth upon it again, B. VI. n. XXVIII. See also *Julian*, in his *Casares*. But as patient as he was, I doubt much where he would have born with any man, that should have reported that of him which *Xylander* (not *Antoninus*,) doth here, who

who translates this passage, *Sumptus procurabat, neque detrectabat de iis rebus causam dicere*: which is little better than of a meek and patient Prince, to make him an obnoxious subject. Now if the word τῶ be not found in other Greek Authours in this very sense, yet is it a most proper word for *Antoninus* his purpose. For what is τῶ properly, but *rigor*? and *rigor* was the word that was then used among the Latins upon this occasion. So *Valerianus* in his Epistle written in the behalf of *Aurelianus*, *Vellemus q. (saith he) singulis devotissimis Reipub. viris multo maiora deferre compendia—sed facit rigor publicus ut accipere de provinciarum oblationibus ultra ordinis sui gradum nemo plus possit, &c.* *Flav. Vopiscus*, in the life of *Aurelianus* the Emperour.

13. That he never was commended by any man] τὸ μῆτε ἀνὴρ πᾶσι εἰπεῖν μῆτε ὅτι σοφιστὴς, μῆτε ὅτι οἰκονομὴς ἐπὶ ἀρχῇ, μῆτε ὅτι φιλαστικός, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἀνὴρ πέποι-
τος, &c. The Greek words may be interpreted, either that he never so commended others, or, (as we have rendred it,) that he never was by others so commended himself. For both interpretations, probable reasons may be given. As for the first, That such a man as *Antoninus* was should not be commended by any, for any officious obsequious man, should be no wonder, a man would think, but rather a wonder if he should. Neither do these other titles of σοφιστὴς, or φιλαστικός, sute so well with the person of a Prince, that the omission of them should be noted and recorded as a matter observable. But that so ingenuous a man as *Antoninus* was, should never commend in any other those

those said parts and faculties mentioned, is not in any man's judgment, I think, without some wonder; and in the judgment of a Stoick, must needs be very commendable: out of the School of which Sect proceeded this decree, *Μηδέποτε ἐπὶ ᾧδ' κρινῶν μήτ' ἐπαινεῖτε μήτε ψέγετε, &c.* Never either commend or discommend any man for any thing that is common and popular, but onely for his Dogmata or certain Tenets in point of life and practice; for they onely are that which every man may truly account his own, and that onely which can make our actions either shamefull or praise-worthy: as by Epictetus in Arrianus you shall find more than once expressed. But now on the other side, that which Antoninus not many lines after doth add of his Father's care, that all in any profession (as Oratours by name) excellent, might according to their desert be reputed and respected in the world; and that which in the sixth Book he doth more clearly set down of the same among other things, that he was not *Sophistes*; doth as pregnantly cross and overthrow that former interpretation. Neither is it necessary, that what is here said of *Pius*; must be understood of him when Emperour; which he was not till the year of his life 53. or thereabouts. And as for those other commendations of *Sophista* and *Scholasticus* (words, then, of the same or little different signification:) they were generally then, and many years after, titles of that high credit and esteem, that the greatest that were, as they disdained not the practice, so they were for the most part very ambitious of the Name, *Sen. Ep. 88. Magno impendio temporum, magnā alienarum aurium molestiā, laudatio*

datio hac constat, O hominem literatum! Simus hoc titulo rusticiore contenti, O virum bonum! That interpretation of the word *ἐργάκλῳ* (whereof *ἐργον* I suppose to be but an illiterate, though literal glossema, from the margin crept into the Text:) an officious obsequious man, I have collected from the use of the word *vernilitas* and *vernilater*, for *ἀρέσκεια* and *κολακικῶς*, &c. which I have found in *Horace*, *Seneca* and others. But a better Interpreter of Antoninus his mind (though he was before him) we cannot desire than *Epictetus*, who, if I mistake not much, what ours intended by the word *ἐργάκλῳ*, doth more plainly express by *ἡδὺς τοῖς συνῶν*, a man of a sweet and pleasing conversation: by whom also, both how ambitious men were generally of this commendation, and how incompatible (as it was used,) the Stoicks esteemed it with true virtue, we may further learn; *εἰ γὰρ κρείσσον τὸ αἰδέσθαι ἢ καὶ κόσμῳ τῷ εἰπεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν! ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιστα, &c.* For if of the two (saith he) thou hadst rather be a true modest grave man, than hear thy self thus commended, O what a loving sweet man this is! then away with these, &c. *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσῃ, ταῦτα, &c.* But if otherwise, &c. *Arrianus, lib. 4. cap. 2. περὶ συμπεφορέας.*

14. Having a respect unto men onely as men] In the Greek *τὸ ἔμφρον καὶ μεμελεμένον ἐν τε θεωρίᾳ καὶ πράξει, καὶ πῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς αὐτὸ ὅτι τὸ δέον περὶ αὐτῶν δεδρακότῃ, καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν εὐδοξίαν*, which I think should be read, ———— καὶ πῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, &c. *περὶ αὐτῶν*, scil. or, for *δεδρακότῃ, δεδρακότῃ*. I read it, *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, because this *ὅτι* (περὶ αὐτὸ ὅτι τὸ δέον, &c.) must needs have

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reference to some former reason. Now that τῆς ἀνδρώπολις is a very good reason, these other passages of *Antoninus* may declare, *Lib. VIII. n. XXII.* *οὐδ' ἔγωγε π; οὐδ' ἄλλος, ἐπ' ἀνδρώπων εὐπείθει ἀναφύων.* Shall I do it? yes, I will; and the end of my action shall be, to do good unto men: that is, and my comfort shall be, that I do it for the good and benefit of men. And in the IX. Book, n. XLIII. *τί γὰρ πλεονέκτησις εὖ ποιήσαι ἀνθρώπων; ἢ ἀρκεῖ σοι, &c.* Thou hast done a good turn to a man: what wouldst thou more? is not this sufficient? must thou also, for a thing done according to thy nature be rewarded? Many other like passages there be. And here I think it will not be unseasonable to note, that he that reads the writings of the Stoicks, must not always too precisely stand upon the ordinary use and construction of words. For besides that they were *miri verborum opifices*, (as *Cicero* somewhere speaketh of them) and coiners of new words (in this little book you may observe many words not any where else to be read that I know:) their Master *Chrysippus* had taught them (as is recorded by *Plutarch*) not to think much if at any time they committed either *πλεονεξίαν* ἢ ἐλλείψεις, ἢ νὴ Δία σολοικισμούς, ἐπ' οἷς ἄλλοι ἀνὰ κωμωδεῖν οὐκ ὀλίγοι· even such solacisms which most others would be ashamed off. For one thing I cannot but highly commend them, that they would express their thoughts, though commonly with words very proper and significant, yet in a style so free from all affectation or curiosity (such as is this of our *Antoninus*, that of *Epicetus* and some others) as cometh next to the simplicity of the Holy Scriptures.

15. His

15. His homely countrey apparat.] The Greek words, as they are printed, are, ἡ ἀπὸ λαοῦ σολῆ, ἀνάγναι ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ ἐπαύλει, καὶ ἡ ἐν Λαυβίῳ τα πολλά· τὰ τελέων ἐν Τύπλοις παραλειμένων ὡς ἐχρήσατο, καὶ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τέρπει. Two learned men have had already to do with this place, and several ways have gone about to correct it; as may be seen in their Notes and Comments upon the *Augustæ Historiæ scriptores*. I may not interpose myself as a Judge between them, for many reasons: neither indeed do I see reason enough yet in their interpretations, that I can warrant either to be true. And therefore though I have translated them, yet I warrant nothing here, but rather desire the Reader to read them, and use his own judgement: and to remember withall that *Antoninus* wrote not these things unto others, but to himself: So that it can be no wonder if in such passages concerning things so private he cannot be understood by us so long after, though he might very well understand himself, and perchance be understood by them that lived in those days, and knew both him and those that are mentioned by him familiarly.

16. To live in the Court without either guards or followers.] μήτε δευφορέσιον χρῆζειν, μήτε ἐκόντων συμμεσόν, μήτε λαμπάδων καὶ ἀνδραγύων τοῶνδε πινον, καὶ τῶ ὁμοῦ κήρυ. *Lipsius* in his Comments upon *Tacitus* takes it for granted, that this place must needs be understood of those things which were properly called τὰ σύμβολα, or, *Insignia Imperii*. Indeed ἡ δευφορέσις, I confess, or οἱ δευφόροι, is commonly the first that is reckoned among these

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particulars; and yet the words are not so proper to express the Royal guard, but they are sometimes used of any troop or company, that either in duty, good-will, or respect, attend any one, though he be neither King nor Prince. As for the words *ἑδῆτες σημειώδεις*, or rather *σημειωταί*, (translated by *Lipsius*, *insignes vestes*, *purpurâque*) they contain no more than extraordinary apparel in general; or that which the Latines called *vestes clavatae*; of which there were many kinds. All the question is, by *λαμπάδες* and *ἀνδριάντες* what is to be understood. By *λαμπάδες* that *πῦρ* or fire (saith *Lipsius*) which *Herodian* testifieth was wont in his time to be carried before the Emperour, as *Insigne Majestatis*. A strange thing to me it is, if this *πῦρ* were a *λαμπάς* indeed, that *Herodian* making mention of it so often as he doth (four several times at the least) should never call it *λαμπάς*, but always *τὸ πῦρ*. But if this were granted of *λαμπάς*, what are these *ἀνδριάντες* that *Antoninus* speaks of here? doth any other Authour mention any such thing among the *Insignia Imperii*? That indeed the ancient Romans had their *cubiculares imagines* (as is observed by my Father upon *Suetonius*,) and that the latter Emperours of Rome did keep a *Fortunam Auream* in their Bed-chambers as *Insigne Imperii*, I know. Of these I am sure these *ἀνδριάντες* here mentioned cannot be understood, and *Lipsius* tells us nothing of them at all, nor any other that I know. For my part, I much incline to think, that *Anton.* doth not here speak of those *Insignia* particularly, but that he doth instance in these particulars, as particulars of worldly pomp and

and magnificence in general: which he himself by those words (*ἡ τῶ ὁμοίῳ κόμπῃ*) doth seem to intimate. Now amongst those many descriptions of great worldly pomp and magnificence that have been made by ancient Authours, there is not any that hath been more taken notice of (imitated since by others, and among others by *Virgil* himself in his *Culex*,) than that of *Lucretius*, in his second Book, the very beginning whereof is,

*Si non aurea sunt Juvenum Simulachra per ades,
Lampadas igniferas manibus retinentia dextris,
Lumina nocturnis epulis ut suppedissentur, &c.*

And yet long before *Lucretius*, had a greater Poet, even *Homer*, the Poet of Poets, used the same expression, whom *Lucretius* herein doth seem rather to translate than imitate: for as their sense, so their words are the same, without any difference, but of the language. *Homer's* words in the description of *Alcinous* his Palace are these:

*Χρῦσειοι δ' ἄρα κῆρυι ἐϋδμήτων ὅπῃ βασιλῆϊ
ἔσσαν ἀδομήνας δαΐδας καὶ χρυσὸν ἔχοντες,
φάνοντες νύκτας καὶ δώματα δαιτυμονέσσι.*

Where though there could be no great doubt of it, yet since the Scholiast thought good to make a note of it, I think it not impertinent to transcribe it hither from him, that by *χρῦσειοι κῆρυι* are to be understood *ἀνδριάντες πνές* which is the word by *Anton.* here used. And though *Lucretius* doth not here mention sumptuous apparel at all, yet elsewhere I find that he doth (in his V. B.) upon that same occasion, and the very self-same that

that is here expressed by *Antoninus*. His words are (speaking of the simplicity of the old time,) *Frigus enim nudos sine pellibus excruciat Terrigenas: at nos nil ludit veste carere Purpureâ, atque auro signisque ingentibus apta*: which is ἐὼς συμμειωλὴν, as directly as may be. I need not say more. Let the Reader judge. I must onely add, that whereas *Antoninus* may be thought to commit a kind of *Tautology* in these words, τοῖσιν δὲ πῶν καὶ οὐ ὁμοίῳ κόμπῳ, his meaning by those τοῖσιν δὲ πῶν is, to distinguish those λαμπράς and αἰδριάντες from ordinary common ones, such as were in every Roman's house almost, which could be no fit instance of great excess and sumptuousness; but *Such* and *Such* as were ordinary among the great ones and in great places.

17. *So that as for the Gods*] ὥς ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς—μὴδὲν κωλύειν ἢδὲ καὶ φύσιν ζῆν με, ἢ ἀπολείπειν ἐπὶ τούτοις παρὰ τὸ ἐμὴν αἰτίαν καὶ παρὰ τὸ, &c. *Xyl.* *Quod ad Deos attineret—nihil jam ob stare, quin aut secundum naturam viverem, aut non. Atque hoc quidem fore meâ culpâ, qui Deum monitus, &c.* Between the particles ἢδὲ and ἐπὶ there is a manifest opposition, which *Xylander* did not observe. The words otherwise, I confess, are somewhat intricate and confused. Not long after, καὶ τούτοις ἐν Καίῃ τῇ ὡς Χρήσῃ, is by *Xylander* rendered, *Hocque Caieta sicut Chresæ*, as if it had been, καὶ τούτοις ἐν Κ. ὡς Χρήσῃ, which although *Xylander* do not so well like of in his Notes, and therefore I may the better be excused, if I did not follow him; yet I durst undertake to maintain it to be most right. For *Caieta*, we know, was an Haven-

Haven-Town of *Campania* in *Italy*; where *Antoninus*, as it shall seem, having been an earnest suitor by the sea-shore, whether to *Apollo*, or any other Heathen God, for something or other, wherein he conceived himself afterwards to have been heard; it could not but put him in mind of *Chryses*, *Apollo's* Priest, who is described in *Homer. Iliad. i.* earnestly praying *Θεὸν Σινὰ πλοῖσβιο θαλάσσης*, that is, *by the sea-shoar*; and there immediately obtaining his request. That the sea-shoar was a place in great request with *Antoninus*, he himself professeth B. IV. n. III.

18. *An unsociable uncharitable Man*] ἀκοινωνήτης, ἀκοινωνήτης, (a frequent word with him) must in *Antoninus* be taken as the opposite of κοινωνικός, a sociable Man, one who out of a due respect unto, and affectionate care of humane society, and of the publick community of men, is in all things that tend to their good, willing to fit and accommodate himself unto others, accounting their welfare his own happiness. He then that is not so, is ἀκοινωνήτης, that is in general, an unsociable man. Now the vertue of a sociable man consisting especially partly in meekness and affability, and partly in goodness and bountifulness; ἀκοινωνήτης may be more particularly interpreted either a harsh, rigid and arrogant man; or one that is hard-hearted and uncharitable. Of these two, because *Antoninus* doth always use the word κοινωνικός whether adjectively or substantively, with special relation to ἐν πατρίαν, ἐν οὐρίαν, and the like; by which words he doth also sometimes express him-

self: the proper signification of ἀκοινώνησις must in his acceptation be that which is properly contrary to goodness and bountifulness. But as Charity, being otherwise of it self but one particular virtue, is nevertheless in another sense and respect said to comprehend all other virtues, (as Rom. 13. 1 Cor. 13. and elsewhere we are taught at large,) so that a man any ways vicious may be called an uncharitable man: even so is the word unsociable used by Antonin. which therefore I know not how better to express, than by the word uncharitable. And here I cannot but say somewhat of the marvelous consent of this Heathen man's Philosophy with the holy Scriptures. That it doth in many things agree with the sacred Word of God, any man that reads him will easily observe. But however, that in many it doth agree, I do not so much regard, as that it doth in the chiefest. In those things, I mean, which in the Scriptures are termed, τὰ μεγαλύτερα τῶ νόμου in the Old Testament; and in the New, τὰ βαρύτερα τῶ νόμου of which kind especially are those two great Commandments, to love God with all our hearts, and our Neighbours as our selves. Which be the very things which in these books are most pressed and stood upon; as might appear by a number of passages, obvious enough to any man that reads him, or almost any part of him. And as our Saviour saith of those, that on them the Law and the Prophets do hang: so doth Anton. in some places seem to reduce all his Philosophy to these two very points: πῶς ἀρετὴ (saith he in a place) πῶς δ' ἄλλο ἢ θεὸς μὴ σέβειν καὶ ἐννομεῖν; ἀνθρώπος δ' ἐννομεῖν; what will suffice thee, as long as thou livest? what else, but

Hof. 8. 12.
Mat. 23. 23

B. V. num.
XXVII.

to worship and praise the gods, and to do good unto men? and again, in another Book: ἐν τέρπῃ καὶ ὁσπ- B. VI.
ἀναπαύῃ, τὸ ἀπὸ περὶ χάριτος κοινωνικῆς μετὰ βαίνειν ἐπὶ n. VI.
περὶ χάριτος κοινωνικῆς, σὺν μνήμῃ θεοῦ. Let the only object of thy joy and content in this world be this, from one charitable action presently to pass unto another, God always remembered in all. And in the same Book again; αἰδοῦ θεοῦ, σὺν ζῆλῳ ἀνθρώπων· βραχύς ὁ βίος, ἡ καρπὸς τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως, διαδοῦς ὅσα, καὶ περὶ χάριτος κοινοῦναι. Fear the Gods, succour them that are in misery [or, intend the good and preservation of men:] this life is but short, and the only fruit and comfort of this earthly life is, a holy disposition, and actions that are charitable. In the same Book; ἐν ᾧ πολλὴ ἀξία, τὸ μὴ ἀληθείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἀδικοῖς διαβίβῃν. There is but one thing in this present life that is of great consequence, and by us much to be respected; for a man whilst he liveth, living according to justice and truth, kindly and lovingly to converse with false unrighteous men. And again, as the Apostle doth particularly reduce all commandments to Charity which therefore he calls the fulfilling of the Law, as elsewhere it is called the end of the Law and the bond of perfectness: so doth Antoninus not only often mention ἐννομεῖν ἐννομεῖν, &c. (which I cannot better English than by the word Charity) as that which is all in all; but also for the same reason, by words (as already hath been intimated) which of themselves are proper and peculiar to either this one virtue, as πολιτικός, κοινωνικός, &c. or to the contrary vice, as ἀκοινωνικός, &c. (words which of themselves imply no more than sociableness or unsociableness; a charitable or uncharitable disposition,) he

he doth include and comprehend all virtues and vices in general. And whereas I have mentioned the word *πολιτικός* as proper to signifie a sociable, or charitable disposition; of it self indeed, and as *Anton.* doth use it, it is so: howbeit it is not so used by all. For *Plato* (whom *Anton.* otherwise both in words and sentences doth studiously follow,) first taking the word more popularly, for one that beareth offices in the Common-wealth, and for an ambitious aspiring man; as *Anton.* doth extend that more proper signification of the word, to imply an honest virtuous man in general: so he (upon farther consequences and deductions from the present estate of that Common-wealth whereof he was a member,) that other more popular word in general to express a vicious ungodly man. In a matter of such weight and consequence as this, which by Writers both divine and humane is made the very matter indeed and purpose of our lives and of all religion, I thought I ought to be the larger, to make the words fully understood; for sure I am they are oftentimes much mistaken.

19. *Bloud, bones, and a skin*] *λευκὸν καὶ ὀστέον καὶ κροκύφαντον ἐκ νεύρων, φλεβίων, ἀρτηριῶν πληγυμάτων, &c.* It is certain that *κροκύφαντον* (whereof the Latin word *crocufantia* in the 34. D. t. 2. de *anro* & *arg. leg.* 25. was made,) or *κικρυφαλον*, was properly some *Péplis*, or coise used by women to cover their head and hairs; answerable (if not the very same) to that which by the Latins was called *reticulus* or *reticulum*. As for the words therefore, we might have thought that *Antoninus* here had alluded to that part of the body which

which the Latins usually call *omentum*, and by the Greeks is sometimes called *γαγγαμὼν* and *σαγήνη*, (a Fisher's Net properly;) as is observed by the Anatomists: and that these following words, *ἐκ νεύρων, φλεβίων, ἀρτηριῶν πληγυμάτων*, had been a farther explication of this *reticulus* or *γαγγαμὼν*: the reason of this Greek application being rendered by *Pollux*, because that (the *omentum*, scil. or *σπλῆν*) *νεύρων ὅτι πλέγυα, καδιδῶρ, &c.* and that the Anatomists do farther describe it, as consisting of a world of little nerves, veins and arteries. And by this, I farther grant, *Antoninus* might allude (and so include) to the bowels also, covered in some sort by his *omentum*, as the hairs divided into tresses, and winded up together (not much unlike the folding and twisting of the bowels in the belly,) were covered and kept in by this *reticulus*. Yet nevertheless why after general and principal parts, as *bloud* and *bones*, he should make such express mention either of the *omentum*, or (to extend it as far as may be) of the *belly* it self, more than of other parts, I know not. And therefore untill I be better satisfied, I rather understand this *κροκύφαντον* here of a more general covering, to wit, the skin of the body; which though by parts of less moment, yet wholly taken, is not onely the most apparent, but also may be reckoned as a principal similiary part of the body; and so of one extraordinarily fallen in his flesh, we usually say in English, that he is nothing but *skin* and *bones*. Now if Anatomists say, that it is the opinion of the *vulgus*, that *ex venarum, arteriarum & nervorum extremitatibus dilatatis, & eorum inexplicabili texturâ generatur*. Whe-

Whether it be so or no, I leave it to them to dispute.

Notes upon the second Book.

EVery man's happiness depends from himself] εὖ γὰρ ὁ βίῃ ἐκείνῳ· ὅτι δὲ σοὶ χάδον δίνουσιν μὴ αἰδουμένη σαυτῷ, &c. The purpose and meaning of all this passage, I think, is apparent enough. If I thought it were not, I would refer the Reader to n. XIV. of this very Book, and sundry other places, where he handles the same matter more at large. As for those words εὖ βίῃ ἐκείνῳ, certainly somewhat must be supplied, to make the sense full: either ἐκείνῳ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, as we have translated it; or, ἐκείνῳ αἰδουμένῳ ἑαυτοῦ, which I think more probable, because *Antoninus* doth much affect (if I may use that word of him, and doe him no wrong) the simplicity of these repetitions, and that it is ordinary for Scribes (as is well known to all them that ever had to doe with MSS.) to slip over something, when they come to such repetitions. All this passage is thus translated (whether I speak properly or no, when I say translated, let the Reader judge:) by *Xylander*,
Bas. ed. p. 179. Ignominiā teipsum affice, anime, contemne teipsum, inquam; ut enim honore teipsum afficias, non tibi pretereā tempus suppetet. Vita enim unicuique id praebe, quae tibi propemodum jam exacta est. Non igitur teipsum venerare, sed felicitatem tuam aliorum in animis repositam habe, &c.

2. That intend not, and guide not by reason and discretion] Τὸς τοῖς τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς κινήμασι μὴ παρεκκλίνειν

παρεκκλίνειν, &c. *Xyl.* qui verò sui ipsius animi motibus non obsequitur, &c. motus non assequitur, at least, had been far more tolerable: παρεκκλίνειν is in *Antoninus* a word of great weight, and doth always import a due, right and rational apprehension of things: but it cannot always be translated alike, though never but very fitly and properly used by him: κίνησις also and κίνησις, as περιπατεῖν and περιπατεῖν, are proper Platonick words, by the right and full explication whereof much light might be given to many obscure passages both of *Anton.* and of others.

3. As after a vulgar sense such things] ὡς ἀντις κοινότερον τὰ ποιῶντα συγκρίνει, &c. *Xyl.* ubi ostendit communiorē ea inter se conferendi rationem, &c. But they are *Antoninus's* words of himself, who though he were not a profest Stoick, yet was so respective of them, that he would not transgress against their common Tenets and Opinions without some short apologie for himself. Now all the World knows, that the Stoicks held, that omnia peccata were equalia, and to compare things known and granted equal must needs be very absurd. Therefore doth *Antoninus* by this short Parenthesis here, from the rigour of their Decrees, appeal to more vulgar and popular judgments.

4. As unable either to prevent, or better to order and dispose] μὴ δυνάμενός τι, &c. a word (or blasphemy rather) which most other Stoicks upon this or the like occasion did not stick at. Whose error therefore *Anton.* doth here modestly and obscurely point at and correct. *Epictetus* (a man otherwise

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wife so divine in his Writings, that some Christians I see, but upon weak grounds I think, have undertaken to prove him a Christian :) in *Arrian*. lib. 1. cap. 1. ὡς περ ἐν ἡ ἀξίον, τὸ κρείττον αὐτῶν πάντων καὶ κρείττον οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν πλεονεξίαν πλεονεξίαν ἐξ ὧν ἡ σωτηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. ἀρα γὰρ ὅτι ἐκ ἡδονῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐκ ἐδωκυίας, καὶ κείνα αὖ ἡμῖν ἐπέτελλον. ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐκ ἐδωκυίας, you may reade more in him to the same purpose. So *Seneca*; *Mittamus animum ad ea quæ æterna sunt, miremur in sublime volitantes rerum omnium formas, Deumque inter illa versantem & providentem, quem admodum quæ immortalia facere non potuit, quia materia prohibebat, defendat à morte, ac ratione vitium corporis vincat.* *Epist.* 58. and *de Benef.* lib. 2. cap. 29. *Quicquid nobis negatum est, dari non potuit.*

3. As for life therefore and death, honour and dishonour] These words I would have the Reader, that is not much otherwise versed in the Stoicks, to take especial notice of, as the true ground of all their strange and unnatural Tenets and Paradoxes. That all temporal worldly blessings are common both to good and bad, they saw. That this, if there were no more in it than so, could not stand with God's justice and goodness, (which to deny is to deny that there is a God :) they saw likewise. Upon this ground (a ground that he stands much upon, and presseth as far as ever any Christian did,) *Plato's* illation was, That after this life there must needs be a Judgment, when both good and bad should according to their deeds be rewarded. The Stoicks, as fully persuaded

as *Plato* was, that a God there is, and he a just and good God; and yet concerning the future estate of the dead, not so fully satisfied as he was; to maintain their belief against that common exception, could find no better way than to maintain, that all those things that man usually did either seek after or flee from, as either good or bad, were in themselves and in very truth neither good nor bad, but altogether indifferent. So that whether a man was rich or poor, in health or in pain, long-lived or soon cut off, in honour or dishonour; that all this was nothing at all to either his happiness or unhappiness, no not whilst he lived, and by consequent, that it was no argument against the goodness and justice of God, that these things were known and granted to happen unto all promiscuously, whether good or bad. *Antoninus* doth elsewhere touch upon it again, as towards the end of the fourth, and about the beginning of the ninth Book. To him, though I intend brevity, yet for farther illustration of a point of that weight and moment, as hath been the occasion of so many large volumes, I can doe no less than add *Epietetus* his words at the least, out of his *Enchirid.* chapter, as I find him by some divided, 38. as by others, 29. Τῆς αὖτε τοῦ θεοῦ εὐσεβείας ἰδίῳ ὅτι περὶ κυριώτατον ἐμμένειν ὅτιν, ὅς τις ἀπολήψεται αὐτῆς ἔχον, ὡς οὐρανῶν καὶ διοικεμένων τὰ ὅλα καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, &c. Know that in this especially true piety towards the Gods doth consist, that thou have right opinions concerning them: as, That they are, That with justice and equity they govern the whole world: That thou to this end wert ordained and appointed, to obey them, to submit unto them, and willingly to follow them in all things,

things, as proceeding all from him, and by him brought to pass, who is Reason and Understanding it self in the highest degree of excellency. So shalt thou never complain of the Gods, or accuse them as neglected and little cared for by them. But this cannot possibly be, except thou first give over all pursuit after those things which are not in our own power: and that on them onely which are in our power and wholly depend on our own wills, thou be fully persuaded, that all that is truly good or evil doth depend. For as for any other things, if thou shalt deem any of them good or evil, it must needs follow, that as thou dost either miss of those thou dost desire, or fall into those thou wouldst not, thou shalt not onely complain of them that are the cause, but hate them also. For this is natural unto every creature, as to shun and abhor all things hurtfull, both the things themselves, and their causes; so those that are profitable, both the things themselves, and their causes, to prosecute and highly to respect, &c.

6. From whose bare conceits and voices, honour and credit] ὧν αἱ ἐπολήψεις καὶ αἱ φωναί, τὴν ἐνδοξίαν. Τί ἔστιν τὸ ἐποθεῖν, &c. quorum opiniones & voces gloriam. Quidnam est mors, &c. So Xylander translates it, and marks it for an imperfect place. That a Verb, to make the sense full, must be supplied, I grant: but because without it the sense of the words may be apparent enough, it may very well be, that whatsoever it is that is to be supplied, was by Anton. himself omitted as not necessary. Now for the sense I must appeal to other like places: as lib. III. n. IV. towards the end; ὁ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἧς ὁ πῶς πάλιν ἀνδρῶν

See Ant.
P. VI. n.
n. XV. B.
IX. n. I.

or, &c. Moreover that honour and praise ought not generally, &c. and again in the same Book, n. X. μὴ ἐν ὃ καὶ ἡ μάλιστα ὑπεροχή, &c. And the greatest fame that can remain, &c. In the fourth Book, num. III. towards the end, ἡ γὰρ σὺν, &c. For the whole Earth is but as one point, &c. But I will not heap all the passages he hath against the vanity of praise and applause. This in the sixth B. n. XV. comes very near: τὸ ἐν πῶμον; τὸ κροῖσθαι; ἔχ' ἑκὼν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ γλωσσῶν κροῖσθαι. αἱ γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινοί, κρότ' ὁ γλωσσῶν. What is it then that should be dear unto us, &c. See also the last words of the same Book.

7. And how that part of man is affected when it is said to be diffused] καὶ ὅτι πῶς ἔχει διακίηλαι τὸ τῷ ἀνδρῶν τῷ μέρει. Xylander. Præterea quomodo afficitur eo tactu pars illa. I translated it as written διακίηλαι from the eighth Book towards the end, where he treats concerning the ψῆσι and διανοίᾳ of the mind and understanding. But it may be, it would fit the place better if it were καὶ ὅτι πῶς ἔχει ἢ διακίηλαι τὸ τῷ ἀνδρῶν τῷ μέρει. Where Antoninus himself did so by an (ἢ διακίηλαι) farther expound himself; or whether it be but a mere glossema proceeding from any other, I leave to others to judge.

8. To the tendence of that spirit which is within him.] πρὸς μόνον τὸ ἐνδον αὐτοῦ δαίμονι ἔδ', &c. I could not easily find a word either Latin or English, whereby to express this δαίμων, here and elsewhere so often mentioned by Antoninus. That by

that word *Antoninus* doth intend a Deity, he himself doth sufficiently clear, not onely where he calls it *θεοποιον*, and *ἀποπομπήν τῷ θεῷ*, but by other passages, where he plainly says of him that he is a God. But even for these passages sake (besides other reasons) could not I well translate it *God*; for so must I have made him say, not onely that *God* was a divine effluence, and a particle of *God*; but also that *God* was *God*; which would have been too gross and manifest a *tautologie*. The word *Genius* used by *Xylander*, however it might fit in some respects; and as it is used and interpreted by some ancients, comes nearest of any Latin word to *Antoninus* his meaning: yet certain it is, as out of *Apuleius* may appear, that it is against its proper signification that it is so used, and in regard of its more popular and ordinary use, there could not be any other more improper and contrary. For whereas there is nothing more ordinary among the Latins than these phrases, *Genio indulgere*, *genium curare*, *genium defraudare*, and the like, in which manner of speeches the word *Genius* is used as the best and greatest Motive to Epicurean mirth and jovialty; *Antoninus* doth always press his duty as the best and greatest motive, and obligation, to all manner of temperance, sobriety, chastity, modesty, holiness and the like. Some will think perchance that I might have retained the word *Demon*. But seeing even in *Antoninus* his time, and before, that word, by means of the blessed Gospel of Christ, was already become so publickly odious to Latin ears, that *Apuleius* himself, an arrant Heathen, being to write of *τῷ Σωκράτῳ Δαίμονι*, (which was *Platarch's* title)

title) though he maintained the thing that it was not a *God*, but a direct *Demon*, of a nature far different and inferiour to the *Gods*, yet avoided the word as odious, and of purpose (as is well and at large observed by *S. Augustin*, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. 8. cap. 14.) intituled his Book, not, *de Demone*, but, *de Deo Socratis*: I should have done *Anton.* great wrong, if I could not have fitted his excellent matter and purpose with a more plausible word. Now for the word *Spirit*, which of all others I have made choice of, some will think, perchance, that I have made too bold with it, to put it, so sacred a word, in a Heathen's mouth so often, and to make it so common a word with him, as it will be found by my Translation. Although I could give a more direct and general answer both for *Antoninus* and my self, if I would take occasion here to fall on that subject: yet for brevities sake, I will content my self to require that of the Reader, which I think no reasonable man can deny, that to express an Heathen's meaning, I may be allowed words that have been used by Heathens. I think that of *Seneca* no man makes any question, (notwithstanding that ancient report and opinion of many concerning some Epistles that should pass between him and *S. Paul*, which *S. Hierome* and others speak of;) but that he was a Heathen. His words are these, *Epist. 41. Propè est à te Deus: tecum est: intus est. Ita dico, Lucili. Sacer intra nos Spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator & custos: hic prout à nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Bonus vir sine Deo nemo est, &c.* Thus much of the word. Now concerning the thing it self, how *Antoninus* came by

this Philosophy (so much by him in these his Books inculcated) of this inward spirit, and so to examine *Plato's* and other ancients opinion concerning the same, or how near either he or any of them came to the truth, and so to heap together many passages, and to compare them with some like passages in the Scripture; is a thing which I my self have taken much pleasure in, and some others would perchance; but that would require far more scope than this place can afford me, and therefore I let it alone.

9. *With a kind of pity and compassion also*] ἔστ' ὃ ὅτι καὶ τρέπν πνὰ ἐλεεινὰ, &c. The *Stoicks* would not allow ἐλεῶ, or *misericordia*, in a wise man. For they maintained that such a one was in continual joy. Now ἐλεῶ they defined to be *Aegritudinem animi ob alienarum miseriarum spectem*, or, a grief of the mind for other mens supposed miseries. As therefore the word implied grief and sorrow, they rejected it. But as for the effects of it, as *clemency*, *goodness*, and whatsoever it is that true compassion in the highest degree, for the relief and comfort of any distressed, would prompt a man unto, that they thought themselves bound unto as much as any, and proposed it (so they professed) as the main scope of their lives and actions. *Seneca* is very large upon this subject. The truth is, they would not have men to be men, but mere Gods. And whiles they thus went about to elevate this vertue, the crown of all vertues, to a higher pitch of divine purity and simplicity than humane nature was capable of; and to abstract from it, as it were, all that was human and fleshly; I fear they made many, who

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were not so capable of their distinctions and subtillties (such as you shall find in *Seneca* upon this subject) the less to regard that which nature otherwise, and to good purpose, had made them more capable of. Certain it is and by them confessed, that for this very thing, they commonly and their profession had a very hard report. This may be the occasion that *Antoninus* takes occasion to mention so often, and to commend φιλοσοφίαν, which if it be not the same, yet comes next to ἐλεος. Yet such respect did he bear unto the *Stoicks*, that he would not, we see here, use that word by them condemned without some qualification; not ἐλεεινὰ barely, but τρέπν πνὰ ἐλεεινὰ.

10. *That man can part with no life properly, save that little*] ὅτι ἕδεις ἄλλον ἀποβάλλει βίον, ἢ τῶτον ὃν ζῇ, ἕδεις ἄλλον ζῇ, ἢ ὃν ἀποβάλλει. *Xyl.* *Tamen recordandum tibi est, neminem aliam ab ea quam vivit vitam deponere, neque aliam deponere quam eam quam vivit:* so shall you find it in both the Editions.

11. *For those things are plain and apparent which*] δῆλα μὲν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ Κωικὸν Μόνιμον λεγόμενα, δῆλον ὃ καὶ τὸ χρέσιμον, &c. Spoken unto *Monimus*, you must understand, by way of Dialogue, [and philosophical conference; by persons introduced, and made to speak by *Monimus* himself. For that *Monimus* himself and no other must be conceived to be the Authour of those Writings both sweet and profitable, upon which *Anton.* doth here pass his judgment, may be gathered by what *Laertius* doth relate of him, whose words are, ὅτι μὲν ἐμβριθὲς αἰὶν ἐγένετο, ὥστε δόξας μὲν καὶ ἀφρονεῖν, περὶ δὲ ἀλήθειαν περισφύειν· γίγνασθαι δὲ παλγνία σπουδῇ λεληθῆα μεμψ-
μύρας,

μῖα, &c. He was (saith he) marvellous, grave and serious; as in matter of honour and credit altogether careless, so after Truth very hot and vehement. He did write some merry Pleasant Books, mixed with hidden and profitable seriousness. That therefore of *Monimus* his own Writings *Antoninus* is to be understood, I think is apparent: but because what was the form of these Writings, whether they were Dialogues or otherwise, is not certain, and that *Laertius* saith nothing of it; I could be well content that τὰ πρὸς Κωνσταντῶν Μόνιμον λεγόμενα were more generally translated, those things that are spoken of in the Writings of *Monimus the Cynick*, the Greek would allow it; which I much doubt of, though πρὸς for *apud* I know is ordinary.

And thus have I now, for reasons mentioned in the Preface, gone over the two first Books, not omitting wittingly any place that required either light or cure. And because I presume the Reader by this to be fully satisfied both concerning my course that I have held in the translation of this Book, and that it needed a new translation: I will spare my self the labour to proceed farther in the same kind; some few places, here and there, (which would by no means be omitted) excepted. And to this end I will take what that remains together.

Cursorry Notes and Illustrations

U P O N

The X. Books that remain.

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Ibid.

Cursorry

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Ibid.

Ibid. *That which but the other day was vile snivel*] The whole passage in the Greek (as it is printed) runs thus, τὸ δὲ ὄλα καπιδεῖν αἰὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἐρήμερα καὶ εὐπελῆ, καὶ ἐχθρὸς μὲν μὲν ξείριον, αὐρεῖον δὲ τὰριχθὶ ἢ τέρρα, &c. The latter words (for the former he slips quite over) are thus translated by *Xylander*, *Bas. Edit.* 214. & *quid heri fuit piscis, cras erit falsamentum, aut cinis*. The Greek words, as they are printed, are not without fault; but the fault is neither great, nor hard to be discovered. In stead of τὸ δὲ ὄλα, it must be corrected, τὸ δὲ ὄλον· a phrase to this purpose often used by *Antoninus*; τὸ σύνπαν, τὸ σύνολον, and the like; which all signifie one thing. Now for μὲν ξείριον, which by *Xylander* is translated *Piscis*; whether the Greek Dictionary deceived him, or he them, I know not: but sure I am, that both he and they are much deceived, and that μὲν ξείριον here, is a mere diminutive of μύξα, as it signifieth *mucus* or *mucor*; used again in the same sense (and there well translated by *Xylander*) by *Antoninus* himself in another passage of these his Books. They that are any thing versed in the Writings of Greek Stoicks, cannot but know, that it is their ordinary style to speak of all worldly things (the more emphatically to express their vileness and contemptible baseness) by *Diminutives*: to that end taking usually that liberty to themselves, as to coin new ones, where they find none ready coined to their hands. For examples whereof I need to send you no farther than to this our *Antoninus* in very many places of these his Books. The ground, as it seems by him, of *Xyl.* mistake, was by the word τὰριχθ here;

here; which because in its more ordinary signification it signifies *falsamentum*, and *falsamentum* is most proper of Fishes; he concluded that μὲν ξείριον must needs be a *Fish*, and thus, by a translation rather of substances than of words, (which we might more properly call a *Metamorphosis*) of a *man* he hath made a *fish*; and so hath it continued hitherto in all Greek Dictionaries that I have seen. As for the word τὰριχθ, that *Antoninus* may not be thought either the first, or only, that ever used it in this sense; I will produce but one passage out of *Lucian*, which I think will abundantly doe the deed. He therefore in his *Discourse de Lucetia*, towards the end, treating of the several sorts of Burial used by sundry Nations, hath these words; ὁ μὲν Ἑλλῶν (saith he) ἐκωσεν· ὁ δὲ Πέρσης ἐθαψεν· ὁ δὲ Ἰνδός ὕδαρ φειχρίεν· ὁ δὲ Σωθὴς καπιδεῖ· τὰριχθὲν δὲ ὁ Αἰγύπτῳ. *The Grecian did burn; the Persian bury; The Indian doth anoint with Swines grease; (the word in Lucian is ὕδαρ, which must needs signifie either Swines dung, or, as Erasmus doth render it, adipem suillum: but some learned men there be, who correct it, μύελω, medulla:) the Scythian eat; and the Egyptian powder or embalm.* When *Anton.* then saith, (either an *embalmed carcase* or *ashes*;) he doth allude to the custome of his days among the Romans, which was either to bury (the bodies of the richer sort being first embalmed,) or to burn: though indeed the latter, through the increase of Christians, began soon after *Anton.* his time to grow much out of use every where. Now they that *burned*, used to gather the relicks of the dead corpse, consisting of bones and ashes, and to lay them up in *Urnis, Ollis, Ossuariis;*

in Pots, Urns, Crocks, and the like earthen vessels made of purpose; and so to bury them. I would not note it (I must confess,) as a thing that I thought worth noting, (for I think there can be nothing more common:) but that I am glad to take this occasion to impart unto the Reader a memorable curiosity in matter of antiquity, which by the learned Antiquaries beyond the Seas, I am sure, would be much esteemed. Some two or three miles beyond *Sittingborn* in *Kent*, West, as you go to *London*, there is a little Village in the way called *Newington*. It hath not been my luck hitherto, in any either later Book or ancient Record, to find any thing concerning this Village worth the noting. All that I can say of it, is that the inhabitants shew a place, to which they say that in former times the water came, as indeed by many circumstances it is very probable: and that *Milton* (a Town before the Conquest of great fame, and of very great antiquity) is not above two miles from it. About a quarter of a mile before you come to *Newington*, not much above a stone's cast from the high way, on the right hand as you come from *Sittingborn*, there is a field, out of which, in a very little compass of ground, have been taken out by digging within these few years *Roman Pots and Urns*, almost of all sizes and fashions, and in number very many: some thousands, I have been told upon the place; but many hundreds I am sure I may say, and speak within compass. And though so many have already been found and carried away, yet doth the field afford them still (as I am told) plentifully enough now and then, according as you prove either skil-

full

full or lucky in the digging. The figures of some of them I have here caused to be represented to the Reader.

The first and greatest, with an Inscription graven and cut in about the neck of it, *SEVERIANUS*, &c. was above a year ago by the pious and ingenious Vicar of that Parish, Mr. *Henry Deering*, bestowed upon me, which I keep as a great Treasure: as also was the last not long after, with the cover of it over it, so severally represented of purpose, that the form of either might the better appear. The words of the Inscription of that first (as near as they could be imitated) are these:

SEVERIANVS·PATER·D·
OLA·I·OW·V·EE·K·I·A

In the writing of which words although something may be observed not ordinary, as *Ola*, for *Olla*; and those kind of *A*. and *L*. &c. yet is there nothing so singular, but a learned Antiquary, well versed in *Gruter's Thesaurus* of Inscriptions, will soon find Examples of it. As for the sense and meaning of the words, though not so obvious perchance as might be wished, yet must I (because few words will not serve) suspend my opinion till some fitter opportunity. That in the middle, with the Inscription *COCILLIM*, was by the means

means of a worthy friend, M. Dr. *Winston*, (that great ornament of his Profession,) procured unto me from the Right Honourable (for his worth and love to learning as well as by his place) *Richard*, Earl of *Portland*, Lord High Treasurer of *England*, &c. whom, with some other rare Antiquities, it was sent unto some years ago. I was desirous to compare these that I had (for the Inscriptions sake especially) with some others of the same kind. But I find this difference, that whereas mine were much perished and worn by age, such was the brightness and smoothness of this middle, (of the cover of it I mean, which is of a red-coloured earth) as that it rather resembled pure Coral than ordinary red earth: and as for the Letters of the Inscription, that they were not, as mine, rudely graven in with the hand, but in the same mould, and at the same time when the cover it self was formed, very artificially printed, or imbossed rather: as by these figures that are represented you may in part perceive. Since that, when I passed last by *Newington* coming from *London*, among many other fragments of Antiquity, in Mr. *Dearing's* garden, I found the pieces of just such another Cover (but that the colour of it is nothing so fresh) with this Inscription in the middle likewise, *PRISCIAN*. Now as the multitude of these *Newington* Urns (for I do not remember that ever so many in so narrow a compass of ground were found:) is observable; so is the manner of their lying in the ground. They that have been present often at their digging up, have observed, that where one great Urn is found, divers less vessels are; some within

within the great, some about it: all covered either with a proper cover of the same earth and making as the pot it self is; or more coarsely, but very closely stopped up with other earth. Of all those small vessels of what fashion soever that are found either in or about these Urns, I know no other use (to satisfy in some part their curiosity that wonder at them when they see them) that was ordinary among the Romans, but either to contain some fragrant odoriferous liquour and durable confection; or that *libatio* of wine and milk that they used about their dead: or lastly (not to speak here of those burning lamps that have been found in some ancient Urns and Monuments, which so many have largely written and disputed of) to receive and preserve the tears that were shed by the friends of the deceased for grief of their dead. As for the difference of the greater and the lesser Urns, *Fabricius* in his *Roma*, and *Marlianus* in his topographical description of the same, are of opinion, that when Urns of different bigness are found in the same place, the greater were for the greater and richer, as the Masters and *Patroni*; and the lesser, for the poorer and inferiour, as the servants, and *clientes*. In things of this nature, which were, I mean, altogether arbitrary, there is no question but different fashions were used in different places: yea, and likely in the same place, as every man's particular conceit or humour served him. And therefore it were hard to determine any thing as certainly and generally true. But as for these *N.* Urns, this seems to have been the custome there used. One great Urn was appointed to contain the bones and ashes of all

one, either household or kindred. As often therefore as any of them died, so often had they recourse unto the common Urn, which so often was uncovered. To prevent this, I find that the fashion hath been in some places, to let in the ashes through some holes made and fitted for that purpose. See *Gruter*, fol. 814. Now besides the great and common Urn, it is likely that every particular person that died had some less Urn or Vessel, particularly dedicated to his own memory; whereby both the number of the deceased, and the parties themselves might the better be remembred. There might be also another use of these lesser Pots, in my judgment very necessary, and that is, that by them the common great Urns might the better be known and discerned one from another; which being so near, in so small a compass of ground, and not much unlike one another, might otherwise easily be mistaken. And this is the more likely, because of those many hundreds that have been taken up of the lesser sort, scarce have there been found any of one and the same making. I hear not of any thing that hath hitherto been found in these *Newington* Urns besides bones and ashes; and sometimes clear water. And so do I read of Urns or Earthen vessels *plenis limpidissimâ aquâ*, that have been found elsewhere, as that which is mentioned in *Gruterus*, fol. 927. I doubt not but many would be glad (as well as I) to know certainly what this place hath formerly been. But alas! how should we (*who are of yesterday, and know nothing*) without the help of ancient Records, recall the memory of things forgotten so many 100 years ago? Thus much

much we may certainly enough conclude: First, from the multitude of these Urns, that it was once a common-burying place for the Romans. Secondly, from the History of the Romans in this land, that no Urn is there found, but is 1200 or 1300 years old, at the least: so many ages of men have these poor earthen vessels (of so much better clay for durance than humane bodies are,) outlasted both the makers of them, and the persons to whose memory they were consecrated. Lastly, from the place, which is upon an ascent (and for a good way beyond, hilly,) not far from the Sea, and near the high way; we may affirm in all probability, that it was once the seat of a Roman station. If any man can teach me more of it, I shall heartily thank him. Since this was written, I made another journey to the place, and spent some time there in digging, but with no success. However, that I might not return home empty, the same Mr. *Dearing* gave me a piece of Urn, which hath this inscription, F V L. LINUS.

B. V. n. XII. *But as for those which by the vulgar are esteemed good*] *Euripides* in one of his Tragedies had made one of the Actours to commend money upon the Stage in a transcendent manner, styling it, among other things, *ἀρίστη δῆλωμα βελλοῖς*, *ingens generis humani bonum*, (as the words are translated by *Seneca*) *the best gift of the Gods unto men; the principal good or happiness of mankind*. At which and other like words the people took great offence, (I pray God there be no worse people among Christians) insomuch that they rose up together with great indignation,

V 2
ready

*Sen. 115.
Epist.*

ready to thrust both the Actour and the Authour of such wicked lines off the stage: which they had done accordingly, had not *Euripides* himself presently stepped in, and gently desired them, that they would have patience but a-while, to see what would be the end of this great admirer of gold and silver. To some such history or passage of ancient Poet; it must needs be that *Antoninus* doth here allude. In the next words also, it is as certain that he doth allude to some passage or other of ancient Comedy, where the Poet did scurrilously scoff at that paradox of the Stoicks, (so frequent in all their writings) That a wise man, though otherwise he was such an one as was ready to starve for want of food and cloathing, yet was even then the onely rich man of the world; and that all others, if unwise, though never so great in the world, were mere beggars. It doth much favour of *Aristophanes* his scurrilous wit. And indeed I remember that my Father in the Margin of his *Anton.* (which is now in our King's most Royal Library) had written right over this place *Locus Aristoph.* though I must confess, where to find it in *Aristophanes* I know not, nor have indeed at this time the leisure to seek it. But this is the way, and the onely way, to understand obscure places in this book: they that impute the obscurity of many such places to the translation, will be much deceived, I fear, when they come to read the Greek. I remember a place of *Aristophanes* his *Plutus*, somewhat near this in sense, and may perchance give some light to it. There industrious *Poverty* pleading for her self very philosophically, and commending her condition, for that as she had no over-

Aristoph.
Pl. A. 2.
Scen. 5.

over-plus, neither did she want, (*μεγαλὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, καὶ ἐμπλείαν*) Great happiness indeed, replies *Chremylus*, for a man to spare and labour all his life long, and when he dyes, not to leave so much after him as will bury him! playing merrily upon the ambiguity of the word *ἐμπλείαν*, which the Latin will not fitly express.

Ibid. n. XXI. *To live with the Gods*] *Σὺ ζῆν θεοῖς*. Thus it is in many places in the *infinitive*, not *imperative*. In many of these places I have rendered it (according to the Greek idiosm) by the *imperative*; as B. VI. n. 18. B. VII. n. 31, &c. In some I have of purpose retained the *infinitive*, because I conceived them rather hints and heads of meditations, collected out of several Authours by *Antoninus*, and compendiously thus by him entered into this his Book of *Memorandums*, (in which case I think the *infinitive*, as well in the English as in the Greek, is more proper) than precepts, or sayings of his own. That it is, so in many I could easily shew, if I were to write a Comment upon the Book.

Ibid. num. XXIII. *Where there shall neither roarer be nor harlot*] *οὐτε τραγῳδός, οὐτε πόρνη*. I take these words to have been used proverbially by Philosophers, for a place free from all worldly trouble, molestation and distraction: in the same sense as that other Proverb, often used by *Tully*, *Ubi nec Pelopidarum nomen nec facta*; as where he saith, *Quin hinc ipse avolare cupio, ex aliquo pervenire, ubi nec Pelopidarum nomen nec facta audiam*,
V 3 *Epist.*

Epist. ad Fam. lib. VII. epist. 30. The word *παυσ-
δέν*, I am sure, is by *Antoninus* in divers places,
and by other Philosophers often used, as a proper
word to express the troubles, vexations and con-
fusions of a worldly man's life: and as for *πρόση*,
that it is not improper for his purpose, may ap-
pear (not to alledge n. IX. of this very Book,
where it is upon another occasion) from *Crates*
his description of a Philosophical city; from
which excluding all cares and tumultuousness, all
violence, vice and wickedness, he hath among
other things these words,

Εἰς ὧν ὅτε τις εἰσποῖ ἀνὴρ μῶρε παρσίθη,
Οὐτε λίχθη πρόση ἐπαλλόμενον πυγῆσιν, &c.

To which Verses haply this passage of *Ant.* might
have some reference. Against this Proverb, or
common-saying used in the commendation of a
retired and sequestred life, *Anton.* doth here reason
and argue, as he doth elsewhere in many places:
maintaining that there is no such necessity of avoid-
ing mens company, to enjoy rest and tranquillity.
See in the Table, *Solitariness*.

Ibid. n. XXIX. For, alas! what is all this solemn
decl. ¶ It is printed ἐπεὶ τοι γινῆ καλῶν ὅτι τῶν ἐμβ-
λων which I did at first understand more gene-
rally (and therefore had made a section of it a
part) *de forensibus negotiis*. Of which (those ex-
cepted which are for the maintenance of peace
Lib. I. c. 9. and justice among men) that of Saint *Augustin*
in his *Confessions* is for the most part most true:
*Majorum nuga, negotia vocantur; puerorum autem
talia cum sint, praeiuntur a maioribus, &c.* But

now

now that I have better considered of the place, I
find a very plausible coherence of the words with
the former; if we understand them more parti-
cularly of those funeral speeches and orations in
commendation of the dead, usually performed a-
mong the Romans (in a place called the *Rostra*)
with such solemnity, that *Polybius*, a very wise
and grave Historian, attributes those many
rare examples of valour and vertue among them,
to this custome as much as to any thing. From
whence by the way, I would have these words of
Antoninus, Book IV. n. 16. receive some light, viz.
—but even to thee living what is thy praise?
but onely for a secret and politick consideration, which
we call, *οἰονομία*, &c. For that indeed is it which
the Greek Philosophers properly call *οἰονομία*, as
hereafter perchance we may have occasion to
shew more at large. That being ended, saith *Polybi-* *Polyb. hist.*
us, the dead, *καὶ λοιπὸν κόσμος*, with the rest of the fune- l. 6. p. 495.
ral pomp and preparations, is carried *πρὸς τὸ καθεστὸς
ἐμβόλου*, to the place by them called *μβολοι*, or *Ro-*
stra, &c. and some lines after: Then doth his son,
if he have left any, or some one or other of his kin,
ἀναβὰς ὅτι τὸ ἐμβόλου, commemorate his vertues,
and relate at large what brave things he did in his
life, (if he did any,) and that so pathetically,
that what properly is but the private loss of one,
becomes by this means the publick grief and sor-
row of all that are present. This then is that
whereof among all Historians so frequent menti-
on is made *pro rostris laudavit*, or *laudari*, which
Anton. himself very formally according to the
customs of his time performed, not onely unto
his good Father *Antoninus* surnamed the Religious,

V. 4

(as

(as *Pausanias* doth interpret the word,) an Emperour, indeed for his goodness, clemency, prudence and other good parts, inferiour unto none but this his incomparable Son; but also to *Faustina* his wife, though none of the best.

B. VI. n. XXXVII. *As that vile and ridiculous verse*] *Chrysippus* his own words and *Plutarch's* censure upon them you may reade in *Plutarch* *περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐργοῶν* whereby it appears that *Chrysippus* his word was not *σιχθὺν καλοῖτο*, as we have it here, but *ἐπιγευμα καλοῖτο*.

B. VII. n. XXXIX. *Of this mass of flesh that comp.*] It was in former Greek editions, *περιτραμμένον* which would import, *pampered*, but that *περιτρέφεται* is not found in this sense. *Περίτραφον* therefore (*circumdati*, as *Xyl.* had expressed it in his translation) is the more warrantable reading of the two, (as may farther appear by collation of places, where we find *περιτρέφεται* used in the same sense:) and which we have exhibited in our Greek edition.

B. VIII. n. I. *Contrary to that perfection of life*] *ἡ περίληψις καὶ ἐπαγγελία τοῦ σιλοσφόρου* (saith *Epicetus* in *Arrianus*, lib. 4.) *ἢ ἀναμάρτητον*. The profession of a Philosopher is, not to sin: and in the same chapter shall you find, *φιλόσοφος ἀμάρταν*, exploded, as implying a flat contradiction. And now here will I perform what in my Preface I did promise, for the more full and perfect explication of this word *φιλόσοφος*. That the immortality of the soul, and the reward of the

the good and bad after this Life, was never more stoutly maintained by any of all the Heathens, than by *Plato*, is full well known and acknowledged by all. But it is objected, that this sound and true Tenet he by many odd fictions of his own, and ridiculous descriptions of the torments of the wicked after this Life, hath much corrupted and adulterated. One thing especially, though by more objected against him, yet by one Greek Father specially is much exaggerated; that in a place where he treateth of the reward of the just and unjust after this life, he should there propose unto his Philosophers as their best reward for their justice and piety, the *metempsychosis* and transmutation of their souls into Bees and Ants and such like: a thing so strange and ridiculous even to conceive, that I cannot but wonder how they that could believe any such thing of *Plato*, could in other places find in their hearts so highly to extoll, and so absolutely to prefer him before all other Philosophers that ever were. But as for his many relations and strange descriptions both of the manner and place of torments after this life, I will not take upon me to excuse him. Onely this I will say, that he professing in so many places, that what he related in this kind, he neither believed himself, nor required of any that they should believe; and that he was well content, that such relations as these should go for old womens tales, for that in very deed they were no better; and that all that he stood upon, was, That men might certainly be persuaded that the soul was immortal, and that there was a reward for the just after this life, but as for the rest, whether these very things or somewhat equi-

Theodor.
Serm. XI.
Plat. in
Phæd.

Supplem.
3. part.
q. 97. Art. 6

equivalent were believed, untill they had more certain information was to him indifferent: I do not see, what could well be expected more from an Heathen. And he that shall compare those many descriptions of Hell and Purgatory, which are to be found in Books written many hundred years ago, with his, will certainly judge, that either *Plato* was not much amiss, or that many Christians have deserved far more blame than he. And I farther think that *Plato* might in this case with as much reason, to maintain among the vulgar an opinion of the immortality of the soul, and of a judgment after this life, make use of old womens tales; as the Angelical Doctour against some Fathers, who affirm the contrary, doth take upon him to maintain, that *ignis inferni ejusdem est speciei cum igne nostro*, because *Aristotle* hath written, that *omnis aqua omni aqua est idem specie*. And as for that which *Plato* writes concerning the transformation of worldly carnal mens souls, according to *Pythagoras* doctrine; it is true, that *Pythagoras* and his opinions being in great esteem among the people, *Plato* not knowing himself what certainly to affirm of the manner of their punishment after their death, was very indifferent, whether this or that were believed, so somewhat were believed; and therefore proposes sometimes one opinion, sometimes another. But as for the reward of the just and godly, it is an intolerable mistake. For in that very place which is alledged, he plainly says that the true Philosophers after their death *εις θεων γινθ σταινυνται*, are received into the communion and society of the Gods, and are transformed into their very na-

tures.

And though it cannot be doubted who they are that *Plato* calls Philosophers, they being so often and so amply described by him; yet to make the case clearer, I will produce his description of them in that very place: *οι ερθως φιλοσοφει απεχονται των κτ το σωμα επιθυμιων απαστων κη καρτερουν, κη ε παροδιδασιν αυταις ουτες. ετε οικουσαν τε κη περιαν φοβουμενοι, ωσπερ οι πολλοι κη φιλοχρηματοι. εδδ αν απηριαν τε κη αδδξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιδωκεν, ωσπερ οι φίλαρκοι τε κη φιλόπιοι, επειτα απεχονται αυτων, &c.* All true Philosophers abstain from all carnal lusts and concupiscences, &c. They fear not the ruine of their goods and houses, nor poverty, as other ordinary men, and such as are addicted to wealth and riches: they fear not the reproach and dishonour of a private idle life, as they that hunt after honour and glory; for they purposely avoid all such things, &c. The ground (and yet no ground at all, had he been but looked upon,) of the mistake, (as appears by them who have objected this unto him) is, that *Plato* setting down the several transformations of worldly men, according to their several dispositions and employments during their life, saith that *οι πτω δημοτικω τε κη πολιτικω ερατω επιτελιδυκοτες, ω ε χαλσα σαρρεσωλω τε κη δημοσινλω* — *εις ποιυτον παλιν αφικυνται πολιτικον κη ημερον γινθ, ηπερ μεγαληων, η σφηικων, η μυρμικων, &c.* by which words of *οι πτω δημοτικω τε πολικω &c.* he was mistaken, as though he had meant them whom he usually calls *Philosophers*, which in many respects was a very gross mistake. For, first, as was said in the Preface, it was not the love or exercise of vertue alone that made a *Philosopher*, as they meant it; but the love: of

of vertue μετ' ἀναστροφῆς and so distinguished them from politick worldly men, who (not to speak of the vain-glorious,) often exercise justice and many other vertues, not out of any love to them, but because, as the times are, it may be most advantageous for them to shew themselves in their actions just and righteous. And from the *Epicureans*, who though they acknowledged not a divine providence, nor the immortality of the soul, and proposed unto themselves Pleasure as the onely end of their lives; yet maintained (most of them) that they that were φιλήδονοι, or, lovers of pleasure, must of necessity be φιλοδίκαιοι, or, lovers of justice; and that ἀνδ' ἀρετῆς, or, without vertue, it was not possible for a man to live in true pleasure. And certain it is that the *Epicureans* have written as many excellent books to exhort men to vertue, and, for the most part, in the sight of the world lived as well as any of any other Sect: so that as it was said of the Stoicks (for they were most of them notable hypocrites) that they did λέγειν τὰ καλὰ, καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ αἰσχρὰ, of the *Epicureans* it was said, that they did συγκατατίθενται τὰ αἰσχρὰ, καὶ ποιοῦν τὰ καλὰ. Then it was farther to be observed, that *Plato* doth not say δικαιοσύνην absolutely, but, ὡς καλῶσι δικαιοσύνην: nor ἀρετήν absolutely, but, πολλὰ πικρὴν ἀρετήν. by which words he cannot be understood to mean others, than those whom in other places he calls πολίτικους, men that interested themselves in publick affairs and in the government of the commonwealth; of which kind of men he in many places, (as things then stood) maintained that they could not possibly be *Philosophers*: though otherwise (as all know) those Commonwealths he pro-

pronounced most happy, which were governed by them that were. But that which plainly puts all out of doubt, and makes the mistake in a manner inexcusable, is, that *Plato* after these words, presently adds ἀνδ' φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νῦν and in the words immediately following, sets down those that he calls *Philosophers*, as men of a quite different Sect and Profession; which they that object this place unto him confound with the former: and not they onely, but (which is very strange, and in some sort doth acquit those ancient Christians.) Heathens also, even the most learned; as *Alcinous* in his excellent Introduction to *Plato's* Philosophy, cap. 27. I think the Book it self will justifie me, that I do the Authour of it no wrong, for making him a Heathen when he wrote it, whatsoever he became afterwards. For otherwise I am not ignorant, that some have made of this *Alcinous*, not a Christian onely, but a Bishop.

I am glad I have had occasion here in this subject to do *Plato* some right; a man, if ever Heathen was, (as *Plutarch* somewhere of *Socrates*) εἰς ἀρετὴν θεολήπτω and I shall (when occasion serves) as gladly doe it in many others, wherein he is as wrongfully mistaken. However, that which hath now made me the more willing to say so much in his defence is, partly that our *Anton.* might the better be understood, as often as he useth these words *Philosophy* and *Philosophers*; and, partly that some passages of his, otherwise obscure, compared with this of *Plato*, with that which hath been said upon it, might be made plain and easie. See B. III. n. 17. B. VII. n. 37. B. IX. n. 28, &c. Neither will this interpretation of these words *Philosopher* and

and *Philosophy*, onely be usefull in the reading of this *Antoninus* and other Heathens; but of ancient Fathers also, by whom they have been used in the same sense; but especially by *Saint Chrysostom*: as where he saith, that τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπιτάδην μὲν τὴν τῷ Χριστῷ παρουσίαν, that a man is bound to a great deal more *Philosophy* since *Christ*, than they were under the Law; that the *Philosophy* of the Gospel is most perfect: and many such other speeches, which he useth almost in every page.

Ibid. n. XXXV. *What? are either Pantheas*] μὴν ἔδν παρρησίᾳ τῇ τῷ κωίῃ σοφῷ Πάνθειᾳ, &c. The story of *Pantheas* you have at large in *Xenophon*, where, if you reade it, it will easily appear, that either *Antoninus* his memory did here somewhat fail him, or that there is somewhat amiss in the Greek Copy. For κωίῃ a learned man had corrected Κύβη but that is as far or farther from the truth of the storie. You may for variety sake, if you please, reade the same storie in *Philostratus* also the Sophist.

B. X. n. X. *And applaud themselves for their valiant acts against the Sarmatæ*] Great was the glory of these wars, equalled by good Historians to the greatest conquests of the Romans. *Bellum quantum nulla unquam memoria fuit*, say some of them. And by the same Historians is all the honour and glory of these wars, next unto God, (whose providence in some particular passages of this expedition is acknowledged both by Heathens and Christians, to have been very extraordinary, and indeed miraculous, (See Note II. upon

upon B. I.) ascribed to *Antoninus* his great valour and wisdom; who himself was present in person all the while for many years together. Yet so little did *Antoninus* take upon himself of all that he had deserved, that as by the Heathens he is often styled *verecundus Imperator*, so by *Orosius* the Spanish Priest, and Historiographer, who lived in *Saint Augustine's* days, for this very reason he is called *gravissimus & modestissimus Imperator*.

B. X. n. XXXVII. *What then should any man desire, &c. Nevertheless,*] Did ever a more meek soul concur with so valiant and courageous a disposition? But these, perchance, were but his intentions; perchance, not so much as intentions, but bare speculative Meditations. If that be true which Historians of best account relate concerning his son *Commodus*, that he hastened his Father's death, &c. it will appear, that as he proved a true Prophet in regard of others, so in regard of himself he approved himself in his death as true and profitable a Teacher; yea, that his practice in this very particular rather went beyond his vows and meditations, than came short of them.

B. XI. n. III. *Violently and passionately set upon opposition, as Christians are wont,*] G. μὴ κατὰ ψαλὴν παρὰ τὰξιν, ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοί, ἀλλὰ λελογισμένως, καὶ σεμνῶς, &c. It was an error of the Stoicks (forsaking herein the more sound doctrine of ancienter Philosophers, as *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and others,) that in some cases it was not onely lawfull, but also laudable, for a man to make himself away.
I do

I do not find that our *Antoninus* doth any where absolutely and directly oppose this errour; but this I find, and any man may observe that shall read him, that in many places he doth restrain the case with such limitations and restrictions, as might seem in some manner equivalent to a plain and direct opposition. However, I speak not this to excuse him, but that it shall be free for me or any man to judge him or his opinions, as they shall see occasion. The reason that moves me to take here more particular notice of his opinion in this point, than I do in many others of no less moment, is, partly, because *Antoninus*, though he often toucheth upon it, yet every where he doth it so briefly and obscurely, that his main drift and intention, I fear, will not so easily be discovered by many: and, partly, because I shall at once both remove from *Antoninus* the crime and imputation of being the Authour of a most heinous and foul slander concerning the Christians, and vindicate those primitive godly Christians innocency from the malice or ignorance of Heathenish tongues. *Antoninus* then, you must know, was of opinion that they were much to blame, who either *passionately* or *inconsiderately* (for to these two we may refer all his other exceptions by him inculcated in divers places:) did at any time part with their lives; and instead of these requireth and presseth often these two, *rationality*, and *calmly*, or *meekly*. For the first, Τὸ τοῦ ἑν καὶ ἀνδραγῶν ὅτι λελοισμένον, μὴ ὁλοκαυῶς μὴ ὡς πᾶς μὴδὲ ὑπερβολῶς πρὸς τὸ θάνατον ἔχειν, &c. *It is the part of a wise man, &c.* B. IX. n. III. μὴ καταργονῶν, *not contemptibly, or scornfully;*

μὴ ἐριζέμεν, *not angrily, or passionately*, saith he elsewhere to the same purpose, and inculcates the word *ἡσυχῶς*, *calmly*, and *meekly*, so often, that were it not so good a word as it is, hardly would any man have the patience to read it so often as he repeats it. But much more shall we be induced to bear with *Antoninus* his many repetitions in this kind, if we farther consider, that all that he did aim at by all these words, was merely to take down the pride and haughty spirit of the common Stoicks of his days, and before. Many of whom both by their own practice, and by their doctrine and exhortations, did teach a man generally upon all occasions, but in matter of Death especially, rather to be desperately stout and resolute, than rationally and really wise: which made *Antoninus* in almost all his exhortations and instructions so carefully to inculcate *humility* and a *meek spirit*. Δὲς ὁ θάλας, ὑπολαβεὶ ὁ θάλας, τῇ πάντῃ διδόνῃ καὶ ἀπολαμβάνουσιν φύσις ὁ πεπαιδευμένῳ καὶ αἰσθημάτων λέγει· λέγει δὲ ὅτι οὐ καταδρασσώμεν, ἀλλὰ πηδερχῶν μόνον καὶ εὐνοῶν αὐτῇ. *Give what thou wilt, and take away what thou wilt, &c.* Book X. num. XVI. They that are any thing acquainted with *Seneca's* style and *genius* of writing, will easily make a Comment upon this. But not to go from this very subject of death that we are now upon, how does he set out his *Cato*, his great and almost onely pattern of wisdom? *I am* (saith he) *non tantum Cæsari, sed sibi iratus, nudas in vulnus manus egit, & generosum illum contemptoremque omnis potentia spiritum non emisit, sed eiecit, &c.* Epist. 24. Is this to dye like a Philosopher or a wise man, or rather like a desperate wretch?

wretch? If any man shall answer for *Sen.* that he wrote this as an Oratour rather than a Philosopher; I grant indeed that it was wit that he affected more than sound wisdom, (in this and many such passages, I mean:) but yet it is in the person of a Philosopher that he speaks it; and whether it were a good Oratour's part to adscribe such a passionate (that I say not desperate) and discontented end to such a perfect wise man as he would have *Cato* reputed, I leave to others to judge.

The other main condition that *Antoninus* doth generally stand upon (as hath been said) is, *rationality*, or, *not inconsiderately*. A man may undervalue life as well as overprize it. It was *Aristotle's* opinion, that a man ὅσοις ἂν μάλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχει πλεονέχῃ, the more vertuous he is, and the better furnished with all manner of rare perfections, the more unwilling he must needs be to die. And certainly according to truth and sound Philosophy, for a man to contemn life, and either in a mere bravado (as many Duellists and contentious persons often do,) to cast it away or otherwise easily and slightly, upon no grounds of sound reason and good ratiocination, to part with it, must needs be the highest degree of madness and mere brutishness that can be conceived. And on the other side, ὅταν ἐν λόγῳ (as *Epicletus* upon this occasion speaketh,) *cum exigit ratio*, or, *ratio suadet*, (as *Seneca* in his Epistles,) when apparent reason doth induce us for some greater good (as either for a better life, or for the performance of some duty which in reason ought to be dearer unto us than life,) not to regard it, for a man then, through either fear of death or love

of this world, to linger and to draw back, is great baseness, and greater folly. As for that *Antoninus* doth here alledge the Christians as an example of that frensie that he doth tax and reprove; the ground of it is, the fervent zeal of the primitive Christians, whose love to Christ was such, that they not onely were content to suffer for him, when they were called to it, but even so longed to die for him, that they could hardly by the Church-cansons and discipline provided in that behalf be restrained from offering themselves to death, and being their own accusers and promoters. In-somuch that in *Africa* at a certain time when they flocked by multitudes to the Inquisitours or Judges, the Governour of that Province amazed, cried out, *O wretched creatures! if you must needs die, have you no halters or precipices at home?* as is recorded by *Tertull.* *ad Scap.* last Chapter. And though this course was by the better learned and more sober Prelates inhibited and restrained; yet such was commonly their constancy and their readiness to death, whensoever they were apprehended and condemned by their persecutours, yea their joy and exultation such, (*Deo gratias*, or, *God be praised*, was their common and solemn word, when their sentence was read;) that that alone was sufficient to amaze their enemies, and to make them think very strangely of them. Neither indeed were the Christians better known unto the Heathens by any other property than this, that they were a kind of people that did not regard their lives. Before *Antoninus*, *Arrianus* had already mentioned them upon the same occasion. For *L. 4. c. 7. πρὸς ἀποβίαν*, treating of an undaunted disposition,

tion not capable of any fear or terrour, πῶς ἢ
 τέτρω πύραν; φοβερὸς; ἢ πῶς ἢ δρυφόροι; ἢ πῶς ἢ
 χεῖραι αὐτῶν; εἴτα ὑπὸ μανίας ἢ δυνάμει περὶ ὑμᾶς
 παθεῖναι πρὸς ταῦτα, καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι· ὑμῶν
 λόγος; καὶ ὑποδείξεως ὑμῶν δυνάμει, &c. To him,
 (saith he) that stands so affected, what Tyrant,
 what officers, what swords can be dreadful? Or shall
 it be so that some through mere madness, others by
 use and custome, as the Galilæans, can be brought
 to that pass, that they shall fear nothing; and shall
 not reason and sound ratiocination, &c. I know
 these words are somewhat otherwise interpreted
 by others, who refer both μανίας and ἔθους to
 Christians; but if the whole passage be well con-
 sidered, it will appear otherwise, especially if it
 be compared with Seneca's last words of his
 Epist. 36. which are these, Denique finem faciam
 hoc unum adjecero, nec infantes, nec pueros, nec mem-
 lapsos timere mortem; & esse turpissimum, si eam se-
 curitatem nobis ratio non praestat, ad quam stultitia
 perducit: which words of Seneca I produce here
 the more willingly, because they may also serve
 to give light to another place of Antoninus,
 B. V. n. XVI. if any shall take pains to compare
 them. As for that Arrianus calls the Christians
 Galilaans, he doth but as many others did; as
 Lucian by name, (if he be the Authour of
 that Dialogue which goeth under his name)
 and Julian the Apostate, as all men know. This
 readiness then and alacrity of these godly Chri-
 stians to seal their profession with their blood,
 so known and approved every where, was never-
 theless so much mistaken and mis-interpreted, as
 that upon a supposition that it had no ground in
 reason,

reason, (as Antoninus you see doth here alledge,) it
 was commonly termed by the Heathens perva-
 cy and obstinateness. *Obstinatio* indeed was the
 very word. *Illa ipsa obstinatio quam exprobratis*,
 saith Tertull. towards the end of his *Apologeti-
 cus*; and *ad Nationes*, lib. 1. cap. 18. *Reliquum Ob-
 stinationis in illo capitulo collocatis, quod neque gla-
 dios, neque cruces, neque bestias vestras; non ignem,
 non tormenta, ob duritatem ac contemptum mortis a-
 nimo recusamus*, &c. And before him Pliny,
 in his Epistle de Christianis written to Trajanus
 the Emperour, *Neque enim dubitabam, quaecumque
 esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe & inflexibi-
 lem obstinationem debere puniri*. Seneca also,
 though not of the Christians particularly, he yet
 in the same sense doth use the word *obstinatio*, in
 his 76. Epist. By which passages it doth ap-
 pear how happily Xylander, professing what he
 doth in his Notes, did hit upon this word in his
 Translation, than which he could never have
 found a more fit and proper, had he sought ne-
 ver so long. But some Interpreters of Tertull. it
 seems did not well understand it in his de Spectac.
 first Chap. where he saith, *Sunt qui existiment Chri-
 stianum, expeditum morti genus ad hanc Obstinationem
 abdicatione voluptatum erudiri*, &c. who note
 that Tertull. doth there use *Obstinatio* in a good
 sense for *Constantia*; whereas he useth it in no
 other sense than the Heathens did, that ob-
 jected it unto them; and it is as from them
 that he speaks it, as if he said, *ad hanc quam no-
 bis objicitis*, or, *exprobratis*, (as elsewhere) *ob-
 stinationem*, &c. The word πρὸς ταῖς here used by
 Anton. will I think hardly be found in any other
 Greek

Greek Authour in this sense; a word nevertheless (as all his are) as elegant and proper as may be; importing as much in things civil, as ἀντιστοιχείαις doth in things natural. That which S. Basil doth elegantly call τῆς ἀντοχής ἀμεσότης, is much to the same purpose. But S. Nazianzen will give us a very full and elegant interpretation of this word, which will also much conduce to the illustration of the matter that hath been spoken of. For in his first *Invective*, treating of the reasons why Julian would not set upon the Christians with open persecution, as former Emperours had done, which meant them not so ill as he did; he makes this to have been the cause of it, because Julian had observed, that the Christians the more they were persecuted, the more resolute and peremptory they did grow. For, as fire, saith he, exposed to a blustering wind, the more it is blown upon, the greater it grows; so is it with generous dispositions, the more they are opposed with force and violence, the more obstinate and peremptory is their resistance. φιλονεικίης γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς ῥυέσθαι βιάζομενκε, καὶ ἀντιθέσθαι τῇ πυρρῇ τῇ ἐξ ἐντοπείας ἐκπύρας· φιλεῖ γὰρ τὸ ῥονεῖα φρονηματὶα πρὸς τὸ βίαια κρατῶν ἀνταρδύζεσθαι, καὶ κατὰ φλόξ ὑπὸ ἀνέμου ῥιπυμένη, πρὸς μᾶλλον ἀσπείδεσθαι, ὅταν ἂν σσεδύσῃ καὶ ἀπένειω. Antoninus doth use the words again, (but in the Verb there, as others use it also,) in the same sense, B. VIII. n. XLVI. speaking of the liberty of the will of man, Μνησθε (saith he) ὅτι ἀκαταμάχῳ ἵνα τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὅπου εἰς ἐμὴν συστρεφέν ἀρκεθῇ ἐμὴν μὴ ποιεῖν ὃ μὴ θέλει, καὶ ἐλὼς λόγῳ παρατύχῃσιν, &c. Remember that thy mind, &c. And so doth the same Nazianzen in his second


Invective,

in his 2^d *Invective*, speaking of a resolute and courageous Christian Martyr, ἐν τῇς φυγῆς ἐπέμνησι, (saith he) καὶ τῶ δῆμῳ φέρον ἐκδιδωσι χρεῖσθαι ὃ, πέλαιντο, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῷ καίρῳ παρατάσσεται δυσκολίαν. as one that had entred the list, as it were, to buckle and grapple with the present adversities themselves.

Ibid. n. V. After the Tragedie the Comædia vetus was brought in.] Horace in his *De Arte Poetica*, having immediately before spoken of *Æschylus* the Tragick Poet, *Successit vetus his Comædia*, saith he, *non sine multa Laude, sed in vitium libertas excidit, & vim Dignam lege regi, &c.* They that have read learned *Heinsius* his elaborate Notes upon this place, will easily see what I aim at, by citing this place of *Horace*; and will acknowledge that *Horace* is much beholden to this place of *Anton.*

B. XII. n. IX. Whatsoever doth happen.] Τὸ ἐξ ἧς τῇ φύσει. These words may also be referred to the former paragraph, or number; as in the Latin translation is to be seen. But they fit this place so well too, that it is not easie to determine to which of the two they belong. Such diversities may be observed in other places too; which some, rashly, may deem over-sights or repugnancies: but men of better judgment and skill will easily see what hath caused this variety. But in places of greatest difficulty, I must refer the Reader to my Latin Notes.

F I N I S.



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FINIS.

Select Remarks
ON THE
MEDITATIONS
OF
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus,
THE
ROMAN EMPEROR.

Remarks upon the Title.

THE Title of this Treatise has been variously explain'd. The Greek Copy runs thus, *Twelve Books of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus to himself, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν.* By which the wise Emperor means Nothing else, but that these Twelve Books, are a Collection of Familiar
B Thoughts

2 *Select Remarks on M. A. Antoninus,*
Thoughts and Addresses, with which he
entertain'd himself. For indeed, *Antoninus*
speaks to none but himself through the whole
Work. And this Kind of Solitary Conversa-
tion, is a wholesome Discipline, Effectually
curing the Distempers of the Mind. One
cannot better represent *Antoninus's* Practice,
than by comparing it with what *Horace* us'd
to do, as he says of himself:

— *Neque enim, cum Lectulus aut me
Porticus excepit, desum mihi. Rectius hoc est:
Hoc faciens vivam melius: sic dulcis amicis
Occurram; hoc quidem non belle. Numquid
(ego illi
Imprudens olim faciam simile? Hæc ego mecum
Compressis agito labris. —*

For neither am I Alone or Idle, when Sitting or
Walking. This is the best way, say I to my self.
In doing thus, I shall live Happier, and be more
Agreeable to my Friends. I see some miscarry,
in this or that Course: Shall I be such a Fool, as
to tread in their Steps? These are the Silent Dis-
courses, with which I entertain my self. And
this is exactly the same with *Antoninus's* Cu-
stom, during the few Hours he had of Lei-
sure from the Cares of the Empire. For, he
pass'd them away in Conversing with him-
self, writing down these Soliloquies, as Me-
morandum's and Rules, by which he might
square the Future Actions of his Life.

Remarks

By Monsieur and Madam Dacier.

3

Remarks upon Book I.

Page 29. l. 11. Of my Grandfather *Verus* [I
have learn'd.] This was *Annius Verus*, who
had been Thrice Consul, or Governor of Rome,
and rais'd to the Dignity of a Senator by the
Two Censors, *Titus* and *Vespasian*. *Antoninus*
being very Young when his Father died, was
brought up in the House of this *Annius Verus*,
his Grandfather. One Thing appears very
Remarkable: Which is, That this Emperor,
though of such an Ancient and Noble Family,
yet here mentions none but his Father, Grand-
father and Great-Grandfather; taking no
Notice of his other Ancestors, of whom Men
generally love to boast.

lb. l. 25. From the Fame and Memory of him
that begot me.] He was very Young, when
his Father *Annius Verus* died, and cou'd scarce
remember, that ever he saw him. But he
cou'd not so easily forget the Idea of his Vir-
tue, which serv'd as a Light to direct his
Steps. *Annius Verus*, in this, receiv'd from his
Son an Honour which few Children can give
their Fathers: Because few Fathers live so, as
their Virtue may be a Pattern to their Chil-
dren; tho' they can do nothing more Glori-
ous, than thus to secure the Education of
their Offspring. For then that Saying of *Ec-
clesiasticus* may be apply'd to them: *Mortuus
est pater eorum, & quasi non est mortuus. Their
Father*

B 2

4 *Select Remarks on M. A. Antoninus,*

Father is dead, and yet he is as if he were not dead. Because he survives in such Virtuous Sons.

Ib. l. 27. Of my Mother to be Religious.] In giving this Praise to his Mother, he excludes not, his Father and Grandfather. But, as commonly a Mother has the Chief Hand in bringing up her Children: So it is her Part to plant in their Souls this Happy Principle of Piety, which is the Root of all other Virtues. The Mother of *Antoninus*, was *Domitia Calvilla Lucilla*, the Daughter of *Calvisius Tullus*, who had been Twice Consul.

P. 30. l. 1. To content my self with a spare Diet, and to fly all such Excess, &c.] This Praise of his Mother, seems to be Equal, if not Greater than the First. For there are few Ladies of Quality, who Educate not their Children Piously, altho' they have no other Reason for it, than purely to comply with Civility and the Fashion. But there is scarce one that teaches 'em Frugality and Temperance. They all generally act like the Wife of *Strepsiades* in *Aristophanes*, who us'd to Cares her Son with such Discourse as this: *My Son, when you become a Man, you must keep a gallant Equipage, wear Gold and Purple, make Horse-Races and Triumphant Cavalcades through the City, like your Uncle Megacles.*

Ib. l. 3. Of my Great-Grandfather.] 'Tis a Question, of which Great-Grandfather he speaks, whether of his Father's Side, or Mother's. Some think, the Former; but without any

by Monsieur and Madam Dacier. 5

any Ground. For, the First *Annius Verus*, Great-Grandfather of *Antoninus*, was dead long before this Emperor was of Age sufficient to learn any Thing from him. Therefore it is more Probable, he speaks of his Great Grandfather by his Mother's Side, *Catilius Severus*, who had Adopted him, and given him his Name.

Ib. l. 10. Either of the Two great Factions of the Coursers in the Circus.] The Greek Copy runs thus, *Not to be of any Party, whether the Green, the Blue, the Thracian, or the Pursuivant.* In the Chariot-Races, there were commonly Four Factions, the White, the Red, the Green and the Blue. And there were several Sorts of Gladiators, the Thracians, the Mirmillions, the Samnites and the Pursuivants, *Secutores*, &c.

Ib. l. 27. Not to keep Coturnices or Quails for the Game.] The Romans learn'd this Superstition of the Greeks, who kept Quails to Fight together; by the Success of which Battles, they judg'd of Future Events. See *Pollux*, Book IX. Chap. 7.

P. 31. l. 7. That I did not fall into the Ambition of ordinary Sophists.] The Sophists in those Days, were as to Philosophy, what our Hereticks and Hypocrites are at this Day in Matters of Religion: By a False Appearance of Science, they deceiv'd the Simple. 'Tis against this Sort of Philosophers, that *Socrates* so often argues in *Plato*.

Ib. l. 18. Moreover, I have learn'd to write Letters, without any Affectation or Curiosity.]

6 *Select Remarks on M. A. Antoninus,*

This Simplicity of Style, makes the Letters of *Antoninus* Admirable; as may be judg'd by those we find in his *Life*. *Philostratus* also says, That those who, in his Opinion, had the best Faculty of Writing Letters among the *Philosophers*, were *Tyaneus* and *Dion*; amongst the Great Generals, *Brutus*; and *Antoninus* among the Emperors. In whose Letters, besides the Exactness of his Familiar Style, one may observe a great Constancy of Sentiments from First to Last.

Ib. l. 31. From *Apollonius*, true Liberty.] This was *Apollonius* the *Philosopher* of *Chalcois*, whom *Antoninus Pius* sent for from *Athens*, to be the Tutor of our Emperor. And on whom *Demonax* put this Jest, when he saw him and his Scholars depart; Behold *Jason* and his *Argonauts*: Reproaching him, as if he went to enrich himself at the Court, as *Jason* sail'd to *Colchos* to get the *Golden Fleece*.

P. 32. l. 19. Of *Sextus*, Mildness.] This *Philosopher* *Sextus* was the Grand-Son of *Plutarch*; not *Sextus Empiricus*, the *Pyrrhonian*, as some think. For he was dead long before.

P. 33. l. 26. Of *Alexander* the *Platonick*.] This was, without doubt, *Alexander* of *Seleucia*, who was sent in Embassy from his Country, to the Court of *Antoninus Pius*, and whom *Marcus Antoninus* afterwards made his Secretary for the Greek Tongue. *Philostratus* has writ his *Life*. He was an Eloquent Man, but above all, he was admir'd for his Copiousness, and Facility of expressing himself. For as soon

By Monsieur and Madam Dacier.

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soon as he had made an Oration, he wou'd the next Moment, rehearse it all again in other Terms. *Herod* the *Sophist*, for one only *Pamphyrick* he receiv'd from him, gave him at once, Ten Slaves, Ten Horses, Ten Secretaries (who had the Art of Writing in Short-Hand) Twenty Talents of Gold, with Abundance of Silver, and other Presents.

Ib. l. 27. Not often, nor without great Necessity to say or to write to any Man in a Letter, I AM NOT AT LEISURE.] This Precept is Divine. The World wou'd be too Happy, if Men's true Encumbrances only hinder'd them from serving their Neighbours. But there is Nothing more Common, than for People who live at Ease, to pretend Impediments which they have not, when they are desir'd to assist Another. Thus aggravating their Unkindness with a Lye.

Ib. l. 34. Of *Catulus*.] *Cinna Catulus*, a Stoick *Philosopher*.

P. 34. l. 7. From my Brother *Severus*.] Some Criticks read it, My Brother *Vernus*. But *Vernus* was too Young, to teach *Antoninus* such fine Maxims. It is more Probable, That *Antoninus* speaks here of *Claudius Severus*, the *Peripatetick* *Philosopher*: Whom he calls his Brother, because of the Tenderness he had for him.

Ib. l. 9. By whom also I came to the Knowledge of *Thraseas* and *Helvidius*.] It was *Severus*, who had recommended to him the History of *Thraseas Petus*, and his Son-in-Law

Helvidius. The First of which, Nero put to Death; and banish'd the Other, as *Tacitus* relates in the XVI. Book of his *Annals*.

Ib. l. 11. *Cato, Dio and Brutus.*] Whose *Lives* are writ by *Plutarch*. There is extant also a *Letter*, which *Plato* address'd to this *Dio*.

Ib. l. 28. *From Claudius Maximus.*] *Claudius Maximus* was a *Stoick Philosopher*, who died before *Antoninus* wrote this, as appears by the Sequel of this *Text*; and by the Third Book, where he says, *Secunda* has bury'd her Husband *Maximus*.

P. 35. l. 4. *Never to wonder at any Thing.*] See *Horace* Book I. *Epist.* 6. and what is remark'd there on this Happy Indifference.

Ib. l. 18. *In my Father, I observ'd his Meekness.*] He speaks of *Antoninus Pius*, his Adoptive Father. This Place is perfectly Beautiful, and gives us a great Character of that Prince. It deserves to be attentively and often read.

Ib. l. 32. *Neither absolutely requiring of his Friends, that they should wait on him at his ordinary Meals.*] This Passage has need of a Comment, to make it Intelligible to us in these Times, wherein the *Modes* of the Court, are different from what they were formerly: When the Greatest Mark of Haughtiness and Pride a Prince cou'd be Guilty of, was, to Eat Alone. This appear'd Insupportable. But, the other Extreme into which they afterwards fell, was yet Greater. For those who had

once

once receiv'd the Honour to sit at the Emperor's Table, durst not be Absent One Meal, without Permission: And, to ask that, was to incur the Prince's Displeasure. *Antoninus Pius* was one of the First, who observing that there was Nothing more Inhuman, than to turn this Honour into Slavery, excus'd his Courtiers and Friends from their Attendance at such Times, and left 'em to their Liberty. *Marcus Antoninus* follow'd his Example, receiving his Friends to his Table, when they had a Mind to come, but not enjoying it as a Duty.

Ib. l. 34. *Nor that they should of Necessity, accompany him in his Journeys.*] *Marcus Antoninus* so well imitated this Indulgence, that he dispens'd with *Galienus*, his best Physician, from following him in one of his Expeditions against the *Marcomans*, giving him Leave to tarry at Rome, according to his Desire; as *Julian* tells us, in one of his *Treatises*.

P. 38. l. 13. *Never curious or solicitous, either about his Meat, &c.*] The Greek Expression is Remarkable: He was not Inventive as to Eating, &c. That is, he did not employ his Time and Phancy, in Studying New Ragous. *Antoninus* here rallies some Princes, who being addicted to a Refin'd Sort of Gluttony, affect to surpass their Cooks themselves, in the Art of making Sawces.

P. 39. l. 7. *A good Sister.*] *Annia Cornificia*, who was Married to *Quadratus*.

Ib. l. 28.

Ib. l. 28. Such and such Torches and Statues.] Antoninus speaks here of Statues, which were Common in the Palaces of Princes, and Great Lords, holding Torches to give Light in the Night. This Sort of Magnificence, was very Ancient. For, Homer speaks of it in Book VII. of his Odyssees, describing the Palace of Alcinous. There were, says he, upon stately Pedestals, the Golden Statues of Children, which held Lamps in their Hands, to give Light to the Guests at Night. This is that Passage which Lucretius has Translated in Book I. of his Excellent Poem..

*Si non aurea sunt Juvenum Simulacra per
(Ædes
Lampadas igniferus manibus retinentia dextris,
Lumina Nocturnis Epulis ut suppeditentur.*

Ib. l. 34. That I have had such a Brother.] He speaks of Lucius Verus, his Brother by Adoption, and with whom he shar'd the Empire. Whom; notwithstanding his Debauchery and Vices, he lov'd to the last, and conceal'd his Faults, both while he was Living, and after his Death; as Capitolinus testifies.

P. 40. l. 4. That I have got ingenuous Children.] Antoninus had by his Wife Faustina, Three Sons, Commodus, Verus and Antoninus: And Three Daughters (some say Four) Lucilla and Fadilla. The Name of the other is not known. All these Children, were Fair and Well-shap'd. Lucilla was like her Mother,

ther, a Prodigy of Beauty: And Commodus was the Handsomest Prince in the World.

Ib. l. 32. That my Body in such a Life, has been able to hold out so long.] In his Youth, he was very Strong and Vigorous. For, he fought in Armour, and kill'd the Greatest Wild Boars when he went a-Hunting. But his great Application to State-Affairs and Study; his Austerity and Abstinence, made him so Infirm, that he had not a Moment of Health during his whole Reign. So the Emperor Julian represents him among the Cæsars, with Hollow Eyes, Meager Looks, and his Body like a Skeleton.

P. 41. l. 13. That I have such a Wife, so Obedient, so Loving, and so Ingenuous.] Antoninus never knew the Irregular Conduct of his Wife. And this ought not to seem strange, if we consider on the One Side the Simplicity of Antoninus; and on the Other, the Cunning Wit of Faustina: Who had no less Address than Beauty. And there is Nothing wherein Women can better Act their Part, than in the feign'd Demonstrations of Love and Fidelity to their Husbands. Julian in his Book of the Cæsars, seems to justify Antoninus's Love to his Wife, by the Example of his Predecessors: But 'twas only to take an Occasion from thence, to involve in his Satyr, the Wife of Adrian, Vespasian, and even of Augustus himself.

Ib. l. 14. That I had choice of fit and able Men, to whom I might commit the bringing up of

of my Children.] Herodian observes in the Beginning of his *History*, that the Principal Care of *Antoninus* was, to seek out Learned and Able Men for this Purpose. He made *Onesicritus*, *Antistius*, *Capella*, *Attaius Sanctus* their Tutors, and gave them *Pisbolanus* for their Governour.

Ib. l. 16. *That by Dreams I have received Help.*] There is Nothing more Common among the *Ancients*, than the Stories of Remedies Revealed to the Sick in their *Dreams*. *Aristides* declares the same of himself. *Synesius* assures us, That by the Help of *Dreams*, he had escap'd very great Dangers. And 'tis well known what *Socrates* says of them.

Ib. l. 30. *Of the Gods and of Fortune.*] *Fortune* is not here taken for that *Blind Divinity*, of which all the World speaks, and no Body knows any Thing. But it is the *Destiny*, or *Fatum* of the *Stoicks*; viz. the *Divine Providence*, which by its *Eternal Foresight*, *Regulates* every Thing, and marks out its Time.

Ib. l. 32. *In the Country of the Quadi at Grana.*] This was, without doubt, in one of *Antoninus's* last *Expeditions*, after the Death of *Verus*. By which we may see, the Good Use this *Emperor* made of his Time, amidst the Greatest Difficulties, and even in the Sight of his Enemies.

Remarks

Remarks upon Book II.

Page 45. l. 8. *Do, Soul, do; abuse and condemn thy self.*] This Expression is taken out of *Plato de Legibus*, Book V. where he says, *That no Man honours his Soul as he ought to do.* See the Observations on the same Book, Chap. 16.

Ib. l. 18. *Cease roving and wandring to and fro.*] *Ennius* has well express'd this roving Uneasiness:

*Imus huc, hinc illuc: cum illuc ventum, ire
(illinc lubet.
Incerte errat Animus, præter propter vita
(vivitur.*

We go hitber and thither: and when we are in this Place, we have a Mind to go else-where. Our Mind roves at Random, and so our Life passes without any certain Design.

Ib. l. 25. *For not observing the State of another Man's Soul, scarce was ever any Man known to be Unhappy.*] To this may be apply'd that Verse of *Homer*, which *Socrates* had always in his Mouth:

Ὅτ' ἄν τινι ἐν μετὰ δεξιῇ, κακὸν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τίτῃται.

That is, in the Sence of *Socrates*, *That whatsoever is Good or Evil for us, springs from within*

in our selves. And he made Use of this, to dehort Men from all Unprofitable Sciences, and Vain Curiosities, and to allure them to the Study of Morality, and the Knowledge of themselves.

P. 46. l. 5. *Theophrastus, where he compares Sin with Sin*] Here Antoninus declares against the Equality of Sins, which those of his Sect so obstinately and so falsely asserted. But, this is not the only Thing wherein he differs from the Primitive Stoicks.

P. 47. l. 13. *Neither must we think that the Nature of the Universe.*] By Nature, he means that Intelligent Spirit which Governs the World, viz. God.

Ib. l. 15. *Or if not as ignorant of them, yet as unable either to prevent, or better to dispose and order them.*] Antoninus here endeavours to confute certain Philosophers, who maintain'd, That Matter was so Weak and Corrupted, that God could not restore it to its Original State.

P. 47. l. 17. *It cannot be, that she through want either of Power or Skill.*] This Reason is very solid. For, either God cou'd not hinder this Disorder; or, he was Ignorant of it. If he knew it not, he was Blind. If knowing it he wou'd not remedy it, he was Envious. And, if he cou'd not do it, he was Impotent. But, none of these can be said, without a Horrid Sacrilege, and Detestable Blasphemy.

P. 48. l. 18. *Now Death, it is not only a Work of Nature, but also conducing to Nature.*] For, the World is maintain'd by these Changes:
And

And we may properly say, *That we only Live by Death.* *Ad mortibus vivimus*, according to one of the Ancients.

P. 49. l. 13. *With a Kind of Pity and Compassion also.*] Antoninus here puts this Restriction, a Kind of, because he wou'd not too openly contradict the Opinion of the Stoicks, who held, That Compassion is a Vice.

P. 50. l. 15. *Monimus the Cynick.*] The Disciple of Diogenes and Crates.

Ib. l. 17. *If that which is true and serious in them.*] The Wise Emperor adds this, to give an Antidote against the Poison that is spread through all the Works of Monimus.

Ib. l. 20. *A Man's Soul doth wrong and disrespect it self, &c.*] Here Antoninus has Respect to what Plato says, Book V. de Legibus.

Ib. l. 32. *When she doth dissemble, and covertly and falsely, either doth or saith any Thing.*] The Pagans had more Regard to Truth, than many Christians, who believe it is permitted them to use Fraud and Dissimulation. Cicero says in his Offices, Book III. *Ex omni Vita Simulatio & Dissimulatio tollenda est. Et Ratio igitur postulat, ne quid insidiosè, ne quid simulatè, ne quid fallaciter.*

P. 51. l. 9. *And most ancient Commonwealth.*] This Passage, puts us in Mind of another excellent one in Plutarch's Morals; *That God who Created All, and is Almighty, Sovereignly Just, and a most Perfect Architect (as Pindar says) has built the World, as a City Common to Gods and Men, that they may live in it with Justice and Vertue.*
Ib. l. 21.

Ib. l. 21. *One only Thing, Philosophy.*] *Philosophy Properly taken, is Nothing but the Knowledge of Things Divine and Human, viz. Religion.*

Ib. l. 32. *Death, as being Nothing else but the Resolution of those Elements.*] This was the Opinion of the *Platonists*, which they borrow'd from *Empedocles*, That the Birth and Duration of Bodies, was Nothing else, but the Union, and blending together of the First Principles; and that Death was Nothing else, but their Separation. And that as there is now, no New Creation or Production of Any Thing out of Nothing; so neither does Any Thing Perish, or return to Nothing.

Remarks upon Book III.

Page 54. l. 31. *Died afterwards all fill'd with Water within, and all bedaub'd with Dirt and Dung without.*] *Heraclitus* having a Dropsie, ask'd his Physicians, Whether they cou'd cure him? They answering him, That they cou'd not; he plac'd himself in a Hot Dung-Hill in the Sun, believing that the Heat of the Dung-Hill, wou'd dissipate the Watry Humour in his Body, which occasion'd his Distemper. But, this Remedy had not its desir'd Effect. For he dy'd in the Dung-Hill. *Antoninus* here gives him a sensible Touch for his Folly.

This

This *Philosopher* amus'd himself in discoursing of the Conflagration of the World, a Thing far from the Purpose; yet saw not, that he was perishing by an Internal Deluge of Water, of which he himself was the Source.

Ib. l. 33. *Lice kill'd Democritus*] *Antoninus* is the only Man, that thus relates the Death of *Democritus*. For, the Common Opinion is, that he kill'd himself, when he saw Old Age had weaken'd his Understanding.

Ib. l. 33. *Socrates, an other Sort of Vermin.*] He speaks of the Accusers of *Socrates*, and the People who put him to Death.

P. 55. l. 21 *That Part of himself which is Rational.*] That is, the Understanding, the Soul, which is all that thou hast pure.

P. 56. l. 8. *A very Priest and Minister of the Gods.*] This Thought is Great and Noble, and might be Happily improv'd by *Christians* at this Day.

P. 57. l. 19. *He therefore regards not such Praise and Approbation, as proceeding from them, who cannot like and approve themselves.*] This Definition of Foolish and Vicious Men, is very fine; viz. They cannot please themselves. We may apply to them, what *Tyresias* says to *Oedipus* in *Sophocles*, Such Sort of People are Insupportable to themselves. In a Word, Vice is an Intestine Sedition, or Civil War in the Soul, which perpetually harasses and fatigues a Man, not affording him a Moment of Rest or Enjoyment.

P. 58. l. 1. *As one who needs neither the Oath, &c.] The Stoicks hold, That a wise Man ought to be believ'd, on his bare Word, without an Oath. And the Ancients observe, That Heraclitus never swore but Once, in all his Life.*

P. 60. l. 16. *In the Mind that is once truly disciplin'd and purg'd.] To purge the Passions, among the Stoicks, signifies, to root 'em quite out: But Aristotle, when he talks of purging the Passions, means the Reducing 'em to a Mediocrity, so that they may be always subject to Reason.*

Ib. l. 32. *To do nothing rashly.] Antoninus in this, seems to recommend the Caution and Reservedness of the Cyrenaick Philosophers, who were never positive in asserting their Opinions, nor unadvis'd in their Actions, but both spoke and did all Things with Abundance of Modesty and Hesitation.*

P. 61. l. 11. *Is by the Succession of silly Mortal Men preserv'd, who likewise shall shortly die.] These Five or Six short Lines, give us an Admirable Lesson. There is so great a Quickness in them, that the Imagination it self can hardly keep pace with Sense. Therefore they deserve to be attentively reflected on.*

P. 63. l. 2. *Thou shalt live happily.] According to Zeno, Plato and Aristotle, to live Well, is to live Happily.*

Ib. l. 6. *So have thou always thy Dogmata in a Readiness for the Knowledge of Things.] This was the Method of the Stoicks. They taught their*

their Scholars, to reduce all Morality into Precepts and Maxims, that they might always be ready when they had Occasion for them.

Remarks upon Book IV.

P. 68. l. 6. *The Things or Objects themselves, reach not unto the Soul.] Antoninus explains here a Physical Truth, as sensibly, as the Greatest Philosopher could have done. For, it depends on us, to separate our Thoughts from the Motions of our Blood and Spirits; the Soul having no farther Share in the Impressions made on the Brain by Outward Objects, than she her self pleases, by more or less reflecting on them.*

Ibid. l. 17. *If to understand, and to be reasonable, be common unto all Men.] The Consequences, which Antoninus heaps together in this Chapter, make up a Demonstration, That the Soul is Immaterial and Immortal.*

P. 70. l. 7. *As the Word Good is properly taken.] For there is Nothing so commonly given, as the Name of a Good Man: It's become a Term of Civility and Custom. We call a Man a Good Man, as we term him Sir, or Master: And as we name a Ship, The Victorious, The Conquerour, &c. before it have been at Sea. Yet this Title, Good Man, ought not to be made use of, but to distinguish the most sincere Virtue.*

Ib. l. 9. *Conceit no such Things, as he that wrongeth thee conceiveth.*] The shortest and surest Way to revenge us of our Enemies, is, to take from them the Pleasure, of believing they have done us Ill.

P. 71. l. 8. *Will esteem of thee no better, than of a mere Brute, and of an Ape.*] Antoninus makes a manifest Allusion to the Words of Aristotle, in his *Politicks*, Book I. *ἢ Θεός, ἢ Δαίμων.* Either a God, or a Beast. Meaning, that People are Incapable of observing a Medium in the Judgments they make of Princes: Either looking upon them as Monsters, or as Gods. Antoninus made this Reflection, no doubt, at a Time, when, by some extraordinary Regulations, he had discontented the People. Therefore he exhorts himself to remain steadfast and firm, not regarding the Murmurs of the Vulgar, who knew not their own Good.

Ib. l. 17. *Or to express it in Agatho's Words.*] There were Two Poets of this Name; the One a Tragedian, the Other a Comedian. The Sentence which Antoninus rehearses, is taken out of the First, as he is introduc'd by Plato, speaking in his *Banquet*.

P. 73. l. 1. *So the Souls after Death transferr'd into Air, after they have convers'd there awhile, are either by Way of Transmutation, or, &c.*] Antoninus here follows the Opinion of certain Philosophers, who believ'd, That after Death the Soul retir'd into the Air, to be purg'd and cleans'd from the Stains she had contracted in the Body; and that from thence, she is Tran-

slated

slated to Heaven, and re-united to the Divinity from whence she sprung.

P. 75. l. 17. *Either this World is a Κόσμος, or a comely Piece, &c.*] Antoninus here frames a Dilemma out of the Two Contrary Opinions of the Stoicks and Epicureans. Either the World was Form'd by Providence, or by the Casual Jumbling of Atoms. Be it which way it will, it is still Beautiful and full of Order. And this he proves, *à Minori ad Majus*, by the Symmetry of Parts in Man's Body.

P. 76. l. 20. *There is, who without so much as a Coat; and there is, who without so much as a Book, doth put Philosophy in practice.*] Antoninus here overthrows the frivolous Excuses, which Men commonly make, to palliate their Vicious Lives. For, Nakedness, Poverty, Sickness, Ignorance, &c. are the strangest Motives to engage us in the Study of Wisdom or Philosophy.

Ib. l. 20. *Without so much as a Coat.*] As all the Cynick Philosophers.

Ib. l. 21. *Without so much as a Book.*] Antoninus seems here to take Notice of what Cleanthes did, who wanting Money to buy either Books or Paper, writ the Dogmata of Zeno on Shells and Bones.

P. 77. l. 1. *Consider in thy Mind for Example's Sake, the Times of Vespasian: Thou shalt see but the same Things.*] This is very Mortifying to vain Ambitious Men, who imagine, the Earth will always echo the Sound of their Name. Whereas all Names quickly become

22 *Select Remarks on M. A. Antoninus,*
Barbarous Words to Posterity, and Unintelligible.

P. 78. l. 5. *Camillus, Cæso, Volesius, Leonnatus.*] Behold here a List of Names, which few know any Thing of without a Comment. *Camillus* drove the Gauls out of Rome. *Cæso* was One of the Pillars of the Common-wealth. *Volesius* is unknown. *Leonnatus* was one of the Principal Friends, and Chief Generals of *Alexander*, whose Kinsman he was.

P. 79. l. 5. *Whatsoever is, is but, as it were, the Seed of that which shall be.*] Thus our Bodies may be call'd the Seed, out of which, when we die, Worms and Serpents are Generated.

P. 80. l. 9. *Ever consider and think upon the World, as being but one living Substance, and having but one Soul.*] The Stoicks esteem'd the World to be one Great Animal, whereof God was the Soul. This Errour was apparently drawn from what they had read in the Prophets, That God fills Heaven and Earth. But they understood it wrong.

Ib. l. 23. *To suffer Change, can be no Hurt; as no Benefit it is, by Change to attain to Being.*] Death is no Real Evil, nor Life a Real Good, since they are Reciprocally the Cause of each other. Death produces New Lives; as New Lives spring up to die.

P. 81. l. 6. *For thou must consider the Things of the World, not as a loose Independent Number.*] This is an Excellent Comparison. For, Numbers are not connected one to another, but
subsist

by Monsieur and Madam Dacier. 23

subsist Independent and Entire by themselves. 3 has no Relation to 4 that follows it, or to 2 that goes before it. But the Events of the World, necessarily depend on their Causes.

Ib. l. 29. *And that we must not be as Children, who follow their Fathers Example.*] This Blind Obedience, Implicite Faith and Prepossession, without True Knowledge, is always to be condemn'd.

P. 82. l. 11. *How many Physicians who once look'd so grim, and so tetrically shrunk their Brows on their Patients, are dead and gone themselves.*] This Emperour reproaches more than once, the Physicians with their Vanity.

Ib. l. 13. *How many Astrologers.*] *Antoninus* plays upon the Judicial Astrologers. He thinks it a strange Thing, that Men should affect to be admir'd for foretelling the Deaths of others, who are born to die themselves.

P. 84. l. 20. *Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus.*] All these were Persons of a very long Life, yet dropt at last as well as others.

Remarks upon Book V.

PAGE 85. l. 9. *In the Morning when thou findest thy self unwilling to rise.*] The Greek Word which we have Translated, the Morning, signifies properly, the First Dawning of
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of the Day. This was the Hour at which Labouring Men commonly rose. The Emperour therefore stirs himself up by this Consideration, That he was born to Labour as well as others, since 'tis the Unavoidable Condition of all Mortals.

P. 86. l. 29. *And let not the Reproach, or Report of some that may ensue upon it, ever deterr thee.*] Infamy ought not to deterr us from doing Good. Seneca has well express'd this: *Aquissimo animo ad honestum Consilium per mediam Infamiam tendam. Nemo mihi videtur pluris aestimare virtutem, nemo illi esse magis devotus, quam qui boni viri Famam perdidit, ne Conscientiam periret.*

P. 87. l. 19. *No Man can admire thee for thy sharp, acute Language, such is thy Natural Disability that way. Be it so.*] Antoninus labours here to prevent Men from falling into Despair, as they are wont to do, when they have not those Glittering Qualities, which make Men admir'd by all the World. This Man's a Great Poet, That a Fine Orator, Another a Cunning Statesman, a Fourth excells them all in the Quickness of his Phancy; and I have none of these Gifts. Such Kind of Reflections, are often the Occasion of some Mens Despair. But, if we consider the Ill Use, the best Qualify'd Men make of their Parts, there's no great Temptation to envy them, but rather to rejoyce in our selves; especially, if we live according to Reason.

P. 88. l. 14. *Such there be, who when they have done a Good Turn to any, are ready to set them on the Score for it.*] This Division of Benefactors into Three Classes, is Admirable. The First and the most Numerous, is of those who place to their Accounts the Good they have done for another, that they may be afterwards recompenc'd. And then their Good Deed is but a Loan, or rather an Usury, as Seneca says, *Turpis Fœneratio est, Beneficium ferre.* The Second Class is of those, who, though they expect not a Recompence, yet pride themselves, and are as it were in an Extasie, when they can say within themselves, *I have so many Debtours, I have this Advantage of them, that they are oblig'd to me.* The Third Classis, and the Least in Number, is of those, who, forgetting the Good Offices they have already done, continue them daily, and add New Ones; still studying, how they may be serviceable to their Fellow Mortals, without reproaching any Man, or so much as reflecting Inwardly on what is past, with any Affectation, or secret Pride.

P. 89. l. 24. *Either we should not pray at all, or more absolutely and freely*] Antoninus commends the Athenians, because their Prayers were General; and none Petition'd for his own Private Affairs, but for the Publick Good.

Ib. l. 28. *As we say commonly, the Physician has prescrib'd to this Man Riding.*] Antoninus proves here, that all the Evils which happen to us, are either a Medicine for the Sick, or an Exercise for the Sound.

P. 90. l. 18. *So is the Destiny of particular Causes and Events, one General one, of the same Nature that particular Causes are.*] Antoninus explains here what *Destiny* is, *Nil aliud est Fatum, quam Series implexæ Causarum.* So Plato defin'd *Destiny*, *A Law proceeding from God.* This is the *Divine Reason* or *Wisdom*, which Nothing can disorder or violate.

P. 91. l. 19. *Because the good Success and perfect Welfare, and indeed the very Continuance of him that is the Administrator of the Whole, doth depend on it.*] This Consequence is drawn from the Error of the *Stoicks*, who esteeming *God* as the *Soul* of the *Universe*, held that he was enclos'd in *Matter*, and subject to *Corruption*, *Dissolution* and *Alteration*.

Ib. l. 22. *Be not discontented, be not disheartned, be not out of Hope, if often it succeed not.*] Antoninus endeavours to support Men under the *Discouragements* they meet with, when even their Attempts to live *Virtuously* are sometimes baffled. As often as we fall, we ought to rise with more *Courage*, like the *Giant Anteus* in the *Fable*, who as often as he fell to the *Earth*, drew fresh *Vigour* and *Strength* from it.

P. 93. l. 3. *As for the Things of the World, their true Nature is in a Manner so involv'd with Obscurity.*] Antoninus's Aim is, to make Men see their Error, when they place their Chief Happiness in *Science*, *Pleasure*, *Riches*, and the *Things* of the *World*. For, *Science* is Nothing but *Obscurity* and *Folly*: *Riches* and Plea-

Pleasures, the *Dotage* and *Infirmity* of the *Mind*. In a Word, all the *Enjoyments* of the *World*, are but a *Burthen* and *Grief*.

Ib. l. 13. *Such as may be in the Power and Possession of some Abominable loose Liver, of some common Strumpet, of some notorious Oppressour and Extortioner.*] Antoninus here gives us a sure *Rule*, whereby to distinguish true *Felicity*, from that which is falsely esteemed such. For, who will set any *Value* on, or be fond of that which for the most part falls to the *Share* of *Wicked Men*?

P. 94. l. 24. *He is well contented to hear, that what is spoken by the Comedian, is but familiarly and popularly spoken.*] He means this Verse of *Aristophanes*.

Ἄλλ' ἐν κατὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τύχαι.

P. 96. l. 22. *But thou may'st live at the Court; there thou also may'st thou live well and happily.*] Antoninus here anticipates the vain Pretences which *Courtiers* ordinarily make for their *Liberty*, as it is at this *Day*. How many are there, who liv'd very *virtuously* in a private Condition; yet, as soon as they come to the *Court*, give the *Reins* to their *Passions*, and fall into a *Thousand Debaucheries*, purely for *Fashion's* Sake? And they excuse it, by saying, *The Court is not like the City, or the Country: When we are at Rome, we must live like Romans.* He that will be singular there, makes himself *Ridiculous*. Therefore it is Necessary to swim

swim with the Stream. These are the frivolous Excuses, with which such Men commonly think to palliate their Vices.

P. 97. l. 19. *Neither doth any thing happen to any Man, which in the ordinary Course of Nature, as Natural to him doth not happen.*] Antoninus recommends Patience under Calamities, with very forcible Reasons. In Regard, Nothing happens to us, which Nature does not enable us to support; and, that many suffer such Things without being concern'd; and, the greatest Part of Men endure much more only in Ostentation and Vanity,

P. 98. l. 5. *After one Consideration, Man is nearest unto us, &c.*] He teaches us here, what Sentiments we ought to have of Ill Men. As their Vices hinder 'em not from being Men, we shou'd always have Charity for 'em. And as they are Wicked, they deserve at worst, but our Indifference. We shou'd value 'em at the same Rate, as we do the Wind, the Sun or the Rain: Which though they may hinder us from doing some Important Business, yet cannot reach our Intention and Design.

P. 100. l. 25. *To live with the Gods.*] This is that which the Scripture calls, *Walking with God*: As when it says of Enoch, *Et ambulavit cum Deo*. The meaning is, he was always Obedient to the Divine Conduct.

P. 101. l. 30. *That Rational Essence, by which the Universe is grounded, is for Community and Society.*] God has not made any Man only for

for his own Sake: *Nemo sibi natus*: We are born to serve God, our Friends and the Publick.

P. 102. l. 8. *How hast thou carried thy self hitherto towards the Gods? towards thy Parents, &c.*] It is a pity that Antoninus did not here add, *his Subjects*. For, a Good Prince ought no less to examine his Conduct toward his *Subjects*, than toward his *Relations, Friends and Domesticks*. But, to be sure, he thought on 'em, though he does not expressly mention 'em.

P. 103. l. 21. *An Extinction, or a Translation.*] An Extinction, if the Soul be Nothing else but a Kind of Fire, which is quench'd when we die: or a Translation, if the Soul be Immortal, and after Death returns to its Source, according to the Doctrine of the Stoicks.

lb. l. 34. *These two Things be common to the Souls, as of God, so of Men, and of every Reasonable Creature.*] He makes this last Distinction, and of every Reasonable Creature, because the Philosophers rank'd Heroes and Demons between God and Man.

P. 104. l. 8. *If this that makes my Friend to lament, neither be my wicked Act, &c.*] Among the most Tragical Accidents that happen either to us or our Friends, none ought to trouble us, but those which proceed from our own Fault. Then indeed we ought to mourn: But otherwise to be Indifferent. This is the right Sentiment of the Stoicks.

Remarks upon Book VI.

PAGE 105. l. 9. *The Matter it self of which the Universe doth consist, is of it self very tractable and pliable.*] Antoninus, in this Place, corrects the Extravagant Opinion of some Stoicks, who maintain'd, That God finds Matter Untractable and Stubborn: And that in Regard it was Eternal, and Increated as well as he, therefore his Power over it is limited. A Blasphemy, which has been sufficiently refuted by the Fathers.

P. 106. l. 4. *And either they shall be resolv'd by Way of Exhalation.*] Here he contemplates Matter, under the Two different Notions the Philosophers had of it. Some affirm'd it to be One and Simple, and that the Four Elements were only compounded of its different Parts. Others held, that the Four Elements were so many distinct Original Kinds of Matter.

Ib. l. 15. *The best Kind of Revenge.*] This Maxim is taken from Diogenes; who being ask'd by one, *What he shou'd do to be reveng'd of his Enemy,* answer'd, *Thou must become an Honest Man.*

Ib. l. 29. *Either this Universe is a mere confused Mass.*] By this he means, that which soever of the Two Celebrated Opinions be true, either that of the Epicureans, who ascribe the Origin and Conservation of the World to Chance, or that of the Stoicks, who attri-

attribute it to Providence, Men ought to expect Death patiently, without desiring or fearing it.

P. 107. l. 12. *Whensoever by some present hard occurrences thou art constrained to be, as it were, troubled and vexed.*] When a Man goes out of himself to be reveng'd on the Objects that vex him, he puts his Soul out of Tune, and spoils its Consort with the Soul of the World, yet cannot accomplish his Aim. For, both the Soul of the World, and all Things govern'd by it, keep on quietly in performing their Regular Functions.

Ib. l. 22. *If it were that thou hadst at one time both a Step-Mother and a Natural Mother living.*] Men now-a-days invert the Order of Antoninus, whilst they make the Court their Mother, and Philosophy or Religion their Step-Dame.

P. 108. l. 6. *This purple Robe but Sheeps hair.*] A Philosopher once told a Young Man, who was very proud of his Rich Garments, *That they were but the cast Rags of a Sheep.*

Ib. l. 27. *See what Crates pronounceth concerning Xenocrates himself.*] Xenocrates affected Gravity, to a Proverb. But Crates ridicul'd him and demonstrated, *That all his Preciseness, was only Pride and Ostentation.*

Ib. l. 32. *Merely natural, or naturally affected and qualify'd, as Stones, Wood, Figs, Vines, Olives.*] Antoninus Here follows the Method of Anciente Philosophers, who divided all Beings into Things Inanimate, Sensible, and Ratio.

Rational. And, of Rational Beings, or Men, he establishes Two Sorts, One *Mechanick*, the Other *Divine*. As for the First, he allows them no Part in that Soul, which renders Men entirely Noble and Great.

P. 110. l. 18. *For the Praises of many Tongues, is in effect no better than the clattering of so many Tongues.*] He alludes to a Saying of *Euripides*, who in *Hecuba* calls Fame and Praises, but the Clattering of Tongues.

Ib. l. 33. *What else doth the Education of Children, and all learned Professions tend unto?*] Our Education aims not to make us Good and Wise, but Learned. We are taught at School, how to decline the Word [*Virtus*] but we learn not how to practise *Virtue*.

P. 111. l. 25. *Under, above, and about, are the Motions of the Elements; but the Motion of Virtue, is none of those Motions.*] It is the Property of *Virtue*, not to yield to Difficulties, as the *Elements* do, but from them to draw Occasions of Strength and Resolution. We may say of *Virtue*, what *Horace* said of *Gold*,

— Perrumpere amat Saxa potentior
Ictus fulmineo.

Ib. l. 31. *Who can chuse but wonder at them?*] There is no Greater Injustice nor more Ridiculous Vanity, than for Man through Envy to deny their *Cotemporaries*, of whose *Virtue* they are Eye-witnesses, the Praises which they expect of their *Posterity*, whom they shall never see, nor be seen by them.

P. 112. l. 8.

P. 112. l. 8. *Whatsoever in general thou canst conceive possible and proper unto any Man, think that very possible unto thee also.*] The Intention of *Antoninus* is, to suppress the Effeminate Suggestions of his Sences, which would insinuate, That the *Maxims* of the *Stoicks* were too Rigid; ever whispering, *Nimis dura præcipiunt*. We often take the Liberty to condemn some Examples of *Virtue*, calling them Extravagant Actions, or the like, because our Cowardise makes them appear beyond our Strength: Whereas, we only want Resolution, to do as Great, or Greater Things our selves.

Ib. l. 12. *Suppose that at the Palæstra, or Fencing-School, some Body hath all torn thee with his Nails.*] This World is a Theatre, or Field of Exercise; but Men's Passions turn it into a Campagne of Blood and Slaughter.

P. 113. l. 27. *Consider how many different things, whether they concern our Bodies or our Souls, in a Moment of Time come to pass in every one of us.*] The Force of this Argument lies here, That if Men attentively consider'd the Prodigies of Thought, Memory, Imagination, Judgment, Discourse, and all the other Faculties and Operations of their own Souls, with the Admirable Mechanism and Contrivance of their Bodies, they would cease to wonder at any Thing without 'em; since all is the Effect of Infinite and Eternal Reason.

P. 114. l. 1. *If any should put this question unto thee, how this Word Antoninus is written.*] As the Name of *Antoninus* subsists no longer,
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if One Letter be missing; so in keeping the Law, if we neglect One Precept, we are Guilty of Violating the Whole. This is the Emperor's Meaning.

Ib. l. 33. *If in this kind of Life thy Body be able to hold out, it is a Shame that thy Soul should faint first and give over.*] The Body seems Indefatigable in the Pursuit of what is Necessary to its Conservation and Happiness; but the Soul soon Faints in the Race of Virtue.

P. 115. l. 1. *Take heed lest (of a Philosopher) thou become a (mere) Cæsar in time.*] As if he had said, *Take heed lest thou Cæsarise*, reflecting on the Tyranny of the Primitive Cæsars.

P. 117. l. 3. *Neither doth she busle her self about any, but those that are present; for as for future and passed Operations.*] The Time Past cannot be recall'd; The Future is Uncertain, and out of our Power. We ought therefore only to take Care of the Present.

Ib. l. 20. *Dost thou not see, how even those that profess Mechanick Arts, though in some Respect they be no better than mere Idiots, yet they stick close to the Course of their Trade.*] Antoninus's Meaning is, That as a Tradesman always observes the Rules of his Art, without regarding the Impertinent Corrections of Busy-Bodies and Ignorant People: So ought a Philosopher or Wise-Man, to persevere in the Road of Virtue, without being mov'd at the Censures, or Contradictions of Fools and Vicious Persons.

Ib. l. 25.

Ib. l. 25. *And is it not a grievous Thing that an Architect or a Physician, shall respect the Course and Mysteries of their Profession.*] One would wonder, that Antoninus here joyns Physicians (who were esteem'd Equal to the Gods, and whose Science was said to descend from Heaven,) with Architects, who are but Mechanicks. But this is owing to the Contempt, which both the Stoicks and Platonists practis'd toward the Body, and all Employments that related to it. Accounting all Arts Base and Unworthy, in Respect of Moral Philosophy, and the Science of Divine Things.

P. 118. l. 8. *The dreadful Hiatus of a gaping Lion, and all Poison, and all hurtful Things.*] That which seems to us either Hurtful or of no Use, at least helps to compose the Beauty of the Universe. And, for ought we know, may have some Virtue to which we are Strangers. Some Authors have taken much Pains, to describe the Profit and Perfections of Ashes and Dung-Hills.

Ib. l. 24. *For one thing is consequent unto another by local Motion, by natural conspiracy and agreement, and by substantial Union.*] Antoninus here refutes the Opinions of the Epicureans concerning a Vacuum.

Ib. l. 33. *An Instrument, a Tool, an Utensil, whatsoever it be, if it be fit for the Purpose it was made for, it is as it should be, though perchance that made and fitted it be out of sight and gone.*] If the Works of a skilful Artist continue in their Perfections, to serve the Ends

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for

for which they were made, even after they are remov'd at a great Distance from him that made 'em ; questionless, the *Works of Nature* are always serviceable, and answer the Intention of their *Author* ; since they have this Advantage of the other, That *Nature* is never absent from any of her Productions, but is perpetually acting within them. It follows therefore, that Man, who is the most Perfect *Work of Nature*, must needs be Happy, so long as he obeys the *Laws of his Nature*, and submits to the *Will of God*, whom the *Stoicks* call the *Universal Nature*, or *Soul of the World*.

P 120 l. 4. *As I think Heraclitus in a place speaketh of them that sleep, that even they do work in their Kind, and do confer to the General Operations of the World.*] For, Sleep being one of the Actions of Nature, must needs be directed to some End.

Ib. l. 11. *For of such also did the World stand in Need.*] This was the Sence of Chrysippus, when he said, *Vice is not Absolutely Unprofitable in the World, for it serves as a Test to distinguish Virtue.* A Truth which is only cavill'd at by Plutarch, because he understood it not.

Ib. l. 21. *That vile and ridiculous Verse (which Chrysippus in a place doth mention) is a part of the Comedy.*] Here are the very Words of Chrysippus, As Comedies have sometimes Ridiculous Verses and Ralleries, good for Nothing of themselves, yet Graceful enough in a
Poem ;

Poem ; so *Vice* is certainly Ridiculous, and to be condemn'd in it self, yet it contributes to the Beauty and Order of the *Universe*. And Plutarch made a Wrong Inference, when he said, *If Vice be Useful in the World, then 'tis not an Enemy to God.*

Ib. l. 24. *Doth either the Sun take upon him to do that which belongs to the Rain.*] As all the *Celestial Bodies* differ one from another, and have various Offices, without clashing or interfering ; so very Man ought to be content with his own Station, and perform his Duty, without entrenching on anothers. A proper Check to Ambition and Envy.

Ib. l. 25. *Or his Son Æsculapius that which unto the Earth doth properly belong?*] Æsculapius is here taken for *Serpentarius* or *Ophiocbus*, a Constellation of Seventeen Stars above *Scorpio*. The Poets feign'd, that he was the Son of *Apollo*, whom *Jupiter* had plac'd among the Stars. *Marcellus Palingenius Stellatus*, assigns to this Constellation Eighteen Stars ; Perhaps, for the Sake of his Verse. He places it in *Virgo*. But how that can consist with what he says afterwards, that it Sets when *Gemini* Rises, is left to the *Astronomers* Decision.

Ib. l. 33. *If so be that the Gods have deliberated in particular, of those things which should happen unto me.*] His Meaning is, that if there were only a General Providence, which did not extend to take Care of Men's Particular Affairs, yet we ought to be Resign'd, and Compliant to that Universal Order and Con-
duct,

duct, which God has establish'd for the Preservation of the World. Since the Interest and Welfare of the Whole Body, is to be preferr'd to that of any Particular Member.

P. 121. l. 15. *For then let us neither Sacrifice, nor Pray, nor respect our Oaths, neither let us any more use any of those things*] This Passage is directly levell'd at *Atheists*, who in denying a God, contradict themselves, while they frequently call on his Name; equally Profane in their Prayers and Curses.

P. 122. l. 17. *As the ordinary Shews of the Theatre, and of other such Places, when thou art presented with them, &c.*] We may say of Life, what Young Pliny said of the Races in the Circus, *Nihil novum, nihil varium, quod non semel spectasse sufficiat.*

Ib. l. 24. *When then will there be an End?*] This Kind of abrupt Interrogation, was Common among the *Stoicks*. Seneca uses it often; as in this noted Place, *Fastidio illis esse cœpit vita, & ipse mundus, & subit illud tabidarum deliciarum, quousque eadem?* Life and the World it self were Nauseous to them. And in the Bitterness which attended those Contagious Pleasures, they frequently cry'd out, *How long shall we be cloy'd with these fulsom Delights?*

Ib. l. 30. *Philestio.*] A famous Comedian in Socrates's Time. As for *Phœbus* and *Origanion*, 'tis not certainly known who they were.

P. 123. l. 3. *Eudoxus.*] *Eudoxus* the Cnidian, a great *Astrologer*, expert *Geometrician*, famous *Physician*, and renowned *Lawyer*, in the Time

Time of *Plato*, and of *Dionysius* the Tyrant.

Ib. *Hipparchus.*] A Celebrated Mathematician, who liv'd in the Time of *Ptolomæus Philadelphus*.

Ib. *Archimedes.*] Another Incomparable Mathematician, who when *Syracuse* was taken by Storm, and the Souldiers rushed into his Closet, where he was busy in drawing some Geometrical Scheme, said to them, Let me make an End of this Figure before I die. But the Barbarians kill'd him out of Hand. He was wont to say, That if he could fix his Engines on any other Place save the Earth, he could move this Globe out of its Vortex.

P. 124. l. 6. *Let us do our best Endeavours to persuade them; but however, if Reason and Justice lead thee to it, do it, though they be never so much against it.*] When we can persuade others to live according to Reason, we do a good Work. But when we cannot so far prevail, we ought to take Care, that neither their pernicious Counsels nor Examples tempt us to Vice.

Ib. l. 18. *The ambitious supposeth another Man's Aét to be his own Happiness.*] For he places his Happiness in Fame and Applause, which always depend on others.

P. 125. l. 26. *To them that are sick of the Jaundies, Honey seems bitter.*] *Antoninus* means, that when we represent to our selves outward Accidents as Insupportable, 'tis only our Opinion makes them so: As the Overflowing of

40 *Select Remarks on M. A. Antoninus,*
the Gall, renders whatever we Eat or Drink
bitter to us, though in it self it be sweet,
Vitiato stomacho omnia amara.

Remarks upon Book VII.

PAge 126. l. 14. *What is Wickedness? It is that which many times, and often thou hast already seen, and known in the World.*] *Antoninus* would prevent this Complaint, which the greater part of Men make, when some great Injury is done them : *I never saw such a thing; the like was never seen.* Expressions which flow from an incens'd Imagination, that will give no time to reflect. That which appears so extraordinary, is not at all so. All Ages have seen it, and there are Examples thereof in all Places : They shall be allowed to complain thereof if they can find, I say not an Age, but a Year, or a Month, wherein that does not happen.

P. 127. l. 1. *Which continually to stir up and revive is in thy power.*] Seeing there is nothing new under the Sun, and all things are at all times the same, we can renew our whole Life by renewing and bringing under our review, the things that have happened in our own time; for they are the same that we shall see afterwards.

Ib. l. 18.

by Monsieur and Madam Dacier. 41

Ib. l. 18. *Publick shews and solemnities with much pomp and vanity, Stage-plays.*] The Stoicks condemn all vain Assemblies and Shews, as Things which corrupt Manners, by raising the Passions.

Ib. l. 20. *A Bone thrown to a company of hungry Currs.*] All these Comparisons are very Expressive. As Bones thrown among Dogs makes them Fight, so publick Shews are often the Seeds of Hatred and Division.

P. 128. l. 15. *If it be not, and that otherwise it belong not to me particularly as a private Duty, I will either give it over, or leave it to some other that can better effect it.*] Either things are our Duty, or they are not. If they be, we must do them as we can, either by our selves or with the Assistance of others; and if they be not, at least if we be not certain that we have that genius that is necessary to succeed therein, we ought to leave them to those who can better acquit themselves. There is no Rule more wise, and yet less observ'd. Men generally abandon the Duties that belong to their Profession and Character, and undertake those things that are without the Compass of their Duty; and which makes them yet the more inexcusable, they do so when they have not any of those Qualities that are necessary to perform their Undertakings, so as the Publick may be profited.

Ib. l. 30 *Be not therefore ashamed, whensoever thou must use the help of others.*] Provided

ded, we do our Duty, it is no matter whether we be assisted, or do it by our selves.

P. 129. l. 8. *Let not things future trouble thee.*] Nothing is more foolish than thus to prevent our Miseries by fear. Sufficient to the Day is the Evil thereof.

P. 130. l. 7. *To a reasonable Creature, the same Action is both according to Nature, and according to Reason.*] According to the Stoicks Nature is God himself, for they acknowledge not the Corruption of Nature, nor original Sin.

Ib. l. 17. *But if thou shalt say, I am useless, or a Part, thou dost not yet love Men from thy Heart.*] This Distinction is perfectly good; one cannot be a Member of a Body unless he be a Part thereof; but one may be a Part without being a Member. A Man then who regards himself only as a Part of the Society, considers himself alone, and as separable from the Rest, without suffering any Harm; as a Letter of the Alphabet may be separated from the other Letters, and subsist alone and entire.

P. 131. l. 3. *As if either Gold, or the Emerald, or Purple.*] This Comparison is not forc'd. If we will, all the Powers of the World are no more able to hinder us from being good Men, than to make Gold not to be Gold, and Purple not to be Purple, &c.

P. 132. l. 1. *What is Happiness, but a good Daemon, or Spirit?*] That is to say, the Happiness of a Man is nothing else but his Soul well disposed.

Ib. l. 12.

Ib. l. 12. *Is any Man so foolish as to fear Change?*] Change is the most Ancient Law of the World. By it we live, and the Universe subsists. Nothing therefore should be more familiar to us. But we are so unjust, that after we have profited by the Changes of others, we are unwilling that they should profit by ours.

P. 133. l. 29. *The Nature of the Universe, of the common Substance of all Things, as it were of Wax, hath now perchance formed a Horse.*] Nature serves it self of the same Matter to form all Living Creatures, a Man as well as an Horse; and in this respect, Solomon hath well said, *est æqua utriusque conditio.* This Truth is odious to Men, and their Pride easily persuades them, that Nature hath formed them of the finest Matter.

P. 134. l. 4. *As for Dissolution, if it be no grievous thing to the Chest or Trunk to be joined together; why should it be more grievous to be put asunder?*] This is the Consequence of the Principle he had laid down, That Nature forms all Things of the same Matter; and as Matter is insensible, it no more suffers when it is disunited, than when it is join'd together; and this is true as to Matter. But since in us, it is the Soul that is sensible, it is no Comfort to us in our Miseries, to know that Matter is insensible. The Consequence were true, if we could separate the Soul and remove it from the Matter, as we can the Liquor of a Bottle, which were to be broken in pieces. The Stoicks carried their *Impossibility* too far.

P. 136. l. 18.

44 *Select Remarks on M. A. Antoninus,*

P. 136. l. 18. *And as concerning Pain, that that which is intolerable is soon ended by Death; and that which holds long must needs be tolerable.]* The Epicureans as well as the Stoicks made use of this Argument.

P. 137. l. 4. *Out of Plato.] Antoninus, when he read, made Collections of all that he found fit for his Use.*

Ib. l. 12. *Out of Antisthenes.] Plutarch attributes it to Alexander. If it be his, he ought to be more honoured for it, than the Conquest of the Indies.*

Ib. l. 21. *It will but little avail thee, to turn thine Anger and Indignation upon the things themselves that have fallen cross unto thee.]* The Passage is taken from Euripides. Epictetus gives the Reason why it is so ordinary for Men to be angry at Accidents. He tells us it's a bad Habit sucked in with the Milk, and learn'd from Nurses, who beat the Floor upon which the Child falls, that he may forbear to cry.

Ib. l. 25. *Our Life is reaped like a ripe Ear of Corn.]* This also is taken from Euripides: As Ears of Corn grow that they may be reaped; so Men are born to die. And as it wou'd be against the Course of Nature for an Ear of Corn not to be reaped; so would it be a Curse to a Man to continue always in this Life; says Epictetus.

Ib. l. 27. *But if so be that I and my Children are neglected by the Gods, there is some Reason even for that.]* It is a Passage of some Tragick

gick Poet, where an unhappy Father says, with entire Resignation to the Will of God, That if God had neglected him and his Children, he was perswaded he had Reason to do so, and that this Forgetfulness of God was but an Effect of his Justice, and a Token of his Goodness.

Ib. l. 29. *As long as Right and Equity is on my Side.]* This is out of Aristophanes, who says to the Athenians, Let Creon use his utmost Endeavours to avenge himself of me and destroy me, yet Honesty and Right are for me; they always fight for me. Antoninus had marked this Passage, as a most profitable and useful Lesson; for how comfortable is it, in all the troublesome Accidents that befall us, to be able to say, Right and Equity are on my Side?

Ib. l. 31. *Not to lament with them.]* The Stoicks are reproach'd with making Compassion a Vice, and saying that their wise Man was without Pity. But these Philosophers were too wise to pretend to extinguish in Men so natural a Sentiment, which pours so healthful and precious Balm upon the Miseries of this Life. Their Design was only to keep it within Bounds. They would only hinder us from troubling our selves with slight and false Appearances of Evil.

Ib. l. 32. *Out of Plato.]* This is taken out of the Apology of Socrates, p. 28.

P. 138. l. 26. *To look about, and with the Eyes to follow the Course of the Stars, as though thou wouldst*